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Daily Rambam (3 Chapters) · Expert – Beit Midrash Analysis · On-Ramp

Mishneh Torah, One Who Injures a Person or Property 7-8

On-RampExpert – Beit Midrash AnalysisNovember 13, 2025

Sugya Map

  • Issue: Liability for causing damage that is not physically apparent (e.g., diminishing value, rendering ritually impure).
  • Nafka Mina: Distinguishing between Scriptural (De'orayta) and Rabbinic (De'rabanan) liability; identifying instances of grama (indirect causation) versus direct action; understanding the rationale behind specific penalties and their scope (e.g., knesa - penalty, grama); determining the source and nature of liability for moser (informer).
  • Primary Sources:
    • Mishneh Torah, Laws of Injury and Damages 7:1-8:19.
    • Talmud Bavli, Bava Kamma 28a-29a, 55b, 60a, 73a, 93b, 113a-b.
    • Talmud Bavli, Avodah Zarah 64b.
    • Talmud Bavli, Gittin 54b.
    • Talmud Bavli, Sanhedrin 74a.

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Text Snapshot

Mishneh Torah, Laws of Injury and Damages 7:1

When a person causes damage to a colleague's property that is not evident to the eye, he is not liable to make financial restitution according to Scriptural Law. For the object has not changed, nor has its form become altered. Nevertheless, our Sages ruled that he is liable according to Rabbinic Law, for he reduced the value of the article. They required him to pay the amount by which its value was reduced.

  • Dikduk/Leshon Nuance: The phrase "לא ניכרת" (lo nikaret) – "not evident to the eye" – is crucial. It signifies damage that doesn't manifest as a physical alteration. The contrast between "דין תורה" (din Torah - Scriptural Law) and "מדבריהם" (midivreihem - according to their words/Rabbinic Law) establishes the core distinction. The rationale "שהפחית ערך הדבר" (shehipchit erech hadavar) – "for he reduced the value of the article" – highlights the economic impact as the basis for Rabbinic liability.

Mishneh Torah, Laws of Injury and Damages 7:10

Reuven was owed money by Shimon and sold the promissory note recording the debt to Levi. After he sold the note, he waived Shimon's obligation, freeing Shimon of responsibility, as will be explained in its place. Reuven becomes liable to pay Levi the entire amount mentioned in the promissory note, for he caused him to lose the money that he could have collected with the note. It is as if he destroyed it by fire. Similarly, if one of Reuven's heirs waived the debt, the person who waived the debt must make financial recompense for Levi's loss from the finest property in his possession.

  • Dikduk/Leshon Nuance: "נושה בשמעון" (nosheh b'Shimon) – "was a creditor to Shimon." The critical action is "מחַל" (mechal) – "waived." The phrase "הרי הפסידו" (harei hifsido) – "he has caused him to lose" – directly links the waiver to the financial damage. The comparison "כאילו שרפו באש" (ke'ilu sharafo ba'esh) – "as if he destroyed it by fire" – equates this indirect loss to a direct act of destruction. The instruction to pay "מן היפה שבנכסיו" (min ha'yafeh she'b'nissoiv) – "from the finest property in his possession" – indicates a penalty-like assessment.

Readings

Ohr Sameach on Mishneh Torah, Laws of Injury and Damages 7:10:1

The Ohr Sameach, addressing the case in 7:10 where Reuven sells a debt note to Levi and then forgives the debt owed by Shimon, notes that Reuven is liable to pay Levi from his finest possessions. He connects this to the general principle in 7:1 that one who causes damage indirectly (grama) is liable to pay from his finest property. He cites the Gemara in Bava Kamma (28b) regarding moser (an informer) and piggul (sacrificially forbidden meat), stating that even though these involve indirect causation, they are liable from the finest property. He interprets the Gemara as potentially excluding moser from this rule only in terms of being considered a direct damager, but not regarding the assessment of payment from the finest property.

