Mishneh Torah, Slaves 7-9

Sugya Map

• Issue: The validity and operative mechanisms of a get shichrur (bill of release) for a slave, focusing on the precise language and conditions required for its effectiveness.
• Nafka Mina:
  • Determining whether a slave is freed or remains in servitude.
  • Ascertaining whether the slave acquires any property alongside their freedom.
  • Understanding the procedural requirements for validating the release.
  • Clarifying the status of slaves released jointly or partially.
  • Establishing the implications of a slave's status on their marital eligibility.
• Primary Sources:
  • Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Avadim 7:1-9
  • Gittin 11a-12b
  • Bava Metzia 11b, 77a
  • Kiddushin 18a, 20b
  • Leviticus 25:44-46
  • Deuteronomy 23:15-17
  • Psalms 145:9, 123:2
  • Job 31:13-15

Text Snapshot

Mishneh Torah, Slaves 7:1:

The wording of a bill of release must connote that it is severing the connection between the slave and his master, so that his master no longer has any rights with regard to him. Therefore, if a master writes to his slave: "You and everything I own except for such and such a property or such and such a garment are now your property," the connection between them is not severed. The bill of release is nullified. And since the bill of release is not effective, the slave is not freed and he does not acquire any of the property. The same principles apply in all analogous situations.

• Dikduk/Leshon Nuance: The phrase "דבר הכורת בינו ובין אדונו" (a matter that severs between him and his master) is crucial. Steinsaltz notes: "מבדיל ומנתק" (separates and disconnects). The emphasis is on a complete severance, "ולא יישאר לאדון בו זכות" (and the master shall have no remaining right therein), meaning the content must focus on the slave's rights, not the master's retained rights. The example given, retaining property, is problematic because "כיון שיש בדבור שהוא משתחרר בו שיור, דקאמר כל נכסי ואינו מתקיים כלו לא הוי כרות גיטא" (since there is in the statement of release a reservation, saying "all my property" but not fully realized, it is not a complete severance)¹. This reservation means "לא קנה עצמו" (he did not acquire himself), and consequently, "לא קנה שאר הנכסים דאין קנין לעבד" (he did not acquire the other property, as a slave cannot acquire).

Mishneh Torah, Slaves 7:2:

When a slave brings a bill of release that states: "Your person and my property are acquired by you," he acquires his own person and becomes a free man immediately. He does not, however, acquire the property until the authenticity of the signatures to the document are verified, as is the law with regard to other legal documents. Similarly, if the document states: "All my property is acquired by you," he acquires his own person, but does not, however, acquire the property until the authenticity of the signatures to the document is verified. We divide the content of the document and say: "He acquires his own freedom, for we trust him when he brings his own bill of release, and he does not have to verify the authenticity of the document. With regard to property, a person does not acquire it unless he has clear proof of his ownership. Therefore, he does not acquire it until the authenticity of the document is verified.

• Dikduk/Leshon Nuance: The critical distinction here is between acquiring "עצמו" (himself) and acquiring "נכסים" (property). The freedom is immediate because "כיון שהגיע לידו יצא לחירות ואינו צריך לקיימו" (once it reached his hand, he is freed and does not need to validate it)². This is akin to a bill of divorce for a woman ("גט אשה"), where the woman herself is the subject of the document. Property, however, requires validation like any other transaction ("כקיום שטרא דעלמא"). Yekar Tiferet explains: "בשלמא עצמו קנה מידי דהוה אגט אשה אלא נכסים לא ליקני מידי דהוה אקיום שטרא דעלמא ופלגינן דיבורא" (Naturally, he acquired himself, as with a woman's bill of divorce; however, he does not acquire property, as with the validation of a regular document, and we divide the statement)³.

Readings

Rambam (Mishneh Torah) on the Severance Clause

The Rambam lays down a fundamental principle in 7:1:1 that a get shichrur must effect a "דבר הכורת בינו ובין אדונו" – a severance between the slave and his master. This is not merely a formal declaration but a substantive act of disconnection. If the master retains any right or ownership, even a sliver, the entire severance is nullified. He illustrates this in 7:1:2 with the example of a master retaining specific property. The Rambam asserts, "The bill of release is nullified." This ruling is based on the understanding that the document's purpose is to sever all connection, and any reservation undermines this core intent. As Steinsaltz clarifies, "אין זה כורת והגט בטל" (this is not a severance and the bill of divorce is void)⁴, specifically because "מכיוון שרשומה בגט זכות לאדון, שנכס מסוים נשאר שלו, אין זה גט כריתות" (since a right for the master is recorded in the bill, that a specific asset remains his, it is not a bill of severance)⁵. The consequence is dire: "ולא קנה מן הנכסים כלום" (and he acquired nothing of the property)⁶, because the slave's status remains unchanged, and "העבד כיד רבו" (the slave is like the hand of his master) in terms of acquisition. The underlying principle is that if the master's intent for full severance is not clearly expressed and executed, the entire transaction fails.

