Mishneh Torah, Circumcision 2-3

Hook

You might think brit milah is all about who does the cutting, but the Rambam reveals a deeper, sometimes counterintuitive, reality: the act of circumcision can be valid even when performed by someone explicitly forbidden to do it.

Context

The Mishneh Torah is Maimonides' magnum opus, a comprehensive and systematically organized code of Jewish law. Unlike the Talmud, which presents debates and multiple opinions, the Rambam generally states the final halakha (Jewish law). However, as we'll see, the terse nature of his rulings often necessitates a deeper dive into the underlying debates and principles that inform his conclusions. This allows us to appreciate the intellectual rigor and the centuries of legal discourse that precede and follow his work. One such crucial element in brit milah is pri'ah, the peeling back of the inner membrane. While the milah (the cut) is explicitly commanded in the Torah, pri'ah is understood as halakha l'Moshe miSinai – a law given to Moses at Sinai, indicating its ancient and indispensable status despite not being explicitly written in the Pentateuch. This dual nature underscores the blend of biblical and oral tradition woven into the fabric of this fundamental mitzvah.

Text Snapshot

Mishneh Torah, Circumcision 2-3 (https://www.sefaria.org/Mishneh_Torah%2C_Circumcision_2-3):

Circumcision may be performed by anyone. Even a person who is himself not circumcised, a slave, a woman, or a minor may perform the circumcision, if an adult male is not present. A gentile, however, should not be allowed to perform the circumcision at all. Nevertheless, if he does so, there is no need for a second circumcision. (MT, Circumcision 2:1)

How is the circumcision performed? The foreskin that covers the crown of the penis is cut off until the entire crown is revealed. [This step is referred to as milah.] Afterwards, the soft membrane that is beneath the skin should be split along the mid-line with one's nails and peeled back to either side until the flesh of the crown is revealed. [This step is referred to as pri'ah.] (MT, Circumcision 2:2)

When one performs a circumcision without performing pri'ah, it is considered as if the circumcision was not performed. (MT, Circumcision 2:7)

Close Reading

Insight 1: Structure – The Order of Perfection

The Rambam, true to his encyclopedic style, begins his treatment of brit milah with a precise, almost surgical, delineation of who can perform the mitzvah, what tools are used, and the exact steps. He starts with the broadest category – "Circumcision may be performed by anyone" (MT 2:1) – then progressively narrows the scope, introducing exceptions and preferred practices. He lists those who can perform it (uncircumcised Jew, slave, woman, minor), then those who cannot (gentile), before moving to the ideal tools (iron knife). Only after establishing these external parameters does he dive into the internal mechanics: the three essential steps of milah, pri'ah, and metzitzah (MT 2:2-3). This structured approach reflects a legal mind seeking to first define the boundaries of the act, then its components, and finally its ideal performance and philosophical underpinnings. The progression from agent to tool to procedure to consequences (e.g., tzitzim, Shabbat laws, blessings) demonstrates a clear hierarchy and logical flow, moving from the general permissibility to the specific requirements for an optimal and valid brit. This systematic ordering allows for a comprehensive understanding, ensuring no aspect of the mitzvah is left to ambiguity, even as the details themselves spark profound interpretive debates among later commentators.

Insight 2: Key Term – "כלל" (At All)

The Rambam's use of the word "כלל" (klal, "at all") in the phrase "גוי, לא ימול כלל" (a gentile, however, should not be allowed to perform the circumcision at all) is particularly potent. It signifies an absolute, unequivocal prohibition. It's not merely l'chatchila (ideally not), but b'dieved (after the fact) is still undesirable. Yitzchak Yeranen (on MT, Circumcision 2:1:1) picks up on this, arguing that "כלל" comes to emphasize that any gentile, whether already circumcised (like some Arabs, historically) or uncircumcised, is excluded from performing the mitzvah. This broad exclusion underscores the unique status of brit milah as an identifying mark of the Jewish people, a covenantal sign that cannot be properly administered by an outsider. The gentile's lack of covenantal connection to the mitzvah means their involvement is inherently problematic. This isn't just about their physical capability, but their spiritual and covenantal standing in relation to the mitzvah itself. The strength of this prohibition sets up a significant tension, as we’ll explore next, between the act and the actor. The "כלל" pushes us to ask: if the prohibition is so absolute, how can the outcome still be considered valid?

Insight 3: Tension – The Valid but Forbidden Act

The most striking tension arises from the juxtaposition of two sentences in MT 2:1: "A gentile, however, should not be allowed to perform the circumcision at all. Nevertheless, if he does so, there is no need for a second circumcision." This creates a paradox: an act that is "not allowed at all" (a strong issur, prohibition) can still be considered valid ex post facto (after the fact). The commentaries grapple with why this is the case. The Sefaria footnote 8 points to a fundamental conceptual divide: is milah about (a) the mitzvah of cutting, or (b) the effect of being circumcised?

The Kessef Mishneh (quoted by Yitzchak Yeranen on MT, Circumcision 2:1:2) suggests that milah does not require lishma – "for the sake of the mitzvah." If the mitzvah doesn't necessitate specific intent, then the physical act of removing the foreskin, regardless of the actor's intent or religious status, fulfills the physical requirement. The child is circumcised.

