Mishneh Torah, Circumcision 1

Sugya Map

The Rambam, in Hilkhot Milah Chapter 1, systematically lays out the foundational principles and practical applications of the mitzvah of circumcision.

• Issue: The nature and scope of the mitzvah of milah, including:
  • Its status as a positive commandment (mitzvat asseh) and the karet penalty for non-fulfillment.
  • The primary agents of obligation: father, master, beit din, and the individual himself upon reaching majority.
  • The distinction between milat Yisrael (circumcision of Jews) and milat avadim (circumcision of slaves) regarding timing and Shabbat override.
  • Specific cases requiring hatafat dam brit (extraction of covenantal blood) or delayed milah (e.g., converts, androgynous individuals, yellod caesarean, sick children).
  • The rules governing milah on Shabbat and Yom Tov, and the principle of pikuach nefesh (saving a life) taking precedence.
• Nafka Mina(s):
  • Whether the father's obligation extends beyond the eighth day.
  • The specific bracha recited by the mohel ("למול" vs. "על המילה").
  • The circumstances under which beit din compels milah.
  • The exact definition of "at its proper time" (b'zmano) for Shabbat override.
  • The halakhic status of slaves born to an unimmersed maidservant.
  • The criteria for delaying milah due to illness, particularly for premature or jaundiced infants.
• Primary Sources:
  • Tanakh: Bereishit 17:10-14 (covenant, karet); Vayikra 12:3 (eighth day).
  • Talmud: Kiddushin 29a (father's obligation, women exempt); Shabbat 132a, 134a, 135a (Shabbat override, medical cases); Yevamot 48b, 72b (slave milah, Shabbat override principles); Nedarim 31b (hatafat dam brit).
  • Rambam: Sefer HaMitzvot (Aseh 215); Hilkhot Berakhot 11:11 (blessing formulations); Hilkhot Issurei Bi'ah 13:1-4 (convert milah); Hilkhot Melakhim 9:1-2 (Noachide laws).

Text Snapshot

The opening lines of Hilkhot Milah encapsulate the gravity and primary obligations of this mitzvah:

Halakha 1: The Core Obligation and Karet

"מצות עשה היא מילה שחייבין עליה כרת שנאמר וערל זכר אשר לא ימול את בשר ערלתו ונכרתה הנפש ההיא מעמיה. מצוה על האב למול את בנו ועל האדון למול את עבדיו." (Hilkhot Milah 1:1)

• Dikduk/Leshon Nuance: The Rambam begins by stating "מצוה עשה היא מילה" – it is a positive commandment, not "לעשות מילה" – to perform circumcision. This subtle phrasing hints at the ongoing nature of the mitzvah to be circumcised, beyond the singular act, a point explored by the Tzafnat Pa'aneach (on Hilkhot Milah 1:2). The immediate citation of Bereishit 17:14, the source of karet, underscores the severity of non-compliance for the uncircumcised individual. The subsequent "מצוה על האב למול את בנו" clearly delineates the father as the primary agent responsible for the performance of the mitzvah for his son.

Halakha 2: Karet Distinction and Beit Din's Role

"אם עבר האב או האדון ולא מל אותן ביטל מצות עשה. ואינו חייב כרת שאין כרת אלא על הערל עצמו. ובית דין מצווין למול את אותו הבן או העבד בזמנו ולא יניחו ערל בישראל ובעבדיהם." (Hilkhot Milah 1:2)

• Dikduk/Leshon Nuance: The Rambam distinguishes sharply between the karet incurred by the uncircumcised individual ("על הערל עצמו") and the bitul mitzvah (negation of a positive commandment) incurred by the father or master who fails to circumcise. The phrase "ביטל מצות עשה" (he negated a positive commandment) implies that the father's obligation is to perform the mitzvah, and failing to do so constitutes a bitul. The subsequent imposition of the mitzvah upon beit din ("ובית דין מצווין למול... בזמנו") highlights the communal responsibility to ensure the covenant is maintained, even if the primary obligor fails. The term "בזמנו" (at its proper time) here refers to the eighth day, if possible, or as soon as medically permissible thereafter.

