Mishneh Torah, Testimony 20-22

Sugya Map

• Issue: The halachot pertaining to eidim zomemim (conspiring witnesses), specifically the conditions for their liability and the nature of their punishment (capital, corporal, or monetary).
• Nafka Mina(s):
  • The precise timing of hazamah (disqualification) relative to the judgment: Achar she'nigmar ha'din (after judgment rendered) vs. kodem she'nigmar ha'din (before judgment) – a critical distinction for punishment.
  • The requirement that both witnesses be fit to testify and both be disqualified through hazamah for punishment to apply.
  • The principle of gilgul mitot (rolling punishments), where eidim zomemim receive the lesser of two capital punishments they conspired to inflict (e.g., bat Kohen).
  • The distinction between chayavei mitot (capital offenses), chayavei malchut (lashes), and chayavei mammon (financial obligations), and how eidim zomemim are punished in each.
  • Complex scenarios involving multiple groups of witnesses (e.g., shor muad, chezkas shanim), contradictory testimonies, and testimonies regarding non-monetary/non-capital issurim (e.g., challal, treifah, chalitza).
• Primary Sources:
  • Devarim 19:19: "וַעֲשִׂיתֶם לוֹ כַּאֲשֶׁר זָמַם לַעֲשׂוֹת לְאָחִיו" (The foundational verse for eidim zomemim).
  • Makkot 5a: The central sugya detailing the laws of eidim zomemim.
  • Sanhedrin 55b: Discussions related to gilgul mitot and specific capital offenses, particularly concerning bat Kohen.

Text Snapshot

The Rambam opens with the foundational conditions for punishing eidim zomemim:

"אין העדים זוממין נהרגין ולא לוקין ולא משלמין אלא אם כן היו שניהם ראויין לעדות, והוזמו שניהם אחר שנגמר הדין."¹ (Lying witnesses are neither executed, given lashes, or required to make financial restitution unless both of them were fit to serve as witnesses and they were both disqualified through hazamah after the judgment was rendered.)

Here, the precise phrasing "אחר שנגמר הדין" is paramount. As Steinsaltz notes, this means "רק לאחר שבית הדין חייב את בעל הדין על פי עדותם"² (only after the court obligated the litigant based on their testimony). This distinguishes it from hazamah that occurs before the judgment, which, while disqualifying the testimony, does not trigger punishment for the witnesses.³ Furthermore, if even one witness was unfit (pasul) for testimony (e.g., a relative), they are not punished "אף על פי שהוזמו ונפסלו לכל עדויות שבתורה"⁴, because "אין קשר בין היפסלותם לעדות מפני שהעידו שקר, ובין העונש המיוחד ‘כאשר זמם’"⁵ – a crucial distinction between general psul eidus and the specific onesh of kazman.

A particularly intricate case is presented in MT 20:10:

"שנים שהעידו על ראובן שנאף עם בת כהן ונגמר דינו ליחנק ודין הנואפת לשריפה כו' הרי אלו נחנקין ולא נשרפין כו'."⁶ (When two witnesses testify that Reuven committed adultery with the daughter of a priest, Reuven was sentenced to death by strangulation and the daughter of the priest was sentenced to be burnt to death, and afterwards the witnesses were disqualified through hazamah, they should be executed by strangulation and not burnt to death.)

This highlights the gilgul mitot principle, where the eidim zomemim receive the lesser of the two capital punishments, even though the nif'al (the one acted upon, the bat Kohen) would have received the harsher death. Steinsaltz comments, "אף שהמתחייב בשתי מיתות נידון בחמורה ושרפה חמורה מחנק... אין מחייבים אותם במיתה החמורה שזממו לגרום"⁷, emphasizing that the rule for eidim zomemim is distinct.

Readings

Tosafot: The Derasha of "לאחיו" and "היא" (Makkot 5a, Sanhedrin 55b)

Tosafot grapple with the source for the gilgul mitot in the case of bat Kohen, where the eidim zomemim are strangled, not burned, despite the bat Kohen herself being burned. The Gemara (Makkot 5a) states that eidim zomemim of a bat Kohen are executed by strangulation, not burning. This is derived from the derasha on Devarim 19:19, "ועשיתם לו כאשר זמם לעשות לאחיו," which is expounded as "לאחיו ולא לאחותו" (to his brother, but not to his sister). This implies that eidim zomemim only receive the punishment that the boel (the male adulterer) would have received, which is strangulation, not the punishment of the nive'elet (the bat Kohen), which is burning.

