Mishneh Torah, Foundations of the Torah 9

Sugya Map

• Core Issue: The immutability of the Torah and the precise scope of prophetic authority in relation to its commandments. How do we reconcile the eternal nature of the Torah with the concept of a prophet issuing divine commands?
• Nafka Mina(s):
  • Distinguishing a true prophet from a false prophet, particularly when their message touches upon existing mitzvot.
  • Determining the legal consequence for disobeying a prophet's command.
  • Defining the permissible boundaries of a prophet's command, specifically concerning temporary abrogation (hora'at sha'ah) versus permanent change.
  • Identifying the one absolute limit on prophetic authority: the prohibition of Avodah Zarah.
• Primary Sources:
  • Devarim 13:1 (12:32): "All these matters which I command to you, you shall be careful to perform. You may not add to it or diminish from it." – The bedrock of Torah immutability.
  • Devarim 29:28 (29:29): "What is revealed is for us and our children forever, to carry out all the words of this Torah." – Reinforces eternal obligation.
  • Devarim 30:12: "It is not in the heavens." – Interpreted to mean the Torah is no longer subject to new divine revelation or prophetic alteration.
  • Devarim 18:18-19: "I will appoint a prophet from among their brethren like you...and he will speak...And a person who will not heed My words which he speaks in My name, I will seek [retribution] from him." – Establishes the obligation to obey a true prophet, and divine punishment for disobedience.
  • Malachi 3:22 (4:4): "Remember the Torah of Moses, My servant." – The final prophet's admonition to uphold the existing Torah, underscoring its unchanging nature.
  • Melachim I 18: Eliyahu's sacrifice on Mount Carmel, a paradigmatic example of hora'at sha'ah.
  • Sanhedrin 90a, Temurah 16a, Bava Metzia 59b: Gemara sources discussing the implications of "לא בשמים היא" and the limitations on prophetic innovation.

Text Snapshot

The Rambam, in Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah 9, lays down the fundamental principles of Torah immutability and prophetic authority:

דָּבָר בָּרוּר וּמְפֹרָשׁ בַּתּוֹרָה, שֶׁהִיא מִצְוָה עוֹמֶדֶת לְעוֹלָם וּלְעוֹלְמֵי עוֹלָמִים. אֵין לָהּ לֹא שִׁנּוּי וְלֹא גֵּרוּעַ וְלֹא תּוֹסֶפֶת, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: "אֵת כָּל הַדָּבָר אֲשֶׁר אָנֹכִי מְצַוֶּה אֶתְכֶם אֹתוֹ תִּשְׁמְרוּ לַעֲשׂוֹת לֹא תֹסֵף עָלָיו וְלֹא תִגְרַע מִמֶּנּוּ" (דברים יג, א). וְנֶאֱמַר: "הַנִּגְלֹת לָנוּ וְלִבְנֵינוּ עַד עוֹלָם לַעֲשׂוֹת אֶת כָּל דִּבְרֵי הַתּוֹרָה הַזֹּאת" (דברים כט, כח). הָא לָמַדְתָּ שֶׁכָּל דִּבְרֵי תוֹרָה אָנוּ מְצֻוִּין לַעֲשׂוֹתָן עַד עוֹלָם. וְכֵן הוּא אוֹמֵר: "חֻקַּת עוֹלָם לְדֹרֹתֵיכֶם" (ויקרא כג, כא ועוד). וְנֶאֱמַר: "לֹא בַשָּׁמַיִם הִיא" (דברים ל, יב). הָא לָמַדְתָּ שֶׁאֵין נָבִיא רַשַּׁאי לְחַדֵּשׁ דָּבָר מֵעַתָּה.¹

לְפִיכָךְ אִם יַעֲמֹד אִישׁ אֶחָד, בֵּין מִיִּשְׂרָאֵל בֵּין מֵאֻמּוֹת הָעוֹלָם, וְיַעֲשֶׂה אוֹת וּמוֹפֵת וְיֹאמַר שֶׁה' שְׁלָחוֹ: א. לְהוֹסִיף מִצְוָה. ב. אוֹ לִגְרֹע מִצְוָה. ג. אוֹ לְפָרֵשׁ בְּמִצְוָה מִן הַמִּצְוֹת פֵּרוּשׁ שֶׁלֹּא שָׁמַעְנוּ מִמֹּשֶׁה. ד. אוֹ שֶׁאָמַר שֶׁאֵין הַמִּצְוֹת הָאֵלּוּ כְּדֵי לִנְהֹג בָּהֶן לְעוֹלָם אֶלָּא לְפִי שָׁעָה הָיוּ. הֲרֵי זֶה נְבִיא שֶׁקֶר וּבְחֶנֶק מִיתָתוֹ, עַל שֶׁהֵזִיד לְדַבֵּר בְּשֵׁם ה' דָּבָר אֲשֶׁר לֹא צִוָּהוּ.²

