Mishnah Temurah 6:3-4

Sugya Map

The Mishnah in Temurah 6:3-4 meticulously delineates a series of animals and items disqualified from being offered on the Mizbe'ach (altar), establishing their unique halakhic parameters.

Issue

The core issue is the nature and scope of various psulei HaMizbe'ach (disqualifications for the altar), specifically how they interact with bitul b'rov (nullification in a majority), their applicability to offspring, and the precise definition of "אתנן זונה" (payment of a prostitute) and "מחיר כלב" (price of a dog). The Mishnah also addresses the psul of treifot and yotsei dofen (caesarean-born animals), and the din of pidyon (redemption) for kodashim that become tereifot.

Nafka Mina(s)

• Mixtures: Understanding which psulim prohibit "בכל שהן" (in any amount) – a significant deviation from standard bitul b'rov in issurei kodesh.
• Offspring: Whether the psul extends to the offspring of the prohibited animal, critical for determining subsequent generations' fitness for the altar.
• Scope of "אתנן" and "מחיר": Distinguishing between prohibited payments/prices and permitted ones, and whether the issur applies to money, animals, or other items. This has implications for general halachot of issurei hana'ah (prohibitions of benefit).
• Briar (Retroactive Designation): The debate surrounding the application of briera in d'Oraita (Torah) prohibitions, particularly in the case of divided partnerships involving machir kelev.
• Pidyon Kodashim: Clarifying that kodashim which become tereifot cannot be redeemed, as this would constitute bizuy kodesh (degradation of sacred items).

Primary Sources

• Mishnah Temurah 6:3-4
• Devarim 23:19 ("לא תביא אתנן זונה ומחיר כלב בית ה' אלֹהיך לכל נדר כי תועבת ה' אלֹהיך גם שניהם")
• Talmud Bavli, Bekhorot 57a (regarding briera in machir kelev)
• Talmud Bavli, Zevachim 74a (regarding kodashim that prohibit b'chol she'hu)
• Rambam, Hilchot Issurei Mizbe'ach 4:1-7

Text Snapshot

The Mishnah opens with a foundational principle:

"כל הנאסרין על גבי המזבח, נתערבו בהיתר – אוסרין בכל שהן. אלו הן הנאסרין: רובע ונרבע, מוקצה ונעבד, אתנן ומחיר, כלאים וטרפה, ויוצא דופן."^[Mishnah Temurah 6:3] (With regard to all animals whose sacrifice on the altar is prohibited, if they are intermingled with animals whose sacrifice is permitted, they prohibit the entire mixture of animals in any amount… These are the animals whose sacrifice is prohibited: An animal that copulated with a person, and an animal that was the object of bestiality, and the set-aside, and one that was worshipped, and an animal that was given as payment to a prostitute or as the price of a dog, or an animal crossbred from a mixture of diverse kinds, or an animal with a wound that will cause it to die within twelve months [tereifa], or an animal born by caesarean section.)

This "אוסרין בכל שהן" is a crucial chiddush, as generally, issurei d'Oraita (Torah prohibitions) can be nullified in a 1:60 ratio (bitul b'shishim), but kodashim often have a stricter din. The Mishnah then proceeds to define several of these categories, highlighting subtle distinctions.

Regarding "מוקצה" (set-aside for idol worship) vs. "נעבד" (actually worshipped):

"איזהו מוקצה? שהוקצה לעבודת כוכבים: הוא אסור, ומה שעליו מותר. ואיזהו נעבד? כל שנעבד: הוא ומה שעליו אסור. ושניהם מותרין באכילה."^[Mishnah Temurah 6:3] (Which is the animal that is set-aside? It is an animal that is set aside for idol worship. The animal itself is prohibited, but that which is upon it, e.g., its jewelry and garments, is permitted… And which is the animal that was worshipped? It is any animal that a person worships as an object of idol worship. In this case, the sacrifice of both the animal itself and an animal purchased using the money from the sale of that which is upon it is prohibited. And the consumption of both this, the animal designated for idol worship, and that, the animal worshipped, is permitted.)

Note the dikduk: "הוא אסור, ומה שעליו מותר" for muktzah, but "הוא ומה שעליו אסור" for ne'evad. The issur of ne'evad is more expansive, prohibiting even accessories. Both, however, are mutarim b'achila (permitted for consumption) – a critical distinction from other issurei avodah zarah.

