Mishneh Torah, Murderer and the Preservation of Life 2-4

Sugya Map

The Rambam, in Hilchot Rotzeach u'Shmirat Nefesh (Laws of Murderer and the Preservation of Life) 2:1-4, meticulously delineates the various forms of homicide and the corresponding legal consequences, fundamentally distinguishing between liability for execution by an earthly Beit Din (court) and liability for death at the hands of Heaven (mitat Shamayim). The core of the sugya revolves around the principle of direct causation and the nuanced application of eidus (witness testimony) and hatra'ah (warning).

Issue

The central issue is the definition of a "murderer" for whom Beit Din administers capital punishment, as opposed to one who is merely a "shedder of blood" liable to mitat Shamayim. This distinction hinges on the directness of the act, the presence of an agent (shaliach), and the specific circumstances of the killing. A related, complex thread is the status of a shaliach lidvar aveira (agent for sin) in the context of murder, particularly for Bnei Noach (Noahides) versus Yisrael (Israelites). The Rambam also introduces the concept of hora'at sha'ah (temporary decree) or din malkhut (royal law) as an extra-judicial mechanism to address cases of mitat Shamayim liability or when strict halakhic proof for Beit Din execution is lacking, thereby ensuring societal order and deterrence.

Nafka Mina(s)

1. Scope of Capital Punishment: The sugya establishes the narrow parameters for Beit Din execution, emphasizing the direct, unmediated act of killing. This profoundly impacts the practical application of capital punishment in a functional Sanhedrin.
2. Principle of Ein Shaliach Lidvar Aveira: The Rambam's ruling that one who hires or sends an agent to kill is liable for mitat Shamayim (not Beit Din) implies the application of ein shaliach lidvar aveira – the agent is responsible, not the sender – at least concerning Beit Din jurisdiction for Yisrael. This has broad implications across criminal law.
3. Extra-Judicial Authority: The halakha regarding the king's or court's ability to execute murderers otherwise exempt from Beit Din highlights the dynamic tension between strict halakha and the need for communal stability (tikkun ha'olam). This is a critical principle for understanding governance in Jewish law.
4. Status of Ger Toshav and Eved Kena'ani: The text differentiates the liability for killing a ger toshav (resident alien) from a Jew or eved Kena'ani, impacting the scope of Beit Din's jurisdiction over non-Jews.
5. Causation and Intent: The detailed assessment criteria for the murder weapon, place, force, and victim's condition (e.g., trefah, nefel) underscore the Torah's precise definition of retzicha (murder) and the necessary elements for criminal intent (mezid) versus negligence (shogeg).
6. Multiple Perpetrators: The ruling regarding multiple individuals striking a person, none individually causing death, yet the combined effect leading to death, illuminates complex issues of joint liability and individual culpability in halakha.
7. The Din Kipah: The institution of the kipah (a special prison/starvation punishment) for murderers who cannot be executed by Beit Din due to technicalities (e.g., lack of hatra'ah, contradictory witnesses) demonstrates the severity of murder in halakha even in the absence of formal capital punishment.

Primary Sources

• Mishneh Torah, Murderer and the Preservation of Life 2:1-4: The core text for analysis.
• Bereishit 9:5-6: "אך את דמכם לנפשותיכם אדרוש... מיד כל חיה אדרשנו ומיד האדם מיד איש אחיו אדרוש את נפש האדם. שופך דם האדם באדם דמו ישפך" (Indeed, I will demand an accounting for your blood, for your lives... From the hand of every beast I will demand it, and from the hand of man, from the hand of one's brother, I will demand an accounting for the soul of man. Whoever sheds the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed). These verses are foundational for the Rambam's distinction between mitat Shamayim and mitat Beit Din.
• Shemot 21:14: "וכי יזיד איש על רעהו להרגו בערמה" (But if a man acts intentionally against his colleague, killing him with cunning...). This verse is used to limit Beit Din execution to the killing of a "colleague" (re'ehu), excluding a ger toshav.
• Shemot 21:20-21: Deals with the killing of an eved Kena'ani by his master, introducing the 24-hour rule.
• Bamidbar 35:16-18, 20-21: Specifies types of murder weapons and actions (k'li barzel, even yad, k'li eitz yad) and introduces the requirement for assessment of potential to cause death.
• Vayikra 24:17: "ואיש כי יכה כל נפש אדם מות יומת" (And if a man strikes any human life, he shall surely be put to death). The Rambam interprets "כל נפש" as emphasizing that a single individual must be solely responsible for death to incur Beit Din liability.
• Devarim 19:19: "ועשיתם לו כאשר זמם לעשות לאחיו" (And you shall do to him as he conspired to do to his brother). This verse governs the punishment of eidim zomemin.
• Sanhedrin 57a-b: Discusses Bnei Noach laws, including their liability for murder by shaliach.
• Kiddushin 42b-43a: The primary sugya on ein shaliach lidvar aveira for Yisrael.

Text Snapshot

The foundational lines for this sugya appear in Hilchot Rotzeach u'Shmirat Nefesh 2:1-2:

כל ההורג חבירו בידו - כגון שהכהו בסייף או באבן הממיתה אותו, חנקו עד שמת או שרפו באש - הרי זה נהרג בבית דין, מפני שהוא בעצמו הרגו. Whoever kills his colleague with his hand - such as striking him with a sword or with a stone that can cause death, strangling him until he dies, or burning him in fire - he should be executed by the court, for he himself has killed him.

אבל השוכר הורג להרוג את חבירו, או ששלח עבדיו והרגוהו, או שכפתו ונתנו לפני הארי וכיוצא בו והרגו, וכן ההורג את עצמו - כולן שופכי דמים הן ועוון הריגה בידם וחייבים מיתה לשמים, ואין בהם מיתת בית דין. But a person who hires a murderer to kill a colleague, one who sends his servants and they kill him, one who binds a colleague and leaves him before a lion or the like and the beast kills him, and a person who commits suicide are all considered to be shedders of blood; the sin of bloodshed is upon their hands, and they are liable for death at the hands of God. They are not, however, liable for execution by the court.

מנין שכן הוא הדין? שנאמר: "שופך דם האדם באדם דמו ישפך" (בראשית ט, ו) - זה שהרג את חבירו בעצמו שלא על ידי שליח. Which source indicates that this is the law? Genesis 9:6 states: "When a person sheds the blood of a man, by a man his blood shall be shed." This refers to a person who kills a colleague by himself, without employing an agent.

וכתוב אחריו: "אך את דמכם לנפשותיכם אדרוש" (שם) - זה ההורג את עצמו. The verse continues: "Of the blood of your own lives I will demand an account." This refers to a person who commits suicide.

"מיד כל חיה אדרשנו" (שם ה) - זה המוסר את חבירו לחיה להורגו. "From the hand of every wild beast will I demand an account" (Ibid. 9:5) This refers to a person who places a person before a wild beast so that he will devour him.

"מיד האדם מיד איש אחיו אדרוש את נפש האדם" (שם ו) - זה השוכר אחרים להרוג את חבירו. "From the hand of a man, from the hand of one's brother, will I demand an account for the soul of a man" (Ibid. 9:6). This refers to a person who hires others to kill a colleague.

ובכולן בשלושת האחרונים נאמר "אדרוש", הרי דינם מסור לשמים. In all of the three last instances, the verse uses the expression "will I demand an account," indicating that their judgment is in heaven's hands.

Dikduk/Leshon Nuance

1. "בידו" (by his hand): The Rambam opens with this precise phrase, immediately setting the condition for Beit Din liability. The emphasis is on direct, physical agency. This contrasts sharply with the indirect methods listed subsequently (hiring, sending servants, placing before a lion), which lack this direct "hand" in the killing. This dikduk is crucial for understanding the Torah's definition of murder for capital punishment.
2. "הרי זה נהרג בבית דין, מפני שהוא בעצמו הרגו" (he should be executed by the court, for he himself has killed him): This phrasing underscores the principle of direct causation. "בעצמו" (by himself) reinforces "בידו," clarifying that Beit Din acts only when the murderer is the unmediated cause of death.
3. "שופכי דמים הן ועוון הריגה בידם וחייבים מיתה לשמים" (they are all considered to be shedders of blood; the sin of bloodshed is upon their hands, and they are liable for death at the hands of God): This is a critical distinction. While not subject to Beit Din execution, these individuals are far from innocent. They bear the "sin of bloodshed" and face Divine retribution. The language "עוון הריגה בידם" indicates moral culpability, even if legally unpunishable by human courts.
4. "שופך דם האדם באדם דמו ישפך" (Whoever sheds the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed): The Rambam's interpretation of "באדם" (by man) as "בעצמו שלא על ידי שליח" (by himself, without an agent) is key. This reading limits the scope of Beit Din execution to direct action, effectively deriving the principle of ein shaliach lidvar aveira (no agency for sin) in this context.
5. "אדרוש" (I will demand an account): The repeated use of "אדרוש" in relation to suicide, moser l'chaya, and hiring an agent is the textual pivot for assigning mitat Shamayim. The term signifies Divine judgment, which is distinct from human judicial process. This linguistic consistency across these three cases solidifies their shared status of being beyond Beit Din's direct punitive reach for capital crimes.

Readings

The Rambam's succinct presentation of the laws of murder, particularly the distinction between mitat Beit Din and mitat Shamayim and the role of agency, serves as a fertile ground for extensive lomdus. Key Rishonim and Acharonim delve into the underlying principles, reconciling apparent contradictions and illuminating the Rambam's unique shitah (approach).

Ohr Sameach on Mishneh Torah, Murderer and the Preservation of Life 2:1

The Ohr Sameach (Rabbi Meir Simcha of Dvinsk) immediately zeros in on a significant kushya (difficulty) arising from the Rambam's statement in 2:1: "כל ההורג חבירו בידו... הרי זה נהרג בבית דין, מפני שהוא בעצמו הרגו" (Whoever kills his colleague with his hand... he should be executed by the court, for he himself has killed him). The Ohr Sameach notes that the Rambam in Hilchot Sanhedrin (18:6) rules that eidim zomemin (conspiring witnesses) are executed with the same mitah (death penalty) they intended for the accused. This ruling is explicitly derived from the verse "ועשיתם לו כאשר זמם לעשות לאחיו" (Devarim 19:19) – "and you shall do to him as he conspired to do to his brother." The Ohr Sameach asks: If one conspires to kill by stoning, eidim zomemin would be stoned. However, the general rule for murder by stoning is that the murderer is executed by sword, not stoning, as the mitah for stoning is reserved for specific sins like idolatry. If the eidim zomemin are executed by stoning, it seems to contradict the principle that one who stones another is executed by sword.

The Ohr Sameach explains that this kushya has already been raised by Rabboteinu at the beginning of Makkot (specifically referring to Tosafot in Makkot 5a s.v. "דזה"). The core of the problem is that if eidim zomemin are treated as if they committed the act themselves, and the one who stones another is executed by sword, then eidim zomemin who conspired to stone should also be executed by sword, not stoning. Yet, the Torah dictates that they receive the mitah they plotted. This implies a chiddush (novelty) in the law of eidim zomemin.

He then connects this sugya to the discussion in the Gemara at the beginning of Bava Metzia 56a ("היו בודקין"), which differentiates between the laws of Gerim and Bnei Noach regarding the mitah. The Gemara states "עו"ג להנך תרתי לא דמיא שכן בסייף" (a gentile is not similar to those two, for his mitah is by sword). The Ohr Sameach uses this to suggest that the mitah for murder is fundamentally by sword. If we consider the eidim zomemin as having "killed with their hands" (figuratively), their mitah should be sword. However, the chiddush of "כאשר זמם" means their mitah is determined by their plot.

The Ohr Sameach extends this line of reasoning to the Rambam's halakha about the shaliach. If one considers the shaliach to have acted as an agent, and the Rambam says the sender is liable for mitat Shamayim, it reinforces the idea that Beit Din execution requires direct action. The Ohr Sameach argues that even if we were to consider the eidim zomemin as "having done the act themselves" (through their testimony), their own intrinsic mitah for murder would be by sword. The Torah introduces a chiddush for eidim zomemin that their mitah is "כאשר זמם" – according to what they plotted. This chiddush necessitates "דרישה וחקירה" (detailed investigation and cross-examination) to ascertain their intent precisely. Therefore, the Rambam's initial statement about direct killing by hand leading to Beit Din execution by sword remains consistent, and the eidim zomemin case is an exception due to a specific chiddush in Torah law. He concludes by stating that even the sender in a shaliach case, if considered to have "killed with their hands" (which is not the case for Beit Din), their mitah would ultimately be by sword, as the core principle for murder is execution by sword, not necessarily the method used to kill.

