Mishnah Meilah 1:1-2

Sugya Map

• Issue: The parameters of liability for me'ilah (misuse of consecrated property) concerning kodashim (sacrificial offerings) that have been disqualified, particularly before or after the zrika (sprinkling of blood). The Mishnah explores various pesulim (disqualifications) and their impact on me'ilah status.
• Nafka Mina(s):
  • Liability for a korban me'ilah (guilt offering for misuse) – a karet-level offense if intentional, requiring a korban if unwitting (Vayikra 5:15-16).
  • The distinction between me'ilah de'Oraita (Biblical) and me'ilah de'Rabanan (Rabbinic).
  • The interplay between me'ilah and other prohibitions like piggul (detestable), notar (leftover), and tamei (impure).
• Primary Sources: Mishnah Meilah 1:1-2; Vayikra 19:7 (regarding piggul); Mishnah Zevachim 5:1, 9:2 (regarding pesulim).

Text Snapshot

Mishnah Meilah 1:1-2: "קדשי קדשים ששחטן בדרום מועלין בהן. שחטן בדרום וקבל דמן בצפון, בצפון וקבל דמן בדרום, שחטן ביום וזרק בלילה, בלילה וזרק ביום, או ששחטן חוץ לזמנן וחוץ למקומן, מועלין בהן. רבי יהושע אומר כלל: כל שיש לו שעת היתר לכהנים אין מועלין בו, וכל שאין לו שעת היתר לכהנים מועלין בו. איזו היא שיש לו שעת היתר לכהנים? כגון שנותר, ונטמא, ויצא. ואיזו היא שאין לו שעת היתר לכהנים? כגון שנשחטה חוץ לזמנה, וחוץ למקומה, ושקבלו פסולין וזרקו את דמה. בשר קדשי קדשים שיצא לפני זריקת הדם: רבי אליעזר אומר מועלין בו, ואין חייבין עליו משום פיגול נותר וטמא. רבי עקיבא אומר אין מועלין בו, וחייבין עליו משום פיגול נותר וטמא. אמר רבי עקיבא: וכי מה בין מצא חטאת שנאבדה, ושחטן כאחת וזרק דם אחת מהן, אינו דין כשם שדמה פוטר את בשרה ממעילה, כך פוטר הוא את בשר חברתה ממעילה? אם דמה פטר את בשר חברתה ממעילה, קל וחומר שיפטור את בשרו ממעילה. אימורי קדשים קלים שיצאו לפני זריקת הדם: רבי אליעזר אומר אין מועלין בהן, ואין חייבין עליהן משום פיגול נותר וטמא. רבי עקיבא אומר מועלין בהן, וחייבין עליהן משום פיגול נותר וטמא. מעילה קדשי קדשים, יש בהן לקולא ויש בהן לחומרא, ובקדשים קלים כולה חומרא. כיצד? קדשי קדשים: לפני זריקת דם מועלין באימוריהן ובבשרן. לאחר זריקת דם מועלין באימוריהן, ואין מועלין בבשרן. וזה וזה חייבין עליו משום פיגול נותר וטמא. נמצאת מעילת קדשי קדשים, יש בהן לקולא ויש בהן לחומרא. קדשים קלים: לפני זריקת דם, אין מועלין לא באימוריהן ולא בבשרן. לאחר זריקת דם, מועלין באימוריהן, ואין מועלין בבשרן. וזה וזה חייבין עליו משום פיגול נותר וטמא. נמצאת מעילת קדשים קלים, כולה חומרא." ¹

Translation: Offerings of the most sacred order (kodshei kodashim) that were slaughtered in the south [of the courtyard], one is liable for misusing them. If one slaughtered them in the south and collected their blood in the north, or [slaughtered them] in the north and collected their blood in the south, [or] slaughtered them during the day and sprinkled [blood] at night, [or] at night and sprinkled during the day, or if one slaughtered them with intent beyond their designated time (chutz li'zmanan) or outside their designated area (chutz li'mekoman), one is liable for misusing them.