כְּשֶׁיּוֹרֶה נָבִיא – שֶׁכְּבָר הֻחְזַק לְנָבִיא – לַעֲבֹר עַל אַחַת מִכָּל מִצְוֹת הַתּוֹרָה אוֹ עַל מִצְוֹת רַבּוֹת, קַלּוֹת וַחֲמוּרוֹת, לְפִי שָׁעָה, מִצְוָה לִשְׁמֹעַ לוֹ. וְכֵן לָמְדוּ חֲכָמִים מִפִּי הַשְּׁמוּעָה: אִם יֹאמַר לְךָ נָבִיא עֲבֹר עַל דִּבְרֵי תוֹרָה כְּגוֹן אֵלִיָּהוּ בְּהַר הַכַּרְמֶל, שְׁמַע לוֹ בְּכָל דִּבְרֵי תוֹרָה חוּץ מֵעֲבוֹדַת כּוֹכָבִים. וְהוּא שֶׁתְּהֵא הַהוֹרָאָה לְפִי שָׁעָה.³

Dikduk/Leshon Nuance

• "מִצְוָה עוֹמֶדֶת לְעוֹלָם וּלְעוֹלְמֵי עוֹלָמִים": The double emphasis on "forever and ever" leaves no room for ambiguity regarding the Torah's eternal nature, predating any discussion of prophetic authority. Steinsaltz notes this emphasizes the eternality of the Torah.⁴
• "אֵין לָהּ לֹא שִׁנּוּי וְלֹא גֵּרוּעַ וְלֹא תּוֹסֶפֶת": This tri-partite negative declaration meticulously covers all forms of alteration, making the prohibition against change comprehensive.
• "הָא לָמַדְתָּ שֶׁאֵין נָבִיא רַשַּׁאי לְחַדֵּשׁ דָּבָר מֵעַתָּה": The phrase "הָא לָמַדְתָּ" (you have learned from this) emphasizes the deductive nature of this principle, flowing directly from the preceding verses. The implication of "מֵעַתָּה" (from now on) is crucial: after Sinai, the era of new, permanent legislation through prophecy is closed.
• "לְפָרֵשׁ בְּמִצְוָה מִן הַמִּצְוֹת פֵּרוּשׁ שֶׁלֹּא שָׁמַעְנוּ מִמֹּשֶׁה": This clause is particularly subtle. It's not merely about misinterpretation, but about introducing an explanation that deviates from the received tradition (Mesora) from Moshe. This touches upon the very integrity of the Oral Torah.
• "כְּשֶׁיּוֹרֶה נָבִיא – שֶׁכְּבָר הֻחְזַק לְנָבִיא": The qualification "who has already proven himself to be a prophet" is vital. It implies that only an authentically established prophet can issue a hora'at sha'ah, not someone merely claiming prophecy. This is a safeguard against charlatans.
• "לְפִי שָׁעָה": The repeated emphasis on "for a limited time" is the linchpin distinguishing a permissible prophetic command from a forbidden one. A permanent abrogation is kefira (heresy); a temporary one is hora'at sha'ah.
• "בְּכָל דִּבְרֵי תוֹרָה חוּץ מֵעֲבוֹדַת כּוֹכָבִים": This establishes the single, absolute, and non-negotiable boundary for hora'at sha'ah. Avodah Zarah can never be commanded, even temporarily. This is reiterated strongly at the end of the chapter.

Readings

Shorshei HaYam on Mishneh Torah, Foundations of the Torah 9:1:1

The Shorshei HaYam delves into several nuanced aspects of Rambam's ruling.

1. The Nature of the False Prophet's Death Penalty

Shorshei HaYam begins by clarifying Rambam's assertion that a false prophet is liable for chenek (strangulation). He explains that Rambam follows the view of Rav Chisda, as quoted in Sanhedrin 90a. The Gemara distinguishes between a prophet who prophesies in the name of Avodah Zarah (whose death penalty is sekilah – stoning, derived from "ללכת בה"⁵) and one who merely lies about other mitzvot or claims a new prophecy in God's name (whose death penalty is chenek, derived from "אך הנביא אשר יזיד לדבר דבר בשמי"⁶, where "דבר" implies a complete matter, not necessarily Avodah Zarah). Rambam's use of "על שהזיד לדבר בשם ה' אשר לא צוהו" directly references this latter verse, supporting chenek.

