The Subtle Art of Damage: Rabbinic Extension of Liability for Imperceptible Loss

Sugya Map

• Issue: Liability for damage that is not readily apparent (אבידה שאין בה סימן), specifically focusing on Rabbinic impositions beyond Scriptural law. This includes damage to value, ritual impurity, and indirect causation.
• Nafka Mina(s):
  • Distinguishing between Scriptural and Rabbinic liability in damage cases.
  • The nature of "damage" – is it only physical alteration or also diminution of value/utility?
  • The rationale behind Rabbinic penalties: deterrence, societal order, or compensation?
  • The applicability of dina d'garmi (indirect damage liability) and its limits.
  • The concept of kneset Yisrael (the community of Israel) as a basis for certain Rabbinic enactments.
  • The distinction between intentional and unintentional acts in imposing liability.
  • The implications for heirs and estates.
  • The unique status of moser (informer) and rodef (pursuer) in damage law.
  • The role of oaths in assessing damages when the extent is unknown.
• Primary Sources:
  • Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Nizkei Mamon 7:1-10; 8:1-11.
  • Bava Kamma 60a-b, 79a-80a, 93a-94a, 117a-118a.
  • Gittin 52b.
  • Sanhedrin 74a.
  • Shevuot 47a-48a.
  • Tanakh: Exodus 22:1-3, Leviticus 24:18-20, Numbers 35:31.

Text Snapshot

The core of our discussion lies in the distinction between physical alteration and the reduction of value, particularly in the context of Rabbinic law. Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Nizkei Mamon 7:1 states:

"When a person causes damage to a colleague's property that is not evident to the eye, he is not liable to make financial restitution according to Scriptural Law. For the object has not changed, nor has its form become altered. Nevertheless, our Sages ruled that he is liable according to Rabbinic Law, for he reduced the value of the article. They required him to pay the amount by which its value was reduced."

The subsequent verse, 7:2, provides crucial examples:

"What is implied? If a person causes food belonging to a colleague to be rendered ritually impure, he mixes produce together with produce that is terumah causing it to be considered dimu'a, he mixes a drop of wine that had been used for the sake of idolatry in a colleague's wine, causing the entire quantity to be forbidden, or the like - the amount of the loss is evaluated, and the person who caused the loss is required to pay the entire damages from the finest property in his possession, as is the law regarding anyone who causes damages."

The language here is precise. The first sentence sets a clear Scriptural baseline: physical change (shinnui tzurah) is the prerequisite for liability. The phrase "not evident to the eye" (שאין בה סימן) points to the subtle nature of the damage, but the critical distinction is made between "changed" (שניא) and "form become altered" (צורתו כהשתנתה). The gemara elaborates on this distinction, and Rambam, by referencing "reduced the value" (הפחית ערכו), anchors the Rabbinic extension to this concept. The examples in 7:2 further illuminate this. Rendering food impure (לכנותו טמא), causing dimu'a (דמוע) in terumah (which renders it unfit for consumption), or mixing forbidden wine (יין נסך) all result in the prohibition or devaluation of a larger quantity, even if the physical substance of the original item remains largely intact. The phrase "amount of the loss is evaluated" (השוה את הנזק) emphasizes a quantitative assessment of the diminished utility or acceptability. The requirement to pay "from the finest property in his possession" (מן היפה שבנכסיו) signals a stricter standard, often associated with din kenas (penalty law) or dina d'garmi.

Readings

The extension of liability for subtle, non-physical damages is a cornerstone of the Rabbinic legal framework, moving beyond the Torah's explicit stipulations. Rambam's formulation here is deeply rooted in the discussions found in the Talmud.