Rabbi Yehoshua stated a principle: Any [offering] that had a period of fitness for the priests (she'yesh lo sha'at heter l'kohanim) is not subject to misuse; and any that did not have a period of fitness for the priests is subject to misuse. Which is that which had a period of fitness for the priests? For example, if it became notar, or became impure (nitma), or left [the courtyard] (yatza). And which is that which did not have a period of fitness for the priests? For example, if it was slaughtered chutz li'zmanan, or chutz li'mekoman, or if unfit individuals received and sprinkled its blood.

The meat of kodshei kodashim that left [the courtyard] before the sprinkling of the blood: Rabbi Eliezer says, one is liable for misusing it, and is not liable for it on account of piggul, notar, or tamei. Rabbi Akiva says, one is not liable for misusing it, and is liable for it on account of piggul, notar, or tamei. Rabbi Akiva said: And what is the difference between this and if one found a sin offering (chatat) that was lost, and one designated another in its stead, and then the first was found, and both were slaughtered at once, and the blood of one was sprinkled – is it not logical that just as its blood exempts its own meat from misuse, so too it exempts the meat of its fellow from misuse? If its blood exempted the meat of its fellow from misuse, how much more so should it exempt its own meat from misuse!

The sacrificial portions (eimurim) of offerings of lesser sanctity (kodashim kalim) that left [the courtyard] before the sprinkling of the blood: Rabbi Eliezer says, one is not liable for misusing them, and is not liable for them on account of piggul, notar, or tamei. Rabbi Akiva says, one is liable for misusing them, and is liable for them on account of piggul, notar, or tamei.

Regarding me'ilah for kodshei kodashim, there is a leniency and a stringency; but for kodashim kalim, it is entirely a stringency. How so? Kodshei kodashim: before the sprinkling of blood, one is liable for misuse of their eimurim and their meat. After the sprinkling of blood, one is liable for misuse of their eimurim, but not liable for misuse of their meat. And both these (eimurim and meat) are liable for piggul, notar, and tamei. Thus, the me'ilah of kodshei kodashim is found to have both a leniency and a stringency. Kodashim kalim: before the sprinkling of blood, one is not liable for misuse of either their eimurim or their meat. After the sprinkling of blood, one is liable for misuse of their eimurim, but not liable for misuse of their meat. And both these (eimurim and meat) are liable for piggul, notar, and tamei. Thus, the me'ilah of kodashim kalim is found to be entirely a stringency.

Dikduk/Leshon Nuance: The Mishnah's initial cases ("ששחטן בדרום", "שחטן בדרום וקבל דמן בצפון") illustrate various pesulim that occur before zrika and thus incur me'ilah. The phrase "או ששחטן חוץ לזמנן וחוץ למקומן" uses "או" (or) rather than "ו" (and), suggesting that either chutz li'zmanan or chutz li'mekoman alone suffices for liability. However, the subsequent generalization by R' Yehoshua refers to "שנשחטה חוץ לזמנה וחוץ למקומה" with "ו", implying both or either. Tosafot Yom Tov ² notes this, explaining that the Mishnah often lists each case separately even if a combined case would be a greater chiddush, because once one instance of disqualification is stated, the principle extends. The Rambam ³, in his commentary, distinguishes between "ושקבלו פסולין וזרקו את דמה" (where both actions are necessary for the pesul) and "ושנשחטה חוץ לזמנה וחוץ למקומה" (where either suffices), clarifying the force of "ו" versus "או".