However, Tosafot (Sanhedrin 55b s.v. "לאחיו") also adds another derasha in the name of a baraisa: "היא ולא בועלה" (she, but not her paramour). This seems to create a tension: if "לאחיו" already limits the punishment to the boel's fate, why is "היא" needed to exclude the boel? And if "היא" excludes the boel, then why would the eidim zomemim get any punishment, as they intended to cause two deaths, one of which (burning) cannot be applied to them? Tosafot resolve this by explaining that "היא" comes to exclude the boel from the derasha of "לאחיו" in a specific way, or to ensure that eidim zomemim are punished even if they only testified against the bat Kohen and not the boel. The chiddush of Tosafot lies in their multi-layered derashot to precisely delineate the application of kazman in this complex scenario, ensuring eidim zomemim do not escape punishment entirely, but also do not receive a punishment that cannot be applied to them.

Shorshei HaYam: Clarifying Tosafot's Derashot and the "כאשר זמם" Principle

Shorshei HaYam (on MT 20:10:1) directly engages with Tosafot's analysis, presenting a significant kushya and terutz. He quotes Tosafot's kushya on itself: if "לאחיו" already limits the punishment to the boel, why is "היא" necessary to exclude the boel? Tosafot's terutz is that "היא" ensures eidim zomemim are not excluded from hazamah even if we cannot apply the full kazman principle (i.e., if they only testified against the bat Kohen).

Shorshei HaYam then raises his own kushya on Tosafot's explanation: "וק"ק דהשתא נמי דכתיב היא לא נתמעט זוממים דלא גלי קרא לאחיו למעט זוממים אלא היכא דמעידים נמי על הבועל דמקיים ביה כאשר זמם אבל היכא דאינן מעידים על הבועל בעינן כאשר זמם ולע"ד הא ל"ק כלל"⁸. He questions how "היא" alone could exclude eidim zomemim if "לאחיו" requires the presence of a boel. His chiddush is an alternative interpretation of the derasha: "ודאי עיקר קרא דהיא ע"כ למעט זוממיה אפי' היכא דאינן מעידים על הבועל דאלת"ה מילת היא למאי אתא"⁹. He argues that the primary purpose of the word "היא" in the verse is to exclude the eidim zomemim from the burning punishment, even if they only testified against the bat Kohen and not the boel. If "היא" were only to exclude the boel when "לאחיו" already does, it would be redundant.

The deeper chiddush of Shorshei HaYam emerges when he addresses a fundamental kushya he presents: "ק"ק לי דהיכי ילפינן מקרא דועשיתם לו כאשר זמם לעשות לאחיו דזוממי בת כהן נהרגין במיתת הבועל מדכתיב לאחיו ודרשי' לאחיו ולא לאחותו ולמה לא נאמר דזוממי בת כהן אינן נהרגין כלל כיון דאין אנו יכולים לקיים בהם כאשר זמם שהרי הם זממו להרוג את שניהם לבועל בחנק ולנבעלת בשריפה ואין אנו יכולים לקיים שניהם"¹⁰. Why are eidim zomemim in the bat Kohen case punished at all? They conspired to inflict two different punishments (strangulation on Reuven, burning on the bat Kohen). Since they cannot receive both punishments, and we cannot fulfill "כאשר זמם" perfectly, why aren't they completely exempt, similar to eidim zomemim who testify against a ben gerusha or chalutza? In that case, the derasha "לו ולא לזרעו" (to him, but not to his offspring) means the eidim zomemim are not punished, because their intention (to make the offspring pasul) cannot be reciprocated.

Shorshei HaYam offers a powerful terutz: "ונ"ל דזוממי בת כהן כשבאים להעיד על הבועל ועל הנבעלת לחייבם מיתה הן באים להעיד ב' עדויות דכל א' צריך התראה לבדו כנודע וכשמחייבים אנו את העדים שריפה כמיתת הנבעלת קרינן בהו כאשר זמם שהרי בעדותה איכא כאשר זמם אבל בעדות בן גרושה דליכא אלא עדות אחת שבאו לעשותו בן גרושה ובעדות זה באו לפסול זרעו ג"כ אם נפסול את העדים ולא נפסול זרעם ליכא כאשר זמם כלל ודוק."¹¹ The chiddush is that testifying about bat Kohen adultery constitutes two distinct testimonies, one for the boel and one for the nive'elet, each requiring separate hatra'ah. Therefore, even if we can only fulfill "כאשר זמם" for one of these "testimonies" (e.g., the boel's strangulation), it is sufficient for punishment. In contrast, testifying about ben gerusha is a single testimony where the psul zera is an inherent consequence, not a separate "testimony" that can be isolated for kazman. This distinction is critical for understanding the scope of kazman.

