Mishnah Temurah 6:5-7:1

Sugya Map

The Mishnah in Temurah 6:5-7:1 delineates various categories of animals and items disqualified from the altar (pesulei mizbe'ach), their progeny, and appropriate methods of destruction. The primary focus of 6:5 is the status of offspring, particularly in cases where the parent animal is disqualified.

• Core Issue: The halakhic status of offspring (valad) of animals or items prohibited on the altar, specifically the unique case of vald treifah (offspring of a tereifa animal) and kesheira she'yinka min ha'tereifah (a kosher animal that suckled from a tereifa). The Mishnah then expands to define specific pesulim like muktzah, ne'evadah, atnan, and mechir kelev, their scope, and their interaction with kedusha (sanctity).
• Nafka Mina(s):
  • Eligibility for Korbanot: Which offspring, if any, are fit for sacrifice, impacting the Temple service.
  • Issur Hana'ah (Prohibition of Benefit): Whether the pesul extends to prohibit all benefit from the animal or item, or only its use on the altar.
  • Ubar Yerech Imo: The application of the principle "a fetus is like its mother's thigh" to various pesulim and its implications for the offspring's status.
  • Meta-Halakhic Reasoning: The nature of rabbinic decrees (gezeirot) and whether their underlying reasons (ta'am) must be fully transparent or can stem from broader principles of kedusha or harḥakah (distancing).
  • Methods of Destruction: The distinction between kever (burial) and sreifah (burning) for various consecrated or forbidden items (Temurah 7:1).
• Primary Sources:
  • Mishnah Temurah 6:5-7:1.
  • Devarim 23:19 ("לא תביא אתנן זונה ומחיר כלב בית ה' א-לוהיך לכל נדר") – cited in Temurah 6:6.
  • Tosefta Temurah 4:10.
  • Talmud Bavli, Avodah Zarah 29b-30a; Chullin 116b.
  • Sifrei Devarim 261.

Text Snapshot

The crux of our sugya begins with Mishnah Temurah 6:5:

כל האסורין על גבי המזבח, ולדותיהן מותרין. חוץ מולד טרפה, רבי אליעזר אומר לא יקרב על גבי המזבח. וחכמים אומרים יקרב. רבי חנינא בן אנטיגנוס אומר: כשרה שינקה מן הטרפה פסולה מעל גבי המזבח.

All animals whose sacrifice on the altar is prohibited, their offspring are permitted. Except for the offspring of a tereifah, Rabbi Eliezer says it shall not be sacrificed on the altar. But the Rabbis say: It shall be sacrificed. Rabbi Chanina ben Antigonus says: A kosher animal that suckled from a tereifah is disqualified from sacrifice on the altar.

Dikduk/Leshon Nuance: The Mishnah opens with a sweeping klal (general rule) – "כל האסורין על גבי המזבח, ולדותיהן מותרין" (Mishnah Temurah 6:5). This broad heter (permission) for offspring applies to the many pesulim enumerated in 6:1-4, such as nirba'ah (copulated with a human), ne'evadah (worshipped), atnan (prostitute's payment), mechir kelev (price of a dog), and kil'ayim (crossbred). However, it immediately introduces an explicit exception and a machloket (dispute) concerning "ולד טרפה" (offspring of a tereifah). The phrasing "חוץ מולד טרפה" (except for the offspring of a tereifah) highlights this case as uniquely problematic in the eyes of R' Eliezer, despite the general rule.

The dispute between R' Eliezer and the Chakhamim (Rabbis) uses the specific term "לא יקרב על גבי המזבח" (shall not be sacrificed on the altar), indicating that the pesul (disqualification) is specifically for korbanot. This implies, at least for the Chakhamim and potentially for R' Eliezer (depending on interpretation), that lehedyot (for non-sacred use) the offspring might be permitted.

Following this, R' Chanina ben Antigonus introduces a further stringency concerning a "כשרה שינקה מן הטרפה" (a kosher animal that suckled from a tereifah), stating it is "פסולה מעל גבי המזבח" (disqualified from sacrifice on the altar). This case is distinct from vald treifah as it involves no direct biological parentage from the tereifah animal, but rather a nurturing relationship. The use of "פסולה" (disqualified) rather than "לא יקרב" might suggest a broader pesul, but the context "מעל גבי המזבח" restricts it to sacrificial use. This subtle distinction between "ולד" (offspring) and "יונקת" (suckling) points to different underlying halakhic mechanisms for pesul.

Readings

The Mishnah's succinct statements invite deep exploration, especially regarding the underlying principles distinguishing vald treifah and yonkat treifah from other pesulei mizbe'ach. Our Rishonim and Acharonim grapple with these nuances, offering diverse insights.

Rambam, Commentary to Mishnah Temurah 6:5:1

The Rambam provides a foundational analysis, distinguishing cases of ribui (copulation with a human) and treifah (mortally wounded) based on when the pesul occurred relative to pregnancy. He writes:

כל האסורין על גבי המזבח ולדותיהן מותרין כו': כשנרבעה בהמה והיא חולין ואח"כ ילדה והיא חולין או הקדישה אחר שנרבעה וילדה ולדה מותר לגבי מזבח אבל אם נרבעה והיא מעוברת ולדה אסור לגבי המזבח אע"פ שהיא חולין והוא שאמר ולד נרבעת אסור וזהו שאמרו אם הבהמה הזאת טרפה ואחר שנטרפה נתעברה ר' אליעזר אומר סבת תולדת הולד הזה היא האם שהיא טרפה ואב שהוא כשר לגבי המזבח וזה וזה גורם (מותר) [אסור]: ואם היתה הבהמה הזאת מעוברת והיא טריפה ר' (יהודה) [אליעזר] אומר עובר ירך אמו וחכמים אינם אומרים כן עליו אחר שיצא ונפרד ממנו ולפיכך הוא אצלם מותר לגבי המזבח וזה שאוסר ר' חנינא בן אנטיגנוס כשירה שינקה מן הטריפה הוא באותו היום בלבד שינקה לפי שהיא יכולה לעמוד עליו מעת לעת והוא מתעכל ועד כאן לא נגמר עכולו אבל אם נתעכל ואפי' היה זן אותה דרך משל בכרשינים של עבודת כוכבים עד שהשמינה בתכלית השומן הרי היא מותרת לגבי המזבח לדברי הכל ואין הלכה כר"א וכרבי חנינא בן אנטיגנוס וכתוב בספרי תזבח ולא גיזה ואכלת ולא לכלביך בשר ולא חלב מכאן שאין פודין הקדשים להאכילן לכלבים וידוע שהטריפה אינה ראויה אלא לכלבים:^[1]

