Mishneh Torah, Kings and Wars 9

Sugya Map

The Rambam's Hilchot Melachim U'Milchamot, Perek 9, delineates the Seven Noachide Laws, their historical development, and practical ramifications.

Core Issues

• Origin of Mitzvot Bnei Noach: The text explores which mitzvot were commanded to Adam, Noah, and the Patriarchs, ultimately culminating in the Torah given at Sinai.
• Scope of Liability: Precisely defining the parameters of each mitzvah for Bnei Noach and the specific capital punishments for their transgression.
• Distinction between Noachide and Jewish Halacha: Highlighting instances where the law for a Ben Noach differs from that for a Jew, particularly regarding arayot, theft, ever min ha'chai, and judicial process.

Nafka Mina(s)

• Capital Punishment: The conditions and methods of execution for Bnei Noach transgressing these laws (e.g., decapitation for all capital offenses, single witness/judge, no hatra'ah).
• Specific Prohibitions: Detailed differences in application, such as ever min ha'chai from birds (permitted to Noachides), minimum monetary value for theft (not applicable to Noachides), and various arayot nuances.
• Historical Development of Mitzvot: Understanding the Rambam's view on pre-Sinaitic mitzvot and their relationship to the Sinaitic revelation.

Primary Sources

• Mishneh Torah, Kings and Wars 9:1-14.
• Genesis 2:24 ("על כן יעזב איש את אביו ואת אמו ודבק באשתו והיו לבשר אחד")
• Genesis 9:4 ("אך בשר בנפשו דמו לא תאכלו")
• Genesis 20:13 ("אחתי בת אבי היא אך לא בת אמי ותהי לי לאשה")
• Sanhedrin 56a-57b (implicit background for many halachot).

Text Snapshot

The foundational lines for our discussion:

ששה דברים נצטווה אדם הראשון: עבודה זרה, וברכת השם, ושפיכות דמים, וגילוי עריות, וגזל, ומנין הדינין. אף על פי שכולן קבלה הן בידינו ממשה רבינו, וכל הדעת נוטה להן, מכל מקום מדברי תורה נראה שאדם הראשון נצטוה עליהן. הוסיף לנח אבר מן החי, הרי שבע מצות. שנאמר (בראשית ט, ד) "אך בשר בנפשו דמו לא תאכלו".

These six precepts were commanded to Adam: a) the prohibition against worship of false gods; b) the prohibition against cursing God; c) the prohibition against murder; d) the prohibition against incest and adultery; e) the prohibition against theft; f) the command to establish laws and courts of justice. Even though we have received all of these commands from Moses and, furthermore, they are concepts which intellect itself tends to accept, it appears from the Torah's words that Adam was commanded concerning them. The prohibition against eating flesh from a living animal was added for Noah, as Genesis 9:4 states: 'Nevertheless, you may not eat flesh with its life, which is its blood.' Thus there are seven mitzvot.

Mishneh Torah, Kings and Wars 9:1

Dikduk/Leshon Nuance

The Rambam's phrasing, "מכל מקום מדברי תורה נראה שאדם הראשון נצטוה עליהן" (nevertheless, from the words of the Torah it appears that Adam the First was commanded concerning them), is telling. It implies that while the ultimate kabbalah is from Moshe, the Torah itself provides remachim (hints) or asmachtot (supports) for the pre-Sinaitic origin of these laws. This is crucial for understanding the Kessef Mishneh's (and subsequent acharonim's) queries regarding the Rambam's sources. The Steinsaltz commentary notes that "קבלה הן בידינו ממשה רבינו" refers to the traditional transmission of these Noachide laws through Moses, and "הדעת נוטה להן" means they are rationally understandable (Steinsaltz on Mishneh Torah, Kings and Wars 9:1:3-4).

Readings

Yad Eitan – The Ambiguity of Ever Min Ha'Chai for Adam

The Yad Eitan delves into the Rambam's assertion that ever min ha'chai was added for Noach, implying Adam was not commanded it. He notes that the Kessef Mishneh (on Mishneh Torah, Kings and Wars 9:1:1) suggests Rambam views the derasha in Sanhedrin 56b (from "אכל תאכל" regarding Adam) as mere asmachta. The Kessef Mishneh further supports this by citing Rav's opinion that Adam was not permitted meat at all.