Shorshei HaYam then critiques the Kessef Mishneh, who states that a prophet who lies is liable for chenek because "ועליו נאמר ומת הנביא ההוא"⁷, which Kessef Mishneh links to the general concept of a false prophet. Shorshei HaYam points out that the verse "ומת הנביא ההוא" (Devarim 18:20) in its context refers to a prophet who lies about Avodah Zarah (or falsely claims prophecy), which would lead to sekilah according to the Rabbanan in Sanhedrin 90a who derive sekilah from gzeira shava "סרה סרה" from Devarim 13:6. For lying about other mitzvot, everyone agrees the death penalty is chenek derived from "אך הנביא אשר יזיד", where Avodah Zarah is not mentioned. Thus, Shorshei HaYam argues Kessef Mishneh's sourcing for chenek for a general false prophet is imprecise, as the verse Kessef Mishneh cites (Devarim 18:20) is typically associated with sekilah for Avodah Zarah or full denial of prophecy, not just lying about other mitzvot.⁸

2. Redefining "Interpreting a Mitzvah Differently"

Shorshei HaYam also addresses a difficulty raised by the Lachem Mishneh concerning Rambam's inclusion of "או לפרש במצוה מן המצות פירוש שלא שמענו ממשה" (interpreting a mitzvah in a manner not received from Moshe) as an act punishable by chenek. The Lachem Mishneh questions this, pointing to Rav Chisda's view (Sanhedrin 90a) that one who "מקיים מקצת ומבטל מקצת" (fulfills partly and abrogates partly) regarding other mitzvot is pattur (exempt from punishment). How then can an "interpretation" be so severe as to warrant chenek?

Shorshei HaYam offers a chiddush: Rambam's "interpreting a mitzvah differently" refers specifically to an interpretation that uproots the mitzvah entirely (עוקר המצוה לגמרי) even if it superficially appears to be an interpretation. For example, if a prophet claims that the mitzvah of tefillin means placing a parchment with Bereishit or the Ten Commandments written on it, this is not a partial fulfillment or abrogation, but a complete redefinition that effectively nullifies the actual mitzvah of tefillin. In such a case, the prophet is indeed chayav chenek because he is fundamentally denying the Torah. This clarifies that Rambam is not referring to minor deviations, but to fundamental subversion of the Mesora.⁹ This aligns with the idea that the verse "לא בשמים היא" prevents any prophet from fundamentally altering the content or meaning of a mitzvah as received at Sinai.

Tziunei Maharan on Mishneh Torah, Foundations of the Torah 9:1:1

The Tziunei Maharan focuses on Rambam's source for the principle that "אין נביא רשאי לחדש דבר מעתה" (a prophet is not permitted to innovate anything from now on).

1. Sourcing "Lo BaShamayim Hi"

Rambam cites "לא בשמים היא" (Devarim 30:12) as the scriptural basis for this principle. The Kessef Mishneh notes that this verse is brought in Bava Metzia 59b in the context of the Achnai oven dispute, where Rabbi Yehoshua uses it to assert that Halakha is decided by human Beit Din, not by heavenly voice or prophetic revelation. The Lachem Mishneh adds that while the Gemara also derives this principle from "אלה המצות" (Devarim 6:1), Rambam prefers "לא בשמים היא" because it is a more explicit and well-known source for the idea that Halakha is no longer subject to divine intervention from heaven.

Tziunei Maharan further elaborates on Rambam's choice by pointing to Temurah 16a. There, Rabbi Yochanan states that 3,000 halachot were forgotten during Moshe's mourning period. When Yehoshua was asked to retrieve them, he said, "לא בשמים היא." When Shmuel was asked, he said, "אלה המצות, שאין הנביא רשאי לחדש דבר מעתה." Tziunei Maharan explains that Rambam chose the verse "לא בשמים היא" because it was specifically stated to Yehoshua and Pinchas in this context of forgotten halachot, making it a powerful and direct source for the limitation on prophetic innovation, as the Lachem Mishneh suggested. This chiddush highlights Rambam's precise sourcing, opting for the most direct and contextually relevant prooftext from the Talmud, even when other verses could also support the idea.¹⁰

Seder Mishnah on Mishneh Torah, Foundations of the Torah 9:1:1

The Seder Mishnah engages in a profound theological and halachic debate, primarily with Rabbi Yosef Albo (the Sefer HaIkkarim), regarding the possibility of the Torah changing.