Translation: "Regarding all animals whose sacrifice on the altar is prohibited, their offspring are permitted, etc.: If an animal copulated (with a human) while it was chullin (non-sacred), and afterwards it gave birth, and it (the offspring) was chullin, or if it was consecrated after it copulated and gave birth, its offspring is permitted for the altar. But if it copulated while it was pregnant, its offspring is forbidden for the altar, even if it (the mother) was chullin. And this is what is meant by 'the offspring of a nirba'ah is forbidden,' meaning 'it and its offspring were nirba'ah.' And this is what they said: if this animal was treifah and after it became treifah it became pregnant, R' Eliezer says the cause of the birth of this offspring is the mother who is treifah and the father who is kosher for the altar, and 'this and this cause' (is permitted) [is forbidden]. And if this animal was pregnant and it was treifah, R' Eliezer says 'a fetus is like its mother's thigh.' And the Rabbis do not say so regarding it after it came out and separated from it, and therefore it is permitted for them for the altar. And this which R' Chanina ben Antigonus prohibits, a kosher animal that suckled from a treifah, is only on that day that it suckled, because it can stand (survive) on it for twenty-four hours, and it (the milk) is digested, and until then its digestion is not complete. But if it was digested, and even if, for example, he fed it with karshenin (carob pods) of avodah zarah until it was extremely fat, it is permitted for the altar according to all. And the halakha is not like R' Eliezer and not like R' Chanina ben Antigonus. And it is written in Sifrei: 'You shall sacrifice' and not 'shear,' and 'you shall eat' and not 'for your dogs,' 'meat' and not 'milk.' From here, one does not redeem consecrated items to feed them to dogs, and it is known that treifah is only fit for dogs."

Chiddush: The Rambam clarifies the crucial distinction in the pesul of nirba'ah: if the ribui occurs before conception, the offspring is permitted; if during pregnancy, the offspring is forbidden because "היא וולדה נרבעו" (it and its offspring were copulated with), applying the principle of ubar yerech imo (fetus is like its mother's thigh). However, for treifah, R' Eliezer applies ubar yerech imo, while the Chakhamim reject it after the offspring is born and separated, emphasizing its independent existence. Most significantly, the Rambam limits R' Chanina ben Antigonus's stringency on yonkat treifah to the immediate period of suckling, when the treifah milk is still undigested within the animal. Once digested, the pesul is removed, even if the animal was fattened with forbidden substances like karshenin of avodah zarah. This indicates that R' Chanina's chumra is based on the physical presence of the treifah substance, not an inherent or permanent pesul imparted to the yonka. The Rambam explicitly concludes, "ואין הלכה כר"א וכרבי חנינא בן אנטיגנוס" (the halakha is not like R' Eliezer and not like R' Chanina ben Antigonus), establishing the lenient view as normative.

Tosafot Yom Tov, Commentary to Mishnah Temurah 6:5:1 & 6:5:3

The Tosafot Yom Tov (TYT) delves into the nuances of the Rishonim's interpretations, particularly the Rambam and Rashi, and introduces the perspective of the Tosafot (French and German Rishonim).

On Mishnah Temurah 6:5:1, TYT supports the Rambam's distinction for nirba'ah:

כל האסורים לגבי מזבח כו' . פירש הר"ב כגון בהמה שנרבעה כו'. וזה וזה גורם מותר. עמ"ש במ"ח פ"ג דמסכת עבודה זרה. ומ"ש הר"ב אבל נרבעה כשהיא מעוברת כו' דהיא וולדה נרבעו. וכן ולד נוגחת היא וולדה נגחו. וכן נעבדת ומוקצה דניחא ליה בנפחה וכן פסק הרמב"ם בפירושו בנא"י ובחבורו פ"ב מהא"מ:^[2]

Translation: "Regarding all those forbidden for the altar, etc. The Rav (R' Ovadiah Bartenura) explained, for example, an animal that was nirba'ah, etc. And 'this and this cause' is permitted. See what I wrote in M. Avodah Zarah 3:8. And what the Rav wrote, 'but if it was nirba'ah while pregnant,' etc., that 'it and its offspring were nirba'ah.' And similarly, 'offspring of a nogachat (goring animal)' means 'it and its offspring gored.' And similarly for ne'evadah (worshipped) and muktzah (set aside for idolatry) where 'he was pleased with its inflation.' And so ruled the Rambam in his commentary in N.A.Y. (Nakhmanides, a typo for peirush haMishnah of Rambam, or perhaps Nitzukhei Avraham Yechiel?) and in his Chibur (Mishneh Torah), Chapter 2 of Hilkhot Issurei Mizbe'ach."

Chiddush (6:5:1): TYT affirms Rambam's view that the pesul of ribui extends to the offspring only if the ribui occurred while pregnant, invoking the principle of "היא וולדה נרבעו." He expands this concept to nogachat (goring animal) and even ne'evadah or muktzah where the owner desired its 'inflation' (i.e., its growth and development), implying a direct connection between the pesul and the guf (body) of the developing fetus.