Shorshei HaYam on Mishneh Torah, Murderer and the Preservation of Life 2:1

The Shorshei HaYam (Rabbi Yaakov Chaim Sofer) undertakes an extensive and profound analysis of the Rambam's opening statements, specifically focusing on the derivation from Bereishit 9:5-6 and the implications for Bnei Noach. The Rambam explicitly states that hiring a murderer, sending servants, or exposing one to a beast are all cases of mitat Shamayim for Yisrael, based on the term "אדרוש" (I will demand an account) in Bereishit 9:5-6. However, the Shorshei HaYam immediately points to an apparent contradiction from Midrash Rabba (Bereishit Rabba 34:10).

The Midrash cites Rabbi Chanina who interprets "שופך דם האדם באדם דמו ישפך" (Bereishit 9:6) to include cases of shaliach (agent) or overim (fetuses) for Bnei Noach, stating that they are liable for mitat Beit Din. Specifically, the Midrash says: "מיד איש אחיו – זה השוכר את אחרים להרוג את חבירו... אמר ר' חנינא: כולם בהלכות בני נח בע"א בדיין אחד בלא עדים ובלא התראה ע"י שליח ע"י עוברין בע"א בדיין אחד שופך דם האדם באדם א' דמו ישפך ע"י שליח שופך דם האדם ע"י אדם דמו ישפך ע"י עוברים שופך דם האדם" (From the hand of one's brother – this refers to one who hires others to kill his colleague... Rabbi Chanina said: All of these, regarding the laws of Bnei Noach, even with one witness, one judge, without warnings, by an agent, by fetuses, with one witness, one judge, "whoever sheds the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed" – by an agent, "whoever sheds the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed" – by fetuses, "whoever sheds the blood of man"). This Midrash appears to explicitly state that Bnei Noach are liable for Beit Din execution for murder committed via an agent, directly contradicting the Rambam's ruling for Yisrael and his interpretation of "אדרוש" as mitat Shamayim.

The Shorshei HaYam notes that Maharash Yaffe (on Midrash Rabba) also struggled with this and suggested that R' Chanina might interpret "מיד איש אחיו" differently, perhaps referring to unintentional killing requiring kapparah (atonement) and galut (exile). However, the Shorshei HaYam finds this difficult, as the pesukim in Bereishit are clearly addressed to Noach and his descendants, meaning Bnei Noach. It seems improbable to claim they apply only to Yisrael for shogeg (unintentional) and mezid (intentional) cases.

He offers a profound reconciliation: both the initial drasha (interpretation) and R' Chanina's drasha apply to both Yisrael and Bnei Noach, but with different applications. The initial pesukim ("אך את דמכם... אדרוש") refer to mitat Shamayim for Yisrael when conditions for Beit Din are not met (e.g., no hatra'ah, no two witnesses). For Bnei Noach, these pesukim also refer to mitat Shamayim when there's no judge or witnesses. Then, the verse "שופך דם האדם באדם דמו ישפך" comes to clarify that Bnei Noach are liable for Beit Din execution in cases of shaliach, overim, or even with one witness or self-admission. Thus, R' Chanina does not contradict the initial drasha; rather, the first drasha covers cases where no Beit Din conditions are met, leading to mitat Shamayim, while the second drasha specifies instances where Beit Din can act for Bnei Noach.

The Shorshei HaYam then brings in the Gemara in Niddah 57b (also in Sanhedrin 57b), which derives Bnei Noach laws from these same pesukim. The Gemara there states that a Ben Noach is executed with one judge, one witness, without hatra'ah, and even for overim (fetuses). This is derived from "אך את דמכם לנפשותיכם אדרוש," interpreted as Shamayim demanding an account from the earthly Beit Din of Bnei Noach if they fail to judge these cases. This is a brilliant chiddush: "אדרוש" does not always mean mitat Shamayim for the individual, but can mean Shamayim holds the Beit Din accountable for its failure to act. This reconciliation allows the Rambam to maintain that for Yisrael, shaliach is mitat Shamayim for the individual, but for Bnei Noach, shaliach can lead to mitat Beit Din (because their Beit Din is held accountable by Shamayim if they don't act).

This intricate reconciliation is crucial for understanding the Rambam's consistent position across Hilchot Rotzeach (where he states mitat Shamayim for Yisrael in shaliach cases) and Hilchot Melachim (where he rules mitat Beit Din for Bnei Noach in such cases). The Shorshei HaYam concludes that the Rambam's shitah is that "אדרוש" indeed refers to Shamayim punishment, but for Bnei Noach, this punishment can be directed at their Beit Din for not executing justice, thus empowering their courts to act even in cases where Beit Din Yisrael would not.

Steinsaltz Commentary on Mishneh Torah, Murderer and the Preservation of Life 2:10-11

While the Steinsaltz commentary on these lines is brief, often providing cross-references or clarifying definitions, its value lies in highlighting specific terminologies and their broader halakhic context.

On Hilchot Rotzeach 2:10, the Steinsaltz notes that "ההורג עבד כנעני הרי זה נהרג עליו" (Whoever kills a Canaanite slave is executed for it) is further explained in the subsequent halakha. He also clarifies that "ואם הרג בשגגה גולה" (If he killed unintentionally, he is exiled) refers to Hilchot Rotzeach 5:3. These simple references underscore that the killing of an eved Kena'ani is treated with the severity of killing a Jew, with both intentional murder leading to Beit Din execution and unintentional killing leading to galut (exile to a city of refuge). This is significant because eved Kena'ani are not full Jews, yet they have accepted certain mitzvot. The Steinsaltz commentary on 2:11, explaining "שהעבד כבר קיבל עליו מצוות ונוסף על נחלת ה'" (for the servant has accepted the yoke of mitzvot and has been added to "the heritage of God"), directly addresses this. It clarifies that an eved Kena'ani is obligated in mitzvot like a woman (referencing Hilchot Chagiga 2:1) and is therefore not considered a gentile for this purpose. This elevates their status in the eyes of the law, making their murder a capital offense for Beit Din.

On Hilchot Rotzeach 2:11, the Steinsaltz defines "גר תושב" (resident alien) as a gentile who has accepted not to worship idols and to observe the seven Noahide laws (referencing Hilchot Avodah Zarah 10:6 and Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah 14:7). He then notes that for killing a ger toshav, "אינו נהרג עליו בבית דין" (he is not executed for it by Beit Din), but if killed unintentionally, he is exiled (referencing Hilchot Rotzeach 5:3). This highlights a crucial hierarchy: a Jew is liable for mitat Beit Din for killing a Jew or an eved Kena'ani, but not for a ger toshav (or a gentile idolater, kal vachomer). The distinction is drawn from Shemot 21:14, "וכי יזיד איש על רעהו להרגו בערמה," interpreting "רעהו" (his colleague) as specifically referring to a Jew (or one equated to a Jew, like an eved Kena'ani). The fact that unintentional killing of a ger toshav still leads to galut signifies that while Beit Din capital punishment isn't administered, the act is still considered a grave offense, not completely outside the halakhic framework of accountability. This demonstrates the concentric circles of halakhic protection for human life, with Jews and eved Kena'ani at the innermost circle for Beit Din capital punishment, followed by ger toshav for galut, and then general gentiles, who are afforded protection by the Noahide laws but not necessarily by Beit Din Yisrael.

Friction

The Rambam's concise, categorical statements often conceal layers of complex sugyot and require careful reconciliation with other halakhot and midrashic traditions. The present sugya is no exception, particularly regarding the principle of ein shaliach lidvar aveira (no agency for sin) and its application to different populations.

Kushya 1: Reconciling Shamayim vs. Beit Din for Shaliach in Hilchot Rotzeach and Hilchot Melachim

The Rambam states unequivocally in Hilchot Rotzeach 2:1 that one who hires a murderer, sends servants, or exposes someone to a beast is liable for mitat Shamayim and "אין בהם מיתת בית דין" (there is no Beit Din execution for them). This is derived from the repeated use of "אדרוש" in Bereishit 9:5-6. This ruling clearly applies to Yisrael.

However, in Hilchot Melachim u'Milchamot 9:4, the Rambam rules concerning Bnei Noach:

וכן בן נח שהרג את חבירו בידו או שכר הורג להרוג חבירו או כפתו והשליכו לפני ארי או שרפו באש או הציפו במים וכיוצא באלו הרי זה נהרג עליהן בבית דין של בני נח. Similarly, a Ben Noach who kills his colleague with his hand, or hires a murderer to kill his colleague, or binds him and throws him before a lion, or burns him in fire, or drowns him in water, and the like – he is executed for these by a Beit Din of Bnei Noach.

This passage directly contradicts the Hilchot Rotzeach ruling, as it explicitly states that a Ben Noach is executed by Beit Din for murder via an agent (hiring a killer, exposing to a lion). How can the Rambam maintain these two seemingly opposing positions? If "אדרוש" means mitat Shamayim for Yisrael, why would it mean mitat Beit Din for Bnei Noach in the very same types of indirect causation? This is the central kushya that the Shorshei HaYam grapples with, and indeed, other Acharonim before him.

Terutz 1 (Shorshei HaYam's Reconciliation: Shamayim Demands from Beit Din)

The Shorshei HaYam offers a sophisticated reconciliation, building on insights from the Gemara in Niddah 57b (which is parallel to Sanhedrin 57b). He argues that the phrase "אדרוש" (I will demand an account) can have a dual meaning. For Yisrael, it indeed refers to mitat Shamayim for the individual who commits the act, as their Beit Din operates under stricter rules of eidus and hatra'ah. However, for Bnei Noach, "אדרוש" can be understood as Shamayim demanding an account from their earthly Beit Din if they fail to execute justice.

The Shorshei HaYam elaborates: The Bnei Noach are commanded concerning dinim (laws/justice). If a Ben Noach commits murder, even through an agent or indirectly, and there is sufficient evidence for their Beit Din to act (e.g., one witness, no hatra'ah required), then Shamayim will "demand an account" from that Beit Din if they do not execute the murderer. In this scenario, "אדרוש" functions as a Divine imperative for the Bnei Noach's judicial system to enforce capital punishment for these acts.

Therefore, for Yisrael, the strictures of Torah law regarding Beit Din execution mean that indirect causation is relegated to mitat Shamayim for the individual. For Bnei Noach, however, the broader scope of their dinim means that similar acts of indirect causation do fall under their Beit Din's jurisdiction, precisely because Shamayim holds their Beit Din accountable for enforcing these laws. This resolves the apparent contradiction by distinguishing the addressee of "אדרוש": the individual for Yisrael, and the Beit Din for Bnei Noach.

Terutz 2 (Distinction in the Scope of Ein Shaliach Lidvar Aveira)

Another approach to resolve the tension could lie in a nuanced understanding of the principle "אין שליח לדבר עבירה" (no agency for sin) itself. For Yisrael, the traditional understanding (as codified by the Rambam in Hilchot Gezeila v'Aveida 1:2) is that when an agent commits a sin, the agent is fully responsible, and the sender is absolved from Beit Din punishment for the act, because "דברי הרב ודברי התלמיד דברי מי שומעין" (whose words do we listen to, the Master's or the student's?). The agent, being a rational, commanded individual, should have listened to God's prohibition rather than the sender's instruction.

Perhaps for Bnei Noach, this principle applies differently, or its scope is narrower. The Gemara in Sanhedrin 57b indeed states that Bnei Noach are executed even with one witness and no hatra'ah. Their laws are less stringent regarding evidentiary requirements, making it easier to convict. It is plausible that the concept of ein shaliach lidvar aveira does not apply with the same force, or in the same manner, to Bnei Noach. For instance, if the issur (prohibition) is understood more as a prohibition against causing death rather than a prohibition against the act itself, then the sender, as the ultimate cause, could remain liable.

Alternatively, some Acharonim (e.g., Mishneh LaMelech on Hilchot Rotzeach 2:1) suggest that the principle of ein shaliach lidvar aveira primarily absolves the sender from Beit Din punishment in cases where the shaliach is fully bar chayava (liable). However, if the shaliach is not bar chayava (e.g., a shoteh or katan), then the sender is liable. In the case of Bnei Noach who hire agents, perhaps their legal framework views the agent's culpability differently, or the sender's role is deemed more primary even when the agent is bar chayava. However, the Shorshei HaYam's terutz (Terutz 1 above) is generally considered the most direct and elegant in reconciling the Rambam's two statements.

Kushya 2: The Nachash HaKadmoni and the Limits of Ein Shaliach Lidvar Aveira

The Gemara in Sanhedrin 29a (and Avodah Zarah 22a) derives a crucial halakha from the story of the Nachash (serpent) in Gan Eden: "אין טוענין למסית" (one does not argue on behalf of an inciter). Rabbi Shmuel bar Nachmani, in the name of Rabbi Yonatan, teaches that the Nachash could have presented many arguments, but did not. What argument could it have made? "דברי הרב ודברי התלמיד דברי מי שומעין" (whose words do we listen to, the Master's or the student's?). This implies that the Nachash acted as an agent, and by not making this argument, it forfeited its defense.

