Mishneh Torah, Kings and Wars 10

Welcome back to our journey through Rambam's Mishneh Torah. Today, we're diving into a fascinating and often challenging chapter: Kings and Wars, Chapter 10. This isn't just about ancient monarchs; it's a profound exploration of the legal and ethical framework governing the world beyond Sinai, specifically the Bnei Noach – the Children of Noah.

Hook

What's truly non-obvious here, and perhaps a little unsettling, is the Rambam's seemingly contradictory stance on a Noachide's interaction with mitzvot. On the one hand, a Noachide who intentionally studies Torah or observes Shabbat is "obligated to die," yet if they desire to perform other Torah mitzvot "in order to receive reward," we "should not prevent them." This isn't just a minor legal detail; it reveals a fundamental tension in how Judaism understands universal morality, the particularity of revelation, and the very nature of divine command. Why such a stark difference, and what does it tell us about the boundaries of religious practice?

Context

To truly appreciate this chapter, we need a brief historical and conceptual backdrop. The idea of Bnei Noach – non-Jews obligated in a set of seven universal commandments given to Noah – is foundational in Jewish thought. These laws (prohibitions against idolatry, blasphemy, murder, theft, sexual immorality, eating flesh torn from a living animal, and the positive command to establish courts of justice) represent a universal moral code, essential for the functioning of any civilized society. This concept developed extensively in the Talmud, particularly in Tractates Sanhedrin and Avodah Zarah, and Rambam, writing in 12th-century Egypt, is here codifying these discussions into a clear, systematic legal framework. His work, the Mishneh Torah, aims to present the entirety of Jewish law in a concise, accessible manner, often without explicitly detailing the Talmudic debates that underpin his rulings. However, the very act of codifying these laws for non-Jews reflects a profound engagement with the universal implications of Torah and Israel's role in guiding humanity. It's a vision of a structured world order, not just for Jews, but for all of humanity, governed by divine principles. This chapter, therefore, isn't just an academic exercise; it's a blueprint for Jewish interaction with and understanding of the non-Jewish world, asserting a universal moral standard alongside a particularistic religious path. It addresses questions of justice, punishment, conversion, and even charity, providing a comprehensive, if sometimes stark, picture of the Noachide covenant.

Text Snapshot

Let's zoom in on a few lines that capture some of these surprising distinctions:

"A Noachide who inadvertently violates one of his commandments is exempt from all punishment with the exception of a person who kills inadvertently... If, however, one knew that she was his colleague's wife, but did not know that she was forbidden to him or it occurred to him that this act was permitted or one killed without knowing that it is forbidden to kill, he is considered close to having sinned intentionally and is executed. This is not considered as an inadvertent violation. For he should have learned the obligations incumbent upon him and did not." (MT, Kings and Wars 10:1)

"A gentile who studies the Torah is obligated to die. They should only be involved in the study of their seven mitzvot. Similarly, a gentile who rests, even on a weekday, observing that day as a Sabbath, is obligated to die... The general principle governing these matters is: They are not to be allowed to originate a new religion or create mitzvot for themselves based on their own decisions." (MT, Kings and Wars 10:9)

"We should not prevent a Noachide who desires to perform one of the Torah's mitzvot in order to receive reward from doing so, provided he performs it as required. If he brings an animal to be sacrificed as a burnt offering, we should receive it." (MT, Kings and Wars 10:10)

Close Reading

Insight 1: The Nuance of "Inadvertent" Violation and the Weight of Knowledge

The Rambam opens with a critical distinction regarding inadvertent violations by a Noachide. While generally exempt from punishment for unintentional transgressions, there's a significant exception: "with the exception of a person who kills inadvertently" (MT 10:1). This immediate carve-out for homicide signals a unique gravity. But the more profound point comes next, where Rambam elaborates on what doesn't qualify as inadvertent for a Noachide: "If, however, one knew that she was his colleague's wife, but did not know that she was forbidden to him or it occurred to him that this act was permitted or one killed without knowing that it is forbidden to kill, he is considered close to having sinned intentionally and is executed. This is not considered as an inadvertent violation. For he should have learned the obligations incumbent upon him and did not." (MT 10:1).