Readings

Rambam: Initial De'Oraita Liability and Subsequent Nuance

The Rambam, in his Peirush HaMishnayot, offers a fundamental understanding of me'ilah in these cases. Commenting on "קדשי קדשים ששחטן בדרום מועלין בהן" ⁴, he states: "כבר נתבאר בחמישי מזבחים שקדשי קדשים שחיטתן בצפון וקיבול דמן בכלי שרת בצפון... ולפיכך שמא יעלה על דעתנו שהואיל ששינה מקום שחיטתן וכבר נפסלו תחשב כנבלה ולא יתחייב עליו מעילה בא ללמד שחייב עליו מעילה דבר תורה". ⁵

Chiddush: The Rambam posits that the Mishnah's opening cases of kodshei kodashim disqualified by improper slaughter location or time teach a me'ilah de'Oraita liability. He anticipates the kushya that a disqualified offering might be considered neveilah (carrion), thereby losing its kedusha and me'ilah status. The Mishnah, according to him, explicitly negates this, affirming that even with these pesulim, the kedusha for me'ilah persists Biblically. This is a crucial chiddush, as it establishes that not all disqualifications remove the kedusha entirely from a de'Oraita perspective. He further clarifies the difference between "מועלין" (liable for korban me'ilah), "אין מועלין" (not liable for korban me'ilah), and "לא נהנין ולא מועלין" (prohibited for benefit, but no korban me'ilah). ⁶ This tripartite distinction is essential for understanding the varying degrees of kedusha remaining.

However, the Rambam himself presents a significant chizur (retraction/refinement) in his Mishneh Torah. In Hilchot Meilah 3:1 ⁷, he states that for many of these cases (e.g., shechita in the south, zrika at night), the me'ilah is only de'Rabanan. This apparent contradiction is a major point of discussion among Acharonim, as we will explore in "Friction."

Tosafot Yom Tov: Classification and Structural Analysis

The Tosafot Yom Tov (TYT) ⁸ expands on the Mishnah's initial classification of kodshei kodashim and kodashim kalim.

Chiddush 1: Distinguishing Me'ilah Timing for Different Offering Types. Commenting on "קדשי קדשים," the TYT states: "כגון חטאת ואשם ושלמי צבור שיש בהן מעילה עד שיהא בהן שעת היתר לכהנים דהיינו לאחר זריקה. דעד שעת זריקה מקרו קדשי ה' ובאימורין אף לאחר זריקה. אבל בקדשים קלים אין בהם מעילה עד לאחר זריקה [שאז] הוברר חלק גבוה. ואז יש מעילה באימוריהן". ⁹

This clarifies a fundamental distinction:

• Kodshei Kodashim: Me'ilah applies to both meat and eimurim until zrika. After zrika, the meat gains "שעת היתר לכהנים" (a period of fitness for priests), so me'ilah ceases for the meat, but continues for the eimurim (which are always for * גבוה*).
• Kodashim Kalim: Me'ilah applies only to the eimurim and only after zrika. Before zrika, neither meat nor eimurim are subject to me'ilah. Why? Because the eimurim's status as "חלק גבוה" (God's portion) isn't fully clarified until zrika. The meat of kodashim kalim is eaten by the owner, not just priests, making its kedusha less intense regarding me'ilah. This explains the Mishnah's concluding section about the leniency/stringency.

Chiddush 2: Analysis of Mishnah's Structural Nuances and Rambam's Contradiction. The TYT delves into the precise wording of the Mishnah. On "שחטן בדרום מועלין בהן," he notes the Gemara's discussion (Zevachim 28b) about the chiddush implied by the Mishnah. He argues against the idea that the Mishnah simply teaches that zrika performed with a pesul isn't effective, as that's obvious. Rather, the chiddush must be deeper.