On Mishnah Temurah 6:5:3, TYT addresses the machloket on vald treifah:

ולד טרפה ר"א אומר לא יקרב . כתב הר"ב אבל להדיוט ד"ה שרי [וכן פירש"י ועמ"ש בסמוך בשם התוס'] דלאו מגופה קא רבי אלא מאוירה קא רבי. פירש"י ולד במעי בהמה אינו אדוק בגופה. אלא תלוי באויר ומעצמו הוא נוצר וגדל והולך. ל"א מאוירא קא רבי לאחר שנולד הולך וגדל. הלכך עקר גידולו אינו מאמו. ע"כ. [*ולשתי האוקימתות שכתב הר"ב קשה עליו ועל רש"י שפירשו דלהדיוט ד"ה שרי דבין דפליגי בזה ובזה גורם או דפליגי בעובר ירך אמו אף להדיוט לתסור]. והתוס' דחו פירש"י שכחב לעיל דלד"ה שרי להדיוט דבפ' אלו טרפות מפרש בהדיא דאפי' להדיוט נמי אסור. והא דפליגי לגבוה להודיעך כחן דרבנן דאפי' לגבוה נמי שרי. והא דנקט לא יקרב משום רבנן דאמרי יקרב נקטיה. ע"כ. ועיין כיוצא בזה הרבה. שכתבתי במשנה ו' פ"ד דביצה. ומ"ש הר"ב ורבנן סברי עובר לאו ירך אמו. ולא דמי לנרבעה כשהיא מעוברת דאמרינן לעיל היא וולדה נרבעו. דודאי טרפות שהוא תלוי בחיות ובריאות כיון שאנו רואין הולד חי ובריא אין לנו לומר שנטרף הולד עם אמו ואין לנו לפוסלו בשביל פסול טרפות. אבל גבי רביעה ונגיחה ודאי כירך אמו הוא. ומיהו ק"ק דא"כ הוי מתני' לצדדין דגבי ולד נרבע צ"ל שנרבעה [ולבסוף נתעברה. וגבי ולד טרפה אמרינן שעיבר'] ולבסוף נטרפה [דמסקנא היא בפ' אלו טרפות דטרפה אינה יולדת] וי"ל כיון דבטרפה לא שייך [עיברה] *)בענין אחר לא הוי לצדדין שאינו יורד [אלא] להגיד לך כל היתר הולדות של כל האסורים לגבי המזבח ובנרבע דאיכא ב' צדדין. ואינו מותר אלא לצד אחד. חשיב ליה בשביל אותו צד המותר. ובטריפה דליכא אלא צד אחד [חשיב] אותו צד [ה] מותר. תוס'.^[3]

Translation: "Regarding 'offspring of a treifah, R' Eliezer says it shall not be sacrificed.' The Rav (R' Ovadiah Bartenura) wrote, 'but for hedyot (non-sacred use), everyone agrees it is permitted' [and so Rashi explained, and see what I wrote below in the name of Tosafot] that it doesn't grow from its body but from its 'air.' Rashi explained: 'a fetus in an animal's womb is not attached to its body, but hangs in the air and forms and grows by itself. Therefore, its primary growth is not from its mother.' End quote. [*And for both interpretations that the Rav wrote, it is difficult for him and Rashi who explained that for hedyot everyone agrees it is permitted, because whether they disagree on 'this and this cause' or on 'a fetus is like its mother's thigh,' it should be forbidden even for hedyot.] And Tosafot rejected Rashi's explanation, which he wrote earlier, that it is permitted for hedyot, for in Perek Eleh Terefot it is explicitly explained that even for hedyot it is forbidden. And that they disagree for legavoah (for the altar) is to let you know the strength of the Rabbis, that even for legavoah they permit it. End quote. And see many similar instances that I wrote in Mishnah 4:6 of Beitzah. And what the Rav wrote: 'and the Rabbis hold that a fetus is not like its mother's thigh.' And it is not similar to a nirba'ah animal while pregnant, where we said earlier 'it and its offspring were nirba'ah.' For treifot, which depends on vitality and health, since we see the offspring alive and healthy, we do not say that the offspring became treif with its mother, and we do not disqualify it due to the treifah disqualification. But regarding ribui and negiḥah, it is certainly 'like its mother's thigh.' However, it is difficult if so, that our Mishnah would be contradictory (lit. 'to the sides'), for regarding vald nirba' it must be that it was nirba'ah [and then became pregnant. And regarding vald treifah we say that it became pregnant] and then became treifah [as the conclusion in Perek Eleh Terefot is that a treifah does not give birth]. And one can say that since in treifah it is not relevant [it became pregnant] in another context, it is not contradictory, as it (the Mishnah) only comes to tell you all the permitted offspring of all those forbidden for the altar, and in nirba' where there are two sides, it is permitted only for one side. It is counted for that permitted side. And in treifah where there is only one side, that permitted side is counted. Tosafot."

Chiddush (6:5:3): TYT challenges Rashi's view that vald treifah is permitted lehedyot, citing the Tosafot who explicitly state it is forbidden even lehedyot according to Perek Eleh Terefot (Chullin 3:1). The machloket in our Mishnah is therefore only regarding legavoah (for the altar), highlighting the Chakhamim's leniency. He powerfully distinguishes treifah from other pesulim like ribui and negiḥah. Treifah relates to the mother's health and vitality; if the offspring is born healthy, it is not considered treif. In contrast, ribui and negiḥah represent a more inherent, guf-related pesul that applies through ubar yerech imo. This explains why vald nirba'ah (if conceived during ribui) is forbidden, while vald treifah is permitted by the Rabbis.

Rashash, Commentary to Mishnah Temurah 6:5:1

The Rashash offers a profound chiddush by questioning the underlying reason for the heter of offspring of pesulei mizbe'ach. He suggests a broader principle than zeh v'zeh gorem (where both parents are needed to cause the pesul).

