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Mishneh Torah, Sacrificial Procedure 13-15
Sugya Map
The complex legal matrices of Hilchot Ma'aseh HaKorbanot (Sacrificial Procedure) Chapters 13–15 serve as the primary locus for exploring how physical substances, verbal declarations, and psychological intent intersect to generate, partition, or restrict sanctity (kedushah). To navigate this landscape, we map the core conceptual issues, their practical ramifications (nafka minot), and the primary sources upon which they rest:
[MISHNEH TORAH: MA'ASEH HAKORBANOT 13-15]
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[CHAPTER 13: THE CHEFTZA] [CHAPTER 14: THE GAVRA] [CHAPTER 15: THE FRACTION]
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• Petisah & Kemitzah: • Neder vs. Nedavah: • Partitioned Sanctity:
Ritual vs. Utility Personal vs. Objective Limbs & Temporal Limits
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• Nafka Mina: • Nafka Mina: • Nafka Mina:
Does omission Liability for loss/theft; Status of animal;
invalidate di'avad? coercive enforcement. validity of Temurah.
The Ontology of the Meal-Offering (Cheftza vs. Pe'ulah)
- The Issue: Is the preparation of the menachah—specifically the division of the Chavitin into twelve loaves, the scalding (chalitah), and the breaking (petisah)—a series of independent, formal ritual acts (avodot), or are they merely functional, preparatory steps designed to produce a valid offering (tikkun cheftza)?
- The Nafka Mina: If these processes are skipped or altered (e.g., if the loaves are not broken or if the oil is not mixed in), is the offering disqualified di'avad (post facto), or is it valid because the physical substance (eshel) of the flour and oil remains intact?
- Primary Sources: Leviticus 2:1-16, Leviticus 6:12-16, Menachot 18a[^1], Menachot 76a[^2].
The Metaphysics of Obligation (Neder vs. Nedavah)
- The Issue: How do verbal designations map onto the human subject (gavra) versus the sacrificial object (cheftza)? A vow (neder) creates a personal obligation (חיוב גברא), while a pledge (nedavah) directly consecrates the physical animal (קדושת הגוף).
- The Nafka Mina:
- Who bears the loss if the designated animal is stolen or dies?
- Does the court have the authority to physically coerce (kofin) a person to fulfill a pledge versus a vow, and how does the mechanism of forced consent ("rotzeh ani") function psychologically and legally?
- Primary Sources: Deuteronomy 23:22-24, Rosh HaShanah 5b-6a[^3], Arachin 21a[^4], Nedarim 29a[^5].
Partitioned Sanctity and Temporal Consecration
- The Issue: Can a donor split the physical reality of an animal by consecrating only a limb, a fraction (e.g., half as a burnt-offering and half as a peace-offering), or a specific window of time (e.g., 30 days)?
- The Nafka Mina: Does the entire animal absorb physical sanctity (kedushat haguf), or does it remain in a state of suspended, commercial sanctity (kedushat damim)? If a partner consecrates their half and later purchases and consecrates the second half, is the animal permanently disqualified under the rule of nicheh (rejection), or does the principle of "living animals are never permanently disqualified" (ba'alei chayim einam nidchim) salvage its status?
- Primary Sources: Leviticus 27:9, Temurah 11b[^6], Zevachim 59a[^7].
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Text Snapshot
To understand the Rambam's view of how physical actions shape the sanctity of the menachah, we examine his exact wording regarding petisah (breaking the loaves) and the subsequent kemitzah (scooping the handful):
$$\text{Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Ma'aseh HaKorbanot 13:10-11}$$
"כֵּיצַד פּוֹתְתִין? כּוֹפֵל הַחַלָּה לִשְׁנַיִם וְהַשְּׁנַיִם לְאַרְבָּעָה וּמַבְדִּיל. וְאִם הָיְתָה הַמִּנְחָה שֶׁל זִכְרֵי כְּהֻנָּה, אֵינוֹ מַבְדִּיל וּפוֹתֵת, אֶלָּא כּוֹפֵל וּמַשְׁאִירָהּ כְּפוּלָה. וְכָל הַפְּתִּים יִהְיוּ כְּזַיִת... לֹא בָּלַל, לֹא פָּתַת, לֹא הִגִּישׁ, אוֹ שֶׁלֹּא מָשַׁח הָרְקִיקִין--כְּשֵׁרָה. לֹא נֶאֶמְרוּ כָּל הַדְּבָרִים הָאֵלּוּ אֶלָּא לְמִצְוָה, שֶׁמִּצְוָה לַעֲשׂוֹתָהּ כָּּךְ."