1. Absolute Immutability vs. Theoretical Change: A Critique of Sefer HaIkkarim

Rambam unequivocally states that the Torah is "מצוה עומדת לעולם ולעולמי עולמים. אין לה לא שינוי ולא גרוע ולא תוספת" (an eternal commandment, having no change, diminution, or addition). The Seder Mishnah highlights that Rabbi Yosef Albo, in his Sefer HaIkkarim (Ma'amar 3, Perek 14, 16, 19, 20), extensively argues against this absolute immutability, suggesting that it is possible for a single mitzvah or even many mitzvot to change. Albo posits that if a prophet could attain a level of certainty in his mission comparable to Moshe Rabbeinu's (i.e., if all of Israel heard God directly confirm his prophecy), then such a prophet could potentially abrogate or change mitzvot.

The Seder Mishnah expresses astonishment at Albo's position: "היאך אפשר להעלות על הדעת שיש מציאות שתשתנה אחת ממצות ה' ברה ומכ"ש הרבה מהם" (How can it even be conceived that there is a reality where one of God's pure commandments, let alone many, could change?). His chiddush here is a fundamental logical and theological argument: If the Torah's mitzvot could change, then how could we ever identify a false prophet? The Gemara in Sanhedrin 89b-90a states that if a prophet prophesies in God's name to abrogate even one mitzvah (other than Avodah Zarah for hora'at sha'ah), he is a false prophet liable for chenek. We know he spoke falsely "כי הוא צוה לעקור המצוה או האזהרה ההיא" (because he commanded to uproot that mitzvah or prohibition). If change were possible, we could never be certain that God didn't intend that change through this prophet. The very framework for identifying a false prophet relies on the absolute immutability of the Torah's permanent laws. Albo's view, according to Seder Mishnah, undermines the entire edifice of distinguishing true from false prophecy.¹¹

2. Reconciling Adam HaRishon and Noach on Meat Consumption

Seder Mishnah then tackles a classic kushya against the immutability of mitzvot: the prohibition of meat consumption for Adam HaRishon, which was later permitted to Noach (Bereishit 1:29, 9:3). This appears to be a change in a divine command.

Seder Mishnah discusses Albo's attempt to reconcile this by arguing that Noach's permission was given with a divine revelation (ויברך אלקים את נח ואת בניו ויאמר להם פרו ורבו וגו' לכם יהיה לאכלה וגו') that was heard directly by Noach and his sons, thus establishing a new divine will. However, Seder Mishnah critically refutes this. He argues that it's highly improbable God spoke directly to Cham, who was wicked. Instead, the phrasing "ויאמר להם" likely means God spoke to Noach for his sons, similar to "וידבר ה' אל משה ואל אהרן" where God spoke to Moshe who then conveyed it to Aharon. If Noach's sons did not hear it directly, they would still be bound by Adam HaRishon's earlier prohibition, which came from a prophet (Adam) greater than Noach. Thus, the kushya remains.

Seder Mishnah then concludes that Albo's entire premise is flawed. The initial prohibition for Adam HaRishon was not a mitzvah in the same sense as the mitzvot given at Sinai, but a specific command for Adam in his unique pre-sinful state. The permission to Noach was a new decree for a new world order, not an abrogation of a Sinai-level mitzvah. This chiddush demonstrates how seemingly similar cases must be analyzed within their specific theological and historical contexts.¹²

3. Prophetic vs. Rabbinic Authority

Seder Mishnah briefly alludes to the potential kushya of Beit Din's authority to "uproot a matter from the Torah" (la'akor davar min haTorah) for temporary purposes, as discussed in Sanhedrin 46a and Rambam himself in Hilchot Mamrim 2:9. He dismisses this as a challenge to the immutability of prophetic law, stating that Rambam himself addresses this as a rabbinic prerogative exercised le'hora'at sha'ah or le'haalot gedar (to make a fence), which is distinct from a prophet permanently changing a divine law. This distinction is crucial for maintaining the immutability of the Torah while acknowledging rabbinic legislative authority.¹³

Tzafnat Pa'neach on Mishneh Torah, Foundations of the Torah 9:1:2

The Tzafnat Pa'neach offers rich insights, particularly regarding the nuance of hora'at sha'ah and the nature of the mitzvot.

1. Hora'at Sha'ah: Public vs. Private and the Bamah of Eliyahu

Tzafnat Pa'neach explores the concept of hora'at sha'ah (temporary abrogation) in depth. He differentiates between an individual performing a hora'at sha'ah for themselves (e.g., the case of Kereitut 12b concerning Niddah in a situation of pikuach nefesh), which might not require an established prophet (muchezak navi), and a public hora'at sha'ah (like Eliyahu's sacrifice on Mount Carmel). For a public command that abrogates a Torah law, the prophet must be muchezak (already proven) to be a true prophet.¹⁴