The Mishnah then defines "אתנן" and "מחיר":

"איזהו אתנן זונה? האומר לזונה: הרי לך טלה זה בשכרך. אפילו מאה, כולם אסורין. וכן האומר לחבירו: הרי לך טלה זה ותלין שפחתך אצל עבדי. רבי מאיר אומר: אינו אתנן. וחכמים אומרים: הרי זה אתנן."^[Mishnah Temurah 6:3] (And which is the case of an animal used as payment to a prostitute, which is prohibited as a sacrifice? It is the case of one who says to a prostitute: Here is this lamb as your fee. Even if they were one hundred lambs that he gave her, all of them are prohibited. And likewise, in the case of one who says to another: Here is this lamb and in return your maidservant will lie with my slave and engage in intercourse with him, Rabbi Meir says: Its halakhic status is not that of payment to a prostitute, and the Rabbis say: Its halakhic status is that of payment to a prostitute.)

Here, the phrase "אפילו מאה, כולם אסורין" is striking, demonstrating the pervasive nature of the issur. The dispute between R' Meir and Rabbanan broadens the definition of atnan.

"איזהו מחיר כלב? האומר לחבירו: הרי לך טלה זה תחת כלב זה. וכן שני שותפין שחלקו: אחד נוטל עשרה ואחד נוטל תשעה וכלב. שכנגד הכלב אסורין, ותשעה הכלב מותרין."^[Mishnah Temurah 6:3] (And which is the case where an animal has the halakhic status of the price of a dog...? It is one who says to another: Here is this lamb in place of a dog. And likewise, this prohibition applies in the case of two partners who divided their common property... one took ten lambs and the other one took nine lambs and a dog. Sacrifice of the ten lambs taken by the partner in exchange for the nine lambs and the dog is prohibited, and sacrifice of the nine lambs that were taken by the partner with the dog is permitted.)

The case of the two partners is especially complex, raising questions of briera and bitul b'rov. The Mishnah's ruling "שכנגד הכלב אסורין" (those corresponding to the dog are prohibited) implies a comprehensive issur on the entire group of ten. The phrase "תשעה הכלב מותרין" (the nine lambs with the dog are permitted) further sharpens the distinction.

The Mishnah then distinguishes further:

"אתנן כלב, ומחיר זונה – הרי אלו מותרין, שנאמר: 'שנים ולא ארבעה'. ולדותיהן – מותרין, שנאמר: 'אותן ולא ולדותיהן'."^[Mishnah Temurah 6:3] (With regard to lambs given as payment to another for engaging in intercourse with his dog, or as the price of a prostitute to purchase her as his maidservant, their sacrifice is permitted, as it is stated: “As both of them are an abomination to the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 23:19), from which it is inferred: Two are prohibited, payment to a prostitute and the price of a dog, and not four... Furthermore, with regard to the two prohibited cases... sacrifice of their offspring is permitted, as it is stated “them,” and not their offspring.)

The derasha "שנים ולא ארבעה" and "אותן ולא ולדותיהן" directly from Devarim 23:19 provides the exegetical basis for limiting the issur.

Finally, the Mishnah addresses items other than animals and the cases of treifa and yotsei dofen:

"הביא מעות – מותרין. יין ושמן וסלת, וכל דבר שדרכו לבא למזבח – אסורין. הביא קדשים – מותרין... הביא עופות חולין – אסורין... כל הנאסרין על גבי המזבח – ולדותיהן מותרין... רבי אליעזר אומר: ולד טרפה לא יקרב על גבי המזבח. וחכמים אומרים: יקרב... כל הקדשים שנטרפו – אין פודין אותן, שאין פודין קדשים להאכילן לכלבים."^[Mishnah Temurah 6:4] (If one gave money to a prostitute as her payment, it is permitted... If he paid her with wine, or oil, or flour, or any other item the like of which is sacrificed on the altar, sacrifice of those items is prohibited. If he gave her consecrated items for her services, their sacrifice is permitted... If he paid her with non-sacred birds, their sacrifice is prohibited... With regard to all animals whose sacrifice on the altar is prohibited, sacrifice of their offspring is permitted. Rabbi Eliezer says: The offspring of an animal with a wound that will cause it to die within twelve months [tereifa] shall not be sacrificed on the altar. But the Rabbis say: It shall be sacrificed... With regard to all sacrificial animals that became tereifot, one may not redeem them, as one does not redeem sacrificial animals to feed them to dogs.)

The kal v'chomer regarding birds, followed by a ribbui from "לכל נדר," shows the Mishnaic method of expanding halakha from peshat. The debate on walad treifa highlights a specific disagreement regarding the reach of psul to offspring, and the rule about pidyon for tereifot reinforces the sanctity of kodashim.

Readings

Rambam: The Distributed Nature of "מחיר כלב"

The Rambam, in his commentary on Mishnah Temurah 6:3:1, offers a nuanced interpretation of the case of the two partners who divide their property, one taking ten lambs and the other nine lambs and a dog. The Mishnah states, "שכנגד הכלב אסורים" (those corresponding to the dog are prohibited). The Gemara (Bekhorot 57a) questions this, suggesting that only one lamb should be prohibited, the one specifically designated as machir kelev. The Rambam's explanation, however, posits a more intricate understanding of how the issur of machir kelev attaches to the items.

