Mishneh Torah, Agents and Partners 2-4

Sugya Map

• Issue: Who is eligible to be an agent (shaliach) and for whom? What are the foundational principles of shlichut?
• Nafka Mina(s):
  • Validity of transactions involving non-Jewish agents or agents for non-Jews.
  • Validity of kinyanim (acquisitions) or halachic acts performed by or through agents who are non-bnei brit, chasrei da'at, or eved Canaani.
  • Liability of agents (brokers, watchmen) for losses or deviations from instructions.
  • Specifics of harsha'ah (power of attorney) and its limitations, particularly concerning loans and denied claims.
  • Rules for partnerships, including acquisition of assets and dissolution.
• Primary Sources:
  • Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Shluchin Ve'Shutfim 2:1-4:15.
  • Numbers 18:28 ("וְכֵן תָּרִימוּ גַם אַתֶּם") as the derasha source for shlichut.
  • Mishnah Terumot 1:1, Kiddushin 41a, Gittin 23a, Nedarim 72b (Gemara sources for shlichut concepts).

Text Snapshot

The foundational principles for agency are laid out concisely:

• Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Shluchin Ve'Shutfim 2:1:

  גוי אינו נעשה שליח לשום דבר שבעולם. וכן ישראל אינו נעשה שליח לגוי לשום דבר שבעולם. שנאמר (במדבר יח, כח): "וכן תרימו גם אתם", מה אתם בני ברית, אף שלוחכם בני ברית. וכן הוא הדין לכל התורה כולה. והוא הדין מה אתם בעלי ברית, אף בעלי שלוחכם בני ברית לכל התורה כולה.

  • Dikduk/Leshon Nuance: The phrase "וכן הוא הדין לכל התורה כולה" is critical, expanding the derasha from the specific context of terumat ma'aser to the entirety of halacha. The repetition of "מה אתם בני ברית, אף שלוחכם בני ברית" and then "מה אתם בעלי ברית, אף בעלי שלוחכם בני ברית" emphasizes both the agent and the principal must be bnei brit. The gam in "גם אתם" is key, as Steinsaltz notes it teaches that one's shaliach can also perform the separation (Steinsaltz on MT, Agents and Partners 2:1:2).

• Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Shluchin Ve'Shutfim 2:2:

  איש עושה שליח איש ואישה, ואפילו אשת איש, ואפילו עבד ושפחה, הואיל ויש בהן דעת, וישנן במקצת מצוות, נעשים שלוחים לדבר ממון.

  • Dikduk/Leshon Nuance: "הואיל ויש בהן דעת" (since they possess developed intellectual capacity) and "וישנן במקצת מצוות" (and are obligated in some mitzvot) are the twin criteria for agency in mamon. This immediately qualifies the broad statement of 2:1, limiting shlichut in mamon to those who, while not fully bnei brit for all mitzvot (like women or eved Canaani), still have da'at and some mitzvah obligations. Steinsaltz clarifies that eved Canaani is considered a ben brit in this context because he is obligated in mitzvot that women are, and his master must circumcise him (Steinsaltz on MT, Agents and Partners 2:2:3).

Readings

Chiddush of Rambam: The Derasha's Universal Scope

Rambam's formulation in Hilchot Shluchin Ve'Shutfim 2:1, deriving the universal principle of shlichut from Numbers 18:28 ("וכן תרימו גם אתם"), is foundational. The derasha "מה אתם בני ברית, אף שלוחכם בני ברית. וכן הוא הדין לכל התורה כולה" expands the scope of agency beyond the specific mitzvah of terumat ma'aser to encompass all aspects of Torah law, including mamon. This is a significant chiddush, grounding the very concept of shlichut – both who can be an agent and for whom – in this scriptural exegesis. Rambam himself, in his commentary on Mishnah Terumot 1:1, elaborates on this derasha: "ולמדו מכאן ששליח ישראל הרי הוא כישראל עצמו לכל המצוות שבתורה כולם, בין שהן מדברי תורה, בין שהן מדברי סופרים, וכן אמרו אין שליח לדבר עבירה" (Peh HaMishnah, Terumot 1:1). This directly connects the derasha to the broader principle of shlichut and even to ein shaliach li'dvar aveirah (there is no agency for a sinful act). The core chiddush here is that shlichut is a halachic construct, not merely a secular proxy, and its validity hinges on the covenantal status of both agent and principal.