במשנה כל האסורים כו' ולדותיהן מותרים. ופירש הרע"ב כגון כו' כשהוא חולין והוא מפירוש הרמב"ם משמע דבנרבעו כשהן מוקדשין אסורין והוא כרבא אר"נ לקמן בל"א אבל בחבורו פ"ג מהלכות א"מ הי"ג פסק דאפילו בשנרבעו כשהן מוקדשין מותרין וע"ש בכ"מ ותימה על התוי"ט שלא העיר בזה. ומש"כ הרע"ב טעמא משום זוז"ג הוא כל"ק דרבא ונ"ל דבאתנן ומחיר אפי' היה הזכר ג"כ כיוצא בה מותר הולד משום מיעוטא דהם ולא ולדות ועוד דלא גרע משינוייהן לב"ה דהא נשתנה לזרע ואח"כ לולד. ולכן חלקן התנא לשנותן בפ"ע לעיל ולא סמך על הכלל דכאן. (וזה י"ל משום דחלוקין באם היו מעוברות קודם לכן כמש"כ לעיל) ולפ"ז יפה דקדק הכ"מ בספ"ד שם על הרמב"ם מה שהשמיט היתר דולדותיהן בהדי שינוייהן בפ"ע כמו תנא דמשנתינו ואין תפיסת המל"מ עליו כלום. אבל אחר העיון נלפע"ד בדעת הרמב"ם שגם בשאר איסורין הולדות מותרין אפי' היכא דהזכר ג"כ אסור דליכא זוז"ג ומטעם דאישתנו. וטעם זה נזכר בגמרא לקמן בל"א לר"נ. ותירץ בזה קושיית התד"ה אבל. והראיה מדסתם הרמב"ם ולדותיהן מותרין ולא הזכיר טעם דזוז"ג. וכן בפירושו לא זכר טע"ז אלא בולד טרפה. ועוד ראיה ממה שפסק שם בפ"ג הי"ד דהמשתחוה לקמה חטיה מותרין למנחות שהרי נשתנו ונדמו לולדות של א"מ כו'. וזהו כמו שפשט מ"ז בריה דר"נ בע"ז כדהביא הכ"מ שם. ש"מ דחד טעמא הוא משום דנשתנו. ונכון בס"ד:^[4]

Translation: "In the Mishnah: 'All those forbidden, etc., their offspring are permitted.' And the Rav (R' Ovadiah Bartenura) explained, for example, etc., 'when it (the mother) was chullin.' And from the Rambam's commentary, it implies that if they were nirba'ah while consecrated, they are forbidden, and this is like Rava (who said) in the Gemara later on 30a in the name of R' Nachman. But in his Chibur (Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Issurei Mizbe'ach 3:13), he ruled that even if they were nirba'ah while consecrated, they are permitted, and see there in the Kessef Mishneh. And it is surprising that the Tosafot Yom Tov did not comment on this. And what the Rav wrote, the reason is zeh v'zeh gorem (both male and female cause it), it is like Rava's (view). And it seems to me that for atnan and mechir, even if the male was also similar (prohibited), the offspring is permitted because of the exclusion 'them' and not 'their offspring.' And furthermore, it is no worse than their shinnuyeihem (changes) for Beis Hillel, for it has changed to seed and then to offspring. Therefore, the Tanna divided them to teach them separately earlier and did not rely on the general rule here. (And one can say this is because they differ if they were pregnant beforehand, as I wrote above). And according to this, the Kessef Mishneh correctly raised a difficulty in Chapter 4 there on the Rambam, that he omitted the permission of their offspring alongside their shinnuyeihen separately, like the Tanna of our Mishnah, and the Ma'alot ha'Melamed (Milhamot Hashem) is not accurate in its criticism of him at all. But after examination, it appears to me in the Rambam's view that even in other prohibitions, the offspring are permitted, even where the male is also forbidden, because there is no zeh v'zeh gorem, and for the reason that they nishtanu (changed). And this reason is mentioned in the Gemara later on 30a for R' Nachman. And he (R' Nachman) thereby answered the difficulty of the Toldot Adam V'Chavah (possibly a typo for Talmud Darom or similar, or a specific commentary). And the proof is that the Rambam generally states 'their offspring are permitted' and did not mention the reason of zeh v'zeh gorem. And also in his commentary, he only mentioned this reason for vald treifah. And further proof from what he ruled there in Chapter 3 Halakha 14, that one who bows to a pile of wheat, its wheat is permitted for menachot because they nishtanu and became like offspring of issurei mizbe'ach, etc. And this is as R' Mar bar R' Nachman explained in Avodah Zarah, as the Kessef Mishneh brought there. This shows that it is one reason: because they nishtanu. And it is correct, with God's help."

Chiddush: Rashash identifies a potential inconsistency in Rambam's approach to vald nirba'ah if the mother was already consecrated. He then proposes that the general heter for offspring of pesulei mizbe'ach is not primarily due to zeh v'zeh gorem (where only one parent is pasul), but rather because the offspring nishtanu (changed/transformed) from the original forbidden entity. The offspring is a new creation, distinct from the parent's pesul. This principle applies even if both parents were pesulim of the same type (e.g., both atnan or mechir kelev). He supports this with Rambam's own general statements about offspring and his ruling regarding avodah zarah wheat used for menachot after it has undergone a "change." This chiddush re-frames the discussion from the specific cause of the pesul to the inherent nature of the offspring as a new entity.

Mishnat Eretz Yisrael, Commentary to Mishnah Temurah 6:5:1-4 and 6:5:5-21

Mishnat Eretz Yisrael provides a comprehensive analysis, including textual variants, meta-halakhic considerations, and parallels from other sugyot.

