Mishneh Torah, Foundations of the Torah 1

Hook

Ever wonder why the Rambam, a towering figure of Jewish law, begins his monumental code not with practical commandments, but with abstract philosophical concepts about God's existence and nature? It's not just an introduction; it's a profound statement that the how of Jewish practice is inextricably linked to the what and who of divine reality. This chapter sets the intellectual bedrock for everything that follows, challenging us to move beyond simplistic notions of God.

Context

The Mishneh Torah, authored by Rabbi Moshe ben Maimon (Maimonides, 1138-1204 CE), is an unprecedented work: a comprehensive, systematically organized code of all Jewish law. Rambam's ambition was to create a halakhic work so clear and complete that one would need no other text to understand Jewish practice. What’s particularly striking is that he dedicates the very first book, "Sefer HaMadda" (The Book of Knowledge), to fundamental theological principles. As the anonymous Peirush on Mishneh Torah, Foundations of the Torah 1:1:2 explains, this book is so named "because it includes the commandments dependent on thought, knowledge, and beliefs. And the first laws, Hilkhot Yesodei HaTorah (Laws of the Foundations of the Torah), are called such because the commandments included within them are the essence and foundations of the Torah."

This opening signifies Rambam's conviction that halakha is not merely ritual observance, but an expression of a deeply rational and intellectual engagement with the divine. For Rambam, proper action stems from proper thought. He integrates Aristotelian philosophy into his understanding of Jewish theology, arguing that the existence and nature of God can, to a significant extent, be apprehended through rigorous philosophical inquiry, not solely through faith or revelation. This approach was revolutionary and, at times, controversial, but it shaped Jewish thought for centuries, emphasizing the intellectual pursuit of God-knowledge as a primary religious obligation. The Peirush further notes that "if the existence of God, that He knows the deeds of men, is not affirmed, there will be no belief in the Torah." This highlights the foundational nature of these beliefs – without them, the entire edifice of Torah and mitzvot collapses.

Text Snapshot

"The foundation of all foundations and the pillar of wisdom is to know that there is a Primary Being who brought into being all existence. All the beings of the heavens, the earth, and what is between them came into existence only from the truth of His being. If one would imagine that He does not exist, no other being could possibly exist." (Mishneh Torah, Foundations of the Torah 1:1)

"This God is one. He is not two or more, but one, unified in a manner which [surpasses] any unity that is found in the world..." (Mishneh Torah, Foundations of the Torah 1:7)

"All these [expressions were used] to relate to human thought processes which know only corporeal imagery, for the Torah speaks in the language of man." (Mishneh Torah, Foundations of the Torah 1:10)

Close Reading

Insight 1: Structure – From Contingency to Necessity, and the Ladder of Divine Knowledge

Rambam's opening chapter is a masterclass in philosophical argumentation, building a theological edifice brick by logical brick. He begins with the observable fact of existence and immediately introduces the concept of a "Primary Being" (מצוי ראשון) as the ultimate cause. This isn't just a statement of faith; it's a philosophical deduction. He states, "If one would imagine that He does not exist, no other being could possibly exist" (MT 1:1), directly implying that all other existence is contingent upon Him. Conversely, "If one would imagine that none of the entities aside from Him exist, He alone would continue to exist," establishing His necessary existence – a being whose non-existence is inconceivable.

The Peirush on MT 1:1:3 outlines four fundamental principles necessary for belief in the Creator: "that He exists; that He is one; that He is not a body nor a power within a body; and that the world is new and God created it." Rambam, in this chapter, systematically addresses the first three, presenting them not just as dogmas, but as conclusions derived through reason. The argument proceeds from the necessity of a Primary Being to His unity (MT 1:7-8), and then to His incorporeality (MT 1:9-12). The continuous revolution of the sphere, as mentioned in MT 1:4 and 1:8, serves as empirical evidence for His "infinite and unbounded power" and, by extension, His non-corporeality, since a body's power is always limited.

