Daily Mishnah · Expert – Beit Midrash Analysis · Standard

Mishnah Meilah 6:1-2

StandardExpert – Beit Midrash AnalysisMarch 24, 2026

Sugya Map

  • The Issue: The intersection of shlichut (agency) and me’ilah (misuse of consecrated property). Specifically, under what conditions does an agent’s act of consumption or use render the principal (ba'al ha-bayit) liable for me'ilah versus the agent?
  • Primary Sources: Mishnah Meilah 6:1-2; Kiddushin 42b; Rambam, Hilkhot Me’ilah 7:1-6.
  • Nafka Minot:
    • Agency in Transgression: The classic rule is ein shaliach lidvar aveirah (no agency for a sin). Me’ilah is the notable exception where agency persists, but how far does it stretch?
    • Deviation (Shinui): Does any deviation (e.g., meat vs. liver) automatically sever the agency, or is there a threshold of materiality?
    • Subjective Intent (Devarim she-ba-lev): If the principal’s instructions are objectively fulfilled, does the principal’s internal, unexpressed intent ("I wanted it from the chest, not the window") override the objective act?

Text Snapshot

  • "השליח שעשה שליחותו... בעל הבית מעל": (Mishnah 6:1). The fundamental axiom: Me'ilah allows for agency. The dikduk here is precise: if the principal "forgot" (shagag) that the object was hekdesh, he is the me'il. The responsibility tracks with the command, not the physical act.
  • "דברים שבלב אינם דברים": (Mishnah 6:1). The Mishnah posits that if an agent follows instructions (e.g., "bring from the window"), the principal is liable even if he secretly intended "chest." The leshon underscores the objective nature of shlichut—law is built on the ma'aseh and the dibbur, not the internal psychological state of the principal.

Readings

The Rambam: The Anatomy of Shagag

Rambam (Comm. to Mishnah 6:1) offers a foundational chiddush: the reason the principal is liable is due to shigaga (error). He reads the verse "וְאָשְׁמָה הַנֶּפֶשׁ הַהִיא" (Leviticus 5:17) as pointing to the one who erred initially—the principal who commanded the act thinking it was chullin. The Rambam posits that agency in me'ilah is not merely a legal construct of "representation," but a causal chain: the principal initiated the shigaga, and the agent is merely the extended limb. For the Rambam, the liability is fixed at the moment the principal issues the command without the requisite knowledge of the status of the hekdesh.

Tosafot Yom Tov: The Friction of Agency

The Tosafot Yom Tov (on 6:1:1) engages in a rigorous debate with the Rambam’s derivation. He notes that while the Rambam cites "וְאָשְׁמָה הַנֶּפֶשׁ הַהִיא," the Gemara in Kiddushin 42b derives the validity of agency in me'ilah from a gezerah shavah to terumah. The Tosafot Yom Tov expresses tmihah (astonishment) at the Rambam’s reliance on the verse, noting that even if the agent also forgets, the principal remains liable. The chiddush here is the distinction between "who is the agent?" and "who is the primary sinner?" The Tosafot Yom Tov pushes us to see that me'ilah is unique because it treats the principal's command as an indelible legal act, regardless of the agent's mental state.

The Rashash: Textual Precision

The Rashash (on 6:1:1) provides a biting critique of the standard commentary. He points out that the verse "וְאָשְׁמָה הַנֶּפֶשׁ הַהִיא" is actually located in the context of gezel ha-ger (stolen property of a convert), not me'ilah. He forces us to re-evaluate whether the liability of the principal is rooted in the nature of the sin (the hekdesh itself) or the nature of the agency. By exposing the shaky scriptural foundation of the commentators, he forces the student back to the sugya in Kiddushin: the agency is sui generis. It is not just that he can make an agent; it is that the me'ilah law creates a special category of "agent-as-instrument."

Friction

The Kushya: Ein Shaliach Lidvar Aveirah vs. Me’ilah

The central tension is the contradiction between the general rule (ein shaliach) and the me'ilah exception. If the principal commands someone to eat hekdesh, he is essentially commanding an aveirah. Why does the law of agency hold?

The Terutz: The "Instrument" Logic

The standard terutz (per Kiddushin 42b and Me'ilah 6:1) is that me'ilah is fundamentally a civil-financial wrong (mamon) masquerading as an issur. Because me'ilah can be satisfied through monetary restitution (keren + chomesh), it behaves more like a tort than a ritual transgression. When the principal tells an agent to "give meat to guests," he is not asking the agent to "sin"; he is asking the agent to perform an act of distribution. The me'ilah is a secondary effect of that act. Therefore, the agency remains intact because the primary instruction was not a "sin" but a "transfer." The agent becomes a "conduit" of the principal’s will, and the principal remains the ba'al ha-me'ilah because the agent did exactly what was asked.

Intertext

  • Bava Metzia 96a: The status of the shomer (bailee) vs. the shaliach. The comparison in the Mishnah (Meilah 6:2) regarding money changers vs. homeowners mirrors the shomer debate. If the money is "bound" (keshurah), the bailee has no permission to use it; if "unbound," he acts as a borrower. This links me'ilah to the laws of pikadon (deposit).
  • SA Choshen Mishpat 182: The application of shlichut in financial matters. The principle that "one who deviates from his instructions is not an agent" is the bedrock of the Meilah Mishnah, finding its formal codification in the laws of employment and agency.

Psak/Practice

In modern meta-psak, this sugya establishes the "Objective Instruction Rule." In matters of agency, if the agent follows the external, articulated instructions of the principal, the principal is legally responsible for the outcome, regardless of the principal's "private heart" (devarim she-ba-lev). In the context of contemporary fiduciary duty, this serves as a harsh reminder: an agent’s actions in the principal’s name bind the principal to the liability, provided the agent stays within the defined parameters of the task. The principal cannot claim "that’s not what I meant" if the instructions were clear.

Takeaway

Me'ilah forces agency to be objective and causal; once you delegate, you own the outcome of your words. The law ignores your heart, but it never forgets your instructions.