Ohr Sameach's Nuanced Analysis of Mochal Shtrei

Ohr Sameach, in his commentary on the Mishneh Torah, grapples with the specific case of mochal shtrei (one who waives a debt owed to him, thereby causing loss to a subsequent buyer of the debt note), as discussed in 7:10. He notes Rambam's earlier statement in 7:1 that "anyone who causes damage... is liable to pay from the finest property in his possession" (כל הגורם להזיק... חייב לשלם מן היפה שבנכסיו). Ohr Sameach then seeks to reconcile this with the gemara's discussion regarding moser (an informer) and pigul (sacrificial meat rendered forbidden). He observes that the gemara in Bava Kamma 79b, in discussing pigul, states that moser is liable as garmi (indirect damage), yet moser is not explicitly listed in the baraita (Bava Kamma 79a) enumerating those liable for direct damages. This leads Ohr Sameach to understand that the baraita is only meant to exclude moser from the category of those liable for direct damages, not to exempt him from liability altogether.

Crucially, Ohr Sameach quotes Tosafot on Avodah Zarah 74b, who explain that moser is liable even according to those who don't impose dina d'garmi, because his liability is akin to a Rabbinic penalty (kenas). Ohr Sameach then questions whether the requirement to pay from the "finest property" applies universally to all garmi situations, including mochal shtrei. He posits a potential distinction: when one directly damages a colleague's field (e.g., a field of lesser quality, ziburit), he pays from the finest property because it is his money that is causing the loss to the colleague's property. However, in the case of mochal shtrei, the original debt was owed to Reuven, and the creditor (the buyer of the note, Levi) would have collected from Shimon's "middle quality" property (beinonit). If Reuven then waives the debt, Levi is losing what he could have collected from beinonit property. Ohr Sameach questions why Levi should now be able to collect from Reuven's "finest property" (idit), when the loss itself was only to beinonit level. He suggests a defense: Reuven could argue he is paying for the loss of "a purse full of dinars," implying a direct loss of cash which is always valued at its highest. However, he concludes that if the original debtor (Shimon) was willing to pay, or had the means to pay from beinonit property, then Reuven should only be liable to compensate Levi for the loss of that beinonit level recovery, not for the highest value. This nuanced analysis highlights the intricate debates surrounding the scope and valuation of garmi damages and the "finest property" rule.

Steinsaltz: Illuminating the Rabbinic Rationale and Scope

Rabbi Adin Steinsaltz, in his commentary, provides clarity on the underlying principles and specific applications of these laws. Regarding the mochal shtrei case (7:10), Steinsaltz explains that Reuven owed Shimon money. Reuven sold the promissory note (and the right to collect) to Levi. The key is that "even though the sale of the debt and its collateral is permitted by Rabbinic decree, this sale is not effective according to Torah law. Therefore, the lender [Reuven] can still waive the debt, and his waiver is effective. Thus, when Reuven waived Shimon's debt, the note he sold to Levi became worthless, and he caused Levi to lose the value of the debt." This explanation clarifies that the Torah law's view of debt collection might differ from the Rabbinic permissibility of selling debt notes, creating a potential loophole for the original creditor to nullify the sale.

Furthermore, Steinsaltz addresses the scenario where Reuven's heirs waive the debt. He notes that "even the heir of the creditor can waive the debt, even if the promissory note has been sold to another (as stated there)." This points to the enduring power of the original creditor's right to forgive, a right that can be exercised even by their successors, impacting the security of the note's purchaser.

On the apotiki (pledged servant) scenario (7:11), Steinsaltz clarifies the concept. He explains that the debtor (the borrower) designated a servant as security for the loan. This means the lender could collect the debt specifically from this servant, rather than from the borrower's other assets. The borrower then "freed the servant, and the ruling is that his liberation invalidates the pledge to the lender, and the servant is released to freedom." This highlights how a specific form of collateral, once established, can be undone by the borrower's actions, impacting the lender's security. Steinsaltz adds a crucial detail for tikun olam (repairing the world): "Although the liberation invalidates the pledge and the servant is considered freed, for the sake of tikun olam, the lender is compelled to free him so that he will not encounter him and say, 'You are my servant.'" This reveals a Rabbinic ordinance designed to prevent future social awkwardness and potential claims based on the prior pledge, even after it's legally nullified. These explanations emphasize the practical implications and underlying Rabbinic considerations that animate Rambam's legal rulings.