Rambam then tackles the apparent contradictions posed by anthropomorphic language in the Torah (MT 1:10-12). By asserting "the Torah speaks in the language of man" (MT 1:10), he systematically dismantles any literal interpretation of divine "hands," "eyes," or "sitting." This progression—from abstract existence to unity, to incorporeality, and finally to the metaphorical nature of scripture—demonstrates a carefully constructed intellectual journey designed to elevate the learner's understanding of God from a primitive, anthropomorphic conception to a sophisticated, philosophical one. The Peirush on MT 1:1:3 highlights that while the first three principles have "clear proofs" from philosophers, the fourth (creation ex nihilo) "we should believe through tradition," acknowledging the limits of philosophical reason and the necessity of Kabbalah (received tradition) for certain truths. This structured approach, balancing reason and tradition, is a hallmark of Rambam's thought.

Insight 2: Key Term – "מצוי ראשון" and the "Truth of His Being"

The phrase "מצוי ראשון" (Primary Being) is central to Rambam's argument. It signifies not merely a first cause in a chronological sense, but a necessarily existent being, the ultimate ground of all reality. The Peirush on MT 1:1:2 clarifies this, stating, "He is 'מצוי,' meaning 'necessarily existent' (מחוייב המציאות)." This technical philosophical term distinguishes God from all other entities, which are contingently existent (אפשרי המציאות) – they exist, but could conceivably not exist, and their existence depends on something else. God, in contrast, must exist; His non-existence is a logical impossibility.

Steinsaltz on MT 1:1:2 further elaborates on "מצוי ראשון": "His existence precedes all other existence. This precedence is both temporal and causal, as will be explained." This clarifies that God is not just the first in a sequence, but the foundational cause, the very condition for the possibility of anything else. Rambam emphasizes this in the opening lines: "All the beings of the heavens, the earth, and what is between them came into existence only from the truth of His being" (MT 1:1). Steinsaltz on MT 1:1:3 defines "אמתת המצאו" (the truth of His being) as "from the very truth of the existence of the Primary Being." This means God's existence is not just a fact, but a self-validating, inherent truth, the ultimate reality from which all other realities derive.

The Peirush on MT 1:1:2 provides a crucial philosophical explanation for why Rambam uses "מצוי" (existent) and avoids other descriptors: "because we cannot know the essence of anything except through its boundaries, and the Holy One, blessed be He, has no boundaries." Since God is infinite and simple (not composed of parts), His essence cannot be grasped through categories or definitions that apply to finite, composite beings. Therefore, stating that "His existence is His essence and is not an addition to His essence" (הקב"ה אין לו סוג שיכלל תחתיו לפיכך לא נוכל להשיג מהותו אלא נאמר שהוא מצוי ומציאותו היא מהותו ואינה תוספת על מהותו) is a profound theological statement. It means that unlike contingent beings, for whom existence is an attribute that could be lost, God's very being is His existence. He is pure existence, simple and unbounded, making "מצוי ראשון" the most precise and philosophically robust term to describe Him.

Insight 3: Tension – The Limit of Human Comprehension vs. the Drive to Know

A profound tension runs through this chapter: the human drive to comprehend God versus the inherent limitations of human thought. Rambam unequivocally states, "the truth of this concept cannot be grasped or comprehended by human thought" (MT 1:12). He cites Job 11:7, "Can you find the comprehension of God? Can you find the ultimate bounds of the Almighty?" This sets a clear boundary: God's essence is ultimately unknowable to finite beings.

Yet, this unknowability doesn't negate the commandment to know God. Rambam explicitly states, "The knowledge of this concept is a positive commandment, as [implied by Exodus 20:2]: 'I am God, your Lord....'" (MT 1:6) and again for His unity, "The knowledge of this concept fulfills a positive commandment, as [implied by Deuteronomy 6:4]: '[Hear, Israel,] God is our Lord, God is one.'" (MT 1:8). How can one be commanded to know what is unknowable?

