Mishnah Temurah 6:1-2

Sugya Map

• Core Issue: The Mishnah identifies several categories of animals and items disqualified from being sacrificed on the Mizbeach (altar), establishing their unique halachic statuses regarding nullification in a mixture (bittul b'rov), permissible benefit (hana'ah), and the status of their offspring.
• Nafka Mina(s) (Practical Ramifications/Conceptual Distinctions):
  • The principle of "אוסרין כל שהן" (they prohibit in any amount) for kodshim pesulim – what distinguishes these issurim from others that are nullified in a majority?
  • Precise definitions and differing issurim for "מוקצה לעבודה זרה" (an animal designated for idol worship) versus "נעבד" (an animal actually worshipped as an idol), particularly concerning issur hana'ah and "מה שעליו" (that which is upon it).
  • The scope and limitations of "אתנן זונה" (payment to a prostitute) and "מחיר כלב" (price of a dog) – which items are included (money, wine, birds) and which are excluded (offspring, payments for non-human relations)?
  • The halachic mechanism of kal v'chomer (a fortiori argument) and its potential refutation by a specific pasuk ("לכל נדר").
  • The debate regarding the offspring of a tereifa (an animal with a wound that will cause it to die within twelve months) as pasul l'Mizbeach.
  • The prohibition against redeeming kodshim that became tereifot, and the underlying principle that "אין פודים קדשים להאכילן לכלבים" (one does not redeem consecrated animals to feed them to dogs).
• Primary Sources:
  • Mishnah Temurah 6:1-2
  • Devarim 23:19 (23:18 in some translations) — "לא תביא אתנן זונה ומחיר כלב בית ה' אלהיך לכל נדר כי תועבת ה' אלהיך גם שניהם."
  • Shemot 22:18 (22:19 in some translations) — "כל שוכב עם בהמה מות יומת."
  • Mishnah Avodah Zarah 3:3
  • Rambam, Commentary on the Mishnah, Temurah 6:1:1
  • Tosafot Yom Tov, Commentary on the Mishnah, Temurah 6:1:1-4
  • Tosafot Rabbi Akiva Eiger, Commentary on the Mishnah, Temurah 6:1:1
  • Mishnat Eretz Yisrael, Commentary on the Mishnah, Temurah 6:1:1-4

Text Snapshot

The Mishnah opens with a foundational principle and then meticulously enumerates categories of disqualified offerings:

כָּל הָאֲסוּרִין עַל גַּבֵּי הַמִּזְבֵּחַ, אוֹסְרִין כָּל שֶׁהֵן. אֵלּוּ הֵן: הָרוֹבֵעַ וְהַנִּרְבָּע, וְהַמּוּקְצֶה וְהַנֶּעֱבָד, וְהָאֶתְנָן וְהַמְּחִיר, וְהַכִּלְאַיִם, וְהַטְּרֵפָה, וְיוֹצֵא דֹּפֶן.

אֵיזֶה הוּא מֻקְצֶה? הַמֻּקְצֶה לַעֲבוֹדַת כּוֹכָבִים. הוּא אָסוּר, וּמַה שֶּׁעָלָיו מֻתָּר. וְאֵיזֶה הוּא נֶעֱבָד? כָּל שֶׁעוֹבְדִין אוֹתוֹ. הוּא וּמַה שֶּׁעָלָיו אָסוּר. וְזֶה וְזֶה מֻתָּרִין בַּאֲכִילָה.

אֵיזֶה הוּא אֶתְנָן? הָאוֹמֵר לְזוֹנָה, הֲרֵי לָךְ טָלֶה זֶה בִּשְׂכָרֵךְ. אֲפִלּוּ מֵאָה, כֻּלָּן אֲסוּרִין. וְכֵן הָאוֹמֵר לַחֲבֵרוֹ, הֲרֵי לָךְ טָלֶה זֶה וּשְׁפַחְתְּךָ שׁוֹכֶבֶת עִם עַבְדִּי. רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר: אֵינוֹ אֶתְנָן. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: הֲרֵי זֶה אֶתְנָן.

אֵיזֶה הוּא מְחִיר? הָאוֹמֵר לַחֲבֵרוֹ, הֲרֵי לָךְ טָלֶה זֶה בִּמְקוֹם כֶּלֶב. וְכֵן שְׁנֵי שֻׁתָּפִין שֶׁחָלְקוּ, אֶחָד נָטַל עֲשָׂרָה וְאֶחָד נָטַל תִּשְׁעָה וְכֶלֶב. עֲשָׂרָה שֶׁכְּנֶגֶד הַכֶּלֶב, אֲסוּרִין. וְתִשְׁעָה שֶׁעִם הַכֶּלֶב, מֻתָּרִין.

אֶתְנַן כֶּלֶב, וּמְחִיר זוֹנָה, מֻתָּרִין. שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (דברים כג, יט): "כִּי תוֹעֲבַת ה' אֱלֹהֶיךָ גַּם שְׁנֵיהֶם", שְׁנַיִם וְלֹא אַרְבָּעָה.

וּוְלָדוֹתֵיהֶן מֻתָּרִין. שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: "אוֹתָם", וְלֹא אֶת וְלָדוֹתֵיהֶן.

נָתַן לָהּ מָעוֹת, מֻתָּר. יַיִן אוֹ שֶׁמֶן אוֹ סֹלֶת, וְכָל דָּבָר שֶׁכְּיוֹצֵא בוֹ קָרֵב עַל גַּבֵּי הַמִּזְבֵּחַ, אָסוּר. נָתַן לָהּ קָדָשִׁים, מֻתָּר.

