Mishneh Torah, Circumcision 2-3

Sugya Map

• Issue: Definition of a kasher (valid) mohel (circumciser) and the essential components for a valid milah (circumcision), their performance on Shabbat/Yom Tov, and accompanying berachot (blessings).
• Nafka Mina(s):
  • Whether milah performed by an otherwise pasul (invalid) individual (e.g., goy) is valid b'dieved (post-facto).
  • The precise definition and necessity of pri'ah and metzitzah.
  • The permissibility of various actions and preparations on Shabbat and Yom Tov for milah.
  • The correct formulation of berachot for different contexts (father/other mohel, convert/slave).
• Primary Sources:
  • Rambam, Hilchot Milah 2:1-3:13
  • Avodah Zarah 27a (woman/gentile mohel)
  • Shabbat 137b, Yevamot 71b (pri'ah, tzitzim)
  • Pesachim 92a, Hilchot Shabbat 21:1, 21:26, 6:9, 23:11 (Shabbat/Yom Tov milah and preparations)
  • Genesis 17:1-21 (covenant of milah)
  • Exodus 4:24-26 (Tziporah's milah)
  • Rambam, Hilchot Berachot 11:11-13, 11:16 (formulation of berachot)
  • Rambam, Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 10:1-2 (healing a goy)
  • Rambam, Hilchot Melachim 10:10 (goy fulfilling mitzvot)

Text Snapshot

The Rambam opens Hilchot Milah Chapter 2 by delineating who may perform milah:

הַכֹּל כְּשֵׁרִין לָמוּל. וְאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁמִּצְוָה עַל הָאָב לָמוּל אֶת בְּנוֹ אִם לֹא מָל הָאָב בָּא אַחֵר וּמָל. וַאֲפִלּוּ מִי שֶׁהוּא עָרֵל בְּעַצְמוֹ וְעֶבֶד וְאִשָּׁה וְקָטָן מוֹלִין אִם לֹא נִמְצָא אִישׁ גָּדוֹל. אֲבָל עַכּוּ"ם לֹא יָמוּל כְּלָל. וְאִם מָל אֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ מִילָה שְׁנִיָּה. All are qualified to circumcise. And even though a father is commanded to circumcise his son, if the father does not circumcise, another comes and circumcises. And even one who is himself uncircumcised, a slave, a woman, or a minor may circumcise if an adult male is not present. A gentile, however, should not circumcise at all. But if he did circumcise, a second circumcision is not necessary. (Mishneh Torah, Circumcision 2:1)

The nuance of "כלל" (at all) in reference to a goy is striking, especially when immediately followed by the b'dieved validation. This tension is central. The Rambam then defines the three essential steps:

כֵּיצַד הִיא הַמִּילָה. קוֹצֵץ אֶת הָעוֹר הַמּוֹנֵעַ כִּפַּת הָעֲטָרָה כֻּלָּהּ עַד שֶׁתִּגָּלֶה הָעֲטָרָה כֻּלָּהּ. וְאַחַר כָּךְ פּוֹרֵעַ אֶת הַקְּרוּמִית הָרַכָּה שֶׁמִּתַּחַת לָעוֹר וּמַחֲזִירָהּ לְכָאן וּלְכָאן עַד שֶׁיִּגָּלֶה בְּשַׂר הָעֲטָרָה כֻּלּוֹ. וְאַחַר כָּךְ מֵצֵץ אֶת מְקוֹם הַמִּילָה עַד שֶׁיָּצִיץ הַדָּם מֵרָחוֹק שֶׁמָּא תָּבֹא לִידֵי סַכָּנָה. How is circumcision performed? He cuts off the skin that covers the entire corona of the glans until the entire glans is revealed. And afterwards, he tears the soft membrane that is beneath the skin and folds it back to either side until the entire flesh of the glans is revealed. And afterwards, he sucks the place of the circumcision until the blood comes forth from afar, lest a dangerous situation arise. (Mishneh Torah, Circumcision 2:2)

The explicit inclusion of pri'ah and metzitzah as integral to the milah process, particularly the halachah leMoshe miSinai status of pri'ah (3:7), underscores their critical role beyond mere medical procedure.