This is a startlingly strict standard. For a Jew, ignorance of a prohibition (שוגג מחמת טעות) often mitigates punishment, and certainly, not knowing that an act is forbidden (rather than just not knowing the details of the act) would typically be considered an inadvertent violation requiring a sin-offering, not capital punishment. Here, for a Noachide, simply not knowing that murder or adultery is forbidden – a fundamental aspect of their universal covenant – is treated "close to having sinned intentionally" (קרוב למזיד), leading to execution. The reasoning is crucial: "For he should have learned the obligations incumbent upon him and did not." This establishes a proactive duty of knowledge for Noachides regarding their seven commandments. It implies that these laws are so fundamental and universally accessible (through reason or basic societal structure, in addition to tradition) that ignorance of their prohibitory nature is itself a culpable failure.

The Steinsaltz commentary on this point (Steinsaltz on Mishneh Torah, Kings and Wars 10:1:2) elaborates on the unique situation of the inadvertent killer. It explains that "when a person kills inadvertently, a relative of the deceased ('the redeemer of the blood') can kill the murderer." For Jews, cities of refuge provide asylum, preventing the redeemer of the blood from acting. However, for a Noachide, "there is no law of cities of refuge" – they offer no protection. Thus, if the redeemer of the blood kills the Noachide inadvertent murderer, he is not executed. This highlights that the Noachide system lacks the complex mitigating mechanisms present in Jewish law, emphasizing a more direct, perhaps more primal, form of justice, especially concerning the sanctity of life. The Rambam's definition of "inadvertent" for Noachides elevates the obligation to know fundamental moral laws to an extremely high standard, reflecting a universal expectation of basic ethical awareness. It's not just about what you do, but what you should have known.

Insight 2: The Prohibitions of Innovation and the Strictures on Noachide Practice

Perhaps the most striking and often debated section of this chapter concerns what Noachides are forbidden from doing, specifically studying Torah and observing Shabbat. Rambam states unambiguously: "A gentile who studies the Torah is obligated to die. They should only be involved in the study of their seven mitzvot. Similarly, a gentile who rests, even on a weekday, observing that day as a Sabbath, is obligated to die. Needless to say, he is obligated for that punishment if he creates a festival for himself." (MT 10:9). The underlying principle is then articulated: "They are not to be allowed to originate a new religion or create mitzvot for themselves based on their own decisions. They may either become righteous converts and accept all the mitzvot or retain their statutes without adding or detracting from them." (MT 10:9).

This prohibition against Noachides studying the entire Torah or observing Shabbat is critical. It defines the boundary between the universal Noachide covenant and the particularistic Sinaitic covenant. The Torah, in its entirety, is understood as the unique inheritance of Israel. While Noachides are obligated in their seven laws, delving into the broader corpus of Jewish law or adopting Jewish ritual practices like Shabbat observance is seen not as an act of piety, but as an infringement upon this boundary, a "creation of a new religion." This is not merely a technical prohibition; it's a theological statement about distinct roles and covenants. The Ohr Sameach commentary (Ohr Sameach on Mishneh Torah, Kings and Wars 10:1:1) sheds further light on the varying degrees of punishment for Noachide violations. It explains that Noachides are only executed for those mitzvot that God explicitly commanded their prophets to transmit, and which were later confirmed to Moses. For other mitzvot that were only revealed through Moses (like certain aspects of milah or the specific prohibition of cross-breeding), they are not executed, only warned. This distinction, though applied by the Ohr Sameach to capital punishment, underscores the idea that certain mitzvot have a deeper, more ancient, and universally binding force, while others are particular to the Jewish covenant. The prohibition on Torah study and Shabbat for Noachides falls into the category of creating new mitzvot or blurring the lines of the covenant. It is not about suppressing knowledge or piety, but about maintaining the integrity of distinct divine paths. The Torah for a Noachide is not a means to explore novel religious practices; it's a guide to their specific, universal obligations.