Readings

The Rambam's concise statements often serve as fertile ground for Acharonim to delve into fundamental halakhic principles. Two such Acharonim offer significant insights into the Rambam's formulation in Hilkhot Milah 1:1-2.

Nachal Eitan: The Father's Enduring Obligation

The Nachal Eitan (on Hilkhot Milah 1:1:1) addresses a critical implicit point in the Rambam's ruling: Does the father's mitzvah to circumcise his son continue beyond the eighth day if he failed to perform it then? The Rambam states, "מצוה על האב למול את בנו" – "A father is commanded to circumcise his son." This phrasing, being undated, suggests an ongoing obligation. The Nachal Eitan confirms this understanding, citing the Rambam himself in his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 19:5), as well as Rashi (Shabbat 131b) and Tosafot (Shabbat 131a), all of whom agree that the mitzvah is not nullified if its appointed time passes; rather, the very same mitzvah is performed later. The chiddush of the Nachal Eitan here is his robust defense against the Yad HaMelech's counter-argument. The Yad HaMelech contended that if the mitzvah could be performed later, it should not override Shabbat on the eighth day, drawing an analogy to the Omer offering (Menachot 72b) which, if cut during the day, is valid, yet is not cut on Shabbat if its appointed day falls then.

The Nachal Eitan refutes this analogy on several grounds:

1. Distinction from Korbanot: He argues, following the Sha'agat Aryeh (Responsum 52), that the Omer offering's rules are unique because it needs to be domia d'tamid (similar to the daily Tamid offering), which cannot be prepared on Erev Shabbat or delayed past Shabbat for its specific time. Milah, however, does not require this stringent analogy. It overrides Shabbat on the eighth day because that is "בזמנו כמצותו" (in its proper time, as its mitzvah), even if b'dieved it would be valid later. The mitzvah is to perform it on the eighth day.
2. Rambam's Consistent View: He notes that the Rambam himself, in Hilkhot Temidim u'Musafim, rules that the Omer overrides Shabbat even if it could be cut after Shabbat, indicating that the Gemara's reasoning in Menachot 72b is not universally accepted by the Rambam.
3. "Zrizin Makdimin" Principle: Even for a mitzvah not tied to a specific time, the Rashba (on Shabbat 2:2) in the name of the Ramban rules that one should perform it immediately, even if it means overriding a lav, rather than delaying it. How much more so for milah, which does have a primary appointed time, should one perform it then, even overriding Shabbat. The Nachal Eitan thus affirms that the father's mitzvah is indeed ongoing, but the Shabbat override on the eighth day is due to the unique virtue and primary obligation of milah b'zmanah.

Sha'ar HaMelekh: Slave's Obligation and Gezeirah Shavah

The Sha'ar HaMelekh (on Hilkhot Milah 1:1:1) delves into the question of whether a slave is obligated to circumcise his own son, a point not explicitly stated by the Rambam but crucial for understanding the scope of the father's mitzvah. The Gemara in Kiddushin 29a derives that a woman is exempt from circumcising her son from the verse "כאשר צוה אותו" (as He commanded him), implying him (the father) and not her. The Sha'ar HaMelekh then considers if a slave is similarly exempt. He argues that slaves are generally compared to women via the gezeirah shavah of "לה לה" (from the word "לה" in various verses, as in Chagigah 4a), meaning they are obligated in mitzvot asseh shelo hazman grama (time-bound positive commandments) but exempt from mitzvot asseh shehazman grama (time-bound positive commandments). The mitzvah of milah has a time-bound aspect (the eighth day, and only during the day).

However, Tosafot in Bava Kamma 88a (s.v. יהא עבד כשר לעדות) suggests that this gezeirah shavah of "לה לה" applies only to impose stringencies on a slave (making him like a Jew in certain mitzvot), but not to grant leniencies (exempting him from mitzvot like a woman). The Sha'ar HaMelekh finds this Tosafot difficult, as it contradicts other Gemarot (e.g., Chagigah 4a) where the gezeirah shavah does exempt a slave.