Readings

Kessef Mishneh on Milah Lishmah

The Kessef Mishneh (Rabbi Yosef Karo) addresses the Rambam's seemingly paradoxical ruling in Hilchot Milah 2:1:2 concerning a goy who performs milah. The Sefaria footnote attributes to the Kessef Mishneh the explanation that the Rambam's decision "revolves upon whether or not circumcision must be carried out lishmah, for the sake of the fulfillment of the mitzvah." This implies that for a goy, milah lishmah is not possible, hence he should not circumcise. However, if the physical act of cutting the foreskin is performed, the giyur is valid b'dieved because the cheftza (the state of being circumcised) is achieved, even without the kavannah (intent) that a Jew would bring to the mitzvah. This reading suggests a distinction between the mitzvah of milah (the ma'aseh with kavannah) and the cheftza of milah (the physical state of being circumcised). For the Rambam, the lack of lishmah by a goy renders the act undesirable l'chatchila (ab initio), but does not invalidate the physical change b'dieved.

Sha'agat Aryeh on Tzitzim She'eino Me'akev

The Sha'agat Aryeh (Responsum 50) grapples with Rambam's ruling in Hilchot Milah 2:3:6, which states that if one has interrupted the milah procedure, one must return to remove tzitzim ha'me'akvim (disqualifying remnants) but does not return to remove tzitzim she'eino me'akev (non-disqualifying remnants). The Sha'agat Aryeh finds this problematic, particularly the notion of not returning to remove non-disqualifying tzitzim. He questions why the Rambam would forbid perfecting the mitzvah if it's not a me'akev issue. He suggests that perhaps the Rambam means it is merely not required, not forbidden. The Sefaria footnote offers an explanation from the Merkevet HaMishneh: "since the circumcision is acceptable, it is forbidden to expose the child to further pain." This interpretation clarifies the Rambam's stance as prioritizing minimizing pain once the minimum halachic requirement is met. However, the Sha'agat Aryeh (as implied by his questioning and the Rama's subsequent ruling) still finds the concept challenging, as chazal generally encourage hiddur mitzvah (beautifying a mitzvah).

Ohr Sameach on Pasul vs. Kasher and Shabbat

The Ohr Sameach (Rabbi Meir Simcha of Dvinsk) on Hilchot Milah 2:1:1 delves into a complex safek (doubt) regarding milah on Shabbat when a kasher mohel cannot perform the entire milah, but a pasul (e.g., a goy or arel) can. He asks:

נסתפקתי במילה בזמנה ויש כשר גם פסול שהפסול יכול למול [כמו עו"ג או מומר לערלות] והכשר אינו יכול למול רק גמר המילה יכול גם הכשר, מי אמרינן שהפסול יתחיל והכשר יגמור או דילמא דבעינן שיתקיים מצות מילה בכללה, ולכן לא נימול אותו עד שיבוא כשר, שיכול למול לבדו, וה"ה שלא בזמנו מספקא לי' דחזינא דכל זמן שנשארו ציצין המעכבים חוזר בשבת אף אם פירש א"כ חזינא דעיקרא דמילתא תלוי בגמר המילה, וכן מצאנו להרשב"א הובא בשו"ע סימן רס"ד בנימול תוך ח' יגמור ישראל לח' עיי"ש ובודאי דדוחה שבת. I am in doubt regarding a circumcision on its proper time (Shabbat): if there is a qualified person and an unqualified person, where the unqualified person can circumcise (like a gentile or an apostate to uncircumcision), and the qualified person can only complete the circumcision, do we say that the unqualified person should begin and the qualified person should finish? Or perhaps we require that the mitzvah of circumcision be fulfilled in its entirety by a qualified person, and therefore we do not circumcise him until a qualified person arrives who can circumcise him alone? And similarly, even if it's not on its proper time, I am in doubt. For we see that as long as there are disqualifying tzitzim remaining, one returns on Shabbat even if one interrupted, which shows that the essence of the milah depends on its completion. And so we find in the Rashba, quoted in Shulchan Aruch Siman 264, regarding one circumcised within eight days, that an Israelite should complete it on the eighth day, and it certainly overrides Shabbat.