This presents a kushya for the principle of ein shaliach lidvar aveira. If the Nachash was merely an agent (for God, in a sense, or for Adam/Chava who were told not to eat), and it could have argued "דברי הרב ודברי התלמיד," this suggests that ein shaliach lidvar aveira does apply, making the Nachash solely responsible. However, if the Nachash is responsible, why is it stated that we don't argue on behalf of an inciter? The Shorshei HaYam delves into this, noting the complexity. The standard understanding of ein shaliach lidvar aveira means the agent is responsible, and the sender is absolved from Beit Din (though liable to Shamayim). If the Nachash was an agent, and was commanded, then it should be fully liable, and the "sender" (Adam/Chava/God) should be absolved. But the midrash implies God held Adam and Chava accountable for listening to the Nachash, while also punishing the Nachash. This suggests a departure from the simple ein shaliach lidvar aveira.

Terutz 1 (Shorshei HaYam: Ein Shaliach Applies When Sender is Also Commanded)

The Shorshei HaYam, citing the Perashat Drachim, offers a solution that distinguishes the Nachash's case. The principle of ein shaliach lidvar aveira (where the agent is liable and the sender is absolved) applies when the sender is also commanded in that aveirah. For example, when a Jew tells another Jew to kill, both are commanded not to kill, so the agent is responsible.

However, in the Nachash's case, the Nachash itself was not commanded not to eat from the Eitz HaDa'at. It was only Adam and Chava who received that command. Therefore, the Nachash, as an agent, was not acting against a Divine command that applied to itself. In such a situation, the principle of ein shaliach lidvar aveira (as understood in the context of "דברי הרב ודברי התלמיד") would not apply to the Nachash in the same way. The Nachash could indeed have argued, "I am not commanded, so I listened to the one who was commanded (Adam/Chava) to incite them." Or, more accurately, the Nachash was not commanded to not incite. Since the Nachash was not commanded in the issur of eating from the tree, and its incitement was not itself a transgression it was commanded against, the "דברי הרב ודברי התלמיד" argument would not apply to it.

This means that the Nachash could have argued that it was merely an agent, and since it wasn't commanded, it shouldn't be liable. The Gemara's point, then, is that despite this plausible defense, the Nachash did not present it. From this, we learn that for a masit (inciter) who is commanded not to incite, we do not argue on their behalf with any defense, not even a seemingly valid one like "I didn't intend to incite, only to test them." The Shorshei HaYam clarifies that the Nachash was punished not because it was an agent for sin, but because it caused a stumbling block ("באתה תקלה על ידו"). The drasha "אין טוענין למסית" is thus derived from the Nachash's failure to make a good argument that it could have made, not from the inapplicability of ein shaliach lidvar aveira to it. This ensures that a masit who is commanded in the issur of incitement cannot use such a defense.

Terutz 2 (Distinction Between "שוכר" and "אומר")

A different line of reasoning, extensively discussed by the Shorshei HaYam in the name of Tosafot (Bava Kamma 56a, Kiddushin 43a) and the RitvA, distinguishes between "שוכר" (hiring an agent) and "אומר" (simply telling an agent). Tosafot argue that "אין שליח לדבר עבירה" only applies when one tells someone to commit a sin, and the agent has full free will to refuse. In such a case, the agent is solely liable. However, if one hires an agent, particularly for money, or if the agent is "כבוש תחת ידו" (subjugated to his hand, e.g., a king's servant), then the sender might also bear a degree of responsibility, especially for mitat Shamayim.

The Shorshei HaYam notes that the RitvA and Meiri seem to disagree with Tosafot, holding that the distinction between shocher and omer is not fundamental regarding ein shaliach lidvar aveira. However, for the purpose of the Nachash, this distinction could be relevant. If the Nachash was merely "told" by God or Adam/Chava, it was acting with its own free will, and therefore fully liable. But if it was "hired" or subjugated, the sender might also be liable. The Shorshei HaYam eventually leans towards the idea that the Nachash was not commanded in the issur itself, making it a unique case.

Ultimately, the Shorshei HaYam concludes that the Tosafot's distinction between shocher and omer is indeed valid, and it supports the idea that in cases where the agent is "שכור בדמים" (hired for money) or "כבוש תחתיו" (subjugated), the sender is liable for mitat Shamayim even for Yisrael. This helps resolve the kushya from the Gemara in Kiddushin 43a where David is punished for Uriah's death, implying that he was liable as a "sender" for Joab's act, because Joab was "כבוש תחתיו." This complex discussion underscores the multifaceted nature of agency and responsibility in halakha, particularly when dealing with capital offenses and Divine judgment.

Intertext

The Rambam's discussion of murder, especially the distinction between mitat Beit Din and mitat Shamayim and the role of agency, is deeply rooted in broader halakhic and aggadic traditions. Exploring these intertextual connections enriches our understanding of the sugya.

1. Sanhedrin 72a: The Principle of Ein Shaliach Lidvar Aveira

The Gemara in Sanhedrin 72a (and Kiddushin 42b-43a) is the foundational source for the principle of "אין שליח לדבר עבירה" (no agency for sin). This principle states that if one sends an agent to commit a sin, the agent is held responsible for the act, not the sender. The rationale is "דברי הרב ודברי התלמיד דברי מי שומעין" (whose words do we listen to, the Master's or the student's?). Since the agent is a rational, commanded individual, they should have heeded God's prohibition rather than the sender's instruction.

The Rambam's ruling in Hilchot Rotzeach 2:1, that one who hires a murderer or sends servants is liable for mitat Shamayim but not mitat Beit Din, is a direct application of this principle to capital punishment for Yisrael. The agent (the actual killer) is the one liable for mitat Beit Din, provided all other conditions (witnesses, hatra'ah) are met. The sender, while morally culpable and incurring Divine wrath ("עוון הריגה בידם וחייבים מיתה לשמים"), is not subject to human capital courts because their action was indirect and the agent had free will.

This principle is not absolute. Exceptions exist, for instance, if the agent is shoteh (mentally incompetent), katan (minor), or eved Kena'ani (Canaanite slave), who are not fully bar chayava (liable for mitzvot or capital punishment). In such cases, the sender can be held liable by Beit Din. The sugya in Kiddushin 43a discusses this extensively. The Rambam himself, in Hilchot Gezeila v'Aveida 1:2, explicitly states that "השולח יד ע"י קטן וחרש שוטה, חייב" (one who commits an act of theft through a minor, deaf-mute, or mentally incompetent person, is liable), confirming the exceptions. This underscores that ein shaliach lidvar aveira relies on the agent's full moral and legal capacity.

2. Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Melachim u'Milchamot 9:4: Noahide Laws on Murder

As discussed in the "Friction" section, the Rambam's ruling in Hilchot Melachim 9:4 presents a crucial intertextual challenge to Hilchot Rotzeach 2:1. For Bnei Noach, the Rambam states that one who kills "בידו או שכר הורג להרוג חבירו או כפתו והשליכו לפני ארי" (with his hand, or hires a murderer to kill his colleague, or binds him and throws him before a lion) is executed by a Beit Din of Bnei Noach.

This contrast is central to understanding the nuances of halakha for Yisrael versus Bnei Noach. The Shorshei HaYam's reconciliation (that "אדרוש" in Bereishit 9:5-6 for Bnei Noach refers to Shamayim holding their Beit Din accountable for executing justice) is pivotal. It implies that while the principle of accountability is universal, its enforcement mechanism differs based on the specific halakhic framework. Bnei Noach courts, operating under different evidentiary standards (e.g., one witness, no hatra'ah), have a broader mandate for capital punishment, even for indirect causation, because their failure to act would incur Divine retribution on their judicial system. This highlights the distinct legal structures and moral expectations placed upon these two populations.

3. Devarim 19:19: Eidim Zomemin and "כאשר זמם"

The verse "ועשיתם לו כאשר זמם לעשות לאחיו" (Devarim 19:19) dictates the punishment for eidim zomemin (conspiring witnesses): they receive the punishment they intended for the accused. This verse is central to the Ohr Sameach's kushya in our sugya.

The connection is profound. Eidim zomemin are not direct killers; they merely testify. Their testimony, if believed, causes the execution of an innocent person. Yet, the Torah treats their conspiracy as equivalent to the act itself, at least concerning their mitah. This is a chiddush (novelty) because normally, indirect causation does not lead to Beit Din execution. The Ohr Sameach points out the tension: if eidim zomemin are executed as if they killed directly, and a murderer by stoning is executed by sword, why would eidim zomemin who planned a stoning be stoned? His answer: the Torah here creates a special rule, a chiddush, that their mitah matches their intent, not necessarily the general mitah for the type of act. This reinforces the Rambam's premise that Beit Din execution for murder typically requires direct, physical action, and exceptions (like eidim zomemin) are explicit Torah innovations. It also shows the Torah's deep concern for justice and deterrence, punishing the intent to kill through false testimony as severely as the act itself, even when the mitah might otherwise be different.

4. Vayikra 24:17: "כל נפש אדם" and Individual Culpability

The Rambam (Hilchot Rotzeach 3:10) references Vayikra 24:17: "ואיש כי יכה כל נפש אדם מות יומת" (And if a man strikes any human life, he shall surely be put to death) to derive the law regarding multiple killers. He interprets "כל נפש" (any life/all life) not as encompassing all human life, but as emphasizing that a single individual must be entirely accountable for the death to incur Beit Din execution.

This is a powerful interpretative move. If ten people strike someone with ten sticks, none individually sufficient to cause death, and the person dies, "כולן לא נהרגין בבית דין" (none of them are executed by Beit Din). This is true even if they struck simultaneously. This highlights the Torah's demand for clear, singular causation for capital punishment. The Rambam's drasha from "כל נפש" signifies that Beit Din can only act when the causal chain is unequivocally traceable to one person's act. While all ten might be morally culpable and incur mitat Shamayim, the strict evidentiary and causal requirements for Beit Din mean they are absolved from human capital punishment. This severe limitation on Beit Din's power in capital cases underscores the sanctity of life and the immense burden of proof required for execution.

5. I Kings 21:25 and 22:21: Ach'av and Navot's Blood

The Rambam concludes Hilchot Rotzeach 4:9 with an aggadic discussion of King Ach'av's punishment for the murder of Navot. Ach'av is depicted as an arch-idolater, yet his ultimate downfall is linked specifically to "the blood of Navot." The verse I Kings 21:25 states, "There was none like Ach'av who gave himself over to the performance of wickedness in the eyes of God." Yet, the Rambam notes that when his merits and sins were weighed, "there was no sin that warranted his destruction and was not counterbalanced by a positive quality, except the blood of Navot." This is further supported by I Kings 22:21-22, where the "spirit of Navot" is sent to persuade Ach'av to go to battle and die.

The Rambam emphasizes: "Now this wicked man Ach'av did not actually kill his victim with his own hands; he merely brought about his death. How much more so this condemnation should apply when a person kills another with his own hands." This aggadic passage powerfully reinforces the distinction between direct and indirect causation in terms of Beit Din liability versus mitat Shamayim. Ach'av, like one who hires an agent, was liable for mitat Shamayim. The aggadah teaches that even for such indirect involvement, the sin of bloodshed is so severe that it outweighs all other merits and directly leads to Divine retribution. This serves as a moral counterpoint to the halakhic limitations on Beit Din, emphasizing that Shamayim ultimately holds all perpetrators of bloodshed accountable, regardless of the directness of their action.

Psak/Practice

The Rambam's meticulous delineation of liability in Hilchot Rotzeach u'Shmirat Nefesh 2-4, distinguishing between mitat Beit Din and mitat Shamayim, has profound implications for both halakha l'ma'aseh (practical law) and meta-psak heuristics (principles guiding legal decisions).