Rambam addresses this through the narrative of Moses's request, "Please show me Your glory" (Exodus 33:18). Moses, the greatest prophet, sought to "know the truth of the existence of the Holy One, blessed be He, to the extent that it could be internalized within his mind" (MT 1:13). He wanted to distinguish God's existence from all other entities, to grasp His unique reality. God's response – "You shall see My back, but you shall not see My face" (Exodus 33:23) – is interpreted by Rambam (MT 1:14) not as a partial glimpse of a physical form, but as a revelation of God's existence through His actions and effects, rather than His inaccessible essence. Moses was granted a unique understanding of God's "truth of existence," allowing Him to be "distinguished in his mind from other entities," but still not His essence.

This nuanced position highlights the tension: we are commanded to know God, but this knowledge is not an exhaustive comprehension of His essence. Instead, it is an intellectual ascent, understanding God through His attributes (like His unity and incorporeality) and His actions in the world, recognizing His necessary existence as the ultimate cause. It's a knowledge that acknowledges its own limits, finding profundity in the vastness of what remains unknowable. The anthropomorphic language of the Torah, which Rambam explains as "speaking in the language of man" (MT 1:10), further underscores this tension. It's a concession to human cognitive limits, allowing us to relate to God, even as our intellect strives to transcend such limited imagery. The ultimate goal is to know that He is, and what He is not, rather than what He is in His essence.

Two Angles

The Rambam begins with the positive commandment to know God, citing "I am God, your Lord..." (Exodus 20:2). This immediately raises a classic debate among commentators: Is "אנכי ה' אלקיך" (I am God, your Lord) itself a positive commandment, or is it an introduction to the commandments that follow? This divergence impacts how we understand the very first step in our relationship with the divine.

The Yitzchak Yeranen commentary on Foundations of the Torah 1:1:1 delves into this debate, specifically contrasting the view of Rambam with other early authorities. Rambam, in his Sefer HaMitzvot (Positive Commandment 1), explicitly counts "אנכי ה' אלקיך" as the first of the 613 mitzvot, a positive commandment to believe in God's existence. He sees it as an intellectual obligation: to know and affirm the existence of the divine. The Yitzchak Yeranen cites the Megillat Esther which supports Rambam's view, bringing a proof from the Gemara in Horayot (8a) which states, "Which mitzvah was said first? You must say this is idolatry," and Rashi there explains this by referencing "אנכי ולא יהיה לך" at the beginning of the Ten Commandments. From Rashi's explanation, Megillat Esther infers that the belief in God (implied by "אנכי") is indeed the first mitzvah. For Rambam, this is not merely a preamble but an active intellectual recognition of God's being, which is the foundational principle for all other mitzvot.

On the other hand, the Ba'al Halakhot Gedolot (BeHaG), a much earlier codifier, does not include "אנכי ה' אלקיך" in his enumeration of the 613 mitzvot. The Yitzchak Yeranen quotes the Ramban (Nachmanides), who acknowledges this difference of opinion and seems to lean towards BeHaG's position. The Ramban argues that "אנכי" is not a mitzvah in the conventional sense, but rather a declaration of God's Kingship (קבלת המלכות – acceptance of sovereignty), which serves as a prerequisite or an introduction to all subsequent commands. It's an act of accepting divine authority, which then enables the fulfillment of mitzvot, rather than a mitzvah itself. The Yitzchak Yeranen notes that the Mekhilta, cited by Ramban, supports this by explaining "אנכי" as "you have accepted My Kingship, accept My decrees," framing "אנכי" as an offer of sovereignty that precedes the "לא יהיה לך" (you shall have no other gods), which is the first prohibitive mitzvah.