Linguistic Analysis & Steinsaltz Nuance
- "כּוֹפֵל הַחַלָּה לִשְׁנַיִם" (He folds the cake into two): Rabbi Adin Steinsaltz notes that this double-folding (first into two, then into four layers) is not a random tearing, but a structured geometric folding.[^8] This structural requirement underscores that petisah is a formal ritual of division rather than a casual preparation of food.
- "וְאִם הָיְתָה... שֶׁל זִכְרֵי כְּהֻנָּה" (And if it belonged to male priests): Here, the Rambam distinguishes between the offering of a non-priest (which is split into pieces) and that of a priest (which is folded but not separated). Steinsaltz clarifies that because a priest's menachah is burnt entirely on the altar (כליל תקטר), it does not undergo kemitzah.[^9] Consequently, the pieces are left physically attached at the folds, preserving the visual integrity of the loaf even as it is symbolically broken.
- "לֹא בָּלַל... כְּשֵׁרָה" (If he did not mix... it is acceptable): The Rambam states that omitting these steps does not invalidate the offering. Steinsaltz observes that while the physical act of mixing (belilah) is not me'akev (disqualifying) di'avad, the physical existence of the oil is absolutely required.[^10] This distinction highlights a core tension in Lomdus: the difference between the action of the priest and the substance of the offering.
Readings
The Rishonim and Acharonim analyze these chapters by separating physical acts from metaphysical statuses. We explore three major conceptual disputes that highlight this analytical approach.
[THREE CONCEPTUAL READINGS]
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[READING 1] [READING 2] [READING 3]
Petisah & Kemitzah Neder & Nedavah Fractional Sanctity
(Rambam vs. Ra'avad) (Ratzon & Coercion) (Living Disqualification)
Reading 1: The Mechanics of Petisah and the Partition of the Chavitin
In Ma'aseh HaKorbanot 13:4, the Rambam describes how the High Priest's Chavitin offering is prepared. He rules that the twelve loaves are baked individually, and then each loaf is divided into two parts by hand. This yields twenty-four half-loaves, twelve of which are offered in the morning and twelve in the afternoon.
The Ra'avad strongly disagrees:
"אברהם אמר: אין הדברים הללו מכוונים... אלא שש חלות שלמות בבוקר ושש חלות שלמות בין הערביים."
(Abraham says: These words are incorrect... Rather, six whole cakes are offered in the morning and six whole cakes in the evening.)[^11]
The dispute centers on how to interpret the Torah's requirement: "מחציתה בבקר ומחציתה בערב" (half of it in the morning and half of it in the evening) Leviticus 6:12.
- The Rambam's View: The division must apply to each individual loaf. The twelve loaves represent a single, unified offering (isaron). To divide the offering in half, one must divide each of its constituent parts. Therefore, we require twenty-four half-loaves.
- The Ra'avad's View: The division applies to the total volume of the offering. Since the entire offering consists of twelve loaves, dividing it in half means offering six whole loaves in the morning and six in the evening.
In his Chiddushei Rabbeinu Chaim Halevi, Rav Chaim Soloveitchik explains this dispute through the lens of kedushat haguf (the sanctity of the object).[^12] He asks: Does the sanctity of the Chavitin rest on the isaron as a single, undivided unit, or does it rest on the individual loaves?
The Rambam holds that the isaron is sanctified as a single unit in a sacred vessel before being divided. Because the entire isaron is sanctified together, the individual loaves do not possess independent status; they are merely fractions of the larger whole. Consequently, to offer "half" of this unified sacrifice, every part of that whole must be divided.