עוֹפוֹת שֶׁל חֻלִּין, אֲסוּרִין. כְּשֶׁהוּא אוֹמֵר קַל וָחֹמֶר, וּמָה אִם קָדָשִׁים שֶׁפְּסוּלָן בְּמוּם, אֵין אֶתְנָן וּמְחִיר חָלִין עֲלֵיהֶן, עוֹף שֶׁאֵין פְּסוּלוֹ בְּמוּם, אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁלֹּא יָחוּל עֲלֵיהֶן אֶתְנָן וּמְחִיר? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: "לְכָל נֶדֶר" – לְרַבּוֹת אֶת הָעוֹף.

כָּל הָאֲסוּרִין עַל גַּבֵּי הַמִּזְבֵּחַ, וְלָדוֹתֵיהֶן מֻתָּרִין. רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: וְלַד טְרֵפָה לֹא יִקְרַב עַל גַּבֵּי הַמִּזְבֵּחַ. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: יִקְרַב. רַבִּי חֲנִינָא בֶּן אַנְטִיגְנוֹס אוֹמֵר: כְּשֵׁרָה שֶׁיָּנְקָה מִן הַטְּרֵפָה, פְּסוּלָה עַל גַּבֵּי הַמִּזְבֵּחַ.

כָּל קָדָשִׁים שֶׁנִּטְרְפוּ, אֵין פּוֹדִין אוֹתָן. שֶׁאֵין פּוֹדִין קָדָשִׁים לְהַאֲכִילָן לַכְּלָבִים.

(Mishnah Temurah 6:1-2)

Dikduk and Leshon Nuance

• "כָּל הָאֲסוּרִין עַל גַּבֵּי הַמִּזְבֵּחַ, אוֹסְרִין כָּל שֶׁהֵן": The plural form "אוסרין" (they prohibit) for "כל האסורין" (all that are prohibited) as a collective noun emphasizes that each category of prohibited items, not just a single instance, possesses this inherent power to disqualify an entire mixture, however large. This "כל שהן" is a severe rule, indicating that these prohibitions are not nullified, even in an overwhelmingly large permitted mixture.
• "הוּא אָסוּר, וּמַה שֶּׁעָלָיו מֻתָּר" vs. "הוּא וּמַה שֶּׁעָלָיו אָסוּר": This stark contrast between Muktzah and Ne'evad is crucial. Muktzah l'Avodah Zarah (designated for idol worship) only renders the animal pasul l'Mizbeach, but any accessories (e.g., jewelry) are permitted. Ne'evad (actually worshipped) is more severe; both the animal itself and its accessories are prohibited from hana'ah (benefit), implying a deeper defilement. The key differentiator, as Rishonim will elaborate, lies in the presence of an actual act of worship or "תפיסת ידי אדם" (human craftsmanship/manipulation).
• "שְׁנַיִם וְלֹא אַרְבָּעָה": This interpretive phrase highlights the midrash halacha that derives precise limitations from a biblical text. The pasuk (Devarim 23:19) explicitly mentions "אתנן זונה ומחיר כלב"; the Mishnah's inference is that the Torah deliberately limits the prohibition to these two specific cases, thereby excluding related but distinct scenarios like "אתנן כלב" (payment for intercourse with a dog) or "מחיר זונה" (price of a prostitute-slave). This demonstrates the principle of ribui u'mi'ut (inclusion and exclusion) in biblical exegesis.
• "אוֹתָם וְלֹא אֶת וְלָדוֹתֵיהֶן": Similarly, the Torah's use of "אותם" (them) implies specificity, teaching that the issur applies solely to the prohibited animal itself, not to its offspring. This is a general rule that the Mishnah then challenges with the case of Tereifa offspring, leading to a machloket between R' Eliezer and the Rabbanan.
• "לְכָל נֶדֶר" – לְרַבּוֹת אֶת הָעוֹף": The phrase "לכל נדר" (for any vow) in Devarim 23:19, seemingly redundant after "אתנן זונה ומחיר כלב," is interpreted as an asmachta or ribui (inclusion) to extend the prohibition of Atnan and Mechir to birds, which are otherwise excluded by the kal v'chomer argument. This showcases the power of the Torah's precise language to override logical inferences.

Readings

Rambam, Commentary on the Mishnah, Temurah 6:1:1

The Rambam, in his characteristic analytical style, immediately delves into the foundational principle of "אוסרין כל שהן" and provides a hierarchical understanding of the various prohibitions.

Chiddush 1: Elucidating "אוסרין כל שהן" and Categorizing Prohibitions

Rambam explains: "ענין אוסרין בכל שהוא שאם נתערבו אחד מאלו ואפילו באלף מן הקדשים כולם פסולים לגבי המזבח ואין מקריבים מהם ואפי' אחד" (The meaning of 'they prohibit in any amount' is that if one of these [prohibited animals] is mixed in, even with a thousand consecrated animals, all of them are disqualified for the altar, and not even one may be offered). This immediately establishes the gravity of these pesulim (disqualifications), placing them in the category of prohibitions that are not nullified by a majority (batel b'rov), akin to Avodah Zarah or chametz on Pesach. The implications for kodshim are severe, as even a trace renders the entire mixture unusable.

He then proceeds to categorize the sources for these pesulim: "ואלו המנויים שהם פסולים לגבי המזבח יש מהם מצד פסוק מלא ויש מהם מצד אסמכתא אל המקרא" (These enumerated items that are disqualified for the altar, some are from an explicit pasuk, and some are from a rabbinic support to a pasuk).