Friction

The Kushya: The "כאשר זמם" Paradox in Bat Kohen Adultery

The central kushya, as articulated by Shorshei HaYam, lies in the seemingly incomplete fulfillment of "כאשר זמם" in the bat Kohen adultery case. The eidim zomemim intended to cause two deaths: strangulation for Reuven (the boel) and burning for the bat Kohen (the nive'elet). However, the derasha "לאחיו ולא לאחותו"¹² dictates that the eidim zomemim are only punished with the death intended for the boel, i.e., strangulation. This means they are not punished with burning, which was the death intended for the bat Kohen.

The kushya then arises: If the core principle of eidim zomemim is middah keneged middah – "ועשיתם לו כאשר זמם" – meaning they should receive exactly what they conspired to do, how can they be punished at all if we cannot fully implement both components of their original plot? If they intended two distinct punishments, and we can only apply one to them, doesn't this violate the spirit of "כאשר זמם"? Why aren't they exempt entirely, just as eidim zomemim who testify against a ben gerusha or chalutza are exempt, because "ועשיתם לו ולא לזרעו"¹³ means we cannot fulfill kazman for the psul zera aspect of their testimony? In both cases, there's an element of the original plot that cannot be reciprocated; why the difference in outcome?

The Terutz: Two Testimonies, One Execution

Shorshei HaYam's brilliant terutz resolves this paradox by re-framing the nature of the testimony in bat Kohen adultery. He posits that: "זוממי בת כהן כשבאים להעיד על הבועל ועל הנבעלת לחייבם מיתה הן באים להעיד ב' עדויות דכל א' צריך התראה לבדו כנודע"¹⁴. The testimony concerning bat Kohen adultery is, in essence, two separate testimonies: one regarding the boel's capital offense (adultery with a married woman, punishable by strangulation), and another regarding the nive'elet's capital offense (adultery for a bat Kohen, punishable by burning). Each of these requires its own hatra'ah (warning) for the defendants.

Since there are two distinct testimonies, we can fulfill "כאשר זמם" for one of them. The derasha "לאחיו ולא לאחותו" simply tells us which of the two intended punishments for which the eidim zomemim are liable: the one intended for the "brother" (the boel), which is strangulation. Even though the other intended punishment (burning for the bat Kohen) cannot be applied to the eidim zomemim, the fact that one of their independent testimonies can be reciprocated is sufficient to hold them liable.

This stands in contrast to the ben gerusha/chalutza case. There, the testimony is fundamentally one testimony aimed at establishing the individual's psul (disqualification from marrying a Kohen), with the psul zera (disqualification of offspring) being a consequence of that single testimony, not a separate, independent "testimony" requiring its own hatra'ah. Because the psul zera cannot be reciprocated to the eidim zomemim, and it's an indivisible part of their single malicious intent, the kazman principle cannot be applied at all, leading to their exemption. The distinction between "two testimonies" and "one testimony with a consequence" is the fulcrum upon which Shorshei HaYam's resolution rests.

Intertext

Devarim 19:19 – The Source of "כאשר זמם"

The foundational verse for the laws of eidim zomemim is Devarim 19:19: "וַעֲשִׂיתֶם לוֹ כַּאֲשֶׁר זָמַם לַעֲשׂוֹת לְאָחִיו וּבִעַרְתָּ הָרָע מִקִּרְבֶּךָ."¹⁵ This verse establishes the principle of middah keneged middah (measure for measure) for conspiring witnesses: they are to suffer the same fate they intended for their victim. The phrase "לַעֲשׂוֹת לְאָחִיו" ("to do to his brother") is crucial and subject to intense exegetical scrutiny. As discussed by Tosafot and Shorshei HaYam, this phrase is often darshened as "לאחיו ולא לאחותו," meaning the punishment applies when the intended victim is a male, or receives a punishment applicable to a male. This is the source for the gilgul mitot principle in cases like the bat Kohen, where the eidim zomemim receive the punishment of the boel (strangulation) rather than the nive'elet (burning), as the burning would apply to a "sister" in this context. The precise wording ensures that the divine justice is meted out, but within the bounds of what is halachically applicable to the witnesses themselves.