Rambam (Mishneh Torah) on Acquisition of Self vs. Property

In 7:2, the Rambam distinguishes between the slave acquiring his own person and acquiring property. If the document states, "Your person and my property are acquired by you," the slave becomes immediately free. This is because the acquisition of his own person is inherent in the document itself, and he is the recipient. The validation process, "קיום השטר" (validation of the document), is required only for the acquisition of external property. Yekar Tiferet explains this differentiation by drawing an analogy to a woman's bill of divorce: "בשלמא עצמו קנה מידי דהוה אגט אשה" (Naturally, he acquired himself, as with a woman's bill of divorce)⁷. The freeing of oneself is akin to the woman's right to divorce. However, property acquisition is treated like any other financial transaction: "אלא נכסים לא ליקני מידי דהוה אקיום שטרא דעלמא" (however, he does not acquire property, as with the validation of a regular document)⁸. The master's signature is proof of the transfer of freedom, but the acquisition of property by the slave requires independent verification. This "פלגינן דיבורא" (we divide the statement) highlights the Rambam's precise legal analysis, separating the immediate effect of freedom from the delayed acquisition of assets.

Yekar Tiferet's Insight on Joint Release and Property

Yekar Tiferet offers a profound explanation for the nullification of a joint bill of release for two slaves (7:3). He argues that when a master writes, "All my property is given to so and so and so and so, my slaves," this is problematic because the slaves are still identified as "my slaves." Furthermore, if the property is described as "half of my property is given to so and so... and the other half to so and so," it implies that "possession of half of each one is retained" by the master. This retained possession, even partial, invalidates the severance. The core issue is that the slaves are still viewed as integrated parts of the master's property, and a slave cannot acquire property if he is not fully freed. This is why the text states, "since the slave was not freed, he does not acquire any of the property." The master's intent to fully divest himself of all rights over the slaves is paramount; any ambiguity or retained interest leads to the nullification of the entire process.

Yekar Tiferet's Elucidation on Partial Release

Regarding the partial release of a slave (7:4), Yekar Tiferet clarifies the distinction between a gratuitous release and one involving payment. When a master declares, "You are half free," the slave does not acquire his own freedom because the severance is incomplete. The master still retains half ownership, and the slave remains partially bound. However, if the master receives payment for "half his worth with the intent of freeing that half," the transaction is binding. This implies that the payment acts as a form of "redemption" for that half-portion, creating a binding obligation on the master to sever. The key is that the master is not merely donating freedom; he is engaging in a transaction where his divestment is reciprocated, making the severance operative.

Friction

The core tension within these passages of Avadim revolves around the concept of complete severance versus partial or conditional divestment. The Rambam is adamant that a get shichrur must be a kosher get, a clean break.

The Strongest Kushya: The Rambam states in 7:1:2 that if a master writes to his slave, "You and everything I own except for such and such a property or such and such a garment are now your property," the bill of release is nullified. This seems to contradict the principle of Kinyan Kessef (acquisition through money) or even the general idea of a gift. If the master explicitly grants ownership of almost everything, why is the retention of a minor item so fatal? Furthermore, in 7:3, the Rambam invalidates the release of two slaves with one document because "the slaves are included in the master's property, and possession of half of each one is retained." This implies that even if the master intends to free them, the mere conceptual inclusion of them as part of his property, or retaining a conceptual half, negates the release. How can a document that clearly intends to grant freedom and property be entirely void due to such seemingly technicalities of retained ownership or conceptual inclusion?

The Best Terutz (or Two): The Rambam's insistence on complete severance stems from the unique nature of avodat keshafim ( Canaanite slave labor) and the fundamental halachic distinction between a free person and a slave. A slave is not considered a full legal entity capable of independent acquisition or full agency. Freedom is not merely a status change; it is a complete transformation of being.

1. The "Kinyan Mefursam" Principle: The severing document must be a kinyan mefursam (an explicit acquisition), not merely implied. When a master retains even a small piece of property or a conceptual half-interest, it demonstrates that the slave is not fully separated from the master's dominion. The slave is still, in some sense, bound to the master's property or still considered a part of the master's estate. This is akin to a get ishah where a reservation of rights by the husband would invalidate the divorce; here, the master's reservation, however minor, indicates a lack of complete willingness to sever all ties. Yekar Tiferet explains this by stating, "כיון שיש בדבור שהוא משתחרר בו שיור... לא הוי כרות גיטא" (since there is in the statement of release a reservation... it is not a complete severance)⁹. The lack of complete severance means the slave has not truly "acquired himself."