• Explicit Pesukim: Atnan and Mechir are explicitly mentioned (Devarim 23:19). Yotzei Dofen is implicitly derived from "כי יולד" (when it is born) in the context of kodshim and ma'aser, which implies "פטר רחם" (firstborn opening the womb) as a prerequisite for sanctity, thus excluding yotzei dofen (born by C-section) from kedusha (Rambam, Commentary on Mishnah Bechorot 9:4).
• Rabbinic Support/Derivation: Rambam ties ro'vea and nirba to the general concept of hashchata (corruption/defilement). He states: "ונאמר על אותן שאינן קרבין לגבי המזבח משחתם בהם מום בם ואמרו חכמים ז"ל כל מקום שנאמר השחתה אינו אלא דבר ערוה ועבודת כוכבים" (And it is said about those that are not offered on the altar, 'they are corrupted, there is a blemish in them.' And the Sages said: 'Wherever hashchata is mentioned, it refers to nothing but ervah [forbidden sexual relations] and Avodah Zarah'). This is a profound conceptual link, suggesting that acts of sexual perversion (like ro'vea/nirba) and idol worship are seen as fundamental corruptions (hashchata) that render an animal unfit for the sanctity of the Mizbeach. This drasha is found in Gemara Sanhedrin 55a, connecting hashchata to ervah (Bereishit 6:12 "כי השחית כל בשר את דרכו על הארץ") and to Avodah Zarah (Devarim 4:16 "פן תשחיתון ועשיתם לכם פסל"). This interpretation broadens the understanding of mum (blemish) from merely a physical defect to a spiritual/moral defilement.

Chiddush 2: Defining Muktzah vs. Ne'evad and the Role of "תפיסת ידי אדם"

Rambam offers a nuanced distinction between Muktzah l'Avodah Zarah and Ne'evad, particularly concerning issur hana'ah. He writes: "וכבר נתבאר בשלישי מס' ע"ז שהדברים הנעבדים אינם אסורים בהנאה אלא [א"כ] יש בהם תפיסת יד אדם ולפיכך מי שעבד הר או ים או בעלי חיים אין אותו דבר אסור בהנאה" (It has already been explained in the third chapter of Avodah Zarah that worshipped items are not forbidden for benefit unless they involve human craftsmanship; therefore, one who worships a mountain, sea, or animals, that item is not forbidden for benefit). This refers to Mishnah Avodah Zarah 3:3.

Based on this principle, Rambam clarifies:

• Ne'evad (actually worshipped): "אבל הדבר שהוא על הנעבד כגון חלי זהב וכסף ה"ז אסור בהנאה לפי שאותו דבר כבר נעבד ויש בו תפיסת ידי אדם" (But an item that is on the worshipped object, such as gold or silver ornaments, this is forbidden for benefit, because that item has been worshipped and it has human craftsmanship). The animal itself, if naturally occurring and unadorned, is mutar b'hana'ah even if worshipped. However, the accessories on it, being products of human craftsmanship, become assur b'hana'ah if the animal (with the accessories) was worshipped.
• Muktzah (designated for Avodah Zarah): "אבל המוקצה הרי הוא אסור לגבי המזבח כמו שזכרנו ומה שעליו מותר בהנאה לפי שלא נעבד וכשאמר זה לעבודת כוכבים לא נאסר לפי שעיקר בידינו אין הקדש לעבודת כוכבים" (But the Muktzah is forbidden for the altar as we mentioned, and what is on it is permitted for benefit because it was not worshipped. And when one designated it for Avodah Zarah, it did not become prohibited, because we have a fundamental principle that there is no hekdesh for Avodah Zarah). This is a critical point: mere designation for Avodah Zarah by a Jew does not create issur hana'ah, unlike hekdesh for God. The issur for Muktzah to the Mizbeach is therefore not due to it being assur b'hana'ah.

Rambam then adds a crucial qualifier regarding Muktzah: "והמוקצה הוא מה שזכרו ואמרו אין מוקצה לעבודת כוכבים אסור עד שיעשה בה מעשה עד שיגזז בו או שיעבדו בו וכשמשתמשין בו עובדיהם אם היה שור או גזזו אם היה כבש אז יפסל לגבי מזבח משום מוקצה" (And Muktzah is what they mentioned, and they said: 'Something designated for Avodah Zarah is not prohibited until an act is performed with it, until it is shorn or worshipped with it, or when its worshippers use it, if it was an ox, or shorn if it was a sheep, then it becomes disqualified for the altar due to Muktzah'). This chiddush clarifies that even for Muktzah to become pasul l'Mizbeach, mere intent/designation is insufficient; some action or use in the service of Avodah Zarah is required. This makes the issur of Muktzah l'Avodah Zarah contingent on a tangible link to the actual idol worship, not just the owner's thought process.

Tosafot Yom Tov, Commentary on the Mishnah, Temurah 6:1:1-4

The Tosafot Yom Tov (TYT) provides concise yet insightful comments, often cross-referencing other sugyot and refining the Mishnah's meaning.

Chiddush 1: Contextualizing "אוסרין כל שהן" and "הרובע והנרבע"

• 6:1:1 "אוסרין כל שהן": TYT notes: "תנינא ברפ"ח דזבחים וצריכי כמ"ש שם" (We learned this in the beginning of chapter 8 of Zevachim, and it is necessary there as explained). This indicates that the principle of oser b'chol shehu for kodshim pesulim is a well-established halacha, repeated in various Mishnayot. The repetition here is not redundant but serves to underscore the universality of the principle across different categories of pesulim and in the context of Temurah. The necessity of its repetition in multiple places often implies subtle differences in context or specific applications that are clarified by the adjacent sugya.
• 6:1:2 "הרובע והנרבע": TYT addresses a crucial point about the scope of ro'vea and nirba: "פירש הר"ב כגון דרבע או נרבעה ע"פ ע"א או ע"פ הבעלים. דאלו בשני עדים היה נאסר אפי' להדיוט" (The Rav [Rambam] explained that it is, for example, if it copulated or was copulated with, based on the testimony of one witness or the testimony of the owner. For if it were with two witnesses, it would be forbidden even for ordinary use). This is a significant chiddush. The Mishnah here discusses disqualification l'Mizbeach. TYT (citing Rambam) clarifies that this issur l'Mizbeach applies even in cases where the animal would not be forbidden for ordinary consumption (i.e., mutar l'hedyot). This occurs when there's insufficient testimony (one witness, or the owner's confession, which is not valid for capital punishment or issur hana'ah according to some opinions). If two witnesses had testified to the act of bestiality, the animal would be condemned to death (Shemot 22:18) and certainly assur b'hana'ah and l'Mizbeach. Thus, the Mishnah here highlights a unique aspect of kedusha – even a suspected defilement, or a defilement proven by less than two witnesses, is enough to disqualify from the altar.