Regarding Eliyahu's sacrifice on Mount Carmel, which was performed outside the Temple in Jerusalem (a violation of issur shochtei chutz – offering sacrifices outside the appointed place), Tzafnat Pa'neach notes different interpretations. Some sources (Yerushalmi Megillah 1:1, Sifrei Devarim 84) suggest that offering sacrifices on a bamah (private altar) was permissible by a prophet's command even during the Temple era, making it a valid sacrifice. Others consider it a temporary suspension of the issur shochtei chutz. Tzafnat Pa'neach discusses the Gemara in Zevachim 108b and 119a regarding Shiloh and bamot. He ultimately leans towards the understanding that Eliyahu's act was a unique hora'at sha'ah by a proven prophet, which made the otherwise forbidden act a mitzvah for that specific moment and purpose (disproving Ba'al prophets). This isn't merely a suspension of punishment but a temporary change in the halachic status of the act itself, making it a valid korban. This highlights the profound authority of hora'at sha'ah when issued by a true prophet.¹⁵

2. The Nature of Torah Laws: Din vs. Metziut

Tzafnat Pa'neach also touches upon a fascinating philosophical distinction: whether Torah laws (especially shiurim – measurements) are a din (a legal decree) or a metziut (an inherent reality). For instance, are the shiurim for karet an absolute measure established at Sinai, or do they adapt to changing circumstances or individual capacity? This discussion, while not directly on the prophet's role, underpins the nature of the Torah that the prophet interacts with. If a law is purely a din, a prophet might issue a hora'at sha'ah that temporarily overrides it. If it's a metziut, an inherent quality, then temporary abrogation might be understood differently or be more limited. He suggests that if the law is a din, then those who heard it from Moshe are bound by that din. If it's about metziut or pe'ulah (action/effect), then in addition to the din, one might also be liable for transgressing a prophet's command. This complex distinction helps frame the power and limitations of prophetic decrees.¹⁶

Friction

Kushya 1: The Possibility of Torah Change – Sefer HaIkkarim vs. Rambam

The most profound friction point in this sugya arises from the fundamental disagreement between Rambam and Rabbi Yosef Albo (Sefer HaIkkarim) concerning the very possibility of the Torah's permanent change. Rambam unequivocally states: "דבר ברור ומפורש בתורה, שהיא מצוה עומדת לעולם ולעולמי עולמים. אין לה לא שינוי ולא גרוע ולא תוספת" (Foundations of the Torah 9:1). This establishes an absolute, unbreakable eternity for the Torah's mitzvot. Albo, however, in his Sefer HaIkkarim (Ma'amar 3, Perek 14, 16, 19, 20), posits that while the Torah's general principles are eternal, specific mitzvot could theoretically be changed or abrogated by a prophet whose mission was confirmed by God with the same level of public, direct revelation as Moshe Rabbeinu. Albo argues that the Ani Ma'amin of netzach Yisrael (eternity of Israel) implies the eternity of Torah, but not necessarily of every specific mitzvah. For Albo, the immutability of Torah is conditional on a certain level of revelation.

The kushya for Rambam's system is: If a prophet could arise with such a powerful, Moshe-like revelation, and God did command him to change a mitzvah, then would we still call him a "false prophet"? Albo's position attempts to create a theoretical space for divine flexibility, even within the post-Sinai revelation.

Terutz 1: The Seder Mishnah's Logical Necessity of Absolute Immutability

The Seder Mishnah (on Rambam, Foundations 9:1:1) vehemently rejects Albo's hypothesis, arguing that it creates an insurmountable logical and theological problem for the entire system of prophecy and identifying false prophets. His terutz is based on the following:

1. The Criterion for a False Prophet: The Gemara (Sanhedrin 90a) clearly states that a prophet who commands the abrogation of a mitzvah is a false prophet and is liable for chenek. The Mesora is that we know he is lying precisely because he commands something contrary to the established Torah. As Seder Mishnah asks: "היאך אפשר לומר כן דאנן סהדי שהוא נביא שקר בודאי כיון שהוא אפשר במציאות שישתנו המצות והאזהרות שעד עתה הי' דבר פלוני מצוה או אזהרה, ושוב מחר ואיננו עוד מצוה או אזהרה, וכיון שהוא זה דבר אפשרי איכה נדע את הדבר אשר לא דברו הש"י ושבשקר דברו הנביא?" (How can we say that we are witnesses that he is certainly a false prophet if it is possible for mitzvot to change, such that what was a mitzvah today is not tomorrow? If this is possible, how do we know what God did not command, and that the prophet spoke falsely?). If the Torah could change, then we would never have an objective standard to declare a prophet false. Every purported change could potentially be a legitimate divine command.
2. The "Lo BaShamayim Hi" Principle: Rambam explicitly uses "לא בשמים היא" (Devarim 30:12) to derive that "אין נביא רשאי לחדש דבר מעתה" (a prophet is not permitted to innovate anything from now on). This principle, as elucidated in Temurah 16a and Bava Metzia 59b, removes the Torah from direct heavenly intervention for new legislation. While hora'at sha'ah is possible, it is a temporary suspension or exception, not a permanent abrogation or change to the Torah's inherent law. The Seder Mishnah highlights that the very ability of Chazal to determine Halakha without recourse to prophets or heavenly voices (as in the Achnai oven) relies on this fundamental premise.
3. Moshe's Unique Revelation: The Seder Mishnah emphasizes that Moshe Rabbeinu's prophecy was unique in that all of Israel heard God speaking to Moshe and confirming his prophecy. This established the Torah's authority forever. Any subsequent prophet, even with signs and wonders, cannot replicate this level of direct, collective divine attestation to a new or changed law. To claim such a thing would be to deny the uniqueness and finality of Sinai.