The Ra'avad, by contrast, argues that once the flour is baked into twelve distinct loaves, each loaf becomes an independent vessel of sanctity. Thus, you can divide the offering by grouping the loaves (six and six) rather than cutting them.
Reading 2: The Metaphysics of Neder vs. Nedavah and Coercion (Rotzeh Ani)
In Chapter 14, the Rambam defines the psychological and verbal mechanisms of vows (nedarim) and pledges (nedavot). In 14:15, he introduces his famous explanation of why physical coercion is effective for someone who refuses to bring their obligatory sacrifice:
"כופין אותו עד שיאמר רוצה אני... שהרי זה שאינו רוצה להקריב, אינו נמנע אלא מפני שיצרו הרע תוקפו. לפיכך, כשמכין אותו עד שתשש יצרו ויאמר רוצה אני, כבר הקריב ברצונו."
(We coerce him until he says "I desire"... For this person who does not want to offer is only held back because his evil inclination overcomes him. Therefore, when he is beaten until his inclination is weakened and he says "I desire," he has offered willingly.)[^13]
In his Sha'arei Yosher, Rabbi Shimon Shkop analyzes this passage to understand the nature of legal consent (ratzon).[^14] He contrasts two ways to understand the Rambam's explanation:
THE NATURE OF COERCION (ROTZEH ANI)
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[THE SUBJECTIVE-ONTOLOGICAL PATH] [THE FORMAL-HALACHIC PATH]
Coercion weakens the external The verbal declaration "I desire"
impediment (yetzer hara), allowing creates an objective legal status
the inner, authentic desire to emerge. (chalut), bypassing subjective intent.
- The Subjective-Ontological Path: Every Jew possesses an inner, authentic desire to perform the mitzvot. Coercion does not force a new desire onto the person; it simply weakens the external impediment (the yetzer hara). Once that impediment is removed, the person's true, internal ratzon emerges naturally.
- The Formal-Halachic Path: The Torah does not require a deep, pure emotional desire. It simply requires that the action not be performed under active, unyielding protest. The verbal declaration "I desire"—even when extracted through physical pressure—creates an objective legal status (chalut) of consent that satisfies the verse's requirement of "לרצונו" (for his acceptance) Leviticus 1:3.
This distinction has significant ramifications for the laws of Gittin (divorce bills) and financial transactions. If we follow the ontological path, coercion is only effective for obligations that are already commanded by the Torah (where we can assume an inner spiritual desire exists). It would not work for voluntary financial agreements or personal choices.
If we follow the formal-halachic path, however, the mechanism relies entirely on the verbal declaration. This explains why the Gemara in Bava Batra 48a rules that under certain conditions, a coerced sale (תליוהו וזבין) is legally binding: the pressure forces the person to make a final, objective decision to sell.[^15]
Reading 3: Fractional Consecration and the Principle of "Ba'alei Chayim Einam Nidchim"
In Ma'aseh HaKorbanot 15:3, the Rambam addresses a case where a person attempts to split an animal's identity:
"חצי המפורש בהמה זו עולה וחציה שלמים—הרי זו קדושה, ואינה קריבה."
(If one says: "Half of this animal is a burnt-offering and half is a peace-offering," it is consecrated, but it cannot be offered.)[^16]
Because an animal cannot be offered on the altar for two different purposes, it must pasture until it develops a blemish. It is then sold, and the proceeds are split to purchase two separate sacrifices.
The Minchat Chinuch asks a fundamental question: Why can't the animal be offered immediately as a peace-offering (shelamim)?[^17] Since a peace-offering has a lower level of sanctity (kodashim kalim) than a burnt-offering (kodshei kodashim), and since its blood-sprinkling and consumption rules are more permissive, why not let the lower sanctity absorb the higher one?
The answer lies in the nature of kedushat haguf (physical sanctity). The Rambam holds that when a person consecrates half an animal for an olah and half for a shelamim, both sanctities take effect simultaneously. They do not cancel each other out; instead, they create a physical conflict within the animal's identity. The animal is now a hybrid of two incompatible categories. This structural conflict makes it physically unfit for the altar, even though it is unblemished.