TYT then raises a kushya: "וא"ת ומנלן. הא כי כתיב קרא (שמות כ"א) [ולא יאכל את בשרו. כמ"ש הר"ב במ"ח פ"ד דב"ק] בנוגח כתיב ולא ילפינן מהדדי. כדאמרינן [הכא בפרקין] שיש בנוגח שאין ברובע ויש ברובע שאין בנוגח. ושמא איכא שום דרש" (And if you ask, from where do we know this? For when the verse is written (Shemot 21) 'its flesh shall not be eaten' [as the Rav wrote in chapter 4, Mishnah 8 of Bava Kama], it is written regarding a goring ox, and we do not derive from one to the other. As we say [here in our chapter], there is in a goring ox what is not in a copulating one, and there is in a copulating one what is not in a goring one. Perhaps there is some drasha). TYT acknowledges that the explicit pasuk forbidding consumption of a goring ox (Shemot 21:28) cannot be directly applied to ro'vea/nirba due to a kal v'chomer or gezeirah shava because the sugya itself (elsewhere) differentiates between them. He suggests that a specific drasha must exist to apply the issur hana'ah (or issur l'Mizbeach) to ro'vea/nirba in cases of less than two witnesses. He also references a dikduk from Zevachim 9:3 about the ro'vea not necessarily having killed a human, highlighting the Mishnah's focus on the act of bestiality itself as the disqualifying factor for the altar.

Chiddush 2: Clarifying Tereifa and Yotzei Dofen

• 6:1:3 "והטרפה": TYT, citing Rashi, explains how a tereifa would be included in the "אוסרין כל שהן" list: "כתב הר"ב דלא משכחת לה. אלא כגון שנתערבה דרוסת הארי כו'. א"נ בולד טרפה ואליביה דר"א דאמר [בס"פ] לא יקרב" (The Rav [Rambam] wrote that this is not found, except for example, if a lion-mauled animal was mixed in etc. Or also regarding the offspring of a tereifa according to R' Eliezer who says [at the end of the chapter] it shall not be offered). This is a critical point. A tereifa is inherently pasul l'Mizbeach and assur b'achila. So why list it as "אוסרין כל שהן" in a mixture? TYT (and Rambam) explain that the mixture scenario for tereifa applies when it's mixed with other kodshim before its tereifa status is definitively known, or in the case of a tereifa's offspring, where its status is debated. This emphasizes that the "כל שהן" rule applies even to items whose issur is self-evident, but the context is the mixture.
• 6:1:4 "ויוצא דופן": TYT clarifies that yotzei dofen (C-section born) is pasul for kodshim even according to R' Shimon, who has leniencies regarding it concerning bechor. "אפי' לר"ש דמתני' ב' פ"ח דבכורות ודרפ"ה דנדה מודה בקדשים דגמר לידה לידה מבכור. מה התם פטר רחם אף כאן פטר רחם" (Even according to R' Shimon, who teaches in Mishnah Bechorot 8:2 and Niddah 5:5, he agrees regarding kodshim because he derives 'birth' from 'birth' from a firstborn. Just as there [for a firstborn] it must be 'opening the womb', so too here [for kodshim] it must be 'opening the womb'). This gezeirah shava (verbal analogy) ensures that the requirement of "פטר רחם" for sanctification, applicable to a bechor, extends to all kodshim, making a yotzei dofen inherently disqualified for the altar.

Tosafot Rabbi Akiva Eiger, Commentary on the Mishnah, Temurah 6:1:1

R' Akiva Eiger (RAE) often points out omissions or raises conceptual difficulties in the Mishnah, stimulating deeper analysis.

Chiddush: Query on the Mishnah's Enumeration of Pesulim

RAE poses a sharp question: "[אות יא] במשנה והכלאים. וקשה לי אמאי לא חשיב הנדמה דג"כ פסול להקרבה והוי יותר רבותא מכלאים עיין בב"ק (דף ע"ז) ובכורות (ד' י"ב) וצ"ע. עיין תוס' בכורות (דף נ"ז ע"א ד"ה חוץ) שהקשו כן על מתני' דהתם. וע' מה שתירצו בזה. (והובא בתי"ט בכורות פ"ט מ"ד)" (Regarding the Mishnah's mention of kilayim (crossbred animals): It is difficult for me, why does it not list nidmeh (an animal resembling a human), which is also disqualified from offering, and would be a greater chiddush (novelty/stringency) than kilayim? See Bava Kama 77a and Bechorot 12a, and it requires further study. See Tosafot Bechorot 57a s.v. "חוץ" who raised the same question on a Mishnah there. And see what they answered regarding this. (And it is cited in Tosafot Yom Tov Bechorot 9:4)).

RAE's kushya highlights the selective nature of the Mishnah's list. Nidmeh refers to an animal born with a human-like appearance, which is pasul l'Mizbeach (Bechorot 12b) and also presents unique halachic challenges (e.g., whether it counts for pidyon haben). RAE argues that if kilayim (crossbred) is listed, nidmeh should be too, as it represents a more profound deviation from the natural order, arguably a greater chiddush in terms of disqualification. This kushya forces us to consider the Mishnah's editorial choices and the underlying criteria for inclusion in such an enumerative list. Is the list exhaustive or illustrative? Does it prioritize issurim that are less obvious or those that have specific nuances that need clarification, like Muktzah vs. Ne'evad?

Mishnat Eretz Yisrael, Commentary on the Mishnah, Temurah 6:1:1-4

The Mishnat Eretz Yisrael (MEI) offers a comprehensive perspective, often integrating historical and linguistic context with halachic analysis.