On Temurah 6:5:1-4:

על-פי כתב-יד קופמן כל האסורין על גבי המזבח – בעל מום, וכן הרובע והנרבע וכל הרשימה שבפרק ו מ"א, וולדותיהן מותרין רבי אליעזר אומר – שלוש המילים האחרונות מופיעות גם בכל כתבי היד הטובים והן חסרות רק בדפוסים מאוחרים, וגם בהם הן מופיעות בהמשך כך שאין הבדל משמעותי. ולד טרפה לא יקרב על גבי המזבח – בדפוסים מאוחרים נוסף "וחכמים אומרים יקרב". במשנה המחלוקת היא רק על ולד טרפה, והמשנה בנויה בסגנון רגיל שבו הצהרה כוללת ואחר כך מחלוקת. במקרה זה המחלוקת היא רק על פרט אחד, ולד טרפה. מבנה מעין זה מקובל במשנה (לעיל פ"ג מ"א). אבל בתוספתא שנינו: "כל אסורין לגבי מזבח ולדותיהן מותרין, רבי אלעזר אוסר. ולד טרפה רבי אלעזר אומר לא יקרב לגבי מזבח, וחכמים אומרין יקרב לגבי מזבח" (פ"ד ה"י, עמ' 556). אם כן, המחלוקת היא על כל האסורים למזבח. אפשר שנוסח כזה היה גם במשנה, שכן בכתבי יד רבים כתוב או' בלבד (כגון כתב יד פרמא [ מפ ] הנחשב לכתב יד אמין במיוחד). עם זאת נוסח התוספתא קשה, שהרי אם המחלוקת היא כללית למה יש לחזור על המחלוקת לגבי ולד טרפה, ומדוע פעם אחת היא נוקטת לשון "אוסר" ובפעם השנייה "לא יקרב"? על כן נראה שנוסח המשנה במקומו עומד ובתוספתא חל שיבוש, או שיש לה נוסחה חולקת. בבבלי: "אמר רב: כל האסורים לגבי מזבח ולדותיהן מותרים, ותני עלה: ורבי אליעזר אוסר" (ל ע"ב). ברור שהבבלי הכיר את נוסח משנתנו, והכיר ברייתא השונה כמו בתוספתא, אך לא כחלק מהמשנה. אפשר שבברייתא זו לא הייתה הכפילות שהערנו עליה, ובעל התוספתא שהכיר את ההלכה צירף אותה למה שהכיר מהמשנה, ויצא נוסח בלתי מאוזן מבחינה סגנונית. בתוספתא נוסף עוד: "ומודה רבי אלעזר באפרוח שיצא מביצה טרפה שיקרב לגבי מזבח" (שם). לא נאמר מדוע הוולדות מותרים או אסורים. להלן מתנהל דיון בוולד בהמה שינק מבהמה טרפה, ואולי גם ברישא הדיון הוא סביב החשש האם חלב הבהמה הטמאה פוסל את הבהמה החיה.^[5]

Chiddush (6:5:1-4): Mishnat Eretz Yisrael meticulously examines the textual variations, arguing that the nusach (version) of our Mishnah, where the dispute is only on vald treifah, is the most coherent. He points out stylistic difficulties in the Tosefta's broader dispute. This suggests that vald treifah is indeed a unique case warranting specific discussion, rather than just one instance of a general machloket. He hints that the underlying concern for vald treifah might extend to yonkat treifah, revolving around the potential for "unclean milk" to disqualify a living animal.

On Temurah 6:5:5-21 (regarding R' Chanina ben Antigonus):

רבי חנינא בן אנטיגנס אומר – רבי חנינא חי בדור אושא, היה כוהן, ונודע כחכם המקפיד הקפדה יתרה על טהרות (בבלי, בכורות ל ע"ב). במבוא למסכת בכורות עמדנו על כך שהוא מופיע רבות בדיני מומים המצויים במסכת בכורות, וליתר דיוק הוא מופיע בחטיבה אחת במסכת בכורות. ההקשר שם הוא של מומי בכורות, אך מום בבכור הוא מום למזבח, ולמעשה דבריו נאמרים על שני הנושאים כאחד. ככוהן הוא היה מעורב כנראה בנושאים אלו יותר מחכמים רגילים. גם בהלכה שלנו הוא מפגין עמדה מחמירה. כשירה שינקה מן הטרפה פסולה מעל גבי המזבח – שכן יש בתוכה שמץ של טרפה. ההלכה אינה מוגבלת בזמן (כמה זמן חלף מאז ההנקה); סביר להניח שמבחינה טכנית אחרי שעות מספר או יום כבר לא נותר דבר מחלב הבהמה הטרפה. ברם דומה שרבי חנינא אינו מעלה את החשש הטכני (שיש בבהמה הכשרה שמץ טרפה) אלא מציב סף גבוה יותר של טהרה וקדושה. סביר שלדעתו גם ולד של בהמות אחרות הפסולות למזבח, פסול. בתוספתא (פ"ד ה"י, עמ' 556) ההלכה חוזרת בשם אותו חכם, אך הוא מוסר זאת בשמו של רבי אלעזר חסמא. אם כן, מדובר בהלכה שתמכו בה חכמי דור אושא. גם במשנת חולין מופיעה הלכה זהה: "קבת נכרי ושל נבלה הרי זו אסורה, המעמיד בעור של קבה כשרה, אם יש בנותן טעם הרי זו אסורה. כשרה שינקה מן הטרפה קבתה אסורה, טרפה שינקה מן הכשרה קבתה מותרת, מפני שכנוס במיעיה" (פ"ח מ"ה). אין להעמיד חלב בקיבה של בהמה כדי להפוך אותה לגבינה, וכן אין לאכול בהמה כשרה שינקה מבהמה טרפה. ההלכה במשנה מסויגת יותר: אין היא מדברת על קרבן אלא על אכילה ומתירה לאכול את כל הבהמה הכשרה חוץ מהקיבה, כיוון שבקיבה נותר חלב מהבהמה הטרפה. אין זו אותה הלכה של משנתנו (משנתנו בקרבן), אבל התפיסה זהה.^[6]