However, the Ohr Sameach raises a significant doubt regarding the specific case of forgiving a debt after selling the note. He questions whether the liable party should pay from his finest property when the original debt itself was collectible only from the "middle" tier of property (beinonit). He argues that if one damages a field of lesser quality (ziburit), one pays from the finest property, as it's one's own property being damaged. But here, the original debt was only collectible from beinonit. Why then should the payment be from the finest property (idit)? He suggests a possible justification: the forgiven debtor might have paid willingly, thus making the loss equivalent to losing one's own money thrown into the sea, which is paid from the finest property. Yet, if the debtor was unwilling or unable to pay, and the debt would have to be collected through court from beinonit, then payment should only be from beinonit, as that's the extent of the actual loss. He refers to Tosafot (Bava Kamma 5b s.v. tachat) for further clarification.

Steinsaltz on Mishneh Torah, Laws of Injury and Damages 7:10:1-4 & 7:11:1-3

Rav Steinsaltz, in his commentary on 7:10, clarifies the scenario: Reuven was owed money by Shimon. Reuven sold the promissory note (and the right to collect the debt) to Levi. Subsequently, Reuven forgave Shimon's debt. According to Steinsaltz, even though Rabbinic law permits selling a debt note, the act of forgiveness by the original creditor (Reuven) is still effective according to Torah law. This renders the sold note worthless, thus Reuven has caused Levi a financial loss. The same applies if Reuven's heir forgives the debt after the note was sold.

Regarding 7:11, Steinsaltz explains the concept of an apotiki servant. This refers to a situation where a debtor designates a specific servant to satisfy a debt, meaning the creditor can only collect from that servant and not from the debtor's other assets. If the debtor then frees this designated servant, the lien on the servant is nullified, and the creditor loses the ability to collect. In such a case, the debtor is liable to the creditor. Furthermore, to prevent future disputes, the court compels the creditor to also free the servant, so the creditor cannot later claim the servant is still his.

Friction

The distinction between Scriptural and Rabbinic liability for seemingly minor damages, as introduced in 7:1, leads to a significant tension when examining cases of indirect causation (grama). While 7:1 explicitly states that damage "not evident to the eye" is only liable de'rabanan, the subsequent sections, particularly 7:10 concerning the forgiven debt, and the general principle of paying from the finest property, suggest a more stringent approach to certain types of indirect harm.

The primary friction arises from the assessment of payment from the "finest property" (min ha'yafeh she'b'nissoiv). The Ohr Sameach, in his commentary on 7:10, directly confronts this. He notes that the Gemara in Bava Kamma (28b) implies that moser and piggul cases, which are clear examples of grama, are liable from the finest property. This seemingly contradicts the initial premise of 7:1, which limits liability for non-evident damage to de'rabanan and doesn't specify the assessment method. The Ohr Sameach's core query is whether the knesa (penalty) aspect, which mandates payment from the finest property, applies universally to all forms of grama that incur liability, or if it's reserved for specific egregious cases.

His doubt regarding the forgiven debt scenario is particularly sharp. If the original debt was only enforceable against beinonit property, how can the person who caused the loss of that debt be forced to pay from idit property? This suggests a potential disconnect between the value of the lost asset and the penalty imposed. The rationale for paying from the finest property is often linked to an increased severity of the transgression or a punitive element designed to deter. However, in the forgiven debt case, the actual "damage" to Levi is the loss of a claim collectible only from beinonit. Forcing Reuven to pay from idit seems disproportionate.

A potential terutz (resolution) could be that the obligation to pay from the finest property stems not solely from the nature of the damage itself, but from the act that caused the damage in the context of financial transactions. When Reuven sells the debt, he effectively transfers a tangible asset. His subsequent waiver is not merely a change in Shimon's obligation but a direct nullification of the asset he sold to Levi. This act of nullification, irrespective of the original debt's collectibility tier, is seen as a more severe transgression of trust and financial integrity, thus warranting the higher penalty. The Ohr Sameach's own suggestion that the debtor might have paid willingly points to this: if the potential for collection was high, Reuven's act effectively destroyed a valuable claim, justifying the penalty. The severity is thus tied to the impact of the act of invalidation on the transaction, rather than just the diminished value of the underlying debt.