Chiddush 1: Historical and Linguistic Context of the Pesulim List

MEI notes the recurrence of this specific list of pesulim (disqualified items) in various Mishnayot (e.g., Zevachim 8:1, 9:3, Parah 2:3). This observation is significant: "תופעה זו של רשימות קבועות מלמדת על התפתחות ספרותית ועל התגבשות שפת בית המדרש, בניגוד למשניות ב-ג, ו בפרק הקודם שבהן הצבענו על היעדר שפה הלכתית אחידה, וזאת ברובד העמוק והתוכני של ההלכה" (This phenomenon of fixed lists indicates literary development and the crystallization of the language of the Beit Midrash, in contrast to Mishnayot 2-3 and 6 in the previous chapter where we pointed out the lack of a uniform halachic language, even at the deep and substantive level of halacha). This chiddush suggests that by the time this Mishnah was formulated, the categories of fundamental sacrificial disqualifications had become standardized, reflecting a mature and unified halachic discourse.

MEI also provides socio-historical context for ro'vea/nirba: "לא ברור עד כמה הייתה תופעה זו רווחת. היא נזכרת במקרא ומכונה 'שוכב עם בהמה', וחז"ל פיתחו מונח מיוחד לפעולה מגונה זו (רובע); עצם הפיתוח הלשוני מלמד שהכירה אותה הלכה למעשה" (It is unclear how prevalent this phenomenon was. It is mentioned in the Bible and called 'one who lies with an animal,' and the Sages developed a special term for this despicable act (ro'vea); the very linguistic development indicates that the halacha recognized it as a practical reality). This perspective validates the Mishnah's concern by rooting it in biblical law and the linguistic evolution of Chazal, suggesting that while possibly not widespread, it was a recognized and dealt-with transgression.

Chiddush 2: Nuances of Muktzah and Ne'evad in Jewish Society

MEI delves into the practical implications of Muktzah and Ne'evad regarding Avodah Zarah in the Jewish context. Regarding Muktzah l'Avodah Zarah (designated for idol worship), MEI suggests: "ההגדרה מצביעה על כך שמציאות כזאת של בעל חיים ברחוב היהודי שיועד לעבודה זרה לא היה תופעה בלתי אפשרית. אין מדובר בהכרח שהבעלים לא-יהודי, ואף לא יהודי שהשתמד, אלא גם יהודי שמדי פעם הקריב גם לעבודה זרה, או מתוך אמונה או מתוך הזדהות חברתית" (The definition indicates that such a reality of an animal in the Jewish street designated for idol worship was not an impossible phenomenon. It does not necessarily refer to a non-Jew, nor even an apostate Jew, but also a Jew who occasionally offered sacrifices to idol worship, either out of belief or social identification). This offers a pragmatic reading of the Mishnah, acknowledging the complex religious landscape of the time, where Jews might have engaged in syncretic practices or social conformity that led to such designations.

Furthermore, MEI contextualizes the distinction between Muktzah and Ne'evad in terms of issur hana'ah: "זה וזה מותרין באכילה – אסור להקריב מהם, אך מותר ליהנות מהם באכילה" (Both are permitted for eating – it is forbidden to offer them, but it is permitted to benefit from them by eating). This underscores that the primary prohibition discussed for Muktzah and Ne'evad in this Mishnah is l'Mizbeach, not hana'ah (consumption), except for the accessories of a Ne'evad object of "תפיסת ידי אדם." This aligns with Rambam's explanation that for natural objects or animals, even if worshipped, issur hana'ah does not apply unless they are adorned with human-made items.

Friction

The Mishnah's terse language often leaves room for conceptual friction, compelling later commentators to unravel its underlying principles. Two potent kushyot arise from this Mishnah, challenging its enumeration and its seemingly direct application of issurim.

Kushya 1: The Omission of Nidmeh from the List of Pesulim

As Tosafot Rabbi Akiva Eiger astutely observes, the Mishnah enumerates a list of nine categories of animals "האסורין על גבי המזבח" (prohibited on the altar), including kilayim (crossbred animals). Yet, it conspicuously omits nidmeh (an animal born resembling a human), which is also a pasul l'Mizbeach (Bechorot 12b). The kushya is: why the omission? If kilayim, which is a genetic anomaly, is listed, why not nidmeh, which represents an even more striking deviation from natural animal form, potentially carrying greater implications of tumah or fundamental unfitness for kedusha? RAE explicitly states that nidmeh would be "יותר רבותא מכלאים" (a greater chiddush than kilayim), implying that if the Mishnah intends to teach us about various pesulim, nidmeh should certainly be there due to its unique and severe nature. This is not merely a question of completeness but of the Mishnah's pedagogical intent. What criteria guided its selection?

Terutz: Illustrative vs. Exhaustive and the Nature of the Issur

One robust terutz, implicit in the approach of many Rishonim, is that the Mishnah's list is illustrative rather than exhaustive. Not every pasul is listed in every Mishnah; rather, each Mishnah highlights specific categories relevant to its particular context or those that present unique halachic nuances requiring clarification.