Chiddush (6:5:5-21): Mishnat Eretz Yisrael portrays R' Chanina ben Antigonus as a Kohen and Tanna known for extreme chumra in matters of tahorot (purity). He suggests that R' Chanina's stringency on yonkat treifah may not be a purely technical pesul based on lingering treifah milk (which would quickly digest, as Rambam notes), but rather a higher "סף גבוה יותר של טהרה וקדושה" (higher threshold of purity and sanctity) required for korbanot. This is a meta-halakhic interpretation, hinting that some chumrot (like those related to gevinat goyim in Avodah Zarah) are not based on explicit legal reasoning but on a desire to elevate the standard of holiness, especially in Temple matters. He links this to the sugya of gevinat goyim where R' Yehoshua deflects R' Yishmael's questions about the ta'am (reason) for the gezeirah, implying the gezeirah has no simple, technical halakhic explanation but rather a deeper, perhaps unstated, meta-halakhic rationale. He also notes the evolving halakha concerning kavat nevelah and yonkat treifah from Mishnah Rishona to Mishnah Acharona, showing how initial stringencies can sometimes be relaxed.

Friction

The Mishnah's initial general rule, "כל האסורין על גבי המזבח ולדותיהן מותרין" (Mishnah Temurah 6:5), sets up an expectation of leniency for offspring. However, this is immediately contradicted by the dispute regarding "ולד טרפה" and R' Eliezer's stringent position, followed by R' Chanina ben Antigonus's further chumra on "כשרה שינקה מן הטרפה." This creates significant friction points that demand a deeper lomdus.

The Strongest Kushya: The Peculiarity of Vald Treifah

The most pressing kushya stems from the Mishnah's structure itself. Why is vald treifah singled out for a machloket (dispute) as an exception to the general heter for offspring? What makes treifah so distinct from other pesulim like nirba'ah (copulated with a human), atnan (prostitute's payment), or mechir kelev (price of a dog) that its offspring might be forbidden?

Furthermore, the Gemara's conclusion in Perek Eleh Terefot (Chullin 3:1) is that a treifah does not give birth (טרפה אינה יולדת). If so, the case of vald treifah as an actual biological offspring of a treifah mother would be rare, if not impossible, in a natural sense. This further intensifies the kushya: if vald treifah is rare or impossible, why is it the one explicit exception to the general rule of heter for offspring, and the subject of a specific machloket? The Tosafot Yom Tov, in his commentary to our Mishnah, points out this difficulty with the Gemara's conclusion that a treifah does not give birth.^[7]

Moreover, R' Chanina ben Antigonus's chumra regarding yonkat treifah (a kosher animal that suckled from a treifah) appears to be an even more indirect connection to the pesul. If direct biological parentage from a treifah is debated, why is mere suckling considered a disqualification for the altar? Is the pesul here due to a physical admixture of treifah milk, or something more profound?

The Best Terutz (or Two): Nature of the Pesul and Meta-Halakhic Considerations

The various Rishonim and Acharonim offer complementary answers to this kushya, drawing distinctions in the nature of pesulim and the scope of kedusha.

Terutz 1: Treifah as a Condition vs. Ribui as an Act (Tosafot Yom Tov)

The Tosafot Yom Tov provides a critical distinction between the pesul of treifah and pesulim like ribui or negiḥah (goring). He argues:

דודאי טרפות שהוא תלוי בחיות ובריאות כיון שאנו רואין הולד חי ובריא אין לנו לומר שנטרף הולד עם אמו ואין לנו לפוסלו בשביל פסול טרפות. אבל גבי רביעה ונגיחה ודאי כירך אמו הוא.^[8]

For treifot, which depends on vitality and health, since we see the offspring alive and healthy, we do not say that the offspring became treif with its mother, and we do not disqualify it due to the treifah disqualification. But regarding ribui and negiḥah, it is certainly 'like its mother's thigh.'

This is a profound insight. Treifah is a physical condition of the mother, a defect in her chiyut (vitality) or bri'ut (health). If her offspring is born alive and healthy, it intrinsically demonstrates that it does not share the mother's treifah status. The pesul of treifah is not a transmissible issur (prohibition) in the same way. Therefore, the Rabbis logically conclude that a healthy vald treifah is kosher, even for the altar. The Rambam supports this by ruling that the halakha is not like R' Eliezer.^[9]

In contrast, ribui (copulation with a human) is an act that imbues the animal with a pesul of gilui arayot (sexual transgression), and negiḥah (goring) is an act that can lead to pesul as a shor ha'niskal (stoned ox). These are not conditions of health but rather inherent statuses derived from specific events or actions. If the fetus was in utero when the mother was nirba'ah, then "היא וולדה נרבעו" (it and its offspring were copulated with), as the Rambam explains.^[10] In these cases, the principle of ubar yerech imo (fetus is like its mother's thigh) applies more directly, as the pesul is not about the physical chiyut of the offspring but its connection to the mother's forbidden status derived from an act. The Rashash further supports this by suggesting that even if the male parent is also pasul, the offspring might be permitted due to nishtanu (change/transformation), but this nishtanu is less potent against a pesul directly linked to the developing guf by ubar yerech imo in cases like ribui.

Regarding the Gemara's conclusion that a treifah cannot give birth, the Tosafot Yom Tov offers a resolution: the Mishnah is not contradictory because it serves to teach the heter of offspring for different types of pesulim. For nirba'ah, where there are two scenarios (mother nirba'ah before or during pregnancy), only one allows for a permitted offspring. For treifah, it teaches the heter for the one possible scenario where a vald treifah might exist (i.e., if it was treifah and then became pregnant, or if the treifah was discovered after conception and the fetus still developed, though this is difficult). The focus is on the halakhic potential, even if biologically rare.