The Sha'ar HaMelekh then offers a profound solution by citing his teacher, the author of Batei Kehunah. This solution hinges on the nature of mitzvot asseh shehazman grama. The Tosafot in Kiddushin 29a (s.v. אותו ולא אותה) asked why a specific verse is needed to exempt women from milah; it should be obvious since it's a mitzvat asseh shehazman grama (only on the 8th day, only by day). Tosafot answers that this is only true if one holds that milah not b'zmanah (after the eighth day) is also only by day. If milah not b'zmanah could be done at night, then it wouldn't be a mitzvat asseh shehazman grama (as there's no continuous "time" restriction), thus requiring a verse to exempt women. Since the Rambam (in Hilkhot Milah 1:8) rules that milah, even shelo b'zmanah, is only performed by day, it indeed remains a mitzvat asseh shehazman grama. Therefore, by general rule, women are exempt. The chiddush of the Sha'ar HaMelekh, building on Batei Kehunah, is that the "לה לה" gezeirah shavah does apply to mitzvot asseh shehazman grama, exempting slaves alongside women. For mitzvot asseh shelo hazman grama, however, if women are exempt by a gezeirat HaKatuv (Torah decree) and not because it's time-bound, the analogy to slaves does not necessarily apply to exempt them. This sophisticated analysis clarifies the Rambam's unstated position on a slave's personal obligation to circumcise his son.

Friction

A perennial point of friction in the sugya of milah concerns the interplay of its fixed timing, the Shabbat override, and the ongoing nature of the mitzvah.

The Strongest Kushya: Why Override Shabbat?

The kushya arises from the Rambam's statements in Hilkhot Milah 1:1, 1:2, and 1:9. Halakha 1 establishes the father's obligation to circumcise his son. Halakha 2 states that if the father fails to do so, beit din must circumcise the child "בזמנו" (at its proper time). Halakha 9 declares, "מילת זכרים בזמנה דוחה את השבת" (The circumcision of males at its proper time overrides the Sabbath).

The friction point is evident: If the father's mitzvah is not entirely lost after the eighth day, and beit din can perform it later if necessary, why is it permitted to violate Shabbat to perform milah on the eighth day? The Gemara in Menachot 72b, regarding the Omer offering, grapples with a similar question: If the Omer can be cut during the day (meaning it's valid if delayed), why does it override Shabbat if the 16th of Nisan falls on Shabbat? The Gemara suggests that it's because the Omer must be domia d'tamid (analogous to the daily Tamid offering), which cannot be prepared on Erev Shabbat or delayed. The kushya is, if milah can be done later, why isn't it likewise delayed to avoid Shabbat violation? This question is sharply raised by the Yad HaMelech (cited by Nachal Eitan on Hilkhot Milah 1:1), who argues that the father's mitzvah should only be on the eighth day, precisely because of the Shabbat override. If it extends beyond the eighth day, it would seem to undermine the rationale for overriding Shabbat.

The Best Terutz: "B'Zmano K'Mitzvato" and "Zrizin Makdimin"

The Nachal Eitan (on Hilkhot Milah 1:1) provides a multi-pronged terutz that beautifully resolves this tension, drawing heavily from other Rishonim:

1. "בזמנו כמצותו" - In its Proper Time, as its Mitzvah: The primary and most perfect fulfillment of the mitzvah of milah is specifically on the eighth day. While b'dieved (post-facto) milah performed after the eighth day is valid and fulfills the mitzvah, l'chatchila (ideally) the Torah mandates its performance on the eighth day. The Gemara in Shabbat 132a derives from the verse "ביום השמיני ימול בשר ערלתו" (Vayikra 12:3) that this is an overriding decree, applying even on Shabbat. The Chiddush is that the Shabbat override is not because it cannot be done later, but because the Torah specifically chose the eighth day as the optimal time, and this choice is so significant that it displaces Shabbat prohibitions. The Omer analogy is distinct because its specific halakhot mandate domia d'tamid, a condition not applied to milah.