Halakha L'Ma'aseh

1. Absence of Capital Punishment: In contemporary Jewish legal practice, with the absence of a Sanhedrin (High Court) and the strict adherence to halakhic requirements for capital punishment (e.g., two valid witnesses, specific hatra'ah - warning), Beit Din executions are not performed. This means that the Rambam's detailed rules for mitat Beit Din for murder remain theoretical, guiding our understanding of Torah justice but not directly applied.
2. Severity of Bloodshed (Mitat Shamayim): Despite the lack of Beit Din execution, the Rambam's emphasis on mitat Shamayim for indirect murderers (hiring an agent, moser l'chaya, suicide) and those who kill without fulfilling Beit Din criteria (e.g., lack of hatra'ah, multiple killers) highlights that such acts are still considered grave sins. The moral culpability and Divine accounting are ever-present. This means that even in the absence of human courts, the issur (prohibition) of bloodshed and its spiritual consequences remain fully intact and severe.
3. Extra-Judicial Measures (Hora'at Sha'ah / Din Malkhut): The Rambam's provision for a Jewish king or a Beit Din to execute or severely punish such murderers (even those liable only for mitat Shamayim) "by virtue of his regal authority, in order to perfect society" or "as a result of an immediate fiat, because this was required at the time" (Hilchot Rotzeach 2:4) is highly significant. This principle of hora'at sha'ah (temporary decree) or din malkhut (royal law) allows for practical measures to prevent societal breakdown and deter crime, especially murder, when strict halakhic capital punishment is not applicable. In a modern context, this underlies the authority of rabbinic courts or communal leaders to impose various punishments (e.g., imprisonment, severe corporal punishment) to maintain order and public safety, even if these fall short of Torah capital punishment. The din kipah (special prison for starvation) for murderers without full Beit Din liability (4:8-9) is another example of such extra-judicial measures, demonstrating the profound societal imperative to address murder.
4. Value of Life and Intent: The meticulous assessment criteria for the murder weapon, force, location, and victim's status (e.g., trefah, nefel) underscore the Torah's precise definition of murder and its distinction between intentional and unintentional acts. While these details are primarily for Beit Din capital cases, they inform our understanding of criminal intent and causation in general. Even in civil law (e.g., damages), these distinctions are crucial. The leniency for killing a trefah person by Beit Din (2:7-8) – due to their inherent short lifespan – highlights that Beit Din punishment is for shortening a life that had potential to live, not merely for causing death. However, killing a trefah is still wrong, and the killer is killed if he is trefah and kills, or if he kills a non-trefah (2:9), demonstrating that a trefah is still a human life.
5. Status of Non-Jews: The distinctions regarding killing an eved Kena'ani (treated like a Jew for capital punishment) versus a ger toshav (not liable for Beit Din execution but potentially for galut) versus a gentile idolater (not saved if in danger) are crucial for understanding the halakhic hierarchy of human life and the scope of Beit Din's jurisdiction over different populations. While these laws are complex and have generated much discussion, they demonstrate that halakha differentiates between various categories of non-Jews in terms of legal protection and liability.

Meta-Psak Heuristics

The sugya offers several meta-psak heuristics:

• Balancing Justice and Deterrence: The Rambam masterfully balances the stringent requirements for Torah capital punishment (justice) with the societal need for deterrence (tikkun ha'olam). This often involves resorting to hora'at sha'ah or other extra-judicial measures when strict halakha cannot be applied.
• Divine vs. Human Judgment: The pervasive distinction between mitat Shamayim and mitat Beit Din reminds us that human courts operate under specific, limited parameters, but ultimate judgment belongs to God. This perspective tempers the human impulse for retribution with a recognition of Divine omnipotence and justice.
• The Sanctity of Life: The meticulousness with which the Rambam defines murder, the strictures for conviction, and the alternative punishments for those who escape Beit Din underscore the profound sanctity of human life in Jewish thought. Every act of bloodshed, direct or indirect, is a grave offense.
• Agency and Responsibility: The sugya provides a deep dive into the concept of shaliach lidvar aveira, demonstrating how halakha assigns responsibility when multiple actors are involved in a sinful act. This principle is foundational to many areas of Jewish law beyond murder.

Takeaway

The Rambam meticulously delineates direct and indirect causation in murder, establishing clear boundaries for Beit Din jurisdiction while emphasizing that all bloodshed ultimately incurs Divine judgment, often allowing for extra-judicial measures to protect society. The sugya highlights the complex interplay between human legal limitations and the broader demands of moral accountability and communal order.

Citations

• Mishneh Torah, Murderer and the Preservation of Life 2:1-4: https://www.sefaria.org/Mishneh_Torah%2C_Murderer_and_the_Preservation_of_Life.2.1-4
• Mishneh Torah, Murderer and the Preservation of Life 3:10: https://www.sefaria.org/Mishneh_Torah%2C_Murderer_and_the_Preservation_of_Life.3.10
• Mishneh Torah, Murderer and the Preservation of Life 4:8-9: https://www.sefaria.org/Mishneh_Torah%2C_Murderer_and_the_Preservation_of_Life.4.8-9
• Mishneh Torah, Sanhedrin 18:6: https://www.sefaria.org/Mishneh_Torah%2C_Sanhedrin_and_the_Penalties_Entrusted_to_the_Court.18.6
• Mishneh Torah, Kings and Wars 9:4: https://www.sefaria.org/Mishneh_Torah%2C_Kings_and_Wars.9.4
• Mishneh Torah, Theft and Loss 1:2: https://www.sefaria.org/Mishneh_Torah%2C_Theft_and_Loss.1.2
• Mishneh Torah, Idolatry and Idols 10:6: https://www.sefaria.org/Mishneh_Torah%2C_Idolatry_and_Idols.10.6
• Mishneh Torah, Forbidden Relations 14:7: https://www.sefaria.org/Mishneh_Torah%2C_Forbidden_Relations.14.7
• Mishneh Torah, Chagigah 2:1: https://www.sefaria.org/Mishneh_Torah%2C_Chagigah.2.1
• Bereishit 9:5: https://www.sefaria.org/Genesis.9.5
• Bereishit 9:6: https://www.sefaria.org/Genesis.9.6
• Shemot 21:14: https://www.sefaria.org/Exodus.21.14
• Shemot 21:20-21: https://www.sefaria.org/Exodus.21.20-21
• Bamidbar 35:16-18: https://www.sefaria.org/Numbers.35.16-18
• Bamidbar 35:20-21: https://www.sefaria.org/Numbers.35.20-21
• Vayikra 24:17: https://www.sefaria.org/Leviticus.24.17
• Devarim 19:19: https://www.sefaria.org/Deuteronomy.19.19
• I Kings 21:25: https://www.sefaria.org/I_Kings.21.25
• I Kings 22:21-22: https://www.sefaria.org/I_Kings.22.21-22
• Sanhedrin 29a: https://www.sefaria.org/Sanhedrin.29a
• Sanhedrin 57a: https://www.sefaria.org/Sanhedrin.57a
• Sanhedrin 57b: https://www.sefaria.org/Sanhedrin.57b
• Kiddushin 42b: https://www.sefaria.org/Kiddushin.42b
• Kiddushin 43a: https://www.sefaria.org/Kiddushin.43a
• Bava Kamma 56a: https://www.sefaria.org/Bava_Kamma.56a
• Niddah 57b: https://www.sefaria.org/Niddah.57b
• Makkot 5a: https://www.sefaria.org/Makkot.5a
• Bereishit Rabbah 34:10: https://www.sefaria.org/Bereishit_Rabbah.34.10
• Ohr Sameach on Mishneh Torah, Murderer and the Preservation of Life 2:1:1: https://www.sefaria.org/Ohr_Sameach_on_Mishneh_Torah%2C_Murderer_and_the_Preservation_of_Life.2.1.1?lang=he&p2=Ohr_Sameach_on_Mishneh_Torah%2C_Murderer_and_the_Preservation_of_Life.2.1.1&lang2=he
• Shorshei HaYam on Mishneh Torah, Murderer and the Preservation of Life 2:1:1: https://www.sefaria.org/Shorshei_HaYam_on_Mishneh_Torah%2C_Murderer_and_the_Preservation_of_Life.2.1.1?lang=he&p2=Shorshei_HaYam_on_Mishneh_Torah%2C_Murderer_and_the_Preservation_of_Life.2.1.1&lang2=he
• Steinsaltz on Mishneh Torah, Murderer and the Preservation of Life 2:1:1: https://www.sefaria.org/Steinsaltz_on_Mishneh_Torah%2C_Murderer_and_the_Preservation_of_Life.2.1.1?lang=he&p2=Steinsaltz_on_Mishneh_Torah%2C_Murderer_and_the_Preservation_of_Life.2.1.1&lang2=he
• Steinsaltz on Mishneh Torah, Murderer and the Preservation of Life 2:10:1: https://www.sefaria.org/Steinsaltz_on_Mishneh_Torah%2C_Murderer_and_the_Preservation_of_Life.2.10.1?lang=he&p2=Steinsaltz_on_Mishneh_Torah%2C_Murderer_and_the_Preservation_of_Life.2.10.1&lang2=he
• Steinsaltz on Mishneh Torah, Murderer and the Preservation of Life 2:10:2: https://www.sefaria.org/Steinsaltz_on_Mishneh_Torah%2C_Murderer_and_the_Preservation_of_Life.2.10.2?lang=he&p2=Steinsaltz_on_Mishneh_Torah%2C_Murderer_and_the_Preservation_of_Life.2.10.2&lang2=he
• Steinsaltz on Mishneh Torah, Murderer and the Preservation of Life 2:11:1: https://www.sefaria.org/Steinsaltz_on_Mishneh_Torah%2C_Murderer_and_the_Preservation_of_Life.2.11.1?lang=he&p2=Steinsaltz_on_Mishneh_Torah%2C_Murderer_and_the_Preservation_of_Life.2.11.1&lang2=he
• Steinsaltz on Mishneh Torah, Murderer and the Preservation of Life 2:11:2: https://www.sefaria.org/Steinsaltz_on_Mishneh_Torah%2C_Murderer_and_the_Preservation_of_Life.2.11.2?lang=he&p2=Steinsaltz_on_Mishneh_Torah%2C_Murderer_and_the_Preservation_of_Life.2.11.2&lang2=he
• Steinsaltz on Mishneh Torah, Murderer and the Preservation of Life 2:11:3: https://www.sefaria.org/Steinsaltz_on_Mishneh_Torah%2C_Murderer_and_the_Preservation_of_Life.2.11.3?lang=he&p2=Steinsaltz_on_Mishneh_Torah%2C_Murderer_and_the_Preservation_of_Life.2.11.3&lang2=he## Sugya Map

The Rambam, in Hilchot Rotzeach u'Shmirat Nefesh (Laws of Murderer and the Preservation of Life) 2:1-4, presents a foundational exposition on the various modalities of homicide and the corresponding legal consequences, meticulously distinguishing between liability for execution by an earthly Beit Din (court) and liability for death at the hands of Heaven (mitat Shamayim). The sugya fundamentally unpacks the concept of direct causation in capital offenses and the intricate application of eidus (witness testimony) and hatra'ah (warning).

Issue

The central kushya (difficulty) addressed in this section is the precise definition of a "murderer" who is subject to capital punishment by Beit Din, as opposed to one who is merely a "shedder of blood" liable only to mitat Shamayim. This distinction hinges critically on the directness of the act of killing, the involvement of an agent (shaliach), and other specific circumstances surrounding the homicide. A parallel, yet profoundly complex, issue arises concerning the application of the principle of ein shaliach lidvar aveira (no agency for sin) in murder, particularly when comparing its implications for Bnei Noach (Noahides) versus Yisrael (Israelites). Furthermore, the Rambam introduces the vital concept of hora'at sha'ah (temporary decree) or din malkhut (royal law), providing an extra-judicial framework for the king or court to administer punishment in cases of mitat Shamayim liability or where strict halakhic evidentiary requirements for Beit Din execution are not met, thereby safeguarding societal order and deterrence.

Nafka Mina(s)

1. Strictures of Capital Punishment: The Rambam's analysis establishes extremely narrow parameters for Beit Din execution, demanding a direct, unmediated act of killing. This has profound implications for the practical administration of capital punishment in a functional Sanhedrin, underscoring the Torah's immense value for human life and its reluctance to impose the ultimate penalty.
2. Application of Ein Shaliach Lidvar Aveira: The Rambam's ruling that one who hires a murderer or sends an agent to kill is liable for mitat Shamayim (not Beit Din) for Yisrael is a direct application of ein shaliach lidvar aveira. This principle, which posits that the agent is solely responsible for the sinful act, has far-reaching consequences across various domains of Jewish criminal law, defining the boundaries of moral and legal agency.
3. Extra-Judicial Authority and Tikkun Ha'olam: The halakha granting the king or court the authority to execute or punish murderers otherwise exempt from Beit Din highlights the inherent tension and necessary balance between rigid halakhic adherence and the overarching imperative for communal stability (tikkun ha'olam – perfecting the world). This is a critical heuristic for understanding governance and the adaptability of Jewish law in maintaining social order.
4. Legal Status of Non-Jews: The text carefully differentiates the liability for killing a ger toshav (resident alien) from that of a Jew or an eved Kena'ani (Canaanite slave). This distinction clarifies the concentric circles of halakhic protection for different populations and the scope of Beit Din's jurisdiction over non-Jews.
5. Causation, Intent, and Ma'aseh Retzicha: The detailed assessment criteria for the murder weapon, the location of the blow, the force applied, and the victim's physical condition (e.g., trefah – mortally wounded, nefel – inviable birth) illuminate the Torah's precise definition of retzicha (murder) and the necessary elements that distinguish criminal intent (mezid) from negligence (shogeg).
6. Joint Liability and Multiple Perpetrators: The ruling concerning situations where multiple individuals strike a person, none individually causing death, yet their combined actions lead to mortality, delves into complex issues of joint liability and individual culpability in halakha, emphasizing the need for singular, direct causation for Beit Din capital punishment.
7. The Din Kipah: The institution of the kipah (a specialized prison involving starvation and refeeding) for murderers who cannot be executed by Beit Din due to technical deficiencies (e.g., absence of hatra'ah, contradictory witnesses) profoundly underscores the severity of murder in halakha, even when formal capital punishment is legally precluded.