Ramban's Perspective on Garam and Intent

Rabbi Moses ben Nachman (Ramban), though not directly commenting on this specific text of Rambam, offers a foundational perspective on garmi (indirect damage) that underpins much of the discussion. Ramban, in his novellae on Bava Kamma (e.g., Bava Kamma 59b, s.v. V'ha'amartem), emphasizes that the prohibition against causing damage, even indirectly, is deeply rooted in the principle of lo ta'asu oken (do not do likewise) and the general command to walk in God's ways. He argues that dina d'garmi is not merely a penalty but a fundamental aspect of ensuring societal order and preventing exploitation. For Ramban, the intent of the actor is often secondary to the outcome. If one's actions, even if not directly causing physical destruction, lead to a quantifiable loss for another, liability is established. This perspective supports the Rabbinic extension of liability beyond direct physical harm, as seen in Rambam's examples of ritual impurity or devaluation.

Ramban's approach, particularly his emphasis on the outcome and the broader societal implications, implicitly validates the Rabbinic extension to situations where the damage is not physically apparent but results in a tangible financial or functional loss. The focus shifts from the act of destruction to the result of diminished value or utility, a principle clearly articulated by Rambam.

Maharsha on the Nature of Rabbinic Penalties

Rabbi Shmuel Eliezer Edels (Maharsha), in his Chiddushei Halachot on Bava Kamma, offers profound insights into the nature of Rabbinic enactments and penalties. While not directly on Rambam's text, his discussions on kenas (penalties) and dina d'garmi are highly relevant. Maharsha often explores the distinction between damages that are direct (which fall under the explicit laws of the Torah regarding Bor, Bor, U'Maba'er, Mabit, V'Hafur) and those that are indirect (garmi). He notes that the Torah's explicit penalties are typically for direct damages, whereas indirect damages often incur liability through Rabbinic decree or as a kenas. This perspective helps explain why Rambam specifies that liability for imperceptible damage is mi'd'Rabbanan (Rabbinic), even though the consequence can be severe and the payment from the finest property. Maharsha's analysis of kenas often emphasizes its deterrent purpose – to prevent individuals from engaging in actions that, while not directly destructive, could lead to significant harm or loss. This aligns with Rambam's explicit statement in 7:3 that the ruling for imperceptible damage was "a penalty prescribed by our Sages so that none of the ravagers will go and render a colleague's produce impure and then excuse himself, saying: 'I am not liable.'" Maharsha's work underscores the theological and jurisprudential underpinnings of these Rabbinic extensions of liability.

Friction

The distinction between Scriptural and Rabbinic liability, particularly concerning non-evident damages, creates fertile ground for debate. A key tension arises from the very definition of "damage" and the rationale behind the Rabbinic extension.

Kushya 1: The Scope of "Reduction of Value" vs. Physical Alteration

Rambam clearly delineates between Scriptural liability, which requires physical alteration (צורתו כהשתנתה), and Rabbinic liability, based on reducing value (הפחית ערכו). However, the boundary between these two can be remarkably porous.

The Kushya: Consider the case of a craftsman who, through negligence, slightly mars the surface of a valuable metal artifact belonging to his colleague. There is no significant loss of material, and the artifact is still fundamentally the same object. However, its aesthetic appeal and therefore its market value are significantly diminished for a connoisseur or collector. According to Rambam (7:1), this would fall under Rabbinic law, as the value is reduced. Yet, one could argue that a subtle alteration in appearance, even if not impacting functionality, could be considered a form of "change in form" (shinnui tzurah) that should fall under Scriptural law. If the Torah's intent is to protect property owners from loss, then any alteration that diminishes the owner's ability to derive full benefit or value from the object, whether through sale or personal use, should trigger direct liability. Why does Rambam draw such a sharp line, relegating this to a Rabbinic penalty, when the economic impact on the owner is virtually identical to a direct physical damage?