2. "זריזין מקדימין למצוות" - The Eager Perform Mitzvot Early: This well-known principle (derived from Avraham's alacrity with the Akedah, Pesachim 4a) dictates that when one has an opportunity to perform a mitzvah, one should do so immediately, without delay. Even if the mitzvah can be performed at a later time without chillul Shabbat, the ideal is to perform it at the earliest possible moment, especially when that moment is the mitzvah's designated time. The Rashba (on Shabbat 2:2, in the name of the Ramban) rules that this principle even allows overriding a lav (negative commandment) to perform a mitzvah immediately, even if it could be done later without violating the lav. Therefore, for milah, which has a specific designated time (the 8th day), this principle strongly supports performing it then, even on Shabbat. The ability to perform it later b'dieved does not diminish the obligation and preference for its timely l'chatchila performance.

This dual terutz framework allows the Rambam's seemingly contradictory statements to cohere. The father's obligation is ongoing until the mitzvah is fulfilled, but the mitzvah's unique b'zmanah aspect on the eighth day confers upon it the power to override Shabbat.

Intertext

The Rambam's Hilkhot Milah is deeply rooted in both Tanakh and Chazal, and its principles echo through later halakhic discourse.

Bereishit 17: The Covenantal Imperative

The primary biblical source for milah is Bereishit Chapter 17, where God commands Avraham concerning the covenant: "זאת בריתי אשר תשמרו ביני וביניכם ובין זרעך אחריך, המול לכם כל זכר...ונכרתה הנפש ההוא מעמיה את בריתי הפר" (Bereishit 17:10, 14). This passage is foundational for several halakhot in Rambam's chapter:

• The positive commandment of milah itself.
• The karet penalty for the uncircumcised individual, explicitly cited by the Rambam in Hilkhot Milah 1:1.
• The universal obligation for "כל זכר" (every male) in Avraham's household, which the Rambam extends to slaves (1:1, 1:3).
• The concept of milah as a "covenant" (brit), informing the practice of hatafat dam brit for those already circumcised (1:7).

While Bereishit sets the stage, Vayikra 12:3 provides the specific timing: "וביום השמיני ימול בשר ערלתו" (On the eighth day, the flesh of his foreskin shall be circumcised). This verse is critical for the Shabbat override (1:9) and the specific enumeration of cases where milah is delayed from the eighth day (1:11-14).

Minchat Chinuch and Likkutei Sichot: The Father's Enduring Mitzvah and the Bracha

The nature and extent of the father's obligation are further explored by later authorities. The Minchat Chinuch (Mitzvah 2) questions whether the father's responsibility persists if he fails to circumcise his son before the son reaches bar mitzvah. Once the son is an adult, he is certainly obligated himself. Does the father also remain obligated, perhaps for a bitul mitzvah that continues, or is the son now solely responsible? This is a nafka mina of the Rambam's phrasing in 1:1 ("מצוה על האב למול את בנו") and 1:2 ("אם עבר האב... ביטל מצות עשה").

The Likkutei Sichot (Vol. 11, Parashat Tazria) ties this discussion to the appropriate bracha recited by the mohel. The Rambam, in Hilkhot Berakhot 11:11, distinguishes between a bracha for a mitzvah performed by oneself (e.g., "אשר קדשנו במצוותיו וציוונו למול") and one performed for another ("...וציוונו על המילה"). The Rambam in Hilkhot Milah 3:1 states that the father recites "למול," implying the mitzvah is primarily his. However, in Hilkhot Pidyon HaBen 11:5, for pidyon ha'ben, the father recites "על פדיון הבן," implying the mitzvah is the son's, and the father is merely an agent. The Likkutei Sichot argues that this apparent contradiction in the Rambam (noted by the Rashba Responsum 131) points to a deeper understanding of the father's milah obligation: it is so integral to the father himself that he recites the bracha as if performing it on himself. This reinforces the Nachal Eitan's point that the father's obligation is not merely a temporary agency for the child but a personal chiyuv to bring his son into the covenant. The Minchat Chinuch's question thus probes the very essence of this father-son mitzvah dynamic within the broader halakhic framework.

Psak/Practice

The Rambam's rulings in Hilkhot Milah 1 form the bedrock of halakhic practice regarding circumcision, with broad acceptance across communities.