Primary Sources

• Mishneh Torah, Murderer and the Preservation of Life 2:1-4: The central text under analysis.
• Bereishit 9:5-6: "אך את דמכם לנפשותיכם אדרוש... מיד כל חיה אדרשנו ומיד האדם מיד איש אחיו אדרוש את נפש האדם. שופך דם האדם באדם דמו ישפך" (Indeed, I will demand an accounting for your blood, for your lives... From the hand of every beast I will demand it, and from the hand of man, from the hand of one's brother, I will demand an accounting for the soul of man. Whoever sheds the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed). These verses are foundational for the Rambam's distinction between mitat Shamayim and mitat Beit Din.
• Shemot 21:14: "וכי יזיד איש על רעהו להרגו בערמה" (But if a man acts intentionally against his colleague, killing him with cunning...). This verse is interpreted to limit Beit Din execution to the killing of a "colleague" (re'ehu), thereby excluding a ger toshav.
• Shemot 21:20-21: These verses address the killing of an eved Kena'ani by his master, introducing the critical 24-hour rule for specific contexts.
• Bamidbar 35:16-18, 20-21: These passages specify various types of murder weapons and actions (k'li barzel, even yad, k'li eitz yad) and introduce the crucial requirement for assessing the object's potential to cause death.
• Vayikra 24:17: "ואיש כי יכה כל נפש אדם מות יומת" (And if a man strikes any human life, he shall surely be put to death). The Rambam interprets "כל נפש" as emphasizing that a single individual must be solely and entirely accountable for the death to incur Beit Din liability.
• Devarim 19:19: "ועשיתם לו כאשר זמם לעשות לאחיו" (And you shall do to him as he conspired to do to his brother). This verse forms the legal basis for the punishment of eidim zomemin (conspiring witnesses).
• Sanhedrin 57a-b: This Gemara extensively discusses Bnei Noach laws, including their distinct liability for murder, even when committed via a shaliach.
• Kiddushin 42b-43a: This is the primary sugya in the Talmud that explores the principle of ein shaliach lidvar aveira for Yisrael.

Text Snapshot

The seminal lines for this sugya are found at the commencement of Hilchot Rotzeach u'Shmirat Nefesh, specifically 2:1-2:

כל ההורג חבירו בידו - כגון שהכהו בסייף או באבן הממיתה אותו, חנקו עד שמת או שרפו באש - הרי זה נהרג בבית דין, מפני שהוא בעצמו הרגו. Whoever kills his colleague with his hand - such as striking him with a sword or with a stone that can cause death, strangling him until he dies, or burning him in fire - he should be executed by the court, for he himself has killed him.

אבל השוכר הורג להרוג את חבירו, או ששלח עבדיו והרגוהו, או שכפתו ונתנו לפני הארי וכיוצא בו והרגו, וכן ההורג את עצמו - כולן שופכי דמים הן ועוון הריגה בידם וחייבים מיתה לשמים, ואין בהם מיתת בית דין. But a person who hires a murderer to kill a colleague, one who sends his servants and they kill him, one who binds a colleague and leaves him before a lion or the like and the beast kills him, and a person who commits suicide are all considered to be shedders of blood; the sin of bloodshed is upon their hands, and they are liable for death at the hands of God. They are not, however, liable for execution by the court.

מנין שכן הוא הדין? שנאמר: "שופך דם האדם באדם דמו ישפך" (בראשית ט, ו) - זה שהרג את חבירו בעצמו שלא על ידי שליח. Which source indicates that this is the law? Genesis 9:6 states: "When a person sheds the blood of a man, by a man his blood shall be shed." This refers to a person who kills a colleague by himself, without employing an agent.

וכתוב אחריו: "אך את דמכם לנפשותיכם אדרוש" (שם) - זה ההורג את עצמו. The verse continues: "Of the blood of your own lives I will demand an account." This refers to a person who commits suicide.

"מיד כל חיה אדרשנו" (שם ה) - זה המוסר את חבירו לחיה להורגו. "From the hand of every wild beast will I demand an account" (Ibid. 9:5) This refers to a person who places a person before a wild beast so that he will devour him.

"מיד האדם מיד איש אחיו אדרוש את נפש האדם" (שם ו) - זה השוכר אחרים להרוג את חבירו. "From the hand of a man, from the hand of one's brother, will I demand an account for the soul of a man" (Ibid. 9:6). This refers to a person who hires others to kill a colleague.

ובכולן בשלושת האחרונים נאמר "אדרוש", הרי דינם מסור לשמים. In all of the three last instances, the verse uses the expression "will I demand an account," indicating that their judgment is in heaven's hands.

Dikduk/Leshon Nuance

1. "בידו" (by his hand): The Rambam commences his exposition with this precise phrase, immediately establishing the cardinal condition for Beit Din liability. The explicit emphasis on direct, physical agency sharply contrasts with the subsequent enumeration of indirect methods of killing (e.g., hiring an agent, dispatching servants, exposing to a beast), all of which lack this direct "hand" in the lethal act. This grammatical precision is fundamental to grasping the Torah's exacting definition of murder for the purpose of capital punishment.
2. "הרי זה נהרג בבית דין, מפני שהוא בעצמו הרגו" (he should be executed by the court, for he himself has killed him): This statement unequivocally underscores the principle of direct causation. The term "בעצמו" (by himself) serves as a powerful reinforcement of "בידו," clarifying that Beit Din is empowered to act only when the murderer is the unmediated, direct cause of death.
3. "שופכי דמים הן ועוון הריגה בידם וחייבים מיתה לשמים" (they are all considered to be shedders of blood; the sin of bloodshed is upon their hands, and they are liable for death at the hands of God): This constitutes a pivotal distinction. While these individuals are exempt from Beit Din execution, they are by no means absolved of culpability. They bear the "sin of bloodshed" and are subject to Divine retribution. The phrasing "עוון הריגה בידם" conveys profound moral responsibility, even in cases where human courts lack the jurisdiction to impose capital punishment.
4. "שופך דם האדם באדם דמו ישפך" (Whoever sheds the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed): The Rambam's interpretive move, explaining "באדם" (by man) as "בעצמו שלא על ידי שליח" (by himself, without an agent), is a cornerstone of this sugya. This reading narrowly restricts the scope of Beit Din execution to direct action, effectively deriving the principle of ein shaliach lidvar aveira (no agency for sin) within this specific context of capital murder.
5. "אדרוש" (I will demand an account): The recurrent deployment of the term "אדרוש" in reference to suicide, exposing one to a beast (moser l'chaya), and hiring an agent, serves as the linguistic pivot for assigning mitat Shamayim. This term unmistakably signifies Divine judgment, which is inherently distinct from the processes and punitive powers of human judicial systems. This consistent linguistic pattern across these three cases solidifies their shared status as falling outside the direct punitive purview of Beit Din for capital offenses.

Readings

The Rambam's characteristically succinct articulation of the laws of murder, particularly his delineation between mitat Beit Din and mitat Shamayim and the intricate role of agency, creates a rich canvas for extensive lomdus. Prominent Rishonim and Acharonim engage deeply with these principles, striving to reconcile apparent textual contradictions and to illuminate the Rambam's unique shitah (methodological approach).

Ohr Sameach on Mishneh Torah, Murderer and the Preservation of Life 2:1

The Ohr Sameach (Rabbi Meir Simcha of Dvinsk) immediately identifies a significant kushya (difficulty) stemming from the Rambam's opening declaration in 2:1: "כל ההורג חבירו בידו... הרי זה נהרג בבית דין, מפני שהוא בעצמו הרגו" (Whoever kills his colleague with his hand... he should be executed by the court, for he himself has killed him). The Ohr Sameach points out that the Rambam, in Hilchot Sanhedrin (18:6), rules that eidim zomemin (conspiring witnesses) are executed with the precise mitah (death penalty) they maliciously intended for the accused. This ruling is explicitly grounded in the verse "ועשיתם לו כאשר זמם לעשות לאחיו" (Devarim 19:19) – "and you shall do to him as he conspired to do to his brother."

The Ohr Sameach poses a powerful question: If eidim zomemin are indeed to be executed according to the specific mitah they plotted (e.g., stoning, burning), how does this align with the general halakha that a murderer who kills by stoning is himself executed by the sword, not by stoning (as stoning is reserved for specific transgressions like idolatry)? If the eidim zomemin are treated as if they committed the act themselves, and the act of stoning a person is punishable by sword, then eidim zomemin who conspired for a stoning should logically face execution by sword, not stoning. Yet, the Torah explicitly dictates they receive the mitah they plotted. This implies a significant chiddush (novel legal innovation) within the law concerning eidim zomemin.

He notes that this kushya was already recognized by earlier Rabboteinu (specifically referencing Tosafot in Makkot 5a s.v. "דזה"). The crux of the problem lies in the tension between two principles: the mitah for murder (generally sword) and the mitah for eidim zomemin ("as he conspired"). If eidim zomemin are considered to have "performed the act," their punishment should conform to the mitah for that act. However, the Torah deviates, imposing the mitah of their plot. This suggests that the Torah is not treating them as literal murderers in the standard sense, but rather introducing a unique punitive measure for their specific transgression of false testimony.

The Ohr Sameach then draws a connection to the Gemara's discussion at the beginning of Makkot 5a, which differentiates between the laws regarding Gerim (converts) and Bnei Noach concerning capital punishment. The Gemara states, for instance, "עו"ג להנך תרתי לא דמיא שכן בסייף" (a gentile is not similar to those two, for his mitah is by sword), indicating that the default mitah for murder is by sword. The Ohr Sameach utilizes this to reinforce his argument: even if we conceptualize the eidim zomemin as having "killed with their hands" (metaphorically, through their testimony), their inherent mitah for such an act would still be by sword. The Torah's imposition of the mitah of their plot ("כאשר זמם") is therefore a specific chiddush. This chiddush further necessitates "דרישה וחקירה" (detailed investigation and cross-examination) to precisely ascertain their malicious intent and the mitah they plotted. Thus, the Rambam's initial statement in 2:1, that direct killing by hand leads to Beit Din execution by sword, remains consistent as the general rule, with the eidim zomemin case serving as a unique exception dictated by a specific Torah innovation. He concludes that even the sender in a shaliach case, if hypothetically considered to have "killed with their hands" for Beit Din purposes (which the Rambam denies), their mitah would still fundamentally be by sword, as the core principle for murder is execution by sword, irrespective of the specific method used to commit the killing.

Shorshei HaYam on Mishneh Torah, Murderer and the Preservation of Life 2:1

The Shorshei HaYam (Rabbi Yaakov Chaim Sofer) undertakes an expansive and profound analysis of the Rambam's introductory statements, focusing intensely on the exegetical derivation from Bereishit 9:5-6 and its far-reaching implications, particularly for Bnei Noach. The Rambam explicitly rules that for Yisrael, cases such as hiring a murderer, sending servants, or exposing one to a beast lead to mitat Shamayim, based on the repetitive use of the term "אדרוש" (I will demand an account) in Bereishit 9:5-6. However, the Shorshei HaYam immediately highlights an apparent, glaring contradiction from Midrash Rabba (Bereishit Rabba 34:10).

The Midrash quotes Rabbi Chanina, who interprets "שופך דם האדם באדם דמו ישפך" (Bereishit 9:6) to encompass cases of murder committed via a shaliach (agent) or against overim (fetuses) for Bnei Noach, asserting that they are liable for mitat Beit Din. Specifically, the Midrash states: "מיד איש אחיו – זה השוכר את אחרים להרוג את חבירו... אמר ר' חנינא: כולם בהלכות בני נח בע"א בדיין אחד בלא עדים ובלא התראה ע"י שליח ע"י עוברין בע"א בדיין אחד שופך דם האדם באדם א' דמו ישפך ע"י שליח שופך דם האדם ע"י אדם דמו ישפך ע"י עוברים שופך דם האדם" (From the hand of one's brother – this refers to one who hires others to kill his colleague... Rabbi Chanina said: All of these, regarding the laws of Bnei Noach, even with one witness, one judge, without warnings, by an agent, by fetuses, with one witness, one judge, "whoever sheds the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed" – by an agent, "whoever sheds the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed" – by fetuses, "whoever sheds the blood of man"). This Midrash appears to unequivocally establish Beit Din liability for Bnei Noach for murder committed through an agent, which directly clashes with the Rambam's initial ruling for Yisrael and his interpretation of "אדרוש" as signifying mitat Shamayim.