The Yad Eitan then raises two kushyot against the Kessef Mishneh's position:

1. The Gemara itself seems to treat the derasha as more than asmachta.
2. Rav's opinion (that Adam was forbidden meat) doesn't necessarily mean he wasn't commanded ever min ha'chai. Rashi and Tosafot (e.g., Sanhedrin 59b s.v. "אדם הראשון") interpret Rav as meaning Adam could not shecht (slaughter) for meat, but could eat meat from an animal that died naturally. In such a case, ever min ha'chai would still be relevant if a limb detached from a neveilah. Thus, Rav's view doesn't definitively prove Adam wasn't commanded ever min ha'chai.

To resolve this, the Yad Eitan suggests Rambam's view aligns with the Midrash Rabbah (Bereishit Rabbah 16:6, 24:5) and the opinions of R' Levi and R' Yochanan, who state Adam was only commanded six mitzvot, explicitly excluding ever min ha'chai. He adds that those who hold Adam was commanded ever min ha'chai also believe he was permitted to eat shechted meat, which contradicts Rashi and Tosafot's understanding. This intricate discussion highlights the deep interpretive layers regarding pre-Sinaitic mitzvot.

Tziunei Maharan – Sources and Consistency

The Tziunei Maharan offers several crucial insights:

Source for Adam's Six Mitzvot

He addresses the Kessef Mishneh's implicit query regarding the source for Adam's six mitzvot. The Kessef Mishneh merely points to Sanhedrin, but Sanhedrin 56b explicitly states "שבע מצוות נצטוו בני נח." The Tziunei Maharan explains that the Rambam relies on Midrashim (e.g., Bereishit Rabbah 17:5, 24:5; Midrash Tehillim 10:4; Yalkut Shimoni Mishlei 964) which clearly enumerate six mitzvot for Adam and then add ever min ha'chai for Noach. He praises the Ran (Chiddushim to Sanhedrin 56b s.v. "אדם הראשון") for also noting these Midrashim as the Rambam's source, a point the Kessef Mishneh missed.

The Mitzvot of Amram

The Rambam states, "בימי עמרם נצטוו ישראל במצוות יתירות" (In Egypt, Amram was commanded regarding other mitzvot). The Kessef Mishneh again expresses bewilderment ("צ"ע היכא מייתי לה"). The Tziunei Maharan skillfully defends the Rambam, linking it to Sotah 12a. The Gemara states regarding "וילך איש מבית לוי ויקח את בת לוי" (Shemot 2:1), that "ויקח" implies "ויחזיר" (he returned her), referring to Amram remarrying Yocheved. R' Yochanan explains "מלמד שעשה בה מעשה ליקוחים" (it teaches that he performed an act of acquisition with her). The Tziunei Maharan connects this to Rambam's Hilchot Ishut 1:1, where the Rambam states that before Sinai, marriage involved simply bringing a woman into one's home. After Sinai, however, "נצטוו ישראל שאם ירצה האיש לישא אשה יקנה אותה תחלה בפני עדים" (Israel was commanded that if a man wishes to marry a woman, he must first acquire her in front of witnesses). Since Amram performed an "act of acquisition" before Sinai, it implies he was commanded a mitzvah of acquisition for marriage, which was not yet generally binding but given to him specifically. This is a brilliant harmonization, demonstrating the Rambam's internal consistency across different halachic works.