The core tradeoff here lies in the nature of emunah (belief/faith). For Rambam, emunah is an intellectual mitzvah, a cognitive act of knowing and affirming God's existence, demanding rigorous philosophical inquiry as outlined in the Foundations of the Torah. For the BeHaG and Ramban, while acknowledging God's existence is fundamental, "אנכי" itself functions more as a foundational acceptance of divine authority and identity, a pre-condition for the covenant, rather than a quantifiable mitzvah among the 613. This distinction shapes how one approaches the very first demand of Jewish life: is it primarily an intellectual pursuit of knowledge, or a foundational acceptance of divine rule that then leads to action?

Practice Implication

This profound opening of the Mishneh Torah, particularly the explicit statement that "The knowledge of this concept is a positive commandment" (MT 1:6, 1:8), profoundly shapes daily Jewish practice by transforming emunah from a passive assent into an active, intellectual pursuit. It means that believing in God is not enough; one is obligated to know God, to understand His nature as much as humanly possible. This isn't just about avoiding idolatry; it's about cultivating an informed, sophisticated apprehension of the divine.

For the intermediate learner, this implies a lifelong commitment to theological study. It means engaging with texts like Rambam's Guide for the Perplexed, or even this very chapter, not as abstract philosophy divorced from practice, but as a direct fulfillment of a mitzvah. When we recite Shema Yisrael ("Hear, Israel, God is our Lord, God is one"), Rambam teaches us that we are not merely uttering words; we are fulfilling the commandment to know God's absolute unity (MT 1:8). This knowledge should be robust, grounded in reason, and capable of withstanding scrutiny, pushing us beyond simplistic or anthropomorphic understandings of God.

This active intellectual emunah also fosters a deep sense of humility. Knowing that God is "elevated and exalted above all this" (MT 1:17) – beyond time, space, emotion, and physical form – reminds us of our own limitations. When we pray, when we perform mitzvot, we are interacting with an entity whose essence is utterly beyond our grasp. This awareness prevents us from projecting our human frailties and desires onto the divine, leading to a more refined and profound spirituality. It means recognizing that all human descriptions of God are metaphors, "for the Torah speaks in the language of man" (MT 1:10). This awareness cultivates a reverence that acknowledges the infinite gap between Creator and created, inspiring awe and intellectual honesty in our spiritual journey.

Furthermore, this intellectual foundation underpins ethical decision-making. If God is a "Primary Being who brought into being all existence" and whose "truth of His [being] does not resemble the truth of any of their [beings]" (MT 1:1-2), then all of existence is inherently valuable and interconnected through Him. Our actions, therefore, must reflect this divine order. Understanding God's unity and incorporeality fosters a universalist perspective, recognizing that all humanity, indeed all creation, derives from the same singular, transcendent source. This can inspire greater justice, compassion, and responsibility in our interactions with the world, as we strive to emulate God's actions as revealed through His "back" – His operations in the world, rather than His unknowable "face."

Chevruta Mini

1. Rambam presents a rigorous philosophical argument for God's existence, unity, and incorporeality, asserting that "The knowledge of this concept is a positive commandment." If one arrives at these truths through philosophical reasoning, is their emunah inherently stronger or more virtuous than someone who accepts them purely through tradition and faith (קבלה), especially for those aspects (like creatio ex nihilo) that Rambam admits lack philosophical proof? What are the tradeoffs between a reasoned faith and a faith based on received tradition?
2. Rambam emphasizes that "the truth of this concept cannot be grasped or comprehended by human thought," yet we are commanded to "know" God. How do we balance the intellectual pursuit of understanding God with the necessary humility of acknowledging His ultimate unknowability? What is the practical difference between trying to know God's "face" (essence) versus knowing His "back" (actions/effects), and what are the spiritual benefits or risks of leaning too heavily on one approach over the other?

Takeaway

Rambam grounds all Jewish practice in the intellectual apprehension of God's necessarily existent, utterly unified, and incorporeal nature, transforming belief into an active, lifelong commandment to know the divine within the limits of human comprehension.