Chiddush of Rashi: Shlichut for Akum and Davar Aveirah

Rashi, in various places, offers a more focused approach to the limitations of shlichut, particularly concerning akum and davar aveirah. While not directly interpreting Numbers 18:28 in the same universal way as Rambam, Rashi's understanding of shlichut often aligns with the halachic implications derived by Rambam. On Kiddushin 41a, regarding a person who sends a non-Jew to betroth a woman, Rashi explains: "אינו עושה שליח - דאין שליח לדבר עבירה, ואין שליח לגוי" (Rashi, Kiddushin 41a s.v. אינו עושה שליח). Here, Rashi explicitly states two reasons why a non-Jew cannot be an agent for kiddushin:

1. Ein shaliach li'dvar aveirah: If the non-Jew performs kiddushin, it's a davar aveirah for the Jew who sent him, as kiddushin must be performed by a Jew.
2. Ein shaliach la'goy: A non-Jew cannot be an agent at all. The chiddush in Rashi, particularly when contrasted with Rambam, is that Rashi often roots the inability of a non-Jew to be an agent in the specific nature of the mitzvah or act, rather than a sweeping, all-encompassing derasha from Numbers. For kiddushin, the non-Jew cannot effect a kiddushin because he is not commanded in it, and thus cannot act on behalf of one who is. This is less about "בן ברית" in the covenantal sense and more about the halachic capacity to perform the specific act. However, the second reason, "אין שליח לגוי," is a blanket statement, implying a fundamental disqualification of the akum as an agent, aligning with Rambam's conclusion. The friction arises in the source of this blanket disqualification.

Friction

The Grand Kushya: Derasha's Reach and the Akum's Role

The most potent kushya arises from Rambam's expansive application of the derasha from Numbers 18:28. The verse concerns the mitzvah of terumat ma'aser (separation of tithes), a mitzvat asseh related to the Temple service and agricultural laws. How can a derasha from such a specific mitzvah be applied to "כל התורה כולה," including purely financial matters (mamon) where the agent acts as a mere messenger, and even more so, to prohibit shlichut l'akum for any mission?

Specifically, the Gemara in Gittin 23a explicitly states: "אין שליח לדבר עבירה" (There is no agency for a sinful act). This principle means that if Reuven tells Shimon to kill Levi, Shimon is liable, not Reuven, because Shimon became the primary actor in the aveirah. The Gemara then adds: "אמרי נהרדעי: אף שליח לדבר עבירה הוא" (The Neharde'a school says: An agent for a sinful act is an agent). This is usually reconciled by distinguishing between shlichut for kiddushin or get (where shlichut effects a halachic change and requires the agent to be fit for the act) and shlichut for a davar aveirah (where the agent's action is independently sinful, thus nullifying agency). However, Rambam's derasha "מה אתם בני ברית, אף שלוחכם בני ברית" seems to offer a more fundamental, all-encompassing reason for excluding non-Jews from shlichut. If the akum cannot be an agent because he is not a ben brit, does this supersede or complement ein shaliach li'dvar aveirah? And what about mamon? A non-Jew can certainly buy and sell for himself; why can't he do so for a Jew? The kushya is: Is the exclusion of the akum from shlichut due to a lack of halachic capacity for specific mitzvot (like kiddushin or terumah), or a fundamental, covenantal disqualification from any agency on behalf of a Jew, even for mamon? Rambam's "כל התורה כולה" pushes towards the latter, which seems overly broad for mamon.

The Best Terutz: Distinguishing Halachic vs. Practical Shlichut

The best terutz differentiates between two types of "agency":

1. Halachic Agency (שליחות גמורה): This is where the agent's act is legally imputed to the principal, as if the principal himself performed it. This applies to mitzvot (like terumah, korbanot), kiddushin, get, and other acts that create or change halachic status. For this type of shlichut, the derasha "מה אתם בני ברית, אף שלוחכם בני ברית" is fully applicable. An akum (or chasar da'at) cannot be a shaliach because they lack the covenantal or intellectual capacity to perform such halachic acts "כמותו" (as if the principal himself). The akum is not commanded in mitzvot, so his performance of a mitzvah for a Jew lacks the necessary kedusha or chiyuv. Similarly, kiddushin requires a Jewish male.
2. Practical Agency/Messenger Service (שליחות הובלה/יד ארוכה): This is where the agent merely acts as a messenger or a conduit for the principal's will, particularly in financial matters where the agent does not perform a halachic act but rather a physical transfer or communication. For example, if Reuven sends a non-Jew to deliver money to Shimon. In this case, the akum can serve as a messenger. Rambam himself provides this distinction in Hilchot Shluchin Ve'Shutfim 2:3, where he allows a chasar da'at (e.g., a minor) to be sent as a messenger for oil, but the sender remains liable for loss because the minor is not a full shaliach whose actions are imputed. Only if the recipient explicitly accepts the minor as his messenger does the sender's liability cease. This shows that the halachic definition of shaliach (where the agent's actions legally bind the principal) is distinct from merely sending someone to perform a task.