Crucially, the TYT confronts the Rambam's contradictory stances: "ומ"ש הר"ב [רמב"ם] אבל דרום נהי כו'. הלכך מועלין בהם. גמ'. ולפי זה משמע דמועלין דברי תורה. וכ"כ הרמב"ם בפירושו בהדיא. ובא ללמד שחייב עליה מעילה דברי תורה. ולא פסק כן בחבורו ריש פ"ג מהל' מעילה. והטעם פי' הכ"מ. משום דאמרינן בגמ' דלר"י דמשנה ב' פ"ט דזבחים כל הני אם עלו ירדו ולפיכך אין בהן מעילה אלא מדרבנן. אבל ה"ל להכ"מ לפרש ג"כ שאין נראה כן מהגמ'. או דסוגיא זו דלא כהלכתא. דהא ודאי דטובא קמ"ל. דאע"פ דדין תורה אין בהן מעילה. מועלין מהן מדרבנן." ¹⁰

The TYT explicitly highlights Rambam's chizur. He references the Kessef Mishneh's explanation (which cites Zevachim 9:2 and the principle of "אם עלו ירדו") to reconcile Rambam's Mishneh Torah with his Peirush. However, the TYT himself expresses reservation, implying that even if de'Oraita me'ilah isn't applicable, the Mishnah might still be teaching a de'Rabanan me'ilah, which is also a chiddush. This demonstrates a nuanced approach to kedusha status and the differing levels of me'ilah.

Friction

The Rambam's Apparent Contradiction: Me'ilah De'Oraita vs. De'Rabanan

The Strongest Kushya: The most striking kushya arises from the Rambam's seemingly contradictory positions regarding the me'ilah status of the Mishnah's initial cases. In his Peirush HaMishnayot on Meilah 1:1, the Rambam explicitly states that disqualifications like shechita ba'darom (slaughter in the south) lead to me'ilah de'Oraita: "בא ללמד שחייב עליו מעילה דבר תורה" ¹¹. This indicates that despite the pesul, the item retains its Biblical kedusha for me'ilah. However, in his Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Meilah 3:1, the Rambam writes: "וכן כל הקדשים שנשחטו חוץ למקומן, או חוץ לזמנן, או שקיבלו פסולין את דמן וזרקו, הרי אלו אם נהנה מהן — אין בהן מעילה אלא מדרבנן." ¹² Here, the Rambam unequivocally states that for these very same disqualifications, the me'ilah is merely de'Rabanan. How can these two authoritative statements from the same author be reconciled? This isn't a minor discrepancy; it goes to the core of whether the kedusha for me'ilah is Biblically or Rabbinically maintained after certain pesulim.

The Best Terutz (and an alternative nuance):

The Kessef Mishneh ¹³ (commenting on Hilchot Meilah 3:1) addresses this kushya directly. He explains that the Rambam's position in Mishneh Torah stems from a sugya in Masechet Zevachim (9:2, particularly 40b-41a). There, the Gemara discusses the rule "אם עלו ירדו" (if they went up [onto the altar], they come down). This principle applies to pesulim that happen before zrika but are not so severe as to entirely nullify the kedusha ab initio. Such kodashim, while disqualified from being offered, are considered to have lost their kedusha to the extent that me'ilah is no longer de'Oraita.

Specifically, Zevachim 9:2 presents a dispute between R' Eliezer and R' Yehoshua concerning pesulei kodashim that were brought onto the altar. R' Yehoshua holds that for many pesulim (including shechita ba'darom, zrika ba'laila, chutz li'zmanan, chutz li'mekoman), if the offering was brought onto the altar, it must be removed ("אם עלו ירדו"). This implies that the kedusha is not sufficiently strong to allow the offering to remain on the altar. The Kessef Mishneh leverages this understanding: if the kedusha is so diminished that the offering must be removed from the altar, it implies that me'ilah on such an item is no longer de'Oraita. It effectively ceases to be "קדשי ה'" in the fullest sense for me'ilah purposes. Thus, the Rambam, in his Mishneh Torah, adopts R' Yehoshua's view from Zevachim 9:2, which leads to the conclusion of me'ilah de'Rabanan for these cases.