The Shorshei HaYam notes that Maharash Yaffe (in his commentary on Midrash Rabba) also grappled with this apparent discrepancy. Maharash Yaffe suggested that R' Chanina might interpret "מיד איש אחיו" differently, perhaps referring to unintentional killing requiring kapparah (atonement) and galut (exile). However, the Shorshei HaYam finds this interpretation problematic, arguing that the pesukim in Bereishit are clearly addressed to Noach and his descendants, implying their primary application to Bnei Noach. Thus, it seems implausible to assert that these verses apply solely to Yisrael for distinguishing between shogeg (unintentional) and mezid (intentional) acts.

He then proposes an ingenious and profound reconciliation: both the initial drasha (interpretation) and R' Chanina's drasha apply to both Yisrael and Bnei Noach, but their specific applications differ. The initial pesukim ("אך את דמכם... אדרוש") refer to mitat Shamayim for Yisrael when the stringent conditions for Beit Din execution (e.g., hatra'ah, two valid witnesses) are not fulfilled. For Bnei Noach, these same pesukim also refer to mitat Shamayim in scenarios where their own Beit Din lacks sufficient evidence or authority (e.g., no judge or witnesses at all). Then, the subsequent verse, "שופך דם האדם באדם דמו ישפך," serves to clarify that Bnei Noach are indeed liable for Beit Din execution in cases involving a shaliach, overim, or even with the testimony of a single witness or a self-admission. Therefore, R' Chanina's interpretation does not contradict the initial drasha; rather, the first drasha addresses cases where mitat Shamayim is the consequence due to insufficient Beit Din conditions, while the second drasha specifies the circumstances under which a Beit Din for Bnei Noach can and must act.

The Shorshei HaYam further reinforces this by referencing the Gemara in Niddah 57b (parallel to Sanhedrin 57b), which derives specific Bnei Noach laws from these very pesukim. This Gemara states that a Ben Noach is executed even with one judge, one witness, without hatra'ah, and even for overim. Crucially, the Gemara interprets "אך את דמכם לנפשותיכם אדרוש" as Shamayim demanding an account from the earthly Beit Din of Bnei Noach if they fail to administer justice in these cases. This is a brilliant chiddush: "אדרוש" does not exclusively denote mitat Shamayim for the individual offender; it can also signify that Shamayim holds the Beit Din itself accountable for its failure to execute the murderer. This profound reconciliation allows the Rambam to maintain a consistent shitah across Hilchot Rotzeach (where he rules mitat Shamayim for Yisrael in shaliach cases) and Hilchot Melachim (where he rules mitat Beit Din for Bnei Noach in such cases). The Shorshei HaYam concludes that the Rambam's approach is that "אדרוש" indeed implies Shamayim punishment, but for Bnei Noach, this punishment is directed at their Beit Din for dereliction of duty, thereby empowering their courts to act even in scenarios where a Beit Din Yisrael would be precluded.

Steinsaltz Commentary on Mishneh Torah, Murderer and the Preservation of Life 2:10-11

While the Steinsaltz commentary on these specific lines is characteristically concise, often serving to provide essential cross-references or clarify definitions, its significance lies in highlighting crucial terminologies and their broader halakhic context, thereby illuminating the Rambam's underlying principles.

Regarding Hilchot Rotzeach 2:10, Steinsaltz notes that "ההורג עבד כנעני הרי זה נהרג עליו" (Whoever kills a Canaanite slave is executed for it) is further elaborated in the subsequent halakha. He also clarifies that "ואם הרג בשגגה גולה" (If he killed unintentionally, he is exiled) directly refers to Hilchot Rotzeach 5:3. These seemingly straightforward references are vital: they underscore that the killing of an eved Kena'ani is accorded the same legal gravity as killing a Jew. Both intentional murder leads to Beit Din execution, and unintentional killing leads to galut (exile to a city of refuge). This parity is particularly significant because eved Kena'ani are not full Jews, yet they have voluntarily accepted certain mitzvot. The Steinsaltz commentary on 2:11, explaining "שהעבד כבר קיבל עליו מצוות ונוסף על נחלת ה'" (for the servant has accepted the yoke of mitzvot and has been added to "the heritage of God"), directly addresses the rationale for this elevated status. It clarifies that an eved Kena'ani is obligated in mitzvot in a manner similar to a woman (referencing Hilchot Chagiga 2:1), and is therefore not considered a gentile for this specific legal purpose. This elevation in status confers upon them a heightened legal protection, making their murder a capital offense punishable by Beit Din.

On Hilchot Rotzeach 2:11, Steinsaltz defines "גר תושב" (resident alien) as a gentile who has formally accepted not to worship idols and to observe the seven Noahide laws (referencing Hilchot Avodah Zarah 10:6 and Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah 14:7). He then notes that for killing a ger toshav, "אינו נהרג עליו בבית דין" (he is not executed for it by Beit Din), though if killed unintentionally, he is still exiled (referencing Hilchot Rotzeach 5:3). This distinction reveals a crucial hierarchy of legal protection: a Jew is liable for mitat Beit Din for killing a Jew or an eved Kena'ani, but not for a ger toshav (and kal vachomer, not for a gentile idolater). This distinction is drawn from Shemot 21:14, "וכי יזיד איש על רעהו להרגו בערמה," by interpreting "רעהו" (his colleague) as specifically referring to a Jew (or one legally equated to a Jew, such as an eved Kena'ani). The fact that unintentional killing of a ger toshav still mandates galut indicates that while Beit Din capital punishment is not administered, the act is nonetheless considered a grave offense, not entirely outside the halakhic framework of accountability. This demonstrates the existence of concentric circles of halakhic protection for human life, with Jews and eved Kena'ani residing at the innermost circle for Beit Din capital punishment, followed by ger toshav for galut, and then general gentiles, who are primarily afforded protection by the Noahide laws but not necessarily by Beit Din Yisrael.

Friction

The Rambam's characteristically succinct and categorical pronouncements frequently conceal profound layers of complex sugyot and demand rigorous reconciliation with other halakhot and midrashic traditions. The present sugya is no exception, particularly concerning the principle of ein shaliach lidvar aveira (no agency for sin) and its nuanced application across different populations.

Kushya 1: Reconciling Shamayim vs. Beit Din for Shaliach in Hilchot Rotzeach and Hilchot Melachim

The Rambam states unequivocally in Hilchot Rotzeach 2:1 that an individual who hires a murderer, dispatches servants to kill, or exposes someone to a wild beast is liable for mitat Shamayim and "אין בהם מיתת בית דין" (there is no Beit Din execution for them). This ruling, derived from the repeated use of "אדרוש" in Bereishit 9:5-6, clearly applies to Yisrael.

However, a significant kushya emerges when juxtaposed with Hilchot Melachim u'Milchamot 9:4, where the Rambam rules concerning Bnei Noach:

וכן בן נח שהרג את חבירו בידו או שכר הורג להרוג חבירו או כפתו והשליכו לפני ארי או שרפו באש או הציפו במים וכיוצא באלו הרי זה נהרג עליהן בבית דין של בני נח. Similarly, a Ben Noach who kills his colleague with his hand, or hires a murderer to kill his colleague, or binds him and throws him before a lion, or burns him in fire, or drowns him in water, and the like – he is executed for these by a Beit Din of Bnei Noach.

This passage appears to directly contradict the Hilchot Rotzeach ruling, as it explicitly states that a Ben Noach is executed by Beit Din for murder committed via an agent (e.g., hiring a killer, exposing to a lion). The fundamental question is: if "אדרוש" implies mitat Shamayim for Yisrael for these indirect acts, why would it imply mitat Beit Din for Bnei Noach under the very same circumstances of indirect causation? This forms the central kushya that the Shorshei HaYam, along with numerous other Acharonim, meticulously addresses.

Terutz 1 (Shorshei HaYam's Reconciliation: Shamayim Demands from Beit Din)

The Shorshei HaYam proposes a sophisticated reconciliation, building upon interpretations found in the Gemara in Niddah 57b (which has a parallel in Sanhedrin 57b). He argues that the phrase "אדרוש" (I will demand an account) possesses a dual interpretive potential. For Yisrael, when certain stringent conditions for Beit Din execution are not met (e.g., two valid witnesses, specific hatra'ah), "אדרוש" indeed signifies mitat Shamayim for the individual who commits the act.

However, for Bnei Noach, "אדרוש" can be understood not as Shamayim punishing the individual directly, but rather as Shamayim demanding an account from their earthly Beit Din if that court fails to execute justice. The Shorshei HaYam elucidates this: Bnei Noach are commanded concerning dinim (laws and justice). If a Ben Noach commits murder, even through an agent or by indirect means, and there is sufficient evidence for their Beit Din to act (e.g., with one witness and without the requirement of hatra'ah), then Shamayim will "demand an account" from that Beit Din if they neglect to execute the murderer. In this specific scenario, "אדרוש" functions as a Divine imperative, compelling the Bnei Noach's judicial system to enforce capital punishment for these acts.

Therefore, for Yisrael, the stringent requirements of Torah law regarding Beit Din execution mean that indirect causation is relegated to the realm of mitat Shamayim for the individual. For Bnei Noach, conversely, the broader scope of their dinim implies that similar acts of indirect causation do fall within their Beit Din's jurisdiction, precisely because Shamayim holds their Beit Din accountable for its mandate to enforce these laws. This resolves the apparent contradiction by distinguishing the primary addressee of "אדרוש": the individual for Yisrael, and the Beit Din for Bnei Noach.

Terutz 2 (Distinction in the Scope of Ein Shaliach Lidvar Aveira)

An alternative resolution to this tension could reside in a nuanced understanding of the principle "אין שליח לדבר עבירה" itself. For Yisrael, the traditional understanding (as codified by the Rambam in Hilchot Gezeila v'Aveida 1:2) is that when a rational, commanded agent commits a sin, the agent is fully responsible, and the sender is absolved from Beit Din punishment for the act. The underlying rationale is "דברי הרב ודברי התלמיד דברי מי שומעין" (whose words do we listen to, the Master's or the student's?); the agent, possessing free will, should have obeyed God's prohibition over the sender's instruction.

It is plausible that for Bnei Noach, this principle applies differently, or its scope is significantly narrower. The Gemara in Sanhedrin 57b explicitly states that Bnei Noach are executed even with one witness and without hatra'ah. Their legal framework is less stringent regarding evidentiary requirements, making convictions more readily attainable. Consequently, the concept of ein shaliach lidvar aveira might not apply with the same force or in the same manner to Bnei Noach. For instance, if the issur (prohibition) is understood more as a prohibition against causing death (where the sender is the ultimate cause) rather than solely against the act itself (where the agent is the direct actor), then the sender could remain liable.

Some Acharonim (e.g., Mishneh LaMelech on Hilchot Rotzeach 2:1) propose that ein shaliach lidvar aveira primarily absolves the sender from Beit Din punishment only when the shaliach is fully bar chayava (liable). However, if the shaliach lacks full bar chayava status (e.g., a shoteh or katan), then the sender is liable. In the context of Bnei Noach who hire agents, their legal framework might view the agent's culpability differently, or the sender's role might be deemed more primary even when the agent is technically bar chayava. Nevertheless, the Shorshei HaYam's terutz (Terutz 1 above) is generally regarded as the most direct and elegant in reconciling the Rambam's seemingly contradictory statements.

Kushya 2: The Nachash HaKadmoni and the Limits of Ein Shaliach Lidvar Aveira

The Gemara in Sanhedrin 29a (and Avodah Zarah 22a) derives a crucial halakha from the narrative of the Nachash (serpent) in Gan Eden: "אין טוענין למסית" (one does not argue on behalf of an inciter). Rabbi Shmuel bar Nachmani, quoting Rabbi Yonatan, teaches that the Nachash could have presented numerous arguments in its defense but failed to do so. The Gemara then asks what argument it could have made: "דברי הרב ודברי התלמיד דברי מי שומעין" (whose words do we listen to, the Master's or the student's?). This implies that the Nachash was functioning as an agent, and by not articulating this defense, it forfeited its opportunity for exculpation.