The Ohr Sameach initially leans towards allowing the pasul to start and kasher to finish, based on the principle that the completion is what defines the milah, similar to tzitzim. However, he then retracts, distinguishing between gmar milah (completing an already valid milah) and hatchalat milah (initiating milah). If the initial act is done by a pasul, it might not establish a valid milah to begin with. He compares it to shechita (ritual slaughter): if started by a goy, the animal is treifah (non-kosher), and a kasher cannot complete it. He concludes that initiating milah by a pasul is like hechsher mitzvah (preparatory act) that could have been done mei'erev Shabbat (before Shabbat) and thus would not override Shabbat. This lomdus highlights the distinction between a mitzvah act itself and its hechsherim, and the unique stringency of milah performed b'zmanah (at its proper time).

Yitzchak Yeranen on "כלל" and the Goy's Milah

Rabbi Yitzchak Meir Hagar, in his Yitzchak Yeranen commentary on Hilchot Milah 2:1:1, addresses two points. First, the Rambam's use of "כלל" ("at all") when prohibiting a goy from circumcising. He suggests this implies that no goy should circumcise, whether already circumcised (like an Arab or Bnei Ketura) or uncircumcised, or whether a Jew is present or not. The word emphasizes the absolute prohibition l'chatchila.

Second, on Hilchot Milah 2:1:2 ("if he does so, there is no need for a second circumcision"), the Yitzchak Yeranen challenges the Kessef Mishneh's explanation of milah lishmah. He argues that if lishmah is the issue, it implies the milah is invalid, in which case hatifat dam brit (drawing a drop of blood for the covenant) would be required, and the Rambam would surely mention it. He offers a novel terutz:

ולענ"ד נראה בדעת רבינו דפסק כמ"ד דמילת נכרי פסולה והיינו שהזהיר הכתוב שלא ימול גוי המל ימול או ואתה את בריתי תשמור למר כדאית ליה ולמר כדאית ליה ברם אי נעשית המצוה שהיא המילה אף דעבר האיסורא שהיא ע"י נכרי הוא איסור מבחוץ אבל עיקר מצות מילה הא נעשית ולא משום שעשה המצוה ע"י נכרי שהוא איסורא מבחוץ נאמר שלא תהא המצוה מצוה... In my humble opinion, it seems that the Rambam rules in accordance with the opinion that a gentile's circumcision is pasul. This means that the verse warned that a gentile should not circumcise – "He that is born in thy house... shall be circumcised" (Genesis 17:13) or "And as for you, you shall keep My covenant" (Genesis 17:9), each according to its interpretation. However, if the mitzvah, which is the milah, was performed, even though the prohibition of it being done by a gentile was transgressed, this is an "external prohibition" (איסור מבחוץ). But the essence of the mitzvah of milah was performed. And it is not because the mitzvah was performed by a gentile, which is an external prohibition, that we say the mitzvah is not a mitzvah.

He then cites Tosafot in Bechorot 34a, Temura 4b, and Chullin 115a, which discuss cases where an action is forbidden but still effective b'dieved if the cheftza (object/state) is achieved. For example, rendering a bechor (firstborn animal) with a mum (blemish) pasul for sacrifice is forbidden, but if done, it's released from its kedusha (sanctity). Similarly, here, the physical act of cutting the foreskin, which constitutes milah, was performed, even if the mohel was pasul. The Rambam views the issur as relating to the gabra (person) performing the act, not necessarily invalidating the cheftza (milah) itself.

Friction

The Enigma of the Gentile's Milah

The most pronounced friction in the Rambam's text appears in Hilchot Milah 2:1, where he states: "אֲבָל עַכּוּ"ם לֹא יָמוּל כְּלָל. וְאִם מָל אֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ מִילָה שְׁנִיָּה" — "A gentile, however, should not circumcise at all. But if he did circumcise, a second circumcision is not necessary." This juxtaposition presents a significant kushya: If a goy is so thoroughly pasul that he "should not circumcise at all," implying the act is fundamentally flawed or even forbidden, how can the resulting milah be valid b'dieved to the extent that "a second circumcision is not necessary"? This seems to contradict the very notion of a pasul act. Usually, if an act is forbidden and invalid l'chatchila, it is also invalid b'dieved.