Potential Terutz 1 (Focus on Intentionality and Kenas): The distinction might hinge on the underlying rationale. Scriptural damages often address direct physical destruction or alteration, where the harm is undeniable and the causal link is immediate. Rabbinic enactments, on the other hand, often serve as kenas (penalties) or takkanot (ordinances) to prevent broader societal harms and close loopholes. In the case of imperceptible damage, the harm is not immediately obvious, making it easier for the perpetrator to deny responsibility. The Rabbinic imposition of liability, even for reduced value without physical change, acts as a deterrent specifically against such subtle forms of exploitation. The payment from the "finest property" reinforces this kenas aspect, signifying a higher standard of culpability beyond mere negligence. Therefore, while the economic loss might seem similar, the legal nature of the transgression is different: one is a direct violation of Torah property law, the other is a violation of a Rabbinic ordinance designed to prevent subtle fraud and encourage greater diligence.

Potential Terutz 2 (The Definition of "Alteration"): The definition of shinnui tzurah might be more stringent than simply a reduction in aesthetic value. The Torah law may require an alteration that impacts the object's fundamental identity or usability, not just its market desirability among a specific class of buyers. For instance, if a utensil is bent, it is physically altered and its function is impaired. If food is rendered ritually impure, its halachic status is altered, rendering it unusable for its intended purpose (consumption by a kohen or for certain ritual uses). In the case of the slightly marred artifact, its fundamental form and function remain intact. Its diminished value stems from subjective appreciation or market demand, rather than an objective impairment of its essence. The Rabbinic law, by focusing on "reduced value," captures these more nuanced economic impacts that don't rise to the level of a Torah-level physical alteration.

Kushya 2: The Paradox of Dina D'Garmi and Kenas in the Mochal Shtrei Case

Rambam (7:10) states that Reuven, who sold a debt note to Levi and then waived the debt owed by Shimon, is liable to pay Levi from his finest property. Ohr Sameach grapples with why this liability, stemming from an indirect act (garmi), requires payment from the finest property, a standard often associated with kenas.

The Kushya: The act of waiving a debt is not a direct physical destruction of Levi's property. It is an act that renders the purchased note worthless. This falls squarely within the category of dina d'garmi. The gemara (Bava Kamma 117a) discusses dina d'garmi and its enforceability. While there are opinions that dina d'garmi is not enforced by the beit din (court) in the same way as direct damages, especially when it concerns financial loss that could have been prevented by caution, the case of mochal shtrei seems to be an exception where liability is imposed. Furthermore, the requirement to pay from the yefeh sheb'nechsav (finest property) usually indicates a kenas or a severe form of garmi. If Reuven's act is garmi, and the payment is from the finest property, what is the precise distinction that elevates this garmi act to such a high level of financial obligation, beyond the standard garmi liability? Is it purely a kenas to deter such actions, or is there a deeper principle at play?

Potential Terutz 1 (The Nature of a Debt Note as Property): A debt note, once sold, represents a tangible asset and a right to future income. By waiving the debt, Reuven is not merely preventing a future gain; he is effectively destroying the asset he sold to Levi. This is akin to destroying a tangible object that Levi rightfully possessed. The value of the note is the sum of the debt it represents. When Reuven invalidates it, he is causing Levi to lose the entire value of that asset. This direct causal link to the destruction of a purchased asset, even if indirect in its mechanism, might elevate its status beyond typical garmi scenarios. The payment from the finest property is then not just a penalty but compensation for the full value of the destroyed asset, reflecting its perceived worth.

Potential Terutz 2 (The Rabbinic Ordination and its Rationale): Ohr Sameach himself hints at this: Tosafot explain that moser is liable as a kenas. Similarly, the liability for mochal shtrei might be a specific Rabbinic ordinance (takkanah) designed to protect the integrity of financial transactions. The sale of debt notes, while permitted, carries inherent risks. The Rabbinic court, to encourage confidence in such transactions and prevent the exploitation of buyers, enacted this stringent liability. The payment from the finest property is the mechanism to ensure that the buyer is fully compensated for his loss, thereby safeguarding the practice of selling debt notes. This takkanah functions as a powerful deterrent against those who might exploit their original claim to undermine a sale, thereby protecting the broader economic system. It is a proactive measure to ensure that once a debt is sold, it cannot be arbitrarily nullified by the original creditor.