Rambam explains:

"מה שאמר שכנגד הכלב אסורים ע"מ שהוא מחיר הכלב בפני עצמו יתר מכל אחד ואחד מהעשרה טלאים שכנגדו לפי שהחלק שהוא תמורת אותו התוספת מצוי בכל אחד מהעשרה טלאים ולפיכך אסורים כלם אבל אם היה מחיר הכלב כנגד מחיר אחד מהעשרה או פחות ממנו מפריש אותו הכבש כנגד הכלב ויהיה מחיריו ויהיו מותרין התשעה שיש עמו."^[Rambam, Mishnah Temurah 6:3:1] (What it said, "those corresponding to the dog are prohibited," is on the condition that the value of the dog by itself is greater than any one of the ten lambs given in exchange for it. For the portion that is the exchange for that additional value is present in each of the ten lambs, and therefore all of them are prohibited. But if the value of the dog was equal to the value of one of the ten [lambs] or less than it, then one would separate that lamb corresponding to the dog, and it would be its price, and the nine [lambs] with it would be permitted.)

Chiddush: The Rambam's chiddush lies in understanding "מחיר כלב" not as an issur attaching to a specific, identifiable lamb, but rather as a value-based prohibition that can be distributed across multiple items. If the dog's value (which becomes machir kelev) is greater than any single lamb, then a proportion of that prohibited value is inherent in each of the ten lambs. Consequently, all ten become prohibited, as each contains a part of the issur. This means the issur is tied to the transactional value rather than the specific physical object, thereby preventing a simple designation of one lamb as the "price of the dog." However, if the dog's value is less than or equal to a single lamb, then a specific lamb can be designated as machir kelev, and the rest remain permitted. This distinction is crucial and explains why the Mishnah prohibits all ten lambs in the case where the collective value of the ten lambs exceeds the value of the nine lambs and the dog, implying the dog contributed a "surplus" value spread across the ten.

Tosafot Yom Tov: Briera and the Timing of Issur

The Tosafot Yom Tov (TYT) on Mishnah Temurah 6:3:1 delves into the same conundrum concerning the two partners and the prohibition of all ten lambs. He notes the Gemara's query: "ליפוק חד להדי כלבא והנך כולהו לישתרו" (Bekhorot 57a)^[Talmud Bavli, Bekhorot 57a] – why not just separate one lamb as machir kelev and permit the rest? This question is rooted in the principle of briera (retroactive designation). The TYT highlights the general rule that "בדאורייתא אין ברירה" (in Torah law, there is no briera), making the Mishnah's ruling problematic. If briera doesn't apply d'Oraita, how can we assume a specific lamb is machir kelev? And if it does, why are all ten prohibited?

The TYT brings the klal gadol (great principle) of Moreinu HaRaMaR (Rabbi Meir of Rothenburg) via Tosafot to resolve this:

"ואומר מורי הרמ"ר כלל גדול בדין זה דודאי כל דבר שהוברר האיסור מתחלה ואח"כ נתערב בהיתר. לא סמכינן אברירה כיון שתערובתו היה באיסור. אבל הני תערובתו בהיתר. כי האיסור לא היה מבורר קודם תערובתו. ולאחר התערובות נולד האיסור אז סמכינן אברירה."^[Tosafot Yom Tov on Mishnah Temurah 6:3:1] (And my teacher the RaMaR states a great principle in this matter: Certainly, any item whose prohibition was clear from the outset and then subsequently mixed with permitted items – we do not rely on briera, since its mixture occurred when it was already prohibited. But in this case [of the partners], its mixture was with permitted items, because the prohibition was not clear before its mixture. And after the mixture, the prohibition was born – then we rely on briera.)

Chiddush: The RaMaR's chiddush introduces a critical distinction regarding the application of briera: its permissibility depends on the timing of the issur's creation relative to the mixture. If the issur exists before the mixture, briera is ineffective. However, if the issur arises or is born as a result of the mixture or transaction itself (as in the partners' division, where the lambs become machir kelev at the moment of exchange), then briera can be applied. This would theoretically allow for separating one lamb. The TYT, however, still needs to reconcile why the Mishnah states all ten are prohibited. Perhaps the RaMaR's klal simply addresses if briera could apply, but not whether it would lead to heter in this specific Kodashim context, where other stringencies (like b'chol she'hu) might override it.

Rashash: Re-evaluating Briera and Bitul in Machir Kelev

The Rashash, in his super-commentary on the Tosafot Yom Tov, critically examines the TYT's reliance on the RaMaR's principle of briera.