This presents a significant kushya for the principle of ein shaliach lidvar aveira. If the Nachash was merely an agent (in a metaphorical sense, for God or for Adam/Chava who were commanded not to eat), and it could have invoked the defense of "דברי הרב ודברי התלמיד," this suggests that ein shaliach lidvar aveira does apply, thereby rendering the Nachash solely responsible. However, if the Nachash is solely responsible, why is it stated that we do not argue on behalf of an inciter? The Shorshei HaYam meticulously examines this, recognizing its inherent complexity. The standard understanding of ein shaliach lidvar aveira dictates that the agent is responsible, and the sender is absolved from Beit Din (though still liable to Shamayim). If the Nachash was an agent and was commanded, it should be fully liable, and the "sender" (Adam/Chava/God) should be absolved. Yet, the midrash implies that God held Adam and Chava accountable for heeding the Nachash, while simultaneously punishing the Nachash, suggesting a departure from the straightforward application of ein shaliach lidvar aveira.

Terutz 1 (Shorshei HaYam: Ein Shaliach Applies When Sender is Also Commanded)

The Shorshei HaYam, citing the Perashat Drachim, offers a compelling solution that hinges on distinguishing the Nachash's unique situation. He posits that the principle of ein shaliach lidvar aveira (where the agent is liable and the sender is absolved from Beit Din) applies primarily when the sender is also commanded in the specific aveirah in question. For example, when one Jew instructs another Jew to kill, both are equally bound by the prohibition against murder; thus, the agent bears full responsibility.

However, in the Nachash's case, the Nachash itself was not commanded not to eat from the Eitz HaDa'at. Only Adam and Chava received that Divine prohibition. Therefore, the Nachash, acting as an agent, was not directly violating a Divine command that applied to its own being. In such a scenario, the principle of ein shaliach lidvar aveira (as typically understood in the context of "דברי הרב ודברי התלמיד") would not apply to the Nachash in the conventional manner. The Nachash could indeed have argued, "I am not commanded in this prohibition, so I merely relayed the message to those who were commanded (Adam/Chava) to incite them." Or, more precisely, the Nachash was not explicitly commanded not to incite. Since the Nachash was not bound by the issur of eating from the tree, and its act of incitement was not itself a transgression that it was commanded against, the "דברי הרב ודברי התלמיד" argument would not apply to it as a defense against its own culpability.

This implies that the Nachash could have argued that it was merely an agent, and since it was not commanded in the core prohibition, it should not be held liable. The Gemara's point, then, is that despite this plausible defense, the Nachash chose not to present it. From this, we derive the halakha that for a masit (inciter) who is commanded not to incite, we do not argue on their behalf with any defense, not even a seemingly valid one like, "I didn't intend to incite, only to test their resolve." The Shorshei HaYam clarifies that the Nachash was ultimately punished not because it was an agent for sin in the strict halakhic sense, but because it caused a stumbling block ("באתה תקלה על ידו"). The drasha "אין טוענין למסית" is thus derived from the Nachash's failure to articulate a valid defense that it legitimately could have made, not from the inherent inapplicability of ein shaliach lidvar aveira to its situation. This ensures that a masit who is commanded in the issur of incitement cannot employ such a defense.

Terutz 2 (Distinction Between "שוכר" and "אומר")

A distinct line of reasoning, extensively explored by the Shorshei HaYam in the name of Tosafot (Bava Kamma 56a, Kiddushin 43a) and the RitvA, draws a critical distinction between "שוכר" (hiring an agent for a task) and "אומר" (simply telling an agent to perform an action). Tosafot argue that the principle of "אין שליח לדבר עבירה" primarily applies when one tells someone to commit a sin, and the agent retains full free will to refuse the instruction. In such a case, the agent alone bears full liability. However, if one hires an agent, particularly for monetary compensation, or if the agent is "כבוש תחת ידו" (subjugated to his hand, e.g., a king's servant who is compelled to obey), then the sender might also bear a degree of responsibility, especially in terms of mitat Shamayim.

The Shorshei HaYam notes that the RitvA and Meiri appear to disagree with Tosafot, contending that the distinction between shocher and omer is not fundamental concerning the application of ein shaliach lidvar aveira. However, for the specific case of the Nachash, this distinction could be highly relevant. If the Nachash was merely "told" by God or Adam/Chava, it was acting with its own independent free will, and therefore would be fully liable. But if it was "hired" or operating under a form of subjugation, the sender might also share liability. The Shorshei HaYam ultimately leans towards the idea that the Nachash was not commanded in the issur itself, making its case sui generis.

Ultimately, the Shorshei HaYam concludes that the Tosafot's distinction between shocher and omer is indeed valid. He asserts that it supports the notion that in cases where the agent is "שכור בדמים" (hired for money) or "כבוש תחתיו" (subjugated to the sender's authority), the sender is liable for mitat Shamayim even for Yisrael. This provides a potential resolution to the kushya from the Gemara in Kiddushin 43a concerning King David's punishment for Uriah's death, implying that David was held liable as a "sender" for Joab's actions because Joab was "כבוש תחתיו." This intricate discussion highlights the multifaceted nature of agency and responsibility in halakha, particularly when dealing with capital offenses and the complexities of Divine judgment.

Intertext

The Rambam's discussion of murder, especially his meticulous distinction between mitat Beit Din and mitat Shamayim and his treatment of agency, is deeply embedded within the rich tapestry of halakhic and aggadic traditions. Exploring these intertextual connections significantly enriches our understanding of the sugya's profound layers.

1. Sanhedrin 72a: The Foundational Principle of Ein Shaliach Lidvar Aveira

The Gemara in Sanhedrin 72a (with parallel discussions in Kiddushin 42b-43a) serves as the foundational source for the principle of "אין שליח לדבר עבירה" (no agency for sin). This principle dictates that if an individual dispatches an agent to commit a sin, the agent is held solely responsible for the transgression, not the sender. The underlying rationale is expressed as "דברי הרב ודברי התלמיד דברי מי שומעין" (whose words do we listen to, the Master's or the student's?). Since the agent is presumed to be a rational, commanded individual, they are expected to prioritize God's prohibition over the sender's instruction.

The Rambam's ruling in Hilchot Rotzeach 2:1, which states that one who hires a murderer or sends servants is liable for mitat Shamayim but not mitat Beit Din, is a direct and crucial application of this principle to capital punishment for Yisrael. In such cases, the agent—the actual perpetrator of the murder—is the one liable for mitat Beit Din, provided all other stringent conditions (e.g., valid witnesses, explicit hatra'ah) are met. The sender, while undeniably morally culpable and subject to Divine wrath ("עוון הריגה בידם וחייבים מיתה לשמים"), is not subject to human capital courts because their involvement was indirect, and the agent possessed the requisite free will to choose otherwise.

This principle, however, is not without its limitations. Exceptions exist, for instance, if the agent is a shoteh (mentally incompetent individual), a katan (minor), or an eved Kena'ani (Canaanite slave) who is not fully bar chayava (liable for all mitzvot or capital punishment). In these specific scenarios, the sender can be held liable by Beit Din. The sugya in Kiddushin 43a delves into these exceptions extensively. The Rambam himself, in Hilchot Gezeila v'Aveida 1:2, explicitly states that "השולח יד ע"י קטן וחרש שוטה, חייב" (one who commits an act of theft through a minor, deaf-mute, or mentally incompetent person, is liable), thereby confirming these critical exceptions. This underscores that the efficacy of ein shaliach lidvar aveira fundamentally relies on the agent's full moral and legal capacity.

2. Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Melachim u'Milchamot 9:4: Noahide Laws on Murder

As extensively discussed in the "Friction" section, the Rambam's ruling in Hilchot Melachim 9:4 presents a pivotal intertextual challenge to his earlier statements in Hilchot Rotzeach 2:1. Concerning Bnei Noach, the Rambam states that an individual who kills "בידו או שכר הורג להרוג חבירו או כפתו והשליכו לפני ארי" (with his hand, or hires a murderer to kill his colleague, or binds him and throws him before a lion) is indeed executed by a Beit Din of Bnei Noach.

This striking contrast is central to comprehending the intricate nuances of halakha as it applies to Yisrael versus Bnei Noach. The Shorshei HaYam's sophisticated reconciliation—that "אדרוש" in Bereishit 9:5-6, when applied to Bnei Noach, refers to Shamayim holding their Beit Din accountable for executing justice—is a critical hermeneutical key. It implies that while the principle of accountability for bloodshed is universal, its enforcement mechanism and the specific legal consequences differ significantly based on the distinct halakhic framework applicable to each population. Bnei Noach courts, operating under different evidentiary standards (e.g., the validity of one witness, no requirement for hatra'ah), possess a broader mandate for capital punishment, even for indirect causation. This is precisely because their failure to act would incur Divine retribution upon their judicial system. This highlights the distinct legal structures and the divergent moral and judicial expectations placed upon these two groups within Jewish law.

3. Devarim 19:19: Eidim Zomemin and the Principle of "כאשר זמם"

The verse "ועשיתם לו כאשר זמם לעשות לאחיו" (Devarim 19:19) directly commands the punishment for eidim zomemin (conspiring witnesses): they are to receive the exact punishment they maliciously intended to inflict upon the accused. This verse is central to the Ohr Sameach's foundational kushya in our primary sugya.

The connection here is profound. Eidim zomemin are not direct perpetrators of murder; they merely provide false testimony. Their testimony, if accepted, directly causes the execution of an innocent person. Yet, the Torah elevates their conspiracy to the moral and legal equivalent of the act itself, at least concerning the determination of their mitah. This constitutes a significant chiddush (novel legal innovation) because, ordinarily, indirect causation does not lead to Beit Din execution. The Ohr Sameach acutely observes the inherent tension: if eidim zomemin are executed as if they directly killed, and a murderer who kills by stoning is executed by sword, why would eidim zomemin who plotted a stoning be themselves stoned? His resolution is that the Torah here establishes a unique, specific rule, a chiddush, that their mitah precisely matches their malicious intent, rather than strictly adhering to the general mitah prescribed for the specific type of act. This reinforces the Rambam's premise that Beit Din execution for murder typically demands direct, physical action, and that exceptions (such as eidim zomemin) are explicit Torah innovations. Furthermore, it powerfully illustrates the Torah's profound concern for justice and deterrence, punishing the intent to kill through false testimony with a severity commensurate to the act itself, even when the specific mitah might otherwise diverge.

4. Vayikra 24:17: "כל נפש אדם" and the Principle of Individual Culpability

The Rambam (Hilchot Rotzeach 3:10) references Vayikra 24:17: "ואיש כי יכה כל נפש אדם מות יומת" (And if a man strikes any human life, he shall surely be put to death) to derive the complex law concerning multiple killers. He interprets "כל נפש" (any life/all life) not merely as an encompassing reference to all human life, but rather as emphasizing that a single individual must be solely and entirely accountable for the death to incur Beit Din execution.

This constitutes a powerful and subtle interpretative move. If, for instance, ten individuals strike a person with ten different sticks, none of which, individually, is sufficient to cause death, yet the combined effect of their blows leads to the person's demise, the Rambam rules: "כולן לא נהרגין בבית דין" (none of them are executed by Beit Din). This remains true even if all the blows were delivered simultaneously. This ruling highlights the Torah's stringent demand for clear, singular, and direct causation for the imposition of capital punishment. The Rambam's drasha from "כל נפש" signifies that Beit Din can only act when the causal chain is unequivocally traceable to the direct, unmediated act of one person. While all ten individuals might be morally culpable and ultimately incur mitat Shamayim, the exacting evidentiary and causal requirements for Beit Din capital punishment mean they are absolved from human judicial execution. This severe limitation on Beit Din's authority in capital cases profoundly underscores the sanctity of life and the immense burden of proof required before the ultimate penalty can be imposed.

5. I Kings 21:25 and 22:21: The Aggadah of Ach'av and Navot's Blood

The Rambam concludes Hilchot Rotzeach 4:9 with a poignant aggadic discussion regarding King Ach'av's ultimate punishment for his role in the murder of Navot. Ach'av, despite being depicted as an arch-idolater of unparalleled wickedness (as stated in I Kings 21:25: "There was none like Ach'av who gave himself over to the performance of wickedness in the eyes of God"), ultimately faced Divine retribution specifically linked to "the blood of Navot." The Rambam notes that when Ach'av's merits and sins were weighed, "there was no sin that warranted his destruction and was not counterbalanced by a positive quality, except the blood of Navot." This is further supported by I Kings 22:21-22, which describes the "spirit of Navot" being dispatched to persuade Ach'av to engage in battle, leading to his demise.

The Rambam emphasizes a crucial point: "Now this wicked man Ach'av did not actually kill his victim with his own hands; he merely brought about his death. How much more so this condemnation should apply when a person kills another with his own hands." This aggadic passage serves as a powerful reinforcement of the distinction between direct and indirect causation in terms of Beit Din liability versus mitat Shamayim. Ach'av, whose involvement in Navot's murder was indirect (akin to one who hires an agent, as the Rambam explicitly categorizes), was liable for mitat Shamayim. The aggadah teaches that even for such indirect involvement, the sin of bloodshed is of such profound severity that it outweighs all other merits and directly leads to inescapable Divine retribution. This narrative serves as a potent moral counterpoint to the halakhic limitations on Beit Din's punitive reach, emphatically underscoring that Shamayim ultimately holds all perpetrators of bloodshed accountable, regardless of the directness of their action, thereby ensuring that no act of murder, however indirect, escapes ultimate justice.