1. Focus on Specific Halachic Nuances: The Mishnah Temurah 6:1-2 is not merely listing pesulim; it delves into the details of their issurim. For instance, it spends considerable effort distinguishing Muktzah from Ne'evad concerning hana'ah and "מה שעליו," and clarifies the scope of Atnan and Mechir through ribui u'mi'ut from the pasuk. The inclusion of kilayim might be precisely because its issur l'Mizbeach is only for the altar and not for hana'ah (as a kilayim animal can be consumed, see Bechorot 12b). In contrast, nidmeh might have a more straightforward issur l'Mizbeach that doesn't require such detailed clarification in this context, or its disqualification is so self-evident (e.g., due to its monstrous nature, which some consider a mum in a broad sense, or an inherent lack of kedushah).
2. Derivation from Broader Principles: The issur of nidmeh might be derived from more general principles of kodshim that are not particular to this list. For example, some suggest that nidmeh is pasul because it falls outside the category of "שור או כשב או עז" (ox or sheep or goat) typically mentioned for offerings (Vayikra 1:2), as its hybrid appearance removes it from a clear species definition. Alternatively, it might be considered a severe mum that renders it unfit. The Mishnah here might prioritize pesulim that arise from external actions (like ro'vea, muktzah, ne'evad, atnan, mechir) or specific halachic categories (like kilayim, tereifa, yotzei dofen) that require explicit biblical or rabbinic designation, rather than inherent, self-evident monstrosities.
3. Cross-referencing to Other Sugyot: As RAE himself notes, Tosafot in Bechorot 57a also grapple with the omission of nidmeh from another Mishnah's list. Their terutz there is that nidmeh is pasul based on a gezeirah shava from Avodah Zarah (deriving from "לא תעשה כל תמונה אשר בשמים ממעל ואשר בארץ מתחת" - Shemot 20:4, that any unnatural form is unfit for kedusha), or simply because it is not considered "בהמה" (an animal) in the pure sense required for an offering. The fact that the issur for nidmeh is discussed and established elsewhere (e.g., Bechorot 12a-b) means this Mishnah does not need to include it. The Mishnah is not a comprehensive encyclopedia of all pesulim but rather a curated selection for pedagogical purposes, often to highlight new or intricate dimensions of the law.

In essence, the Mishnah focuses on pesulim that either have intricate details (like Atnan/Mechir), require a specific drasha (like ro'vea from hashchata), or raise specific machloket (like tereifa's offspring), or have nuances regarding hana'ah (like Muktzah/Ne'evad). Nidmeh, while a significant pasul, might have been considered either too obvious, or its halachic intricacies lay in a different domain than those elaborated upon here.

Kushya 2: Rambam's Requirement of "מעשה" for Muktzah l'Avodah Zarah

Rambam, in his commentary on Mishnah Temurah 6:1:1, states a significant chiddush regarding Muktzah l'Avodah Zarah: "אין מוקצה לעבודת כוכבים אסור עד שיעשה בה מעשה עד שיגזז בו או שיעבדו בו וכשמשתמשין בו עובדיהם אם היה שור או גזזו אם היה כבש אז יפסל לגבי מזבח משום מוקצה" (Something designated for Avodah Zarah is not prohibited until an act is performed with it, until it is shorn or worshipped with it, or when its worshippers use it... then it becomes disqualified for the altar due to Muktzah).

This statement appears to introduce a stringency beyond the simple reading of the Mishnah. The Mishnah's definition of Muktzah is "המוקצה לעבודת כוכבים" (that which is set aside for idol worship), implying that mere designation by the owner is enough to render it pasul l'Mizbeach. Why does Rambam require an actual act ("מעשה") like shearing or using it for idol worship? If the animal is designated for Avodah Zarah, surely that intent alone should be enough to disqualify it from being an offering to Hashem, similar to hekdesh which becomes sanctified by designation. The contrast with Ne'evad, where actual worship is the definition, suggests that Muktzah should represent the case where designation (without actual worship) is the disqualifying factor. Rambam's chiddush seems to blur this distinction, requiring an action for Muktzah as well.

Terutz: The Nature of Hekdesh vs. Issur Avodah Zarah

The terutz lies in understanding the fundamental difference between hekdesh (consecration to God) and issur Avodah Zarah (prohibition of idol worship).

1. No Hekdesh for Avodah Zarah: Rambam explicitly states this principle: "אין הקדש לעבודת כוכבים" (there is no hekdesh for Avodah Zarah). For an object to become consecrated to Hashem, mere verbal designation ("הרי זה עולה") is sufficient. However, for an object to become assur due to Avodah Zarah, the halacha generally requires more than just intent or designation by a Jew. The issur of Avodah Zarah is rooted in the act of worship or the tangible connection to the idolatrous object, not merely the internal thought process of the owner. This is distinct from hekdesh, where kedusha is conferred by speech.
2. Source in Gemara Avodah Zarah: Rambam's chiddush is deeply rooted in the Gemara (e.g., Avodah Zarah 57a-b, 5:8). The Gemara discusses various scenarios where an object might be designated or used for Avodah Zarah. The general rule that emerges is that for an item to become assur b'hana'ah or pasul l'Mizbeach due to Avodah Zarah, there must be a ma'aseh (an act) performed by the idol worshipper (or one who designated it) that directly relates to its idolatrous function. This ma'aseh could be actual worship (ne'evad), or "תפיסת ידי אדם" (human craftsmanship/manipulation for the idol), or even a preparatory act for the idol's use (like shearing the sheep for its wool to be used in idol worship, or using an ox for labor in the idol's service).
3. Distinguishing Muktzah from Ne'evad (with Rambam's nuance): While Ne'evad refers to an animal actually worshipped, which immediately creates issur (especially for "מה שעליו" if it has t'fisat yedei adam), Muktzah refers to an animal merely designated. Rambam's point is that even this designation for Avodah Zarah, to have halachic teeth and render the animal pasul l'Mizbeach, cannot remain in the realm of abstract thought. It needs a physical manifestation, however minor, that ties the animal to the idolatrous cult. This "מעשה" for Muktzah is not necessarily direct worship, but a use or manipulation that indicates its specific dedication to the idol. Without such an act, the animal remains ordinary, and its owner's private intention, while sinful, does not by itself make the animal pasul as an offering to God. This preserves the distinction: Ne'evad is actual worship, Muktzah is designation plus an act of use/preparation. Both require an act, but the nature of the act and the resulting issurim (l'Mizbeach vs. hana'ah) differ.

Therefore, Rambam is not adding a stringency; he is clarifying the halachic threshold for the issur of Muktzah l'Avodah Zarah to take effect, based on the broader principles of halachot Avodah Zarah that require action over mere intent for an object to acquire an issur.