Potential Terutz 3 (Ohr Sameach's Caveat and the Nature of the Loss): Ohr Sameach's own doubt regarding the payment from the finest property, suggesting payment from beinonit if the debtor could only pay from such property, is itself a crucial point. This implies that the "finest property" rule might be applied more flexibly in cases where the initial loss was only to "middle" quality assets. However, the default rule, as stated by Rambam, is the finest property. This suggests that the default assumption is that the purchaser of the note expected to recover the full value of the debt. If Reuven's action causes this expectation to be entirely thwarted, the compensation reflects that full expectation, paid from his highest assets. The nuance Ohr Sameach brings up is an advanced consideration of how the actual recoverable amount might influence the final payout, but the initial imposition of liability from the finest property remains the standard.

Intertext

The principles discussed in Rambam's Hilkhot Nizkei Mamon resonate across a wide spectrum of Jewish legal and ethical thought, connecting to broader concepts of responsibility, intent, and societal well-being.

1. Bava Kamma 60a-b: The Foundational Distinction of Shor and Adam

The entire framework of damages law in the Torah, as elaborated in Bava Kamma, hinges on the distinction between damage caused by an animal (shor) and damage caused by a human being (adam). The Torah states regarding an ox that gores: "If an ox gores a man or a woman... he shall surely be put to death according to the king's decree. If the ox gores a slave, male or female, he shall give to their master thirty shekels of silver..." (Exodus 21:29-32). This establishes a system where the owner is liable, with varying degrees of severity. However, for damage caused by an ox to property, the owner pays the value of the damage (Exodus 22:4).

In contrast, when discussing damage caused by a human, the Torah (Exodus 22:1-3) speaks of restitution for theft or selling stolen goods. The Talmud in Bava Kamma 60a-b extensively analyzes why the Torah does not explicitly detail human-caused property damage in the same way it does for an ox. The conclusion is that human liability is generally more stringent, encompassing garmi and various forms of penalties, as human agency and intent are more complex. Rambam's discussion of Rabbinic extensions for imperceptible damage directly builds upon this foundational distinction, showing how the Sages expanded liability for human actions beyond the explicit Scriptural framework for animal damages, recognizing the unique culpability of a thinking agent. The garmi liability for Reuven waiving a debt (7:10), for instance, is a clear example of this expanded human responsibility.

2. Exodus 22:1-3: The Law of Theft and Restitution

The Torah's laws concerning theft and restitution in Exodus 22:1-3 provide a baseline for financial damages: "If a man steals an ox or a sheep, and slaughters it or sells it, he shall restore five oxen for an ox, and four sheep for a sheep." This verse establishes a punitive multiplier for theft, indicating that restitution is not merely compensatory but also retributive.

This principle of punitive damages is echoed in Rambam's discussion of paying from the "finest property" (7:2, 7:10). While the Torah's multiplier is specific to theft, the concept of paying more than the direct value of the loss is a recurring theme. Rambam's imposition of liability from the finest property for acts like dimu'a or mixing forbidden wine, even when the physical object isn't destroyed, aligns with the spirit of kenas found in the theft laws. It signifies that certain actions, even if their damage isn't immediately apparent or physically destructive, warrant a more severe financial consequence to deter such behavior and ensure full compensation for the victim's loss of utility or value.

3. Leviticus 24:18-20: The Principle of Retaliation in Damages

Leviticus 24:18-20 states: "He who kills a beast shall make it good: beast for beast. If he harms the life of a man, he shall be put to death. You shall have one manner of law, as well for the stranger, as for one of your own country: for I am the Lord your God." This passage, while primarily concerning personal injury and the death penalty, also introduces the concept of "beast for beast" for animal damage.