2. The Nature of Slave-Property: The slave is the "Guf" (body) of the master's property. When the master retains any part of his property, or even a conceptual half, it implies that the slave's guf is still intrinsically linked to the master's ownership. The act of freeing must be a complete divestment of the master's ownership over the slave's guf. The slave cannot simultaneously be considered fully owned by the master (even partially) and fully free. The mere existence of retained property or conceptual ownership suggests the master has not fully relinquished his claim on the slave's very person. This is why, in 7:3, the slaves are "included in the master's property," and "possession of half of each one is retained," thereby invalidating the release. The slave's acquisition of freedom is predicated on the master's absolute relinquishment of his ownership stake.

Intertext

Leviticus 25:44-46 and the Perpetual Service

The foundation of the master-slave relationship, particularly for Canaanite slaves, is laid in Leviticus 25:44-46: "Your slaves and your maidservants whom you may have from the nations around you, from them you shall acquire slaves and maidservants. You may also acquire them from the children of the residents who reside among you, and from their families who bear children in your land; and they shall be your property. You may bequeath them to your sons after you, to inherit as property; you may make them slaves for life. But your brethren, the children of Israel, shall not rule over one another ruthlessly."

The Rambam's detailed analysis of get shichrur is a direct response to this biblical mandate. The requirement for a "severing" element in the bill of release (7:1) is a Rabbinic interpretation designed to ensure that the slave's transition to freedom is a definitive act of separation, not a mere formality. The emphasis on explicit language and the nullification of the release if the master retains any rights highlights the Torah's intent for these slaves to be a permanent property. The Rabbinic framework, as presented by the Rambam, provides the mechanism for overcoming this perpetual servitude, but only under strict conditions that guarantee the master's complete divestment. The contrast with the Israelites, who are explicitly forbidden from ruling "ruthlessly" and are not to be perpetual slaves, underscores the unique status of Canaanite slaves and the stringent requirements for their emancipation.

Deuteronomy 23:15-17: The Fugitive Slave in Zion

The verses in Deuteronomy concerning the fugitive slave who flees to Eretz Yisrael ("Do not return a slave to his master... He shall dwell with you, in your midst, in one of your cities that he desires. You shall not abuse him.") offer a stark counterpoint and a critical safeguard. When a slave flees to the land (7:9), the Rambam states, "he should not be returned to slavery." This is a direct implementation of the pasuk. The master is compelled to issue a bill of release, and the slave owes him his worth via a promissory note. This provision demonstrates a limit to perpetual servitude, especially within the sacred soil of Israel.

This halacha creates a tension with the previous sections. While the master has broad rights to retain slaves and dictate terms of release, the refugee slave gains an immediate, albeit conditional, freedom upon reaching Eretz Yisrael. The Rambam's explanation that "His master is told to compose a bill of release for him, and he writes a promissory note for his master for his worth" (7:9:2) shows the legal framework designed to uphold the fugitive's freedom while acknowledging the former master's financial loss. This halacha serves as an ultimate escape hatch, reinforcing the idea that freedom, once attained by reaching Eretz Yisrael, is paramount and irreversible, even against the master's will.

Psak/Practice

The meticulous conditions for a get shichrur underscore the gravity of a slave’s status and the stringent legal requirements for emancipation. The Rambam’s detailed stipulations, particularly the emphasis on complete severance and the nullification of documents with reservations, demonstrate that freeing a slave is not a casual act.

• Heuristics: The overarching principle is that intent must be unequivocally demonstrated through precise action. Ambiguity or retained rights by the master invalidate the intended freedom. This mirrors many areas of Jewish law where clarity of intent and execution are paramount, such as kiddushin (betrothal) and gittin (divorce).
• Practical Application: In modern contexts, where slavery is abhorrent, these laws are primarily of historical and textual significance. However, the underlying principles of clear intent, irrevocable commitment, and the legal ramifications of conditional acts continue to inform halachic discourse on emancipation and freedom. The concept of a "bill of release" itself, as a formal document signifying the end of a legal bond, has echoes in contemporary legal instruments.

Takeaway

The liberation of a slave is not a mere declaration but a rigorous legal process demanding complete severance from the master's dominion, leaving no room for ambiguity or retained claims. Even the smallest reservation by the master can render the entire act of emancipation void, highlighting the absolute nature of freedom required by halacha.