Therefore, the Seder Mishnah concludes that the absolute immutability of the Torah, as taught by Rambam, is not merely a theological assertion but a logical necessity for the very coherence of Jewish law and the ability to discern true from false prophecy. Without this, the entire framework collapses.¹⁷

Kushya 2: The Scope of "Interpreting a Mitzvah Differently" – Lachem Mishneh vs. Rambam

Rambam states that a prophet who comes "לפרש במצוה מן המצות פירוש שלא שמענו ממשה" (to explain a mitzvah in a manner which differs from the tradition received from Moses) is a false prophet liable for chenek (Foundations 9:1:1). The Lachem Mishneh (on Rambam, Foundations 9:1:1) finds this puzzling. He references Rav Chisda's view in Sanhedrin 90a, which distinguishes between a prophet who completely uproots a mitzvah (in which case he is liable) and one who "מקיים מקצת ומבטל מקצת" (fulfills partly and abrogates partly) regarding other mitzvot (i.e., not Avodah Zarah), in which case he is pattur (exempt from punishment). The Lachem Mishneh argues that "interpreting a mitzvah differently" often amounts to fulfilling it partially and abrogating partially. For instance, if a prophet says to do kiddush on wine but with a different beracha, is that a complete abrogation or a partial one? If it's partial, why would it lead to chenek? The Lachem Mishneh implies that such an interpretation might not be considered a complete uprooting, and thus, according to Rav Chisda, should not incur a death penalty.

Terutz 2: Shorshei HaYam's Clarification of "Uprooting the Mitzvah Entirely"

Shorshei HaYam (on Rambam, Foundations 9:1:1) addresses the Lachem Mishneh's kushya by offering a precise interpretation of Rambam's words. His terutz is that Rambam's phrase "לפרש במצוה... פירוש שלא שמענו ממשה" does not refer to a minor deviation or partial fulfillment. Rather, it refers to an interpretation that, in effect, "עוקר המצוה לגמרי" (uproots the mitzvah entirely).

Shorshei HaYam provides a vivid example: "כגון שהוא מפרש דמצות תפילין פירושו שנניח פ' בראשית או עשרת הדברות כתובים על הנייר וכיוצא בזה במצות לולב וציצית" (For example, if he interprets the mitzvah of tefillin to mean that we should place a chapter of Bereishit or the Ten Commandments written on paper [on our heads/arms], or similarly with the mitzvot of Lulav and Tzitzit). In such a case, the prophet is not merely altering a detail; he is fundamentally redefining the essence of the mitzvah in a way that is utterly foreign to the Mesora. This is not "מקיים מקצת ומבטל מקצת" in the sense of a partial fulfillment, but rather a complete nullification of the actual mitzvah by substituting it with an entirely different practice under the same name.

Therefore, according to Shorshei HaYam, Rambam's position remains consistent with the Gemara. A prophet who "interprets" a mitzvah in such a way that it is entirely disconnected from its traditional understanding and practice is indeed "uprooting the mitzvah entirely," and thus rightly liable for chenek. This rigorous analysis clarifies the precise threshold at which a prophet's "interpretation" crosses the line from permissible exposition to heretical abrogation.¹⁸

Intertext

1. The Paradox of "Lo BaShamayim Hi" and Rabbinic Authority

The Rambam's reliance on "לא בשמים היא" (Devarim 30:12) to assert that "אין נביא רשאי לחדש דבר מעתה" (a prophet is not permitted to innovate anything from now on) finds its most famous Talmudic explication in Bava Metzia 59b. The Gemara recounts the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and the Sages over the Achnai oven. Rabbi Eliezer, to prove his point, called for various miracles, and even a Bat Kol (heavenly voice) proclaimed, "מה לכם אצל רבי אליעזר שהלכה כמותו בכל מקום!" (Why do you dispute Rabbi Eliezer, for the law is always in accordance with him!). Yet, Rabbi Yehoshua famously retorted, "לא בשמים היא!" – interpreting the verse to mean that the Torah has been given to humanity, and its interpretation and application are now within the purview of the Sages, not subject to heavenly intervention or prophetic decree.