Rashash states:

"פשוט דהתוס' ר"ל דוקא למ"ד דיש ברירה כמש"כ בריש הדבור. והרי הא דהלוקח יין מביא הש"ס בכ"מ לפלוגתא דברירה. וכן הא דסוגיין פריך בבכורות (נ"ז) רק למ"ד דיש ברירה. ותמיהני על התוי"ט דנראה שהבין דר"ל דבכה"ג לכ"ע י"ב [יש ברירה]."^[Rashash on Tosafot Yom Tov, Temurah 6:3:1] (It is simple that the Tosafot [RaMaR] means specifically according to the one who holds that there is briera, as written at the beginning of the discussion. And indeed, the case of one who buys wine is brought by the Gemara in many places as a dispute regarding briera. And similarly, the Gemara in Bekhorot (57a) questions our sugya only according to the one who holds there is briera. And I am puzzled by the Tosafot Yom Tov, for it appears he understood that in such a case, briera applies according to all opinions.)

Rashash's Critique: Rashash argues that the TYT seems to imply the RaMaR's klal creates a scenario where briera applies l'kula (leniently) for everyone, resolving the general issue of "אין ברירה בדאורייתא." However, Rashash contends that the briera debate is fundamental and the Gemara's question in Bekhorot 57a only makes sense according to the opinion that yesh briera (there is briera). If ein briera (no briera), the question of "ליפוק חד" (let one be designated) wouldn't even arise. Thus, the RaMaR's klal is not a universal solution but a nuance within the yesh briera camp.

Rashash then addresses Tosafot Chadashim's suggestion that the issur of machir kelev in this specific mixture is only d'Rabanan because d'Oraita it should batel b'rov (be nullified in a majority). Rashash refutes this, citing Shach (YD 110:19) and Milchemet HaShem (Rambam, Hilchot Bekhorot 4:1), which state that if the safek (doubt) concerning the issur arose when it was d'Oraita, it retains its d'Oraita status, even if subsequent factors might seem to reduce it to d'Rabanan. Moreover, the remaining items would still be d'Oraita machir kelev.

Rashash's Own Resolution (citing Milchemet HaShem):

"ומה שהתפלא בתור"ע דאף בלא תערובות אחר כיון דמחיר הכלב מעורב עם ט' מדאורייתא בטל ברוב נ"ל ליישב עפ"י מש"כ המל"מ בפ"ט מהלכות מטמאי מו"מ בכוונת המרדכי וז"ל ונראה דעיקר החילוק הוא שכ"ד שתחלת איסורו כו' היה מעורב לא שייך ביה ביטול ע"ש."^[Rashash on Tosafot Yom Tov, Temurah 6:3:1] (And what the Torah Or wondered, that even without another mixture, since machir kelev is mixed with nine others, it should d'Oraita be nullified in a majority – it seems to me to resolve this based on what the Milchemet HaShem wrote in chapter 9 of Hilchot Metamei Meitim, concerning the intent of the Mordechai, and it states: "And it seems that the main distinction is that any item whose issur began in a mixed state, bitul does not apply to it.")

Chiddush: The Rashash's ultimate chiddush (drawing from Milchemet HaShem) offers a profound understanding of bitul b'rov. It's not merely about a prohibited item getting "lost" in a majority. Rather, if the issur itself originates or begins in a mixed state (i.e., the "price of the dog" never existed as a distinct, unmixed entity, but was created within the group of lambs during the exchange), then the principle of bitul b'rov does not apply. This aligns with the Rambam's idea of the issur being distributed. There's no "single unit" of machir kelev to be nullified, as the prohibited aspect permeated the entire group from its inception.

Mishnat Eretz Yisrael: Historical and Cultural Context of "אתנן" and "מחיר"

The Mishnat Eretz Yisrael (MEI) offers a distinctive approach, moving beyond purely textual-halakhic analysis to explore the historical and cultural origins of "אתנן זונה" and "מחיר כלב." It questions whether the rabbinic definitions perfectly align with the Biblical intent, considering the evolution of pagan practices.