Makkot 5a – The Gemara's Framework for Eidim Zomemim

The Gemara in Makkot 5a is the primary locus for the detailed halachot of eidim zomemim. It systematically outlines the conditions for their liability, the various types of punishments, and the intricate derashot from Devarim 19:19. The Gemara discusses the klaim (accusation) of hazamah ("אתם אמרתם עמנו הייתם במקום פלוני"), the requirement for the mazimim (disqualifying witnesses) to be fit, and the timing of hazamah ("מכאן אמרו אין זוממין נהרגין אלא אם כן נגמר דינם").¹⁶ It also delves into the cases where eidim zomemim are not punished, such as those who testify against a ben gerusha/chalutza ("ועשיתם לו ולא לזרעו") or those who testify about a treifah ("כאשר זמם, לאפוקי עדים שהעידו על טריפה שהרגה את הנפש")¹⁷. Rambam's comprehensive treatment in Hilchot Eidus 20-22 directly mirrors and codifies these Gemara discussions, often adding the tradition that many of these laws are Halacha l'Moshe MiSinai. The Gemara's discussion of gilgul mitot in various capital cases is also central to understanding the Rambam's rulings.

Psak/Practice

In contemporary halachic practice, the laws of eidim zomemim, particularly those involving capital punishment or lashes, remain largely theoretical. With the cessation of Sanhedrin and the practical application of capital punishment, the immediate implications of these sections of Mishneh Torah are not directly enacted. However, their principles resonate deeply within halachic jurisprudence and meta-psak heuristics.

Firstly, the stringent requirements for hazamah (e.g., both witnesses fit, hazamah after judgment, precise rebuttal of where they were) highlight the extreme sanctity of testimony in halacha and the presumption of innocence. The bar for convicting eidim zomemim is incredibly high, reflecting the gravity of their crime and the need to protect the integrity of the witness system.

Secondly, the distinction between psul eidus (disqualification of testimony) and onesh kazman (the punishment for conspiring) is still relevant. Even if eidim are found to have lied, their testimony is disqualified, but they are not necessarily subject to the unique onesh of kazman unless all specific conditions are met. This teaches us that the consequences of false testimony are multi-layered, ranging from simple disqualification to severe penalties, depending on intent and outcome.

Finally, the numerous instances where Rambam states a rule is "הלכה למשה מסיני" (a Halacha l'Moshe MiSinai) underscore the role of oral tradition in shaping even the most detailed aspects of halacha. It demonstrates that not all halachic principles are derived purely through logical inference or textual derasha; many are received traditions that serve as foundational truths, guiding the interpretive process.

Takeaway

The sugya of eidim zomemim is a testament to the Torah's intricate system of justice, meticulously balancing middah keneged middah with the precise limitations of "כאשר זמם." It highlights the profound gravity of false testimony and the rigorous standards required to ensure both justice for the accused and accountability for those who pervert it.

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¹ Mishneh Torah, Testimony 20:1. ² Steinsaltz on Mishneh Torah, Testimony 20:1:2. ³ Mishneh Torah, Testimony 20:1. ⁴ Mishneh Torah, Testimony 20:1. ⁵ Steinsaltz on Mishneh Torah, Testimony 20:1:4. ⁶ Mishneh Torah, Testimony 20:10. ⁷ Steinsaltz on Mishneh Torah, Testimony 20:10:2. ⁸ Shorshei HaYam on Mishneh Torah, Testimony 20:10:1. ⁹ Shorshei HaYam on Mishneh Torah, Testimony 20:10:1. ¹⁰ Shorshei HaYam on Mishneh Torah, Testimony 20:10:1. ¹¹ Shorshei HaYam on Mishneh Torah, Testimony 20:10:1. ¹² Devarim 19:19, Makkot 5a. ¹³ Makkot 5a. ¹⁴ Shorshei HaYam on Mishneh Torah, Testimony 20:10:1. ¹⁵ Devarim 19:19. ¹⁶ Makkot 5a. ¹⁷ Makkot 5a.