This parallels Rambam's sugya directly. While Rambam applies "לא בשמים היא" to limit prophetic innovation, the Gemara extends this to even direct divine pronouncements (like a Bat Kol), establishing the ultimate authority of the Chachamim (Sages) in interpreting and legislating Halakha. This is further seen in Temurah 16a, where it states that 3,000 halachot were forgotten during Moshe's mourning, and when Yehoshua was asked to restore them, he replied, "לא בשמים היא." This underscores that even divinely revealed halachot, once forgotten, cannot be unilaterally restored by a prophet, let alone new ones introduced. This reinforces the post-Sinai closure of the prophetic legislative channel.¹⁹

2. Prophetic Hora'at Sha'ah vs. Rabbinic Hora'at Sha'ah

Rambam allows a proven prophet to command the temporary abrogation of a Torah mitzvah (except Avodah Zarah) as a hora'at sha'ah, citing Eliyahu on Mount Carmel (Melachim I 18) as the paradigm. This seems to grant significant power to a prophet. However, a crucial intertextual comparison arises with Rambam's own Hilchot Mamrim 2:9:

וּבֵית דִּין יֵשׁ לָהֶם לַעֲקֹר דָּבָר מִן הַתּוֹרָה עַל פִּי שָׁעָה כְּדֵי לַעֲשׂוֹת סְיָג לַתּוֹרָה אוֹ כְּדֵי לְחַזֵּק הַדָּת וּכְדֵי לְהַעֲמִיד יִשְׂרָאֵל בְּדָתָם כְּמוֹ שֶׁאָמַר אֵלִיָּהוּ בְּהַר הַכַּרְמֶל בְּבֵית דִּין שֶׁלּוֹ הִקְרִיב קָרְבָּן בַּחוּץ לְפִי שָׁעָה.²⁰

Here, Rambam attributes a similar power to Beit Din – to "uproot a matter from the Torah for a temporary period" (la'akor davar min haTorah al pi sha'ah). He even cites Eliyahu on Mount Carmel as an example, implying Eliyahu acted with the authority of a Beit Din (or that his prophetic hora'at sha'ah is analogous to a rabbinic one).

The tension lies in the source and nature of this authority. A prophet acts by direct divine command. A Beit Din acts by rabbinic interpretation and enactment, rooted in their understanding of Torah principles and communal needs (e.g., le'haalot gedar – to make a fence, le'chazek ha'dat – to strengthen religion). This distinction is critical:

• Prophetic Hora'at Sha'ah: Derives from a direct divine command, requiring a muchezak navi, and is binding on all who hear it. Its purpose is specific to the divine will for that moment.
• Rabbinic Hora'at Sha'ah: Derives from rabbinic authority, enacted by a Beit Din, and is binding on the community. Its purpose is to safeguard or strengthen Halakha itself, even if it involves a temporary suspension of a lesser mitzvah to prevent a greater transgression.

The Seder Mishnah (on Foundations 9:1:1) briefly touches on this, noting that Rambam himself resolves the apparent contradiction. The power of Beit Din to make hora'at sha'ah is a rabbinic legislative power, not a prophetic one. It operates within the framework of Lo BaShamayim Hi, asserting the Sages' authority to manage Halakha for the sake of its observance, rather than claiming new divine revelation. This parallel clarifies that while both prophets and Beit Din can issue temporary overrides, their sources of authority, scope, and underlying rationale are distinct, all while upholding the immutable core of the Torah.

Psak/Practice

The principles laid out by Rambam in Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah 9 are not merely theoretical but form foundational tenets of Halakha and Jewish theological meta-psak.