The Yitzchak Yeranen's Resolution: Issur Gavra vs. Pesul Cheftza

The Yitzchak Yeranen (on Hilchot Milah 2:1:2), as detailed above, offers a compelling terutz rooted in a fundamental lomdus distinction: the difference between an issur (prohibition) relating to the gabra (the actor) and a pesul (invalidity) relating to the cheftza (the object or outcome of the act). He argues that the prohibition against a goy performing milah (לא ימול כלל) is an issur gabra – a prohibition on the goy himself from undertaking this sacred task, perhaps because it is the "covenant of Abraham" meant for Israel, or due to a lack of kavannah lishmah. However, this prohibition on the actor does not necessarily invalidate the act itself if the physical requirements of the milah (the cutting of the foreskin and revealing the atarah) are met.

To buttress this, he references several Tosafot passages:

1. Bechorot 34a, d.h. ומי קניס: Tosafot discusses the case of one who intentionally blemishes a bechor (firstborn animal). While it is forbidden to create a mum on a bechor, if one does so, the bechor becomes permitted to eat. The issur is on the ma'aseh of blemishing, but the cheftza (the animal now having a mum) is nonetheless effective in changing its status.
2. Temura 4b, d.h. ורבי יעקב: A similar principle is found regarding hekdesh (consecration). If one consecrates an animal al menat (on condition) that it be returned, and then returns it, the hekdesh is valid, even though the condition might be problematic. The act of hekdesh (the cheftza) is effective.
3. Chullin 115a, d.h. כל שתיעבתי: Here, Tosafot explains that mumim that disqualify an animal from being a sacrifice but allow it to be eaten are not considered to'evah (abomination) in themselves. The issur is only on causing the mum if done intentionally, not on the resulting state of the animal.

Applying this to milah, the Yitzchak Yeranen posits that the Torah's directive "המל ימול" (Genesis 17:13) or "ואתה את בריתי תשמור" (Genesis 17:9) establishes that the milah should be performed by a Jew. A goy performing it is a transgression of this external command. Yet, the physical act of "מילה" – the cutting of the foreskin – has occurred. Since the core physical definition of milah is met, the child is no longer considered arel (uncircumcised). The issur was on the goy (the gabra), but the milah (the cheftza) is valid. Therefore, no second milah is required, as the state of being circumcised has been achieved, even if not through the ideal actor.

This terutz beautifully reconciles the two parts of the Rambam's statement by distinguishing the halachic validity of the outcome from the permissibility of the actor's conduct, a classic lomdishe move often seen in analyzing issurim and kiyumei mitzvot.

Intertext

Tziporah's Milah and the Koach of a Woman

The Rambam's inclusion of a woman as a kasher mohel ("וְאִשָּׁה מוֹלִין") directly references the foundational narrative in Shemot 4:25: "וַתִּקַּח צִפֹּרָה צֹר וַתִּכְרֹת אֶת עָרְלַת בְּנָהּ וַתַּגַּע לְרַגְלָיו וַתֹּאמֶר כִּי חֲתַן דָּמִים אַתָּה לִי" ("Then Zipporah took a flint, and cut off the foreskin of her son, and cast it at his feet, and said, 'Surely a bridegroom of blood are you to me.'"). This verse is the subject of extensive discussion in Avodah Zarah 27a. R' Yehuda there states that a woman is pasul for milah, citing "ותקח צפורה צור ותכרות" and resolving it by saying "אתחלתא אתחולי הוא דאתחלא, אבל גמר לא גמרה" (she only started it, but didn't finish it). R' Yose, however, holds that a woman is kasher, stating "אשה כשירה למול" (a woman is fit to circumcise) and that "אשה הרי היא כמי שמלה" (a woman is considered as if she is circumcised). The Rambam, by listing "אשה" among the kasherim, clearly aligns with R' Yose's position, indicating that the act of milah is not exclusive to males, reinforcing the idea that the mitzvah is primarily about the physical transformation, not solely about the gabra. This also echoes Hilchot Berachot 11:13, where the Rambam discusses a woman reciting berachot for mitzvot she is obligated in, even for men.