Insight 3: The Tension Between Universal Piety and Particularistic Boundaries in Charity

The tension between universalism and particularism resurfaces powerfully in the discussion of charity and interaction with non-Jews. Rambam makes an important distinction: "A Noachide who observes the seven mitzvot gives charity, we should accept it from him. It appears to me that it should be given to the Jewish poor for the Noachide may derive his sustenance from the Jews and they are commanded to support him if necessary. In contrast, if an idolater gives charity, we should accept it from him and give it to the gentile poor." (MT 10:10). This passage differentiates between a righteous Noachide (who observes the seven laws) and an idolater. While charity is accepted from both, its ultimate destination is different, reflecting a hierarchy of obligation and relationship.

However, the Teshuvah MeYirah commentary (Teshuvah MeYirah on Mishneh Torah, Kings and Wars 10:10:1) raises significant questions about Rambam's stance here. It challenges the Rambam's apparent implication that Noachides are not obligated in the mitzvah of charity, citing the Talmud in Sanhedrin 57a which states "Bnei Noach are obligated in charity." If they are obligated, why does Rambam speak of them giving charity rather than fulfilling an obligation? Furthermore, the Teshuvah MeYirah questions the Rambam's distinction regarding the recipient of the charity. If an idolater gives charity, and we accept it for darchei shalom (for the sake of peace), why would we direct it to gentile poor? And why would we not direct a Noachide's charity to the Noachide poor? The commentary points out that if accepting charity from an idolater is merely for darchei shalom, it implies that it's not a genuine fulfillment of a mitzvah on their part, and that Jews are generally forbidden from "doing good" for idolaters ("לא מעלין ולא מורידין"). This creates a deep tension: are Noachides truly commanded in charity? If so, why does Rambam treat it differently than other mitzvot? The Teshuvah MeYirah suggests that perhaps the Rambam means that while Noachides are obligated in charity, it doesn't carry the same atoning power as for Jews, and thus Jewish courts are not "obligated" to accept it from them in the same way.

This discussion profoundly shapes our understanding of the nuances of interaction. While the Rambam permits accepting olah (burnt offerings) even from idolaters (as noted by the Teshuvah MeYirah citing Rambam's Hilchot Ma'aseh HaKorbanot), charity presents a more complex case, especially if it's seen as providing atonement or spiritual benefit. The Rambam's practical ruling to direct the Noachide's charity to Jewish poor, justified by the Noachide's potential dependence on Jews for sustenance ("he may derive his sustenance from the Jews and they are commanded to support him if necessary"), is a pragmatic solution that also reinforces the unique relationship between Israel and the righteous Noachide, a relationship not extended to the idolater. The tension remains: how do we balance the universal call to kindness and peace (darchei shalom) with the distinct legal and theological boundaries that define Jewish identity and responsibility?

Two Angles

The chapter presents several opportunities to explore different interpretive angles, but let's focus on two key areas where commentators engage deeply with Rambam's concise rulings: the nature of capital punishment for Noachides and the implications of charity from non-Jews.

Angle 1: The Scope of Capital Punishment for Noachide Violations (Ohr Sameach vs. the Text's Implied Simplicity)

Rambam states throughout the chapter that Noachides are "executed" for various violations, implying a straightforward application of capital punishment for transgression of their seven laws (e.g., murder, certain sexual offenses, blasphemy, idolatry). However, the Ohr Sameach (Ohr Sameach on Mishneh Torah, Kings and Wars 10:1:1) introduces a profound nuance that complicates this apparent simplicity. He argues that Noachides are not executed for all seven mitzvot. Instead, they are only liable for capital punishment for those mitzvot that were explicitly commanded to them through their prophets and then later affirmed to Moses at Sinai as applicable to them. For mitzvot that were only revealed to Moses and subsequently understood to apply to Noachides (e.g., the prohibition of cross-breeding animals or grafting trees, or even certain aspects of milah for Keturah's descendants), the punishment is merely a warning, not execution.