MEI states:

"איזה מחיר כלב האומר לחבירו הא לך טלה זה תחת כלב זה – עדיין העברה אינה ברורה, שהרי החלפת כלב בטלה אינה עברה. הכוונה כנראה שנותן לו את הטלה כדי שהכלב ירביע את הטלה. בתוספתא שנינו: 'איזהו מחיר כלב? אלו חלופי כלב, שנאמר 'תמכר' עמך בלא הון ולא רבית במחיריהם. החליף עמו פרכילי ענבים, ועטרות של שובלין, יינות, שמנים, וסלתות, כל דבר שהוא כיוצא בו קרב לגבי מזבח אסורה' (פ"ד ה"ד, עמ' 555). פרכילי (אשכולות) ענבים ויתר הרשימה הם מסממניה המובהקים של עבודה זרה... התוספתא פירשה אפוא את 'מחיר כלב' לא כהרבעה אלא כדרך של עבודה זרה."^[Mishnat Eretz Yisrael on Mishnah Temurah 6:3:1] (Which is the price of a dog? One who says to his friend, "Here is this lamb in place of this dog" – the transgression is still not clear, for exchanging a dog for a lamb is not a transgression. The intention is apparently that he gives him the lamb so that the dog will mate with the lamb. In the Tosefta we learned: "Which is the price of a dog? These are exchanges for a dog, as it says, 'You sell your people for no gain, and make no profit on their price.' He exchanged with him grape clusters, and wreaths of sheaves, wines, oils, and fine flour – any item of its kind that is offered on the altar is prohibited." (Tosefta Avodah Zarah 4:4). Grape clusters and the rest of the list are clear signs of idol worship... The Tosefta therefore interpreted "price of a dog" not as mating but as a form of idol worship.)

MEI's Contextual Insights:

1. Challenging the Obvious: MEI points out that a simple exchange of a dog for a lamb doesn't inherently constitute a transgression. It suggests the Gemara's interpretation of "זנות בבהמה" (bestiality with an animal) might imply a dog mating with a lamb.
2. Avodah Zarah Connection: Drawing from the Tosefta, MEI argues that "מחיר כלב" might be linked to Avodah Zarah practices, where specific items (grape clusters, wine, etc.) were associated with pagan cults, and dogs might have been sacred animals or objects of worship. It cites Ramban on Devarim 23:19, who also grappled with the plain meaning, suggesting dogs were associated with hunting and pagan rituals involving effigies of dogs before idols for success.
3. Mythological and Archeological Parallels: MEI explores fascinating parallels, such as the Greek myth of Kerberos (the monstrous dog guarding the underworld) and the practice of placing coins on the eyes of the deceased as payment for Charon's ferry. It speculates on a possible blurring between payment for the ferryman and payment for the dog-guardian, potentially explaining "מחיר כלב." It also references archeological findings of dog burials in Ashkelon from the Persian period, suggesting sacred dogs in Canaanite culture.
4. Rabbinic Re-interpretation: MEI posits that the Chazal's definitions of "אתנן" and "מחיר" might be applications of ancient Biblical concepts to their contemporary (Greek-Roman) realities, or even literary expressions rather than reflections of widespread practices in their time. The term "מחיר" (price) in Chazal's usage often means "exchange" (chalifin), not necessarily monetary payment.

Chiddush: The Mishnat Eretz Yisrael's chiddush is its multi-layered, interdisciplinary approach. It enriches the textual understanding by anchoring "אתנן" and "מחיר" in their broader historical, cultural, and mythological contexts. It suggests that Chazal might have been interpreting a Biblical prohibition whose original context was already obscure, or adapting it to new pagan realities, thereby highlighting the dynamic nature of halakhic interpretation across generations.

Friction

The most potent kushya in this sugya emerges from the Mishnah's ruling in the case of the two partners:

"וכן שני שותפין שחלקו: אחד נוטל עשרה ואחד נוטל תשעה וכלב. שכנגד הכלב אסורין..."^[Mishnah Temurah 6:3] (And likewise, this prohibition applies in the case of two partners who divided their common property... one took ten lambs and the other one took nine lambs and a dog. Sacrifice of the ten lambs taken by the partner in exchange for the nine lambs and the dog is prohibited...)

The Gemara in Bekhorot challenges this: "ליפוק חד להדי כלבא והנך כולהו לישתרו?"^[Talmud Bavli, Bekhorot 57a] (Why not designate one lamb as corresponding to the dog, and permit the rest?). This is a fundamental challenge rooted in two interconnected halakhic principles:

1. Briar (Retroactive Designation): If we know one of the ten lambs is machir kelev, why can't we retroactively designate which one it is, remove it, and permit the remaining nine?
2. Bitul b'rov (Nullification in a Majority): Even if briera isn't applicable, why isn't the one machir kelev lamb nullified within the nine permitted ones? Generally, issurei d'Oraita are nullified by a 1:60 ratio. While kodashim have specific stringencies, the phrase "אוסרין בכל שהן" (prohibit in any amount) in the Mishnah's opening refers to the listed categories themselves once they are prohibited, not necessarily to every instance of mixture. Here, we have one prohibited item (the machir kelev lamb) mixed with nine permitted ones.

The friction is profound because the Mishnah's blanket prohibition on all ten lambs seems to contradict intuitive applications of briera or bitul b'rov. If the issur is on a single item (the "price of the dog"), why does it infect the entire group?