Terutz 2: R' Chanina's Chumra and Meta-Halakhic Purity (Mishnat Eretz Yisrael)

R' Chanina ben Antigonus's stringency on yonkat treifah presents a different challenge. The Rambam interprets this chumra as limited to the actual presence of undigested treifah milk, implying a technical pesul of admixture. However, Mishnat Eretz Yisrael proposes a meta-halakhic dimension to R' Chanina's view. Given R' Chanina's background as a Kohen known for extreme chumra in tahorot, his stance might not be based on a strictly technical halakhic disqualification but rather on a "higher threshold of purity and sanctity" for korbanot.^[11]

This perspective aligns with the broader sugya in Avodah Zarah 2:5, where R' Yehoshua deflects R' Yishmael's repeated questions about the ta'am (reason) for the gezeirah on gevinat goyim (Gentile cheese). Mishnat Eretz Yisrael argues that R' Yehoshua's deflection implies that no simple, technical halakhic reason fully explains the gezeirah; rather, it stems from a broader harḥakah (distancing) from non-Jews or a general desire for a higher standard of kedusha. Similarly, R' Chanina's chumra on yonkat treifah could be seen as an expression of this elevated standard for anything offered on the Mizbe'ach, even if the "technical" pesul of the treifah milk is minimal or transient. The Mizbe'ach demands an ultimate level of purity, and any perceived connection to treifah, however indirect, might be deemed unacceptable by some Tannaim like R' Chanina.

In sum, the friction is resolved by distinguishing the type of pesul: treifah is a health condition that does not inherently transfer to a healthy offspring, unlike ribui which is a status-altering act. R' Eliezer's individual stringency on vald treifah and R' Chanina's chumra on yonkat treifah are ultimately rejected by the Chakhamim and the Rambam, but their opinions highlight the deep philosophical and halakhic discussions about the nature of pesul, biological connection, and the pursuit of extreme kedusha.

Intertext

The Mishnah's discussion on vald treifah and yonkat treifah finds rich intertextual parallels, particularly in sugyot concerning issur hana'ah (prohibition of benefit) and the nature of gezeirot (rabbinic decrees). These parallels illuminate the underlying principles at play.

1. Gevinat Goyim and Kavat Nevelah (Avodah Zarah 2:5, Chullin 8:5, Chullin 116b)

The most striking parallel, extensively analyzed by Mishnat Eretz Yisrael, comes from the sugya of gevinat goyim (Gentile cheese) and kavat nevelah (rennet from a nevelah - improperly slaughtered animal). Mishnah Avodah Zarah 2:5 recounts a famous dialogue:

אמר רבי יהודה שאל רבי ישמעאל את רבי יהושע כשהיו מהלכין בדרך, אמר לו מפני מה אסרו גבינות גוים? אמר לו מפני שמעמידין אותה בקיבה של נבלה. אמר לו והלא קיבת עולה חמורה מקיבת נבלה, ואמרו 'כהן שדעתו יפה שורפה חיה ולא הודו לו, אבל אמרו אין נהנין ולא מועלין', חזר אמר לו מפני שמעמידין אותה בקיבת עגלי עבודה זרה. אמר לו אם כן למה לא אסרוה בהנאה? השיאו לדבר אחר, אמר לו: ישמעאל אחי, היאך אתה קורא כי טובים דודֶיך מיין או כי טובים דודַייך? אמר לו: כי טובים דודַייך. אמר לו: אין הדבר כן, שהרי חבירו מלמד עליו: לריח שמניך טובים.^[12]

Rabbi Yehudah said: Rabbi Yishmael asked Rabbi Yehoshua while they were walking on the road: 'Why did they prohibit Gentile cheeses?' He said to him: 'Because they curdle it with the rennet of a nevelah (an animal not ritually slaughtered).' He (R' Yishmael) said to him: 'But is not the rennet of an olah (burnt offering) more severe than the rennet of a nevelah, and they said: "A priest of sound judgment burns it (the milk in the rennet) while alive," but they did not agree with him, but said: "One may derive no benefit from it, nor does one commit me'ilah (misuse of sacred property) with it." ' He (R' Yehoshua) reverted and said to him: 'Because they curdle it with the rennet of calves designated for idol worship.' He (R' Yishmael) said to him: 'If so, why did they not prohibit it from all benefit?' He (R' Yehoshua) deflected him to another matter, saying to him: 'My brother Yishmael, how do you read "For your loves are better than wine" (Song of Songs 1:2), "Dodékha" or "Dodáyikh"?' He said to him: "Dodáyikh." He said to him: 'That is not so, for its companion teaches about it: "To the fragrance of your oils is good" (Song of Songs 1:3).'

This sugya directly relates to our Mishnah's discussion of yonkat treifah and the potential for a pesul to transfer through indirect means (milk/rennet). R' Yishmael's persistent questioning and R' Yehoshua's eventual deflection ("השיאו לדבר אחר") are highly significant. Mishnat Eretz Yisrael explains that R' Yehoshua's inability or unwillingness to provide a satisfactory legal-technical reason for the gezeirah (prohibition) suggests that its basis lies not in a clear, specific halakhic flaw, but in a broader chumra related to kedusha (sanctity) or harḥakah (distancing from non-Jews).^[13]

This parallels R' Chanina ben Antigonus's chumra on yonkat treifah. While the Rambam provides a technical explanation (undigested milk), Mishnat Eretz Yisrael posits that R' Chanina, as a Kohen and a machmir, might have been motivated by a higher standard of kedusha for the Mizbe'ach, where even a faint, transient association with treifah (via suckling) is deemed unacceptable, regardless of a precise "technical" halakhic pesul. The evolving halakha concerning kavat nevelah and yonkat treifah (from Mishnah Rishona to Mishnah Acharona in Y. Beitzah 1:1, 60a and B. Chullin 116b, where it is permitted) further demonstrates how initial gezeirot, potentially based on broader chumrot, can be re-evaluated and sometimes softened over time as the understanding of their ta'am shifts.