Psak/Practice

The Rambam's meticulous delineation of liability in Hilchot Rotzeach u'Shmirat Nefesh 2-4, specifically distinguishing between mitat Beit Din and mitat Shamayim, carries profound implications for both halakha l'ma'aseh (practical law) and meta-psak heuristics (the overarching principles guiding legal decisions).

Halakha L'Ma'aseh

1. The Theoretical Nature of Capital Punishment: In contemporary Jewish legal practice, due to the absence of a fully constituted Sanhedrin (High Court) and the stringent adherence to halakhic requirements for capital punishment (e.g., the testimony of two valid witnesses, the precise and explicit hatra'ah - warning), Beit Din executions are not performed. Consequently, the Rambam's detailed rules for mitat Beit Din for murder, while foundational for understanding Torah justice, remain primarily theoretical, guiding scholarly inquiry rather than direct practical application.
2. The Enduring Severity of Bloodshed (Mitat Shamayim): Notwithstanding the practical non-applicability of Beit Din execution, the Rambam's consistent emphasis on mitat Shamayim for indirect murderers (such as hiring an agent, exposing one to a beast, or suicide) and for those who kill without fulfilling all the exacting criteria for Beit Din execution (e.g., lack of hatra'ah, cases of multiple killers where individual causation is unclear) underscores that such acts are unequivocally considered grave sins. The moral culpability and the inevitability of Divine accounting for bloodshed are ever-present and undiminished. This means that, even in the absence of human judicial enforcement, the issur (prohibition) of bloodshed and its profound spiritual consequences remain fully intact and critically severe.
3. The Vital Role of Extra-Judicial Measures (Hora'at Sha'ah / Din Malkhut): The Rambam's crucial provision (in Hilchot Rotzeach 2:4) for a Jewish king or a Beit Din to execute or severely punish such murderers (even those technically liable only for mitat Shamayim) "by virtue of his regal authority, in order to perfect society" (tikkun ha'olam) or "as a result of an immediate fiat, because this was required at the time" (hora'at sha'ah) is extraordinarily significant. This principle of hora'at sha'ah or din malkhut (royal law) provides a vital mechanism for implementing practical measures to prevent societal breakdown and deter crime, especially murder, when strict halakhic capital punishment is not administratively feasible. In a modern context, this principle underpins the authority of rabbinic courts or communal leaders to impose various forms of punishment (e.g., imprisonment, severe corporal punishment, social ostracism) to maintain public order and safety, even if these measures fall short of Torah capital punishment. The institution of the din kipah (a specialized prison involving starvation) for murderers who cannot be fully liable for Beit Din execution due to evidentiary technicalities (4:8-9) is another potent example of such extra-judicial measures, demonstrating the profound societal imperative to address and punish murder.
4. The Nuances of Life and Intent: The meticulous assessment criteria for the murder weapon, the specific location of the blow, the force applied, and the victim's physical status (e.g., trefah – a person with a mortal wound, nefel – an inviable infant) highlight the Torah's precise definition of murder and its critical distinction between intentional (mezid) and unintentional (shogeg) acts. While these detailed requirements are primarily designed for Beit Din capital cases, they deeply inform our broader understanding of criminal intent, causation, and responsibility in Jewish law. Even in civil law contexts (e.g., for assessing damages), these distinctions are fundamentally important. The leniency for Beit Din punishment when killing a trefah (2:7-8)—due to their inherently short remaining lifespan—underscores that Beit Din capital punishment is specifically for shortening a life that possessed the potential for continued existence, not merely for causing death. Nevertheless, killing a trefah is still morally reprehensible, and the killer is killed if he himself is a trefah and commits murder, or if he kills a non-trefah individual (2:9), demonstrating that a trefah is still recognized as a human life deserving of protection.
5. The Status of Non-Jewish Individuals: The nuanced distinctions regarding killing an eved Kena'ani (who is legally treated similarly to a Jew for capital punishment purposes) versus a ger toshav (for whom Beit Din execution is not applicable, though galut may be) versus a gentile idolater (whom one is not obligated to save if their life is in danger) are crucial for comprehending the halakhic hierarchy concerning human life and the precise scope of Beit Din's jurisdiction over different populations. While these laws are complex and have generated extensive discussion throughout Jewish legal history, they clearly demonstrate that halakha differentiates between various categories of non-Jews in terms of legal protection and the application of punitive measures.

Meta-Psak Heuristics

The sugya offers several enduring meta-psak heuristics that guide Jewish legal thought:

• Balancing Strict Justice with Societal Deterrence: The Rambam masterfully navigates the delicate balance between the exceedingly stringent requirements for Torah capital punishment (demanding perfect justice) and the undeniable societal imperative for deterrence and public order (tikkun ha'olam). This often necessitates the invocation of hora'at sha'ah or other extra-judicial measures when the strictures of halakha cannot be perfectly met by a functioning Beit Din.
• The Dual Nature of Divine vs. Human Judgment: The pervasive and meticulously maintained distinction between mitat Shamayim and mitat Beit Din serves as a constant reminder that human courts operate under specific, inherently limited parameters, whereas ultimate and perfect judgment rests solely with God. This profound perspective tempers the human impulse for retribution with a deep recognition of Divine omnipotence, omniscience, and ultimate justice.
• The Absolute Sanctity of Life: The meticulousness with which the Rambam defines the act of murder, the extreme strictures placed upon conviction, and the provision for alternative punishments for those who escape the direct punitive reach of Beit Din, all profoundly underscore the absolute sanctity of human life in Jewish thought. Every act of bloodshed, whether direct or indirect, is unequivocally presented as a grave offense against both man and God.
• The Nuances of Agency and Responsibility: The sugya provides an invaluable deep dive into the complex concept of shaliach lidvar aveira, demonstrating how halakha meticulously assigns responsibility when multiple actors are involved in the commission of a sinful act. This principle, with its intricate details and exceptions, is foundational to numerous areas of Jewish law, extending far beyond the immediate context of murder.

Takeaway

The Rambam meticulously delineates direct and indirect causation in murder, establishing clear boundaries for Beit Din jurisdiction while emphasizing that all bloodshed ultimately incurs Divine judgment, often allowing for extra-judicial measures to protect society. The sugya highlights the complex interplay between human legal limitations and the broader demands of moral accountability and communal order.

Citations

• Mishneh Torah, Murderer and the Preservation of Life 2:1-4: https://www.sefaria.org/Mishneh_Torah%2C_Murderer_and_the_Preservation_of_Life.2.1-4
• Mishneh Torah, Murderer and the Preservation of Life 3:10: https://www.sefaria.org/Mishneh_Torah%2C_Murderer_and_the_Preservation_of_Life.3.10
• Mishneh Torah, Murderer and the Preservation of Life 4:8-9: https://www.sefaria.org/Mishneh_Torah%2C_Murderer_and_the_Preservation_of_Life.4.8-9
• Mishneh Torah, Sanhedrin 18:6: https://www.sefaria.org/Mishneh_Torah%2C_Sanhedrin_and_the_Penalties_Entrusted_to_the_Court.18.6
• Mishneh Torah, Kings and Wars 9:4: https://www.sefaria.org/Mishneh_Torah%2C_Kings_and_Wars.9.4
• Mishneh Torah, Theft and Loss 1:2: https://www.sefaria.org/Mishneh_Torah%2C_Theft_and_Loss.1.2
• Mishneh Torah, Idolatry and Idols 10:6: https://www.sefaria.org/Mishneh_Torah%2C_Idolatry_and_Idols.10.6
• Mishneh Torah, Forbidden Relations 14:7: https://www.sefaria.org/Mishneh_Torah%2C_Forbidden_Relations.14.7
• Mishneh Torah, Chagigah 2:1: https://www.sefaria.org/Mishneh_Torah%2C_Chagigah.2.1
• Bereishit 9:5: https://www.sefaria.org/Genesis.9.5
• Bereishit 9:6: https://www.sefaria.org/Genesis.9.6
• Shemot 21:14: https://www.sefaria.org/Exodus.21.14
• Shemot 21:20-21: https://www.sefaria.org/Exodus.21.20-21
• Bamidbar 35:16-18: https://www.sefaria.org/Numbers.35.16-18
• Bamidbar 35:20-21: https://www.sefaria.org/Numbers.35.20-21
• Vayikra 24:17: https://www.sefaria.org/Leviticus.24.17
• Devarim 19:19: https://www.sefaria.org/Deuteronomy.19.19
• I Kings 21:25: https://www.sefaria.org/I_Kings.21.25
• I Kings 22:21-22: https://www.sefaria.org/I_Kings.22.21-22
• Sanhedrin 29a: https://www.sefaria.org/Sanhedrin.29a
• Sanhedrin 57a: https://www.sefaria.org/Sanhedrin.57a
• Sanhedrin 57b: https://www.sefaria.org/Sanhedrin.57b
• Kiddushin 42b: https://www.sefaria.org/Kiddushin.42b
• Kiddushin 43a: https://www.sefaria.org/Kiddushin.43a
• Bava Kamma 56a: https://www.sefaria.org/Bava_Kamma.56a
• Niddah 57b: https://www.sefaria.org/Niddah.57b
• Makkot 5a: https://www.sefaria.org/Makkot.5a
• Bereishit Rabbah 34:10: https://www.sefaria.org/Bereishit_Rabbah.34.10
• Ohr Sameach on Mishneh Torah, Murderer and the Preservation of Life 2:1:1: https://www.sefaria.org/Ohr_Sameach_on_Mishneh_Torah%2C_Murderer_and_the_Preservation_of_Life.2.1.1?lang=he&p2=Ohr_Sameach_on_Mishneh_Torah%2C_Murderer_and_the_Preservation_of_Life.2.1.1&lang2=he
• Shorshei HaYam on Mishneh Torah, Murderer and the Preservation of Life 2:1:1: https://www.sefaria.org/Shorshei_HaYam_on_Mishneh_Torah%2C_Murderer_and_the_Preservation_of_Life.2.1.1?lang=he&p2=Shorshei_HaYam_on_Mishneh_Torah%2C_Murderer_and_the_Preservation_of_Life.2.1.1&lang2=he
• Steinsaltz on Mishneh Torah, Murderer and the Preservation of Life 2:1:1: https://www.sefaria.org/Steinsaltz_on_Mishneh_Torah%2C_Murderer_and_the_Preservation_of_Life.2.1.1?lang=he&p2=Steinsaltz_on_Mishneh_Torah%2C_Murderer_and_the_Preservation_of_Life.2.1.1&lang2=he
• Steinsaltz on Mishneh Torah, Murderer and the Preservation of Life 2:10:1: https://www.sefaria.org/Steinsaltz_on_Mishneh_Torah%2C_Murderer_and_the_Preservation_of_Life.2.10.1?lang=he&p2=Steinsaltz_on_Mishneh_Torah%2C_Murderer_and_the_Preservation_of_Life.2.10.1&lang2=he
• Steinsaltz on Mishneh Torah, Murderer and the Preservation of Life 2:10:2: https://www.sefaria.org/Steinsaltz_on_Mishneh_Torah%2C_Murderer_and_the_Preservation_of_Life.2.10.2?lang=he&p2=Steinsaltz_on_Mishneh_Torah%2C_Murderer_and_the_Preservation_of_Life.2.10.2&lang2=he
• Steinsaltz on Mishneh Torah, Murderer and the Preservation of Life 2:11:1: https://www.sefaria.org/Steinsaltz_on_Mishneh_Torah%2C_Murderer_and_the_Preservation_of_Life.2.11.1?lang=he&p2=Steinsaltz_on_Mishneh_Torah%2C_Murderer_and_the_Preservation_of_Life.2.11.1&lang2=he
• Steinsaltz on Mishneh Torah, Murderer and the Preservation of Life 2:11:2: https://www.sefaria.org/Steinsaltz_on_Mishneh_Torah%2C_Murderer_and_the_Preservation_of_Life.2.11.2?lang=he&p2=Steinsaltz_on_Mishneh_Torah%2C_Murderer_and_the_Preservation_of_Life.2.11.2&lang2=he
• Steinsaltz on Mishneh Torah, Murderer and the Preservation of Life 2:11:3: https://www.sefaria.org/Steinsaltz_on_Mishneh_Torah%2C_Murderer_and_the_Preservation_of_Life.2.11.3?lang=he&p2=Steinsaltz_on_Mishneh_Torah%2C_Murderer_and_the_Preservation_of_Life.2.11.3&lang2=he