This distinction highlights a fundamental difference in how divine commands are transmitted and their resulting legal force for Noachides. The Ohr Sameach posits that the direct prophetic command to humanity carries the weight of capital punishment, whereas the expansion of Noachide law through the Sinaitic revelation to Moses, while binding, does not carry the same ultimate penalty. This perspective adds layers of complexity to Rambam's seemingly categorical statements about Noachide capital punishment, suggesting that the precise historical and theological origin of each command impacts its penal consequence. It moves beyond a simple "seven laws = execution" model to a more nuanced understanding of the divine legislative process for non-Jews.

Angle 2: The Obligation and Acceptance of Charity from Non-Jews (Rambam's View vs. Teshuvah MeYirah's Challenge)

Rambam, in MT 10:10, distinguishes between a "Noachide who observes the seven mitzvot" and an "idolater" regarding charity. He states that charity from the former should be accepted and given to Jewish poor, while charity from the latter should be accepted (for darchei shalom) but given to gentile poor. This implies a difference in the nature of their giving and the Jewish community's responsibility towards them. Rambam's justification for directing the Noachide's charity to Jews ("for the Noachide may derive his sustenance from the Jews and they are commanded to support him if necessary") suggests a reciprocal relationship and a communal obligation.

The Teshuvah MeYirah (Teshuvah MeYirah on Mishneh Torah, Kings and Wars 10:10:1) launches a comprehensive critique of Rambam's position. Firstly, it challenges the implicit notion that Noachides are not obligated in charity, citing Sanhedrin 57a, which explicitly states they are. If so, why does Rambam treat their charity as a voluntary act rather than a fulfillment of a command? Secondly, the Teshuvah MeYirah questions the rationale for directing the Noachide's charity to Jews, especially if the giver's intent was for gentile poor. This raises concerns of gezel (theft) or misdirection of funds. Furthermore, the Teshuvah MeYirah grapples with the general principle that Jews are not to "do good" for idolaters ("לא מעלין ולא מורידין"). If accepting charity from idolaters is only for darchei shalom, and charity brings atonement or spiritual benefit, then why should Jews facilitate this for idolaters?

The Teshuvah MeYirah suggests that Rambam's distinction might be based on whether the charity provides atonement for the giver. For idolaters, it might not atone, so accepting it for darchei shalom is permissible. For a righteous Noachide (or ger toshav), however, whose life Jews are commanded to sustain, accepting their charity and even directing it to Jewish poor becomes justifiable due to this reciprocal obligation and the overall positive relationship. The commentary ultimately finds Rambam's position "unfathomable" and "perplexing," highlighting a deep disagreement over the precise nature of Noachide obligation in charity, the ethics of accepting it, and the underlying theological implications of "doing good" for non-Jews. This reflects a tension between the universal call for kindness and the particularistic boundaries of Jewish law and communal responsibility, a tension that remains a vibrant area of discourse.

Practice Implication

This chapter, particularly the Rambam's distinction regarding charity and the Teshuvah MeYirah's extensive critique, has profound implications for how we, as Jews, interact with the non-Jewish world today, especially concerning acts of kindness and philanthropy.

Rambam states that if a "Noachide who observes the seven mitzvot gives charity, we should accept it from him," and "it appears to me that it should be given to the Jewish poor for the Noachide may derive his sustenance from the Jews and they are commanded to support him if necessary." In contrast, "if an idolater gives charity, we should accept it from him and give it to the gentile poor." This presents a clear, albeit nuanced, directive: accept charity from both, but the destination depends on the giver's status. The underlying principle seems to be that a righteous Noachide is part of a broader moral-social order that Jews are commanded to support, and their charity can, in a sense, feed back into the Jewish community that sustains them. Idolaters, while deserving of peace and basic human dignity (darchei shalom), do not share this specific reciprocal relationship.