Therefore, the derasha "מה אתם בני ברית, אף שלוחכם בני ברית" applies strictly to halachic agency. For mamon matters, an akum or chasar da'at cannot be a halachic shaliach in the sense that their actions automatically create legal obligations for the principal in all cases. However, they can act as messengers or proxies, but the legal implications (e.g., liability for loss) might shift. The Gemara in Gittin 23a regarding ein shaliach li'dvar aveirah primarily refers to halachic agency for acts that are inherently sinful or that require specific halachic status. The sweeping statement "אין שליח לגוי" in Rashi (Kiddushin 41a) refers to this halachic agency. For simple mamon transactions, where the akum merely facilitates a transfer, they can function as a "hand" of the principal, but the halachic responsibility remains with the principal unless the third party explicitly accepts the akum as the principal's agent, as per the case of the minor in MT 2:3. Thus, Rambam's "כל התורה כולה" means that for any matter where halachic agency is required for the act to be validly performed as if by the principal, only a ben brit with da'at can be an agent.

Intertext

Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 188:1

The practical halacha largely follows Rambam's ruling. The Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 188:1 states: "גוי אינו נעשה שליח לשום דבר שבעולם; ולא ישראל לגוי. וכן קטן וחרש שוטה וקטנה, אין נעשים שלוחים, ולא עושים שליחים" (A non-Jew cannot be an agent for any matter in the world; nor a Jew for a non-Jew. Similarly, a minor, deaf-mute, mentally unsound person, or female minor cannot be agents, nor can they appoint agents). This directly mirrors Rambam's initial ruling. The Sema (R' Yehoshua Falk) on CM 188:1 (s.v. גוי אינו נעשה) clarifies that this refers to shlichut where the agent's act is imputed to the principal, not merely a messenger service. If a non-Jew merely delivers something, it's not a full shlichut. This distinction echoes our terutz above, showing how the halachic system reconciles the broad exclusion with practical necessity.

Responsa on Shlichut for Legal Representation

A compelling parallel can be found in discussions regarding shlichut for legal representation in non-Jewish courts (ערכאות של גויים) or where a Jew needs a non-Jew to act on his behalf in a secular legal context. For example, contemporary poskim discuss whether a Jew can appoint a non-Jewish lawyer to represent him in a secular court. While the halachic principle of "אין שליח לגוי" remains, the practical reality is that such representation is often necessary. The terutz often hinges on the idea that the non-Jewish lawyer is not performing a halachic act of kinyan or divorce or kiddushin, but rather acting as a conduit or a "mouthpiece" in a secular system. The halachic validity of the underlying kinyan or transaction is determined by halacha, not by the non-Jewish lawyer's actions. This is similar to the Rambam's distinction for mamon (MT 2:2) where women, avadim, and shifchot can be agents because they have da'at and some mitzvot. The focus shifts from strict "בן ברית" to the capacity for da'at and the nature of the act. If the act is purely practical and does not carry halachic weight, the limitations of shlichut are relaxed. This nuanced approach allows for necessary interactions in a complex world while upholding the fundamental halachic principles derived from the Torah.

Psak/Practice

The Rambam's rulings in Hilchot Shluchin Ve'Shutfim 2:1-4 form the bedrock of halacha regarding agency. The core principle that a goy or chasar da'at cannot be a halachic shaliach (i.e., someone whose actions are legally imputed to the principal) is universally accepted and codified in the Shulchan Aruch (CM 188:1). This means:

• A goy cannot perform kiddushin or get on behalf of a Jew.
• A goy cannot separate terumot u'ma'aserot for a Jew.
• A goy cannot acquire property for a Jew in a way that creates halachic ownership if the kinyan itself requires a ben brit.

However, the distinction between halachic shlichut and practical messenger services is crucial. For mamon matters, where the agent is merely conveying a message or physically transferring an item, an akum can be employed. The critical point is that in such cases, the principal often remains liable for the akum's actions or inactions, unless the third party explicitly accepted the akum as the principal's agent. This means that while a non-Jew can physically deliver a document or money, the halachic responsibility and legal imputation of the act typically do not transfer entirely to the non-Jew as they would with a halachically valid agent. This meta-psak heuristic highlights the careful balance between rigid halachic definitions and the practical necessities of commercial and social interaction, always prioritizing the halachic integrity of the act.

Takeaway

Rambam's derivation of universal shlichut principles from Numbers 18:28, particularly the "בן ברית" requirement, establishes shlichut as a deep halachic construct, not merely a secular proxy. This fundamental concept informs who can act as an agent and for what purpose, distinguishing between acts with inherent halachic weight and mere messenger services.