Now consider Ma'aseh HaKorbanot 15:4: if a partner consecrates their half of an animal, and later buys and consecrates the other half, the animal can be offered. The Rambam explains that "living animals are never permanently disqualified" (ba'alei chayim einam nidchim).
The Rogatchover Gaon (Tzofnat Paneach) explains that the concept of dichuy (rejection) only applies when an animal was once fully fit for a sacrifice and then became disqualified.[^18] When only half of the animal was consecrated, it was never fit to be offered as a sacrifice in that state. Because it was never fully fit, it was never formally "rejected." Once the second half is consecrated, the animal's physical sanctity is completed, and it can be offered on the altar.
Friction
The Kushya: The Contradiction of Omitted Mixing (Belilah)
In Ma'aseh HaKorbanot 13:11, the Rambam rules that if a priest does not mix the oil into the flour (לא בלל), the offering is still valid (כשר). He adds: "All of these matters were mentioned only as a mitzvah."[^19]
However, in Hilchot Issurei Mizbeiach 5:12, the Rambam rules that if an offering lacks the required amount of oil or salt, it is disqualified.[^20]
Furthermore, the Gemara in Menachot 18a states that while the action of mixing is not me'akev (disqualifying), this is only true because of the principle of "ראויה לבילה" (fit for mixing).[^21] That is, as long as the ratio of flour to oil could be mixed, actual mixing is not required. But if the volume of flour is so large that it is physically impossible to mix it with the oil (e.g., if one attempts to mix sixty-one isaron of flour with a single log of oil in one vessel), the offering is disqualified.
This creates a clear contradiction: If the action of mixing is merely a non-essential mitzvah (as stated in 13:11), why does a physical barrier to mixing invalidate the entire offering? If the action does not matter di'avad, why does the potential for that action dictate the validity of the offering's physical substance?
THE BELILAH CONTRADICTION
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[MA'ASEH HAKORBANOT 13:11] [ISSUREI MIZBEIACH 5:12]
Actual act of mixing (belilah) Physical "fitness" for mixing
is NOT me'akev (invalidating). is absolutely me'akev.
The Terutzim
Terutz 1: The Brisker Distinction between Cheftza and Gavra
In his Chiddushei Rabbeinu Chaim Halevi, Rav Chaim Soloveitchik resolves this contradiction by distinguishing between the cheftza (the object) and the gavra (the person).[^22]
RAV CHAIM'S CHEFTZA VS. GAVRA DISTINCTION
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[THE CHEFTZA REQUIREMENT] [THE GAVRA REQUIREMENT]
The flour and oil must exist in a The priest is commanded to perform
state of potential unity ("fit for the physical action of mixing.
mixing"). This is me'akev. This is merely a mitzvah.
- The Cheftza Requirement: The Torah defines a menachah as a mixture: "סולת בלולה בשמן" (fine flour mixed with oil) Leviticus 2:5. This definition requires that the flour and oil exist in a state of potential unity. If the volume of flour is too large for the oil, they cannot be unified. In this case, the offering is fundamentally flawed; it is not a "mixture" but two separate, incompatible substances. This is why the potential for mixing (ראויה לבילה) is absolutely me'akev—it defines the physical status of the object.
- The Gavra Requirement: The actual physical action of kneading and stirring the flour and oil is a commandment directed at the priest (chovat gavra). If the offering itself is valid (meaning the flour and oil are in a proportion that could be mixed), the priest's failure to perform this action does not invalidate the sacrifice.
This explains the Rambam's precision in 13:11: "לא בלל... כשרה" (If he did not mix... it is acceptable). The action was omitted, but the substance remains valid.
Terutz 2: The Rogatchover's Ontological Unity of Oil and Flour
The Rogatchover Gaon (Tzofnat Paneach) offers an alternative, metaphysical resolution based on the nature of liquids and solids.[^23]
He argues that oil does not merely sit alongside the flour; rather, it dissolves and permeates it, changing its physical state. The requirement of belilah is not an administrative rule about preparation. It is a physical requirement that the oil must absorb into the flour to create a single, unified substance.
- When the Rambam rules that actual mixing is not me'akev di'avad, he is relying on the physical reality that when oil and flour are placed in the same vessel, they naturally begin to absorb into one another over time, even without manual stirring. The physical process of absorption occurs on its own.