An alternative nuance, hinted at by Tosafot Yom Tov, is that the Mishnah's teaching of "מועלין בהן" in its opening cases might be a chiddush even if it is only de'Rabanan. The novelty would be that despite the pesulim, the item retains any me'ilah status at all, rather than becoming entirely chullin. This interpretation acknowledges the Rambam's chizur but still finds a significant teaching in the Mishnah, even if the level of me'ilah is downgraded. This addresses the question of why the Mishnah would even bother listing these cases if the me'ilah isn't de'Oraita, suggesting the chiddush is in the continued existence of kedusha at a Rabbinic level.

In summary, the Kessef Mishneh's explanation is the primary terutz: the Rambam's Peirush might represent an initial understanding or a pesak not entirely aligned with the sugya in Zevachim 9:2. His Mishneh Torah, written later and serving as a definitive psak, incorporates the full ramifications of the "אם עלו ירדו" principle, leading to the me'ilah de'Rabanan conclusion.

Intertext

Piggul and Me'ilah: Overlapping Disqualifications

The Mishnah explicitly mentions piggul alongside me'ilah when discussing the opinions of R' Eliezer and R' Akiva regarding meat that yatza (left the courtyard). R' Eliezer holds "מועלין בו, ואין חייבין עליו משום פיגול נותר וטמא," while R' Akiva counters "אין מועלין בו, וחייבין עליו משום פיגול נותר וטמא." ¹⁴ This highlights the intricate relationship between various pesulim and their respective liabilities.

The concept of piggul itself is derived from Vayikra 7:18: "וְאִם הֵאָכֹל יֵאָכֵל מִבְּשַׂר זֶבַח שְׁלָמָיו בַּיּוֹם הַשְּׁלִישִׁי לֹא יֵרָצֶה הַקְרִיב אֹתוֹ לֹא יֵחָשֵׁב לוֹ פִּגּוּל יִהְיֶה וְהַנֶּפֶשׁ הָאֹכֶלֶת מִמֶּנּוּ עֲוֺנָהּ תִּשָּׂא." ¹⁵ This verse establishes piggul as a severe disqualification, a gezeirat haKatuv (Biblical decree), triggered by an improper intention during shechita or zrika to eat the meat or sprinkle the blood beyond its designated time. The consequence is karet for consumption.

The friction between me'ilah and piggul is profound. Me'ilah relates to the kedusha of the object itself, prohibiting any benefit from it. Piggul relates to the korban process and the eligibility of the meat for consumption; it renders the offering detestable and its consumption punishable by karet. The Mishnah's dispute between R' Eliezer and R' Akiva in our text hinges on whether a pesul like yatza lifnei zrika (leaving before sprinkling) entirely nullifies the zrika's efficacy.

R' Eliezer maintains that if the meat yatza before zrika, the subsequent zrika is ineffective. Therefore, the meat never attains a "שעת היתר לכהנים" (period of fitness for priests), remaining fully kodesh in its me'ilah status, and thus one is liable for me'ilah. Concomitantly, since the zrika was ineffective, the meat is not subject to piggul, notar, or tamei prohibitions, as these apply only to meat that was once permitted (or would have been, had it not been disqualified by piggul etc., but the zrika itself was valid).

R' Akiva argues that even if the meat yatza, the zrika is still effective in principle. This means the meat did achieve "שעת היתר לכהנים," hence no me'ilah. However, because the meat yatza, it is now prohibited by other means, and thus subject to piggul, notar, and tamei prohibitions (assuming those conditions are met). R' Akiva's kal vachomer from the "lost chatat" ¹⁶ illustrates that zrika can have broader effects than just on the specific item its blood came from, suggesting its potency even in cases of yatza.

This debate showcases how different pesulim interact. A pesul that nullifies the zrika's efficacy entirely (R' Eliezer) leads to me'ilah liability but exempts from piggul. A pesul that maintains zrika's efficacy but prohibits consumption through another avenue (R' Akiva) leads to piggul liability but exempts from me'ilah. The sugya forces us to consider which kedusha status takes precedence and how the various issurim (prohibitions) stack up.