Intertext

Bava Kamma 55b: The Case of the Me'agel (One Who Causes Animals to Trample)

The Mishneh Torah, in 8:1, discusses the liability of one who causes damage through the actions of his animals, such as an ox or a donkey. This aligns with the principle of grama in a more direct sense than the abstract reduction of value. The Gemara in Bava Kamma 55b deals with a similar concept, where one who causes animals to trample another's field is liable. The discussion there revolves around the assessment of damages, specifically whether the compensation should be based on the value of the damaged field or the value of the produce that would have grown.

Bava Kamma 55b:

Rava said: If one causes an animal to trample [a field], he pays from the best of his field. And Rava said: If one causes an animal to trample [a field], he pays from the best of his field. And Rava said: If one causes an animal to trample [a field], he pays from the best of his field.

Rava said: When one causes an animal to trample, he pays from the best of his fields. Why? Because it is as if he himself trampled it. [Bava Kamma 55b]

The parallel is clear: both the Mishneh Torah and the Gemara address liability for actions that damage property, even if indirectly through the agency of another entity (an animal in the Gemara, or an indirect cause like waiving a debt in the Mishneh Torah). The crucial link is the payment from the "best of his fields" (or "finest property"), indicating a punitive element beyond simple restitution for the direct loss. This reinforces the idea that certain indirect damages are treated with heightened severity due to the nature of the act or the intent behind it.

Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 373: Laws of Moser

The concept of moser (informer) is explicitly linked to damage liability in Mishneh Torah 8:10-13. The text states that a moser who informs about a colleague's property, leading to its confiscation by gentiles, is liable to reimburse the owner from his finest property. This connects directly to the broader discussion of damages. The Shulchan Aruch, in Choshen Mishpat 373, codifies the laws of moser, emphasizing the severe prohibition and the perpetrator's liability.

Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 373:1

It is forbidden to inform about a fellow Jew to gentiles, whether about his person or his property, even if he is a wicked person who sins, and even if he causes him minor annoyance. Whoever informs about a Jew and endangers his person or property will not receive a portion in the World to Come.

Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 373:1

While the Shulchan Aruch focuses on the prohibition and the spiritual ramifications, the Mishneh Torah explicitly ties this to financial liability, specifically payment from the finest property. This highlights how the severity of the offense, even when not a direct physical alteration, incurs a significant financial penalty, underscoring the meta-halachic principle that certain actions that undermine community trust or safety carry a punitive financial burden.

Psak/Practice

The distinction between Scriptural and Rabbinic liability for non-evident damage is fundamental. While direct physical damage is clearly de'orayta, damages that merely reduce value, even without visible alteration, are subject to Rabbinic decree. This implies that in modern legal contexts, proving such damages might require demonstrating a quantifiable loss of market value, even if the object appears unchanged.

The requirement to pay from the "finest property" for certain types of grama and for moser acts as a significant deterrent. This suggests that when assessing damages, the nature of the act that caused the loss is a critical factor. It's not just about the quantum of loss, but the character of the transgression. This meta-heuristic guides us to view certain damages as carrying a punitive component, demanding a higher standard of restitution.

In cases involving moser, the severity of the prohibition and the associated financial penalty are extreme. This reflects a societal imperative to protect individuals from betrayal and the potential for communal harm stemming from such actions. The prohibition itself is so severe that the Mishneh Torah even permits killing a moser under certain circumstances, demonstrating the gravity with which this offense is viewed.

Takeaway

The halacha meticulously calibrates liability, distinguishing between direct and indirect harm, and between Scriptural and Rabbinic mandates, often grounding Rabbinic law in preventing value reduction.

The punitive assessment from one's finest property for specific indirect damages and transgressions like moser underscores a profound principle: the halacha penalizes not just the outcome but the nature and intent of the act, aiming to deter severe breaches of trust and societal order.

Citations

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