- However, if the ratio of flour to oil is so unbalanced that the oil cannot physically permeate the entire mass of flour, the flour remains dry and un-unified. Because the natural process of absorption cannot occur, the offering lacks the essential physical unity required of a menachah.
Therefore, manual mixing is optional because nature completes the process; but the physical capacity for that absorption is essential because it defines the offering's material existence.
Intertext
To see how these abstract sacrificial concepts apply outside the Temple, we trace the development of neder (vow) and nedavah (pledge) from biblical sources to practical halacha.
The Biblical Source and Talmudic Development
The distinction between neder and nedavah is rooted in Deuteronomy 23:22-24:
"כִּי תִדֹּר נֶדֶר לַה' אֱלֹקֶיךָ לֹא תְאַחֵר לְשַׁלְּמוֹ... מוֹצָא שְׂפָתֶיךָ תִּשְׁמֹר וְעָשִׂיתָ כַּאֲשֶׁר נָדַרְתָּ לַה' אֱלֹקֶיךָ נְדָבָה אֲשֶׁר דִּבַּרְתָּ בְּפִיךָ."
(When you make a vow to the Lord your God, do not delay in paying it... You must be careful to perform what has passed your lips, for you have voluntarily vowed to the Lord your God what you have promised with your mouth.)
In Rosh HaShanah 5b-6a, the Gemara analyzes this verse to establish the laws of Bal Te'acher (the prohibition against delaying vows):[^24]
BAL TE'ACHER DUALITY
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"KASHER NADARTA" (Neder) "NEDAVAH" (Pledge)
Refers to a personal obligation Refers to an object-based sanctity
tied to the person (gavra). tied to the item (cheftza).
- "כאשר נדרת" (As you have vowed) refers to a neder: "I obligate myself to bring an offering." The obligation rests on the person (gavra). If the animal dies, the person remains obligated to replace it.
- "נדבה" (A voluntary pledge) refers to a nedavah: "This animal is an offering." The sanctity rests on the physical object (cheftza). If the animal dies, the obligation is resolved because the specific object of the pledge no longer exists.
The Halachic Practical Application: Charity (Tzedakah)
This sacrificial distinction is directly applied to the laws of charity (tzedakah) in the Shulchan Aruch.
$$\text{Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 258:8}$$
"האומר: 'סלע זו לצדקה'—הרי זה כנדבה. ואם אמר: 'הרי עלי סלע לצדקה'—הרי זה כנדר. ונפקא מינה, שאם אבד הראשון, אינו חייב באחריותו; ואם אבד השני, חייב באחריותו."
(One who says: "This Sela is for charity"—this is like a pledge [nedavah]. If he says: "It is incumbent upon me to give a Sela to charity"—this is like a vow [neder]. The practical difference is that if the first is lost, he is not liable to replace it; if the second is lost, he is liable to replace it.)[^25]
CHARITY (TZEDAKAH) ANALOGY
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"THIS dollar is for charity" "I OBLIGATE myself to give a dollar"
• Object-based sanctity (Nedavah) • Personal obligation (Neder)
• If lost: No obligation to replace • If lost: Must replace
This ruling directly translates the metaphysics of Temple offerings into post-Temple life:
- When you point to a physical coin and say, "This is for charity," you bind the sanctity of the mitzvah to that specific physical object. You act as a trustee for that coin. If it is lost or stolen without negligence, your role as trustee ends, and you are not required to replace it.
- When you say, "I obligate myself," you create a personal debt to the treasury of the poor. That debt remains active until it is paid, regardless of what happens to any specific coins you had set aside.
Psak/Practice
The Rambam’s analysis of physical actions and psychological intent continues to shape contemporary halachic rulings and legal frameworks.
Coercion in Modern Rabbinical Courts (Gittin)
The most significant practical application of the Rambam's concept of coercion (kofin) is in the laws of divorce (Gittin). Under Jewish law, a husband must deliver a bill of divorce (get) of his own free will Deuteronomy 24:1. If he is forced to do so without a valid legal basis, the divorce is invalid (גט מעושה).