Yaakov and Gid Hanasheh

The Rambam states, "ויעקב הוסיף גיד הנשה" (Jacob added the prohibition against eating the sciatic nerve). The Lechem Mishneh (on Mishneh Torah, Kings and Wars 9:1:1 s.v. "ויעקב") raises a significant kushya from Chullin 100a: "אמרו לו בסיני נאמר אלא שנכתב במקומו" (they said to him, it was stated at Sinai, but written in its place). This Gemara implies gid hanasheh was a Sinaitic command, not a mitzvah added by Yaakov. The Tziunei Maharan resolves this by referencing Rambam's Perush HaMishnayot to Chullin 100a. There, Rambam explains that while certain practices (like ever min ha'chai for Noach, or gid hanasheh for Yaakov) were observed by earlier generations, their binding force for Israel derives only from their re-enactment and command at Sinai via Moshe. The mitzvot observed by the Patriarchs were either self-imposed or prophetic commands specific to them, but not universal mitzvot for their descendants until Sinai. This interpretation reconciles the apparent contradiction, highlighting the Rambam's unique perspective on the nature of mitzvot prior to Matan Torah.

Yitzchak Yeranen – Ever Min Ha'Chai and Milk

The Yitzchak Yeranen discusses the halacha that ever min ha'chai is forbidden to a Ben Noach. He then raises a kushya from Tosafot Chitzoniyot (MS. Munich 95) on Bekhorot 6b. The Gemara there discusses the permissibility of milk from a beheima tehora. The Tosafot Chitzoniyot asks why we don't derive its permissibility from Avraham serving "חמאה וחלב" (butter and milk) to the angels (Bereishit 18:8). Avraham kept the entire Torah, and surely wouldn't feed guests (even if he thought they were Bnei Noach) something forbidden. The Tosafot Chitzoniyot suggests that R' Yochanan of Paris explained Avraham thought they were Bnei Noach who are not commanded against milk, as it's not one of the Seven Noachide Laws. This seems contradictory, as ever min ha'chai is forbidden to Bnei Noach, and milk is considered "דם נעכר ונעשה חלב" (blood congealed into milk) or "אבריהם מתפרקין" (their limbs detach) – either way, seemingly related to the ever min ha'chai prohibition.

The Yitzchak Yeranen unpacks the Gemara in Bekhorot 6b, which debates whether milk is considered "blood congealed" or "limbs detaching." If it's "limbs detaching," it could be considered ever min ha'chai and thus forbidden to Bnei Noach. The Gemara's question, "וחלב בהמה טהורה מנא לן דשרי" (from where do we know that milk from a kosher animal is permitted?), implies it's not self-evident. If milk were forbidden as ever min ha'chai, then Avraham couldn't have served it. Thus, the very act of Avraham serving milk implies milk is permitted, even to Bnei Noach, which contradicts the Tosafot Chitzoniyot's explanation that Bnei Noach are not commanded on it because it's not one of the seven. The Yitzchak Yeranen concludes that the permissibility of milk (even for Bnei Noach) must be derived from other sources, as it cannot be considered ever min ha'chai in a prohibitory sense for them. He further critiques the Etz HaChaim's attempt to reconcile the views, finding it problematic to conflate the "blood congealed" and "limbs detaching" opinions.

Friction

The Sinaitic Enactment of Patriarchal Mitzvot

The most significant kushya arises from the Lechem Mishneh's challenge to the Rambam's statement in MT Kings and Wars 9:1 that "ויעקב הוסיף גיד הנשה" (Jacob added the prohibition against eating the sciatic nerve).

The Kushya

The Gemara in Chullin 100a explicitly states regarding gid hanasheh: "אמרו לו בסיני נאמר אלא שנכתב במקומו" (they said to him, it was stated at Sinai, but written in its place). This statement seems to directly contradict the Rambam, who attributes the addition of this mitzvah to Yaakov. If it was commanded at Sinai, how could Yaakov have "added" it? This isn't merely a matter of historical sequence, but of the very nature and source of the mitzvah's binding authority. If the Gemara means it was first commanded at Sinai, then Yaakov's observance was either voluntary or a hora'at sha'ah (temporary decree) without universal, eternal halachic weight. The Rambam's use of "הוסיף" (added) implies Yaakov's act was the definitive establishment of the mitzvah.