More broadly, the principle of ayin tachat ayin, shen tachat shen (an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth) found in Exodus 21:24, though interpreted by the Rabbis as monetary compensation rather than literal mutilation, underscores the idea that the compensation should be proportional to the harm suffered. Rambam's insistence on evaluating the "amount of the loss" (7:2) and his detailed examples of how value is reduced (e.g., rendering food impure, causing wine to be forbidden) demonstrate a sophisticated application of this proportionality. Even when the damage is not physical, the focus is on quantifying the actual loss to the owner, ensuring that the compensation reflects the full extent of the diminished value or utility, aligning with the spirit of equivalence in damages, whether literal or compensatory.

4. Maimonides' Introduction to Mishneh Torah: The Goal of Clarity and Order

In his introduction to the Mishneh Torah, Rambam outlines his goal: to present the entire body of Jewish law in a clear, organized, and accessible manner, resolving ambiguities and inconsistencies found in the Talmud. His treatment of damages, particularly the distinction between Torah and Rabbinic law and the rationale for imposing liability for non-evident damages, is a prime example of this endeavor.

Rambam synthesizes complex Talmudic discussions into concise rulings. His explicit statement that liability for imperceptible damage is mi'd'Rabbanan (Rabbinic law) serves to clarify the legal basis, differentiating it from direct Torah violations. This clarity is essential for practical application. By meticulously detailing the types of damages that incur Rabbinic liability and the reasons behind them (deterrence, preventing exploitation), Rambam provides a systematic understanding of how the Sages expanded the law to meet evolving societal needs and ethical considerations, ensuring that justice is served even in subtle cases.

Psak/Practice

The rulings in Hilkhot Nizkei Mamon 7-8 have direct implications for contemporary practice, particularly in areas of financial liability and preventative legal measures.

The Preeminence of Rabbinic Ordinances in Modern Law

While Rambam distinguishes between Torah and Rabbinic law, in practice, Rabbinic ordinances carry the full force of law within Jewish communities and are often the operative basis for psak halacha (halachic rulings). The concept of liability for damage that reduces value, even without physical alteration, is widely accepted. This means that actions such as causing food to become terumah or ma'aser when it is yisrael's, or inadvertently mixing forbidden substances into another's property (e.g., kosher food with non-kosher, or potentially even causing a product to lose its marketability due to a subtle defect), can incur financial liability.

The principle that "the amount of the loss is evaluated" is crucial. This requires careful assessment of the actual financial impact on the injured party. In business dealings, this might involve expert opinions on market value, usability, or regulatory compliance. The requirement to pay from the "finest property" signifies the seriousness with which these Rabbinic penalties are treated, aiming to ensure full restitution and deterring such acts.

The Importance of Due Diligence and Prevention

The detailed discussion of garmi and subtle damages underscores the paramount importance of zerizut (diligence) and hashgacha pratit (careful attention) in all dealings. The Rabbinic imposition of liability for non-evident damages serves as a strong incentive for individuals to exercise extreme caution to avoid causing any form of loss, even if subtle. This extends beyond direct financial transactions to include any action that could potentially diminish the value or utility of another's property.

In modern contexts, this translates to the need for robust contracts, clear disclaimers, and thorough quality control in business. For individuals, it means being mindful of the potential consequences of their actions, even if the damage is not immediately apparent. The complex rulings on moseir and rodef also highlight the ethical imperative to protect one's fellow Jew from harm, both physical and financial, and the severe consequences for those who betray this trust.

Heirs and Estates: The Enduring Impact of Damages

The ruling that the penalty for imperceptible damage is not expropriated from the estate of the perpetrator (7:3) is significant. This differentiates it from certain other liabilities, such as debts owed by the deceased, which typically pass to the heirs. The rationale provided is that the penalty was imposed upon the individual who transgressed. However, it's important to note that other forms of garmi damages, particularly those considered contractual or financial obligations that existed during the deceased's lifetime, might still be collectible from the estate. This distinction requires careful legal analysis in each specific case.