1. Immutability of Torah as an Ikkar Emunah (Fundamental Belief): The absolute and eternal nature of the Torah, without change, addition, or diminishment, is considered an Ikkar Emunah (fundamental belief) in Judaism. Rambam lists this as one of his Thirteen Principles of Faith.²¹ Any claim of a new, permanent mitzvah or abrogation of an existing one, even with signs and wonders, is automatically deemed false prophecy and heresy. This provides a clear heuristic for evaluating any religious claim that purports to supersede or alter the Torah given at Sinai. The psak is definitive: such a claim leads to chenek.
2. Limitations on Prophetic Authority: A prophet's role is not to legislate new permanent Halakha, but to reinforce existing Torah, to offer warnings, exhortations, and sometimes, to issue temporary commands (hora'at sha'ah). The verse "לא בשמים היא" (Devarim 30:12) serves as the ultimate boundary. This means that after Sinai, the Beit Din (Rabbinic court) holds the authority to interpret and apply Halakha, not individual prophets based on new revelations. This centralizes authority in the Chachamim and their mesora.
3. The Hora'at Sha'ah Exception: A true, proven prophet can command the temporary transgression of a Torah mitzvah (e.g., Eliyahu on Carmel). Disobeying such a command is punishable by Mita Bidei Shamayim (death at the hand of Heaven). This is a crucial practical point: it allows for divine intervention in extraordinary circumstances, but always within strict limits. The key elements are:
   • "Proven Prophet" (שֶׁכְּבָר הֻחְזַק לְנָבִיא): The prophet must already be established as true; a sign or wonder alone is insufficient if the message contradicts the Torah's immutability.
   • "Temporary" (לְפִי שָׁעָה): The command must be limited in time and purpose. A permanent abrogation is grounds for execution.
   • "Except Avodah Zarah" (חוּץ מֵעֲבוֹדַת כּוֹכָבִים): This is the single, non-negotiable boundary. No prophet, no matter how great or proven, can ever command Avodah Zarah, even temporarily. Such a prophet is unequivocally a false prophet, and any miracles performed are deemed sorcery.²² This forms an absolute safeguard against idolatry.
4. Meta-Psak Heuristics: These principles provide a framework for navigating religious claims and movements throughout history. Any group or individual claiming a "new Torah," a "supersession" of mitzvot, or a permanent change to Halakha (e.g., many Messianic movements, or historical instances like Sabbateanism) is, by definition, operating outside the bounds of normative Jewish belief as codified by Rambam and rooted in Chazal. The immutability of Torah ensures continuity and stability in Halakha across generations.

Takeaway

The Torah, as given at Sinai, is eternally immutable, establishing the unshakeable foundation of Jewish law. Prophets can reinforce, exhort, and even temporarily suspend mitzvot (except Avodah Zarah) via hora'at sha'ah, but they cannot permanently alter or add to Halakha, as "לא בשמים היא" unequivocally reserves legislative authority to the Sages.

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¹ Mishneh Torah, Foundations of the Torah 9:1. ² Ibid. 9:1:2. ³ Ibid. 9:1:3. ⁴ Steinsaltz on Mishneh Torah, Foundations of the Torah 9:1:1 s.v. shehi mitzvah omedet l'olam. ⁵ Sanhedrin 90a, Rashi s.v. macheloket. ⁶ Devarim 18:20. ⁷ Ibid. 18:20. ⁸ Shorshei HaYam on Mishneh Torah, Foundations of the Torah 9:1:1 s.v. shoresh mitat navi hasheker. ⁹ Ibid. s.v. v'harav lacham she'tammah al divrei R'. ¹⁰ Tziunei Maharan on Mishneh Torah, Foundations of the Torah 9:1:1 s.v. davar barur u'meforash baTorah. ¹¹ Seder Mishnah on Mishneh Torah, Foundations of the Torah 9:1:1 s.v. davar barur u'meforash baTorah. ¹² Ibid. s.v. baram gam im nevater. ¹³ Ibid. s.v. v'od kasheh l'anid al ba'al Sefer HaIkkarim. ¹⁴ Tzafnat Pa'neach on Mishneh Torah, Foundations of the Torah 9:1:2 [from the second edition] s.v. davar barur koo. ¹⁵ Ibid. s.v. davar barur koo (referring to the extended discussion on Eliyahu and Bamot). ¹⁶ Ibid. s.v. davar barur koo (referring to the discussion of shiurim and din vs metziut). ¹⁷ Seder Mishnah on Mishneh Torah, Foundations of the Torah 9:1:1 s.v. davar barur u'meforash baTorah. ¹⁸ Shorshei HaYam on Mishneh Torah, Foundations of the Torah 9:1:1 s.v. v'harav lacham she'tammah al divrei R'. ¹⁹ See Bava Metzia 59b; Temurah 16a; Tziunei Maharan on Mishneh Torah, Foundations of the Torah 9:1:1 s.v. davar barur u'meforash baTorah. ²⁰ Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Mamrim 2:9. ²¹ Mishneh Torah, Introduction to Chelek (Commentary on Mishnah Sanhedrin, Perek Chelek), Principle 9: "That this Torah will not be exchanged, and there will be no other Torah from God." ²² Mishneh Torah, Foundations of the Torah 9:4.