Intertext

The Mishnah in Temurah 6:1-2 is deeply embedded in a rich tapestry of biblical and rabbinic texts, drawing its authority and conceptual framework from various sources.

Devarim 23:19 (23:18) – The Cornerstone of Atnan and Mechir

"לֹא תָבִיא אֶתְנַן זוֹנָה וּמְחִיר כֶּלֶב בֵּית ה' אֱלֹהֶיךָ לְכָל נֶדֶר כִּי תוֹעֲבַת ה' אֱלֹהֶיךָ גַּם שְׁנֵיהֶם." (You shall not bring the payment of a prostitute, or the price of a dog, into the House of the Lord your God for any vow, for both of them are an abomination to the Lord your God.)

This pasuk is the explicit biblical foundation for the prohibition of Atnan (prostitute's payment) and Mechir (dog's price) as offerings on the Mizbeach. The Mishnah meticulously unpacks the nuances of this verse:

• "אתנן זונה ומחיר כלב": These are the two primary cases. The Mishnah provides concrete examples of what constitutes Atnan (e.g., "הרי לך טלה זה בשכרך") and Mechir (e.g., "הרי לך טלה זה במקום כלב"), extending the former to include indirect sexual services (R' Meir vs. Rabbanan regarding "שפחתך שוכבת עם עבדי").
• "שניהם" – "שנין ולא ארבעה": The Mishnah derives a critical limitation from the word "שניהם" (both of them). It teaches that the prohibition applies only to these two specific scenarios, and not to analogous cases like "אתנן כלב" (payment for intercourse with a dog) or "מחיר זונה" (price of a prostitute-slave, i.e., buying a prostitute as a maidservant). This demonstrates the principle of mi'ut (exclusion) in Torah exegesis, where the Torah's specificity limits the scope of the issur.
• "אותם" – "ולא את ולדותיהן": The Mishnah similarly derives from the implied pronoun "אותם" (them) that the prohibition applies exclusively to the animals themselves that were used as Atnan or Mechir, but not to their offspring. This is another example of mi'ut, preventing the issur from extending to subsequent generations.
• "לכל נדר" – "לרבות את העוף": The seemingly superfluous phrase "לכל נדר" (for any vow) is interpreted by the Mishnah as a ribui (inclusion). This is used to extend the prohibition of Atnan and Mechir to birds, which would otherwise be excluded by a kal v'chomer argument based on kodshim (animals) and their susceptibility to mum (blemish). This demonstrates how Chazal utilize every word of the Torah to derive subtle halachic distinctions and expansions.
• "כי תועבת ה' אלהיך": This phrase provides the moral and theological underpinning for the prohibition, categorizing these transactions as "abominations" in the eyes of God, thereby rendering any offering derived from them unsuitable for the sanctity of the Mizbeach.

Shemot 22:18 (22:19) – The Source of Bestiality's Defilement

"כָּל שֹׁכֵב עִם בְּהֵמָה מֹות יוּמָת." (Whoever lies with an animal shall surely be put to death.)

While this pasuk primarily addresses the capital punishment for the human perpetrator of bestiality (ro'vea), it is profoundly relevant to the Mishnah's inclusion of "הרובע והנרבע" (the animal that copulated with a person and the animal that was the object of bestiality) as pasul l'Mizbeach.

• Defilement by Transgression: The Torah's severe condemnation of bestiality, making it a capital offense for the human, inherently marks the animal involved as defiled. This defilement, even if the animal is not put to death (e.g., if there were no two witnesses, as noted by Tosafot Yom Tov Temurah 6:1:2), is sufficient to disqualify it from the sacred service of the Mizbeach. The act itself, being a to'eivah (abomination), renders the animal unfit to be an offering to God.
• Connection to Hashchata: As Rambam explains (Temurah 6:1:1), the issur for ro'vea/nirba is linked to the concept of hashchata (corruption/defilement), derived from pesukim like Bereishit 6:12 ("כי השחית כל בשר את דרכו על הארץ"). Bestiality is the epitome of such corruption, disrupting the natural order and moral boundaries. This deep-seated corruption is what renders the animal pasul l'Mizbeach, regardless of whether it also incurs issur hana'ah (which it would if witnessed by two witnesses and condemned to death).

Mishnah Avodah Zarah 3:3 – The Principle of Tefisat Yedei Adam

"כְּלָל אָמְרוּ בַּעֲבוֹדַת כּוֹכָבִים: כָּל שֶׁיֵּשׁ בּוֹ תְּפִיסַת יְדֵי אָדָם אָסוּר, וּמַה שֶּׁעָלָיו מֻתָּר." (They stated a general rule concerning idol worship: Anything that has human craftsmanship is forbidden, but that which is upon it is permitted.)

This Mishnah is a crucial parallel for understanding the distinction between "מוקצה" and "נעבד" in Temurah 6:1 and the varying degrees of issur hana'ah. Rambam explicitly references this sugya in his commentary.

• The Nature of Issur Hana'ah for Idolatry: The Mishnah in Avodah Zarah establishes that natural objects (like mountains, trees, or unadorned animals) do not become assur b'hana'ah even if worshipped as idols, because they lack "תפיסת ידי אדם" (human craftsmanship/manipulation). This explains the Mishnah Temurah's ruling: "וְזֶה וְזֶה מֻתָּרִין בַּאֲכִילָה" (Both [Muktzah and Ne'evad animals] are permitted for eating). The animals themselves, being natural creations, do not acquire an issur hana'ah even if worshipped.
• "הוא ומה שעליו אסור" for Ne'evad: The Mishnah in Avodah Zarah clarifies that if an object does have "תפיסת ידי אדם," it becomes assur b'hana'ah if worshipped. This is the basis for the Temurah Mishnah's ruling regarding Ne'evad: "הוּא וּמַה שֶּׁעָלָיו אָסוּר." If the Ne'evad animal was adorned with jewelry or garments (products of human craftsmanship), those items become assur b'hana'ah along with the animal itself (if the animal is considered part of the idol's "body" and the adornments are integral). Rambam further clarifies that for Ne'evad, the animal itself would be assur b'hana'ah if it's considered to have "תפיסת ידי אדם" (e.g., it was sculpted or specifically trained and presented as an idol), but if it's a regular animal that simply became an object of worship, only its adornments made by humans would be assur b'hana'ah.
• "הוא אסור ומה שעליו מותר" for Muktzah: For Muktzah (designated, but not yet worshipped), the Mishnah in Temurah rules that "הוא אסור [למזבח], ומה שעליו מותר [בהנאה]". This is because mere designation (without actual worship) does not create issur hana'ah for the animal or its accessories. This further highlights that the issur for Muktzah is primarily l'Mizbeach, not hana'ah.