The rule regarding moser (7:14), where heirs are liable, demonstrates that not all damage-related liabilities are limited to the perpetrator's lifetime. This suggests that the nature of the transgression and its impact on the community or individual rights can determine the longevity of the financial obligation.

Takeaway

Rabbinic law extends liability beyond overt physical destruction to encompass any action that diminishes the value or utility of another's property, emphasizing deterrence and comprehensive restitution. This intricate legal framework compels meticulous diligence, recognizing that subtle transgressions carry significant financial and ethical weight.

Citations

• Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Nizkei Mamon 7:1-10 (Hebrew): https://www.sefaria.org/Mishneh_Torah%2C_One_Who_Injures_a_Person_or_Property_7
• Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Nizkei Mamon 8:1-11 (Hebrew): https://www.sefaria.org/Mishneh_Torah%2C_One_Who_Injures_a_Person_or_Property_8
• Bava Kamma 60a-b (Hebrew): https://www.sefaria.org/Bava_Kamma_60a
• Bava Kamma 79a-80a (Hebrew): https://www.sefaria.org/Bava_Kamma_79a
• Bava Kamma 93a-94a (Hebrew): https://www.sefaria.org/Bava_Kamma_93a
• Bava Kamma 117a-118a (Hebrew): https://www.sefaria.org/Bava_Kamma_117a
• Gittin 52b (Hebrew): https://www.sefaria.org/Gittin_52b
• Sanhedrin 74a (Hebrew): https://www.sefaria.org/Sanhedrin_74a
• Shevuot 47a-48a (Hebrew): https://www.sefaria.org/Shevuot_47a
• Exodus 22:1-3 (Hebrew): https://www.sefaria.org/Exodus_22%3A1
• Leviticus 24:18-20 (Hebrew): https://www.sefaria.org/Leviticus_24%3A18
• Numbers 35:31 (Hebrew): https://www.sefaria.org/Numbers_35%3A31
• Ohr Sameach on Mishneh Torah, One Who Injures a Person or Property 7:10:1 (Hebrew): https://www.sefaria.org/Ohr_Sameach%2C_Mishneh_Torah%2C_One_Who_Injures_a_Person_or_Property_7.10.1
• Steinsaltz on Mishneh Torah, One Who Injures a Person or Property 7:10:1 (Hebrew): https://www.sefaria.org/Steinsaltz%2C_Mishneh_Torah%2C_One_Who_Injures_a_Person_or_Property_7.10.1
• Steinsaltz on Mishneh Torah, One Who Injures a Person or Property 7:10:2 (Hebrew): https://www.sefaria.org/Steinsaltz%2C_Mishneh_Torah%2C_One_Who_Injures_a_Person_or_Property_7.10.2
• Steinsaltz on Mishneh Torah, One Who Injures a Person or Property 7:10:3 (Hebrew): https://www.sefaria.org/Steinsaltz%2C_Mishneh_Torah%2C_One_Who_Injures_a_Person_or_Property_7.10.3
• Steinsaltz on Mishneh Torah, One Who Injures a Person or Property 7:10:4 (Hebrew): https://www.sefaria.org/Steinsaltz%2C_Mishneh_Torah%2C_One_Who_Injures_a_Person_or_Property_7.10.4
• Steinsaltz on Mishneh Torah, One Who Injures a Person or Property 7:11:1 (Hebrew): https://www.sefaria.org/Steinsaltz%2C_Mishneh_Torah%2C_One_Who_Injures_a_Person_or_Property_7.11.1
• Steinsaltz on Mishneh Torah, One Who Injures a Person or Property 7:11:2 (Hebrew): https://www.sefaria.org/Steinsaltz%2C_Mishneh_Torah%2C_One_Who_Injures_a_Person_or_Property_7.11.2
• Steinsaltz on Mishneh Torah, One Who Injures a Person or Property 7:11:3 (Hebrew): https://www.sefaria.org/Steinsaltz%2C_Mishneh_Torah%2C_One_Who_Injures_a_Person_or_Property_7.11.3