Universal Principles

The core tenets articulated by the Rambam are universally observed:

• The obligation of milah on the eighth day (Yoreh De'ah 262:1).
• The father's primary responsibility, followed by beit din and the individual himself (YD 260:1, Aruch HaShulchan, YD 260:4).
• The overriding of Shabbat for milah b'zmanah (on the eighth day) (YD 266:1).
• The absolute precedence of pikuach nefesh (danger to life) over milah, mandating delay for sick infants (YD 262:2-3). This is a meta-psak heuristic that pervades all areas of halakha.
• The requirement of hatafat dam brit for converts already circumcised or for babies born without a foreskin (YD 268:1, 263:4).

Evolving Practice: Eighth-Month Babies

One notable area where psak has diverged from the Gemara's literal statements, as presented by the Rambam in Hilkhot Milah 1:12-13, concerns infants born in the eighth month of gestation. The Gemara (Shabbat 135a, Yevamot 80b) and Rambam rule that such a child is considered nefel (a stillborn or non-viable fetus) unless their hair and nails are fully formed, or they survive 30 days. Consequently, their milah would not override Shabbat.

However, as early as Tosafot (Shabbat 135a s.v. בן שמונה), it is noted that "אין אנו בקיאים" (we are not experts) in distinguishing between seven and eight-month babies, nor in discerning the maturity of hair and nails in premature infants. Therefore, the psak in the Shulchan Aruch (YD 266:11) reflects this uncertainty, effectively treating all premature babies as potentially viable (like seven-month babies) and allowing their milah on Shabbat if the eighth day falls then, unless there is a specific medical concern. Modern medicine further supports this, as the viability of premature infants has dramatically increased, rendering the ancient criteria for "eighth-month babies" obsolete for halakhic pikuach nefesh considerations. Today, any medical condition that might endanger the child leads to a delay in milah, regardless of gestational age, underscoring the universal principle that pikuach nefesh doche et hakol (saving a life overrides everything).

Takeaway

The Rambam's exposition of milah reveals a mitzvah deeply embedded in covenantal theology, yet meticulously detailed in its practical application, navigating individual, communal, and medical considerations. It stands as a prime example of how halakha balances divine command with human well-being, consistently prioritizing life above all.

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¹ Hilkhot Milah 1:1. ² Bereishit 17:14. ³ Hilkhot Milah 1:1. ⁴ Hilkhot Milah 1:2. ⁵ Hilkhot Milah 1:2. ⁶ Hilkhot Milah 1:9. ⁷ Nachal Eitan on Hilkhot Milah 1:1:1. ⁸ Shabbat 131b, Rashi s.v. דאפשר למיעבד. ⁹ Nachal Eitan on Hilkhot Milah 1:1:1, citing Sha'agat Aryeh Responsum 52. ¹⁰ Menachot 72b. ¹¹ Nachal Eitan on Hilkhot Milah 1:1:1. ¹² Shabbat 132a. ¹³ Pesachim 4a, Bereishit 22:3. ¹⁴ Rashba on Shabbat 2:2, in the name of Ramban. ¹⁵ Bereishit 17:10, 14. ¹⁶ Vayikra 12:3. ¹⁷ Hilkhot Milah 1:1, 1:3, 1:7. ¹⁸ Minchat Chinuch Mitzvah 2. ¹⁹ Likkutei Sichot Vol. 11, Parashat Tazria. ²⁰ Hilkhot Berakhot 11:11. ²¹ Hilkhot Pidyon HaBen 11:5. ²² Rashba Responsum 131. ²³ Yoreh De'ah 262:1. ²⁴ Yoreh De'ah 260:1; Aruch HaShulchan, Yoreh De'ah 260:4. ²⁵ Yoreh De'ah 266:1. ²⁶ Yoreh De'ah 262:2-3. ²⁷ Yoreh De'ah 268:1, 263:4. ²⁸ Shabbat 135a, Yevamot 80b. ²⁹ Hilkhot Milah 1:12-13. ³⁰ Tosafot on Shabbat 135a s.v. בן שמונה. ³¹ Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De'ah 266:11.