Psak/Practice

The Mishnah's discussion and R' Yehoshua's principle ("כל שיש לו שעת היתר לכהנים אין מועלין בו, וכל שאין לו שעת היתר לכהנים מועלין בו" ¹⁷) form the bedrock of Hilchot Me'ilah. This principle, adopted by the Rambam ¹⁸ and subsequent poskim, is a key heuristic for determining me'ilah liability. If an item of kodesh can transition to permitted consumption (even if it subsequently becomes prohibited for other reasons), its me'ilah status often ceases at that point.

However, the Rambam's chizur from me'ilah de'Oraita to de'Rabanan for many of the initial cases is a significant practical distinction. While korban me'ilah is still required for unwitting misuse of de'Rabanan me'ilah (according to some opinions, e.g., Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim 608:12 ¹⁹ regarding chametz), the severity of the issur (prohibition) is reduced. The Kessef Mishneh's explanation, rooted in the "אם עלו ירדו" principle, thus becomes critical for psak. It means that for certain pesulim that happen before zrika, while the item is still kodesh, its kedusha is diminished to a Rabbinic level concerning me'ilah.

The practical implication of the R' Eliezer/R' Akiva dispute in our Mishnah (regarding yatza lifnei zrika) is also crucial. The Halacha generally follows R' Akiva ²⁰, meaning that if meat yatza before zrika, the subsequent zrika is effective, and one is liable for piggul, notar, or tamei (if applicable), but not me'ilah. This underscores the potency of zrika even when the offering has suffered other disqualifications.

Takeaway

The Mishnah in Meilah 1:1-2 meticulously delineates the boundaries of me'ilah liability for disqualified kodashim, establishing R' Yehoshua's principle as a fundamental meta-halachic heuristic. The interplay between me'ilah de'Oraita and de'Rabanan, particularly as clarified by the Rambam's chizur and the "אם עלו ירדו" principle, reveals the nuanced and graded nature of kedusha even in a state of pesul.

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¹ Mishnah Meilah 1:1-2 ² Tosafot Yom Tov on Mishnah Meilah 1:1:3 s.v. "שחטן בדרום וקבל דמן בצפון" ³ Rambam on Mishnah Meilah 1:1:1 s.v. "ושקבלו פסולין וזרקו את דמה" ⁴ Mishnah Meilah 1:1:1 ⁵ Rambam on Mishnah Meilah 1:1:1 s.v. "קדשי קדשים ששחטן בדרום מועלין בהן" ⁶ Rambam on Mishnah Meilah 1:1:1 s.v. "ואני צריך לבאר לך" ⁷ Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Meilah 3:1 ⁸ Tosafot Yom Tov on Mishnah Meilah 1:1:1 s.v. "קדשי קדשים" ⁹ Tosafot Yom Tov on Mishnah Meilah 1:1:1 s.v. "קדשי קדשים" ¹⁰ Tosafot Yom Tov on Mishnah Meilah 1:1:2 s.v. "ששחטן בדרום מועלין בהן" ¹¹ Rambam on Mishnah Meilah 1:1:1 s.v. "קדשי קדשים ששחטן בדרום מועלין בהן" ¹² Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Meilah 3:1 ¹³ Kessef Mishneh on Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Meilah 3:1 ¹⁴ Mishnah Meilah 1:1:2 ¹⁵ Vayikra 7:18 ¹⁶ Mishnah Meilah 1:1:2 ¹⁷ Mishnah Meilah 1:1:2 ¹⁸ Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Meilah 3:1 ¹⁹ Although this specific reference is for chametz on Pesach, it reflects the broader principle that Rabbinic prohibitions can sometimes carry korban liability. For me'ilah, the Gemara (Meilah 16a) states that me'ilah de'Rabanan also requires a korban me'ilah. ²⁰ Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Meilah 3:10. The Rambam rules like R' Akiva for yatza before zrika, stating that "אין בהן מעילה" and "חייבין עליהן משום פיגול נותר וטמא".