The Best Terutz (or two)

Terutz 1: The RaMaR's Distinction in Briera (via Tosafot Yom Tov)

The first strong terutz addresses the briera aspect by refining its application, as presented by the Tosafot Yom Tov in the name of Moreinu HaRaMaR. The general rule is "בדאורייתא אין ברירה" (there is no briera in Torah law), meaning we cannot retroactively designate a specific item as the prohibited one if the issur was unclear at the outset. However, the RaMaR distinguishes:

"כל דבר שהוברר האיסור מתחלה ואח"כ נתערב בהיתר. לא סמכינן אברירה כיון שתערובתו היה באיסור. אבל הני תערובתו בהיתר. כי האיסור לא היה מבורר קודם תערובתו. ולאחר התערובות נולד האיסור אז סמכינן אברירה."^[Tosafot Yom Tov on Mishnah Temurah 6:3:1] (Certainly, any item whose prohibition was clear from the outset and then subsequently mixed with permitted items – we do not rely on briera, since its mixture occurred when it was already prohibited. But in this case [of the partners], its mixture was with permitted items, because the prohibition was not clear before its mixture. And after the mixture, the prohibition was born – then we rely on briera.)

According to this, the issur of machir kelev in the partners' case is "נולד האיסור לאחר התערובות" (the prohibition was born after the mixture). The lambs only became "price of a dog" at the moment of the exchange and division. Since the mixture (the group of ten lambs) already existed when the issur came into being, briera could theoretically be applied to identify the specific lamb.

However, the RaMaR's distinction, while allowing for briera in this scenario, doesn't immediately explain why all ten are prohibited. If briera applies, why not designate one and permit the rest? The Gemara in Bekhorot 57a does indeed question this, suggesting that if there is briera, one should be removed. The Mishnah's ruling of "אסורין" for all implies that even with briera, something else prevents the remaining nine from being permitted. This leads us to the second, perhaps more comprehensive, terutz.

Terutz 2: The Distributed Issur and Inception of Mixture (Rambam & Milchemet HaShem via Rashash)

This terutz operates on two complementary levels, best articulated by the Rambam's explanation and further developed by the Milchemet HaShem (Malbim) as cited by the Rashash.

A. Rambam's Distributed Value: The Rambam explains that the prohibition of "מחיר כלב" is not necessarily attached to a single, identifiable lamb, but rather to the value of the dog. If the dog's value exceeds that of any single lamb, then the prohibited "price" is effectively distributed across all the lambs received in exchange. Each lamb thus contains a portion of the issur. Since the issur is spread, there is no single "one lamb" to remove or designate, and consequently, no briera can effectively separate it without leaving a prohibited residue in the others.

"החלק שהוא תמורת אותו התוספת מצוי בכל אחד מהעשרה טלאים ולפיכך אסורים כלם."^[Rambam, Mishnah Temurah 6:3:1] (The portion that is the exchange for that additional value is present in each of the ten lambs, and therefore all of them are prohibited.)

B. Milchemet HaShem's "Inception of Issur in Mixture" (cited by Rashash): Building upon this, the Rashash cites the Milchemet HaShem's explanation of the Mordechai:

"עיקר החילוק הוא שכ"ד שתחלת איסורו כו' היה מעורב לא שייך ביה ביטול."^[Rashash on Tosafot Yom Tov, Temurah 6:3:1] (The main distinction is that any item whose issur began in a mixed state, bitul does not apply to it.)

This principle directly addresses the bitul b'rov aspect. The "price of a dog" is not a pre-existing prohibited entity that later got mixed with permitted items. Rather, the issur comes into being at the very moment the exchange occurs, and it is already intertwined with the group of ten lambs. Since the issur was never a distinct, unmixed entity, there's no "bitul" process to apply. The issur is inherently part of the mixture from its very inception.

Synthesis: When these two points are combined, the Mishnah's ruling makes perfect sense. The issur of machir kelev is not a discrete item to be identified (rendering briera inapplicable in a practical sense), nor can it be nullified, because it was born into and spread across the entire mixture at the very moment of the prohibited transaction. This demonstrates a heightened stringency for kodashim, where the nature of the issur itself (transactional, distributed, or originating in a mixture) can override standard halakhot of mixtures.

This approach resolves both the briera and bitul b'rov questions by fundamentally altering our understanding of how machir kelev attaches to the items, making the Mishnah's "שכנגד הכלב אסורין" a precise and logical outcome.

Intertext

The sugya of atnan and machir kelev is deeply rooted in Tanakh and reverberates through various halakhic discussions, particularly concerning kodashim and general issurei hana'ah.