2. Atnan Zonna and Mechir Kelev (Devarim 23:19, Temurah 6:6)

The Mishnah itself refers to the biblical source for the prohibition of atnan zonna (prostitute's payment) and mechir kelev (price of a dog):

שנאמר: "כי תועבת ה' אלהיך גם שניהם" (דברים כג, יט).^[14]

As it is stated: "for both of them are an abomination to the Lord your God" (Deuteronomy 23:19).

This verse, "לא תביא אתנן זונה ומחיר כלב בית ה' א-לוהיך לכל נדר" (Devarim 23:19), is the explicit basis for the pesul of these items for the altar. The Mishnah then derives from the word "שניהם" (both of them) that "שנים ולא ארבעה" (two, and not four), meaning only atnan and mechir kelev are forbidden, but not atnan kelev (payment for a dog's copulation) or mechir zonna (price of a prostitute bought as a maidservant). This derivation, "אותם ולא ולדותיהם" (them, and not their offspring), further reinforces the general rule that offspring are permitted, as stated in Temurah 6:5.

This intertextual link highlights the precise, text-based nature of certain pesulim. Unlike the ambiguity surrounding the ta'am of gevinat goyim or R' Chanina's chumra, the pesul of atnan and mechir is directly rooted in a biblical injunction, and its scope is carefully delimited by exegetical methods (derashot). The fact that the Mishnah explicitly states "ולדותיהן מותרין" (their offspring are permitted) for atnan and mechir (based on "אותם ולא ולדותיהם") further underlines the Chakhamim's stance that a pesul does not inherently transmit to a new entity (the offspring) unless there's a specific reason, such as ubar yerech imo (as for a nirba'ah while pregnant) or a unique textual exclusion. This provides a strong contrast to R' Eliezer's view on vald treifah, emphasizing that the Chakhamim require a compelling reason to extend a pesul to offspring.

Psak/Practice

The halakhic conclusions drawn from this sugya are clear, largely due to the definitive ruling of the Rambam, which reflects the normative psak (halakhic ruling) in such disputes.

The Rambam explicitly states in his commentary: "ואין הלכה כר"א וכרבי חנינא בן אנטיגנוס" (Mishnah Temurah 6:5:1). This means that the halakha follows the Chakhamim (Rabbis) in their dispute with R' Eliezer, and does not accept R' Chanina ben Antigonus's stringency.

1. Vald Treifah: According to the Chakhamim and accepted halakha, the offspring of a treifah animal is kosher and permitted for sacrifice on the altar, provided it is itself healthy and unblemished. The pesul of the mother (being treifah) is a condition of her own vitality and does not transfer to her healthy offspring. This aligns with the principle that treifot are not inherited, and a new, healthy life is not inherently flawed by its parent's physical defect.
2. Kesheira She'yinka Min Ha'treifah: Similarly, a kosher animal that suckled from a treifah animal is kosher and permitted for the altar. The Rambam's interpretation limits R' Chanina's chumra to the transient presence of undigested treifah milk, and once digested, the pesul is removed. The normative psak rejects even this temporary pesul, allowing the yonka to be offered.

Meta-Psak Heuristics: This sugya offers crucial insights into meta-psak heuristics:

• Following the Rabbis: In disputes between an individual Tanna and the Chakhamim, the halakha generally follows the Chakhamim. This is clearly exemplified here in the rejection of R' Eliezer's and R' Chanina's stringent views.
• Nature of Pesulim: The sugya highlights the distinction between pesulim that are inherent to the guf or status (like ribui) and those that are conditions of health (treifah). This distinction influences whether a pesul is transmitted to offspring or transfers through indirect means.
• Rejection of Overly Stringent Gezeirot: While Chazal enacted many gezeirot to safeguard halakha, the psak often avoids adopting chumrot that lack strong conceptual or textual support, particularly when they appear to contradict broader principles of halakha (like the independent status of a healthy offspring). This is evident in the rejection of R' Chanina's view.

In practice, for modern halakha (outside the context of korbanot), the principles derived from this sugya regarding the non-transmission of treifah status to healthy offspring are fundamental. A calf born to a treifah cow, if healthy, is not considered treifah itself. Similarly, the milk of a treifah animal is forbidden to drink (as basar be'chalav or just treifah), but a kosher animal that consumes it (and digests it) does not become pasul (disqualified) for consumption.

Takeaway

This sugya meticulously dissects the distinct natures of various disqualifications for the altar, revealing that treifah, as a condition of health, does not inherently transmit to healthy offspring, unlike pesulim rooted in status or action. The normative halakha prioritizes the Rabbis' more lenient view, underscoring the principle that a new, healthy entity is generally not burdened by the parent's specific pesul, unless clearly mandated by Torah or a compelling rabbinic decree.

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^[1] Rambam, Mishnah Temurah 6:5:1. ^[2] Tosafot Yom Tov, Mishnah Temurah 6:5:1. ^[3] Tosafot Yom Tov, Mishnah Temurah 6:5:3. ^[4] Rashash, Mishnah Temurah 6:5:1. ^[5] Mishnat Eretz Yisrael, Mishnah Temurah 6:5:1-4. ^[6] Mishnat Eretz Yisrael, Mishnah Temurah 6:5:5-21. ^[7] Tosafot Yom Tov, Mishnah Temurah 6:5:3 s.v. "ומיהו ק"ק דא"כ הוי מתני' לצדדין". ^[8] Tosafot Yom Tov, Mishnah Temurah 6:5:3 s.v. "ומ"ש הר"ב ורבנן סברי". ^[9] Rambam, Mishnah Temurah 6:5:1. ^[10] Rambam, Mishnah Temurah 6:5:1. ^[11] Mishnat Eretz Yisrael, Mishnah Temurah 6:5:5-21. ^[12] Mishnah Avodah Zarah 2:5. ^[13] Mishnat Eretz Yisrael, Mishnah Temurah 6:5:5-21. ^[14] Mishnah Temurah 6:6; Devarim 23:19.