This intertextual web reveals how the Mishnah in Temurah operates by both quoting explicit biblical law and by applying broader halachic principles from other sugyot to define and differentiate the various categories of sacrificial disqualifications.

Psak/Practice

The halachic principles elucidated in Mishnah Temurah 6:1-2, along with the Rishonim and Acharonim, are not merely academic exercises; they form foundational elements of Halacha that impact practical Jewish life, particularly in the realm of Kedusha and Issur V'Heter.

1. The Principle of "אוסרין כל שהן"

This principle, that certain prohibited items disqualify an entire mixture "in any amount" (bittul b'chol shehu), is a cornerstone of halachot kashrut and kodshim. It signifies a severe prohibition that cannot be nullified by a majority. In practice, this means that even a minute quantity of, for example, Avodah Zarah or chametz on Pesach, or these pesulim if mixed with kodshim, renders the entire mixture prohibited. This stringency reflects the absolute nature of certain divine prohibitions and the sanctity required for offerings. Rambam codifies this broadly in Hilchot Ma'achalot Asurot 15:1 and specifically for kodshim in Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 18:1, stating that all items disqualified for the altar "אוסרין כל שהן." This serves as a significant meta-psak heuristic: where kedusha is involved, or the issur is of the highest biblical severity, bittul b'rov is often suspended.

2. Distinction between Muktzah and Ne'evad

The nuances regarding Muktzah l'Avodah Zarah and Ne'evad are critical for understanding the parameters of issur hana'ah for items related to idol worship. The psak follows Rambam (Hilchot Avodah Zarah 7:1-4) and the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 141), which distinguish between an idol itself and its accessories, and between objects that acquire issur through "תפיסת ידי אדם" (human craftsmanship) and natural objects.

• Natural objects: Mountains, trees, or animals (if unadorned) that were worshipped or designated for worship are generally mutar b'hana'ah themselves, but pasul l'Mizbeach.
• Objects with t'fisat yedei adam: Ornaments, sculptures, or items specifically crafted for idolatrous purposes, if worshipped, become assur b'hana'ah. This distinction is vital for determining whether one can derive benefit from items found near an idolatrous site or from animals that may have been involved in pagan rituals. The requirement for Muktzah to involve an act (beyond mere designation) to become pasul l'Mizbeach (as per Rambam's commentary) reflects the halachic emphasis on tangible action over internal intent in the realm of Avodah Zarah.

3. Scope of Atnan and Mechir

The Mishnah's detailed analysis of Atnan and Mechir and its derivation of "שנין ולא ארבעה" and "אותם ולא את ולדותיהן" directly informs the codified Halacha. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 142) explicitly rules according to these principles: only payment to a prostitute or the price of a dog are prohibited as offerings; related transactions (like atnan kelev or mechir zonah) are permitted. Likewise, the offspring of atnan or mechir animals are permitted. This demonstrates a key meta-psak heuristic: Chazal are meticulous in interpreting the precise wording of the Torah, employing ribui u'mi'ut to strictly limit or expand the scope of prohibitions. The inclusion of "לכל נדר" to include birds is also codified, emphasizing that even a kal v'chomer can be overridden by an explicit pasuk.

4. Status of Tereifa Offspring

The machloket between R' Eliezer and Rabbanan regarding tereifa offspring (R' Eliezer: pasul; Rabbanan: kosher) is generally ruled according to the Rabbanan, meaning the offspring of a tereifa is permitted for the altar (Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 19:10). This indicates a general leniency: the disqualification of the parent (due to a physical defect that causes imminent death) does not inherently transfer to its healthy offspring, provided the offspring itself is not a tereifa. This reflects a broader halachic principle that disqualifications are often specific to the entity that incurred them unless explicitly extended.

5. Redemption of Kodshim that Became Tereifot

The Mishnah's final ruling, "כָּל קָדָשִׁים שֶׁנִּטְרְפוּ, אֵין פּוֹדִין אוֹתָן. שֶׁאֵין פּוֹדִין קָדָשִׁים לְהַאֲכִילָן לַכְּלָבִים" (All consecrated animals that became tereifot, one may not redeem them, for one does not redeem consecrated animals to feed them to dogs), establishes a fundamental principle concerning the respect due to kodshim. Even if an animal becomes disqualified and unfit for the altar (and thus no longer has its primary kedusha), it retains a secondary level of sanctity that prevents its redemption for a base purpose like feeding to dogs. Instead, such animals must be buried. This rule, codified in Rambam (Hilchot Ma'aseh HaKorbanot 18:17) and Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 140), underscores the kavod (honor) inherent in kedusha, even after the object's primary function has been lost.

Takeaway

This Mishnah serves as a foundational text in halachot isurei Mizbeach, meticulously defining diverse categories of sacrificial disqualifications and establishing rigorous bittul standards. Its detailed analysis of Atnan, Mechir, and Avodah Zarah reveals how Chazal employ precise textual exegesis and conceptual distinctions to delineate the scope of kedusha and tumah in Jewish law.