Tanakh: The Foundational Source (Devarim 23:19)

The primary source for the prohibition of atnan and machir kelev is Devarim 23:19:

"לֹא תָבִיא אֶתְנַן זוֹנָה וּמְחִיר כֶּלֶב בֵּית ה' אֱלֹהֶיךָ לְכָל נֶדֶר כִּי תוֹעֲבַת ה' אֱלֹהֶיךָ גַּם שְׁנֵיהֶם."^[Devarim 23:19] (You shall not bring the payment of a prostitute, or the price of a dog, into the House of the Lord your God for any vow, for both of them are an abomination to the Lord your God.)

This verse establishes the prohibition against bringing such items as offerings. The Mishnah in Temurah expands on crucial phrases:

• "לְכָל נֶדֶר" (for any vow): The Mishnah uses this phrase to include birds in the prohibition, through a kal v'chomer argument which is then ultimately supported by this ribbui from the pasuk. This demonstrates Chazal's method of deriving broader halakhot from specific Biblical phrasing.
• "כִּי תוֹעֲבַת ה' אֱלֹהֶיךָ גַּם שְׁנֵיהֶם" (for both of them are an abomination to the Lord your God): The Mishnah derives "שנים ולא ארבעה" (two and not four) from "גם שניהם," limiting the issur to these two specific categories and excluding "אתנן כלב" (payment for bestiality with a dog) and "מחיר זונה" (price of a prostitute). This derasha is a prime example of ribbui u'miut (inclusion and exclusion) in halakhic exegesis.
• "אותן ולא ולדותיהן" (them and not their offspring): While not explicit in the verse, the Mishnah derives the permission of offspring from the direct mention of "שניהם" (both of them), implying the issur is restricted to the original items. This is a common derasha pattern (e.g., "אותו ולא את פריו").

The Mishnat Eretz Yisrael (on Temurah 6:3:1) highlights the interpretive challenge of this verse, noting that even Ramban (on Devarim 23:19) struggled with the precise meaning of "מחיר כלב," linking it to pagan practices of hunters. This underscores that Chazal's definitions were often a practical application of ancient, sometimes obscure, Biblical prohibitions.

Halakhot of Ta'aruvot (Mixtures) and Kodashim

The Mishnah's opening statement, "כל הנאסרין על גבי המזבח... אוסרין בכל שהן," sets a stringent precedent for kodashim that deviates from general halakhot of bitul b'rov.

• Zevachim 74a: The Gemara there discusses the stringency of kodashim regarding mixtures, explaining that items prohibited from the Mizbe'ach often prohibit b'chol she'hu. This is because they are considered davar chamur (a weighty matter) or because their psul is inherent and cannot be nullified. The machir kelev falls into this category, reinforcing its exceptional status in mixtures.
• Bekhorot 57a: As discussed in the "Friction" section, this Gemara directly addresses our Mishnah's case of the partners, questioning the non-application of briera. This sugya is a classic case study for the fundamental debate between yesh briera and ein briera in d'Oraita matters. The various terutzim (e.g., RaMaR's distinction, Rambam's distributed issur) are critical for understanding how halakha navigates these complex scenarios.
• Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De'ah 110 (Hilchot Ta'aruvot): While atnan and machir kelev are usually discussed in kodashim, the underlying principles of bitul b'rov and items that "prohibit in any amount" are foundational to Hilchot Ta'aruvot. For instance, the concept of davar she'yeish lo matirin (an item that has a way to be permitted) not being nullified, or issurim that are chaver (significant) not nullifying, provides a broader context for the stringency applied here. Even if atnan and machir kelev are not davar she'yeish lo matirin in the typical sense, their inherent "abomination" status elevates them to a similar stringency where bitul is not an option.

Responsa Literature: Modern Applications of Fundamental Principles

While direct psak on atnan and machir kelev for korbanot is rare today, the underlying principles of briera, bitul b'rov, and issur attaching to value or transaction continue to be debated in contemporary halakhic discourse. For example, discussions in Choshen Mishpat regarding partnerships, ownership, and the nature of "exchange" often draw parallels to these ancient sugyot. A responsum might address a case where money or goods from a prohibited transaction are mixed, and the posek would need to determine if the issur is distributed, if bitul applies, or if briera is relevant, drawing on the very distinctions seen in Temurah.

The narrative involving Rabbi Eliezer and Yaakov Ish Kfar Sakhnin in Avodah Zarah 16b-17a (cited by Mishnat Eretz Yisrael) also provides an interesting intertextual perspective. Yaakov, a Jewish-Christian, asks R' Eliezer about using atnan zona for a public latrine, suggesting "ממקום הטנופת באו, למקום הטנופת ילכו" (from a place of filth they came, to a place of filth they shall go). R' Eliezer admits this idea pleased him, leading to his arrest for heresy. This shows that even though atnan is mutar b'hana'ah (permitted for benefit) and achila (consumption), its morally tainted origin spurred creative, albeit heterodox, attempts to dispose of it appropriately. This highlights the meta-halakhic and moral dimension of these prohibitions, beyond just their sacrificial disqualification.