The Teshuvah MeYirah's challenge, however, forces us to confront deeper questions about the nature of charity from non-Jews. If, as the Talmud implies, Noachides are commanded in charity, then their act is a fulfillment of a divine command. If so, why would Jews redirect it from the giver's likely intent (perhaps for their own poor) to Jewish poor, simply because Jews sustain them? This raises issues of agency and respect for the giver's religious fulfillment. Furthermore, the Teshuvah MeYirah highlights the general halakhic principle that Jews "do not assist or promote" idolaters ("לא מעלין ולא מורידין") if their actions lead to spiritual benefit or atonement for them. If charity does provide such benefit, then accepting it from an idolater, even for darchei shalom, becomes problematic.

In contemporary practice, this translates into a constant navigation of ethical and halakhic boundaries. When a non-Jewish individual or organization offers a charitable donation, especially to a Jewish institution, we must consider:

1. The Giver's Status: Is the giver understood to be a righteous Noachide (observing the seven laws) or an idolater? In a diverse modern society, this distinction is rarely clear-cut. Most non-Jews are not actively idolatrous in the classical sense, but neither do they explicitly accept the seven Noachide laws. How do we categorize them?
2. The Giver's Intent: Does the giver specify the recipient (e.g., "for the poor of your community," or "for general charitable purposes")? Rambam's ruling seems to grant the Jewish court discretion for the Noachide's charity, but what if the giver explicitly states a different intent?
3. The Principle of Darchei Shalom: The Rambam explicitly states that we "visit the gentiles when ill, to bury their dead... and support their poor... for the sake of peace" (MT 10:12). This broad principle of darchei shalom often overrides other concerns in interfaith relations. Does accepting and directing charity in a way that aligns with the giver's likely intent, even if they are an "idolater" in the classical sense, fall under darchei shalom? Many contemporary poskim lean towards a more inclusive interpretation of darchei shalom in such matters, emphasizing maintaining good relations and fostering mutual respect.

Therefore, while Rambam provides a framework, the Teshuvah MeYirah's questions remind us that the application is complex. Today, many Jewish institutions accept donations from non-Jews and often direct them to causes that align with the donor's wishes, understanding that fostering positive interfaith relations and accepting good deeds from all people is a paramount value, falling under the broad rubric of darchei shalom and "God is good to all and His mercies extend over all His works" (Psalms 145:9), as Rambam himself concludes this chapter. The challenge is to uphold halakha while living in a pluralistic world, seeking to balance strict legal definitions with the imperative of universal human dignity and peace.

Chevruta Mini

1. Rambam rules that a Noachide who studies Torah or observes Shabbat is "obligated to die," yet a Noachide who is "forced by another person to violate one of his commandments is permitted to transgress. Even if he is forced to worship false gods, he may worship them. For Noachides are not commanded to sanctify God's name." What tension emerges from these two rulings? What does it tell us about the core purpose of Noachide law versus the unique obligations of the Jewish people?
2. The Teshuvah MeYirah strongly challenges Rambam's apparent implication that Noachides are not obligated in charity. If Noachides are obligated in charity, how might this change our understanding of Rambam's directives on accepting and distributing their donations? Does it make the Jewish court's redirection of a righteous Noachide's charity to Jewish poor more or less problematic, and what are the tradeoffs in respecting the giver's intent versus the Jewish community's needs?

Takeaway

Rambam's Mishneh Torah, Kings and Wars 10, meticulously defines the boundaries and obligations of the Noachide covenant, revealing a complex legal framework that balances universal morality with particularistic revelation, where even inadvertent knowledge and the act of charitable giving carry profound theological and practical implications for Jewish-gentile interaction.