Moshe's Delay and the Severity of Milah

In Hilchot Milah 3:11, the Rambam writes: "בֹּא וּרְאֵה כַּמָּה חֲמוּרָה מִצְוַת מִילָה שֶׁלֹּא נָתְנוּ לְמֹשֶׁה רַבֵּנוּ עָלָיו הַשָּׁלוֹם אַף שְׁעַת קַלָּה עַל יָדָהּ" ("Come and see how severe the mitzvah of circumcision is, that Moses our teacher, peace be upon him, was not granted even a temporary respite for it"). This refers to the narrative in Shemot 4:24-26, and its elaboration in Nedarim 32a. The Gemara there discusses how Moshe was attacked by an angel for delaying Eliezer's milah. This incident underscores the extreme urgency and importance of milah b'zmanah (at its appointed time, the eighth day). It highlights that even for a figure of Moshe Rabbeinu's stature, this mitzvah cannot be postponed, emphasizing its fundamental nature and the chiyuv (obligation) it places upon Israel. This midrash serves as a powerful meta-halachic statement on the chumra (stringency) of milah.

Milah on Shabbat and the Scope of Dechiyah

Rambam's discussion in Hilchot Milah 3:7-10 regarding milah on Shabbat and Yom Tov connects directly to his broader Hilchot Shabbat and Hilchot Yom Tov. For instance, Hilchot Milah 3:7 states: "כָּל דָּבָר שֶׁהוּא מִצְוַת מִילָה עַצְמָהּ דּוֹחֶה אֶת הַשַּׁבָּת" ("Everything that is necessary for the circumcision itself overrides the Sabbath"). This includes milah, pri'ah, and metzitzah. However, Hilchot Milah 3:8 clarifies that "הֲכָנַת דְּבָרִים שֶׁצְּרִיכִים לַמִּילָה אֵינָהּ דּוֹחָה אֶת הַשַּׁבָּת" ("The preparation of articles that are necessary for the circumcision does not supersede the prohibitions against labor on the Sabbath"). The rationale, as explained in Kiryat Sefer (footnote to 3:8), is that only the mitzvah act itself, which cannot be done earlier, overrides Shabbat. Preparatory acts (hechsher mitzvah) that could have been done on Friday do not. This distinction is consistent with Rambam's general framework in Hilchot Shabbat (e.g., 23:11 regarding healing on Shabbat, or 6:9 regarding carrying shofar on Rosh Hashanah). The allowance to instruct a goy to perform a shvut for a mitzvah (3:10) further illustrates the nuanced interaction between mitzvot and Rabbinic decrees on Shabbat, as detailed in Hilchot Shabbat 21:1.

Psak/Practice

The Rambam's rulings, while foundational, are often contrasted with the Rama's (R' Moshe Isserles) positions in Yoreh De'ah, which frequently reflect Ashkenazi practice.

1. Gentile's Milah and Dam Brit: While the Rambam is silent on dam brit after a goy's milah (2:1:2), the Rama (Yoreh De'ah 264:1) rules that although a second milah is not required, "דם ברית צריך להטיף" (a drop of blood of the covenant must be extracted). This is the accepted practice today, even for those who follow the Rambam on the underlying validity. This psak resolves the Kessef Mishneh's difficulty that if the milah is kasher, why would dam brit be needed? The Rama's approach suggests that while the physical milah is achieved, the spiritual aspect of "covenant" might still be lacking, necessitating the hatifah.

2. Removing Tzitzim She'eino Me'akev: The Rambam (2:3:6) rules that if one interrupted, one does not return to remove non-disqualifying tzitzim. The Rama (Yoreh De'ah 264:5), however, states that "אם נעשה בחול, חוזר וחותכו" (if it was performed on a weekday, one returns and cuts it). This means l'chatchila, we do perfect the milah even if the remaining tzitzim are not me'akev. On Shabbat, however, even the Rama would agree with the Rambam that it's forbidden, as the milah is already valid and no further melacha is permitted (Rambam 3:7, footnote 4).

3. Blessing Formulation: The Rambam (3:1) distinguishes between the mohel circumcising his own son ("...למול את הבן") and another's son ("...על המילה"). The Rama (Yoreh De'ah 265:2) states that "המנהג לברך על המילה בין על בנו בין על בן חבירו" (the custom is to recite "...על המילה" whether for one's own son or another's). This unified bracha is the prevalent practice.

These divergences highlight the ongoing dialogue in halachah and the development of accepted practice, often synthesizing or preferring alternative opinions to the Rambam.

Takeaway

The Rambam meticulously dissects the mitzvah of milah, revealing its multi-layered nature where the physical act's validity can be disentangled from the actor's ideal qualification, while simultaneously emphasizing the mitzvah's profound spiritual significance and uncompromising urgency.