Psak/Practice

The sugya of Mishnah Temurah 6:3-4, while primarily dealing with kodashim (sacrifices) which are not currently offered, yields profound halakhic and meta-halakhic insights that continue to inform psak and halakhic heuristics.

Halakhic Application

• Core Prohibitions: The fundamental prohibitions of "אתנן זונה" and "מחיר כלב" from Devarim 23:19, and the extended list of psulei Mizbe'ach (רובע ונרבע, מוקצה ונעבד, כלאים וטרפה, ויוצא דופן), remain enshrined in Halakha. The Rambam codifies these laws extensively in Hilchot Issurei Mizbe'ach (Chapters 3-5)^[Rambam, Hilchot Issurei Mizbe'ach 3:1-5:18]. Were the Beit HaMikdash to be rebuilt, these halakhot would be directly applicable for determining the fitness of offerings.
• Offspring: The general rule "אותן ולא ולדותיהן" (them and not their offspring) for atnan and machir kelev (and most other psulei Mizbe'ach) is a critical distinction. This means that while the original animal is disqualified, its progeny can be offered, highlighting a limited scope for the issur. The exception of R' Eliezer regarding walad treifa and the Rabbis' disagreement further refine this. The accepted halakha follows the Rabbis, that walad treifa is permitted for sacrifice.^[Rambam, Hilchot Issurei Mizbe'ach 4:18]
• Mixtures "בכל שהן": The principle that certain psulei Mizbe'ach prohibit "בכל שהן" (in any amount) upon mixture with heter is a hallmark of the stringency of kodashim. This overrides standard bitul b'rov rules, reflecting the elevated sanctity and specific nature of these prohibitions when it comes to the altar. This rule is codified in Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De'ah regarding kodashim that are not fit for the altar (e.g., YD 100:1, though this specifically for kodashim and not general issurei hana'ah).
• Pidyon of Tereifot: The ruling "אין פודין קדשים להאכילן לכלבים" (one does not redeem sacrificial animals to feed them to dogs) is crucial. It establishes that a kodesh animal, even if it becomes a tereifa (and thus unfit for the altar), cannot be redeemed to be treated as chullin (non-sacred) and used for base purposes. This reflects the concept of bizuy kodesh (degradation of sacred items), a significant concern in halakha. The halakha is that such kodashim must be left to die or be buried.^[Rambam, Hilchot Issurei Mizbe'ach 4:19]

Meta-Psak Heuristics

• Stringency of Kodashim: The entire sugya exemplifies the heightened stringency applied to kodashim. Principles like "אוסרין בכל שהן," the intricate definitions of psul, and the refusal to redeem tereifa kodashim for common use, all underscore that halakha treats items consecrated for the Mizbe'ach with exceptional gravity, often overriding more lenient rules that apply to chullin. This serves as a general heuristic: when dealing with sacred items, expect stricter rules.
• Nature of Issur: Object vs. Transaction/Value: The Rambam's explanation of machir kelev as a distributed issur attached to value rather than a specific object is a powerful meta-halakhic insight. It teaches that issur is not always a static property of a physical item but can be dynamic, transactional, and even abstract. This has implications for understanding issurei hana'ah in financial transactions or complex mixtures where the prohibited element is not physically discrete.
• Briar in D'Oraita: The debate surrounding briera in d'Oraita matters, as seen in the partners' case, is a foundational heuristic. This sugya serves as a classic prooftext and case study for the parameters and limitations of briera, which is debated across many areas of Halakha. The varying approaches (RaMaR, Rashash) demonstrate the intricate reasoning required to determine when briera can or cannot be invoked.
• Biblical Interpretation and Rabbinic Expansion: The Mishnah's use of "שנים ולא ארבעה" and "אותן ולא ולדותיהן" as derashot from Devarim 23:19, and its expansion of "לכל נדר" to include birds, showcases the dynamic interplay between the peshat (plain meaning) of the pasuk and Chazal's exegetical development of Halakha. This is a constant heuristic: Halakha is often derived through sophisticated interpretive methods that go beyond simple literal readings.

Takeaway

The Mishnah in Temurah 6:3-4 meticulously charts the disqualifications for the altar, revealing that issur in kodashim can be uniquely pervasive, attaching to value, originating within mixtures, and defying standard nullification rules, all while rooted in moral imperatives and precise scriptural exegesis.