However, Yitzchak Yeranen himself challenges this explanation. He argues that even if an act is performed in a prohibited manner (e.g., by a gentile), if the substance of the act is achieved, it can still be considered valid. He draws parallels from other areas of halakha, like Bechorot 34a regarding a firstborn animal with a blemish. Even if one causes a blemish (which is forbidden), the animal is still considered blemished and thus permitted for secular use, because the effect of the blemish is present. Similarly, with milah, the physical removal of the foreskin is what constitutes the milah, even if the gentile performing it transgressed by doing so. The prohibition is on the actor (an issur gavra), not necessarily on the validity of the act itself (an issur cheftza). This distinction highlights a profound tension between the ideal performance of a mitzvah and the essential components required for its basic fulfillment. The Rambam's concise wording forces us to consider the core definition of milah – is it the sacred act performed by a Jew, or the resultant state of being circumcised?

Two Angles

The tension surrounding the gentile's circumcision and its validity gives rise to fascinating interpretive approaches, particularly concerning the concept of lishma (for the sake of the mitzvah).

Kessef Mishneh's Perspective on Lishma

As noted by Yitzchak Yeranen (on MT, Circumcision 2:1:2), the Kessef Mishneh explains the Rambam's ruling by suggesting that the mitzvah of milah does not require lishma. According to this view, the critical factor is the physical removal of the foreskin. Since the mitzvah is primarily defined by this physical transformation, the intent or religious identity of the one performing the act is secondary to its objective fulfillment. If the foreskin is removed, the child is considered circumcised, regardless of whether the gentile performing the act intended it specifically as a Jewish mitzvah. The prohibition against a gentile performing milah would then be a concern l'chatchila (ideally), but once the physical act is completed, the b'dieved (after the fact) outcome is valid because lishma isn't a prerequisite.

Yitzchak Yeranen's "Act vs. Actor" Analysis

Yitzchak Yeranen vehemently disagrees with the Kessef Mishneh's explanation regarding lishma for a gentile's circumcision. Instead, he posits a distinction between the issur (prohibition) on the actor and the validity of the act. He argues that the Torah's command "The circumciser shall circumcise" (or similar phrases in Parshat Lech Lecha) prohibits a gentile from performing milah. However, this prohibition is directed at the gentile person (an issur gavra), making their act of circumcision forbidden for them to perform. But if they do perform it, the physical outcome – the removal of the foreskin – is achieved. He draws an analogy from Tosafot (e.g., Bechorot 34a), which states that even if one causes a blemish on a firstborn animal (a forbidden act), the animal is still considered blemished and therefore permitted for use. The act of blemishing is forbidden, but the fact of the blemish means the status changes. Similarly, a gentile performs a forbidden act, but the milah itself is done. Therefore, no second circumcision is needed, not because milah lacks lishma, but because the essential act has been completed, despite the issur on the agent.

Practice Implication

The Rambam's detailed description of the steps of milah – milah, pri'ah, and metzitzah – and his strong emphasis on the necessity of metzitzah (MT 2:3:7: "Any [mohel] who does not perform metzitzah should be removed from his position, because of the danger to which he exposes the children") has a profound implication for contemporary practice. Metzitzah traditionally involved the mohel orally drawing blood from the wound. While the Rambam's ruling highlights the importance of this step for health (preventing dangerous internal bleeding), modern medical understanding has introduced concerns about disease transmission. This led to a halakhic evolution: the use of a pipette for metzitzah b'peh (oral suction) or a mechanical device for metzitzah has become widely accepted. This demonstrates a crucial principle in halakha: while the substance of the mitzvah (the extraction of blood to prevent danger) remains constant, the method can adapt in light of new knowledge and medical advancements, especially when human life and health are at stake. It means that the spirit of the law, focused on safety and effective completion of the mitzvah, guides practical decision-making in a dynamic world.

Chevruta Mini

1. The Rambam states that a gentile should "not be allowed to perform the circumcision at all," yet if they do, no second circumcision is needed. This implies the act is valid, even if forbidden for the actor. What tension does this create regarding the spiritual significance of brit milah? Is a milah performed by a gentile considered equally "covenantal" as one performed by a qualified Jew, or is there a qualitative difference even if a second cut isn't required? What are the tradeoffs between ensuring the physical act is done versus ensuring the spiritual ideal of the mitzvah is met?
2. Regarding a tzitz (small remnant of foreskin) that "does not disqualify the circumcision," the Rambam states that one should not return to remove it once the activity has been interrupted (MT 2:4). However, the Rama (quoted in Sefaria footnote 6) rules that if it's during the week, one should remove it. What considerations might lead to these differing opinions? What are the tradeoffs between avoiding additional pain or risk to the child versus striving for the most complete and aesthetically perfect milah possible?

Takeaway

Brit Milah is a multi-layered mitzvah where the physical act, the spiritual intention, and the agent's identity all intersect in complex ways to define its validity and ideal performance, often balancing strict adherence with practical considerations for health and well-being.