However, when a Rabbinical Court (Beit Din) determines that a husband is legally obligated to divorce his wife (e.g., in cases of abuse or abandonment), they can apply physical or financial pressure to compel him.
The courts rely directly on the Rambam's ruling in Ma'aseh HaKorbanot 14:15:[^26] Because every Jew fundamentally desires to align with the Torah, the court's pressure is not seen as forcing him to act against his will. Rather, the pressure removes the external influence of his yetzer hara, allowing his true, inner desire to do the right thing to emerge.
This psychological-legal principle allows modern Rabbinical Courts to enforce divorce rulings while preserving the essential requirement of free-will consent.
THE MODERN HALACHIC MECHANISM OF GET
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[THE WRONG VIEW] [THE RAMBAM'S VIEW]
The court forces the husband The court weakens the husband's
to perform an action against yetzer hara, allowing his true,
his inner, authentic will. inner desire to do the mitzvah to emerge.
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(INVALID GET) (VALID GET)
Rosh Chodesh Av: Rebuilding Through Study
On Rosh Chodesh Av, as we enter the Nine Days and mourn the destruction of the Beit HaMikdash, this study carries added significance. The Sages teach that when we study the laws of the sacrifices, it is considered as if we have actually offered them on the altar:
"כל העוסק בתורת עולה—כאילו הקריב עולה."
(Anyone who occupies themselves with the Torah of the burnt-offering—it is as if they offered a burnt-offering.)[^27]
By dissecting the precise physical ratios of flour and oil, the legal boundaries of vows, and the mechanics of the Chavitin, we do not merely engage in historical analysis. We rebuild the conceptual framework of the Temple, preserving its laws as an active blueprint for the future.
Takeaway
Sacrificial law reveals that halacha does not merely regulate external behavior; it acts as a precise metaphysical framework, transforming physical materials through structured action and aligning human will with Divine purpose.
Footnotes
[^1]: Menachot 18a s.v. "כל הראוי לבילה". [^2]: Menachot 76a s.v. "מנחת חוטא". [^3]: Rosh HaShanah 5b s.v. "בפיך זו צדקה". [^4]: Arachin 21a s.v. "חייבי עולות ושלמים". [^5]: Nedarim 29a s.v. "האומר משקלה של פרה זו". [^6]: Temurah 11b s.v. "רגל זו עולה". [^7]: Zevachim 59a s.v. "בעלי חיים אינם נדחים". [^8]: Adin Steinsaltz, Steinsaltz on Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Ma'aseh HaKorbanot 13:10:1. [^9]: Ibid. 13:10:2. [^10]: Ibid. 13:11:2. [^11]: Ra'avad, Gloss to Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Ma'aseh HaKorbanot 13:4. [^12]: Yosef Dov Soloveitchik, Chiddushei Rabbeinu Chaim Halevi, Hilchot Ma'aseh HaKorbanot 13:4. [^13]: Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Ma'aseh HaKorbanot 14:15. [^14]: Shimon Shkop, Sha'arei Yosher, Sha'ar 5, Perek 12. [^15]: Bava Batra 48a s.v. "תליוהו וזבין". [^16]: Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Ma'aseh HaKorbanot 15:3. [^17]: Yosef Babad, Minchat Chinuch, Mitzvah 116. [^18]: Yosef Rozin, Tzofnat Paneach, Hilchot Ma'aseh HaKorbanot 15:4. [^19]: Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Ma'aseh HaKorbanot 13:11. [^20]: Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Issurei Mizbeiach 5:12. [^21]: Menachot 18a s.v. "בלולה... בשמן". [^22]: Yosef Dov Soloveitchik, Chiddushei Rabbeinu Chaim Halevi, Hilchot Issurei Mizbeiach 5:12. [^23]: Yosef Rozin, Tzofnat Paneach, Hilchot Ma'aseh HaKorbanot 13:11. [^24]: Rosh HaShanah 5b s.v. "מוצא שפתיך". [^25]: Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 258:8. [^26]: Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Ma'aseh HaKorbanot 14:15; see also Hilchot Gerushin 2:20. [^27]: Menachot 110a s.v. "זאת תורת העולה".
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