The Terutz (Tziunei Maharan via Rambam's Perush HaMishnayot)

The Tziunei Maharan resolves this kushya by directing us to the Rambam's own Perush HaMishnayot on Chullin 100a. There, the Rambam articulates a fundamental principle regarding pre-Sinaitic mitzvot:

"שים לבך על עיקר הגדול הנכלל במשנה הזאת והוא מה שאמר מסיני נאסר. לפי שאתה הראית לדעת שכל מה שאנו מרחיקים או עושים היום אין אנו עושין אלא במצות הקב"ה ע"י משה רע"ה, לא שהקב"ה אמר זה לנביאים שלפניו... הלא תראה מה שאמרו תרי"ג מצות נאמרו לו למשה בסיני וכל אלו מכלל המצות." (Pay attention to the great principle contained in this Mishnah, which is what it says: 'it was forbidden from Sinai.' For you have seen that everything we forbid or do today, we do only by the command of the Holy One, blessed be He, through Moses our teacher, not because the Holy One, blessed be He, said this to the prophets before him... Do you not see what they said: '613 mitzvot were told to Moses at Sinai,' and all these are among these mitzvot.) Rambam, Perush HaMishnayot, Chullin 7:6

According to this explanation, the Rambam posits that while the Patriarchs observed various mitzvot (like gid hanasheh by Yaakov, or ever min ha'chai by Noach), their observance was either a personal spiritual choice, a prophetic command for that specific individual, or a temporary decree. The universal, eternally binding halachic force of these mitzvot for Klal Yisrael begins only with their re-enactment and command at Sinai through Moshe. Therefore, when the Rambam says Yaakov "added" gid hanasheh, he means Yaakov was the first to observe it as a mitzvah, establishing its pre-Sinaitic precedent. However, for us, the prohibition is binding because it was re-commanded at Sinai. The Gemara's statement "בסיני נאמר" refers to the point of universal halachic obligation for the Jewish people. This reconciles the Gemara with the Rambam's historical account, showing that the Rambam distinguishes between the historical observance by individuals and the ultimate halachic imperative for the nation.

Intertext

Sanhedrin 56a-57b: The Talmudic Foundation

The entire sugya of Mitzvot Bnei Noach in Rambam is fundamentally rooted in the discussions in Masechet Sanhedrin, particularly dafim 56a-57b. This Gemara serves as the primary Talmudic source for the enumeration and details of the seven laws. For instance, the Gemara (Sanhedrin 56b) explicitly lists "שבע מצוות נצטוו בני נח: דינין, וברכת השם, עבודה זרה, גילוי עריות, שפיכות דמים, גזל, אבר מן החי" (Seven precepts were commanded to Noachides: laws, cursing God, idolatry, illicit sexual relations, murder, theft, a limb from a living animal).

Crucially, the Gemara presents a machloket (Sanhedrin 56b) regarding whether Adam was commanded ever min ha'chai. Rabbi Yehudah HaNasi holds Adam was commanded it, deriving it from "אכל תאכל" (Genesis 2:16) – implying an exclusion of ever min ha'chai. Rav and Shmuel disagree, holding Adam was not commanded it, and it was only given to Noach. The Rambam, by stating "הוסיף לנח אבר מן החי" (Mishneh Torah, Kings and Wars 9:1), clearly adopts the latter view, aligning with Rav and Shmuel, and as elaborated by the Yad Eitan, with the Midrashim cited by Tziunei Maharan. This demonstrates the Rambam's selective psak from among various Talmudic opinions.

Genesis 2:24 and 20:13: Deriving Arayot

The Rambam's derivation of the various forbidden arayot for Bnei Noach directly from pesukim in Bereishit is a classic example of Midrash Halacha. He states:

"ששה עריות אסורות לבן נח: אמו, אשת אביו, אשת איש, אחותו מן האם, וזכר, ובהמה. ודברים אלו נלמדו מן הפסוק (בראשית ב, כד) "על כן יעזב איש את אביו ואת אמו ודבק באשתו והיו לבשר אחד"." (There are six illicit sexual relations forbidden to a Noachide: a) his mother; b) his father's wife; c) a married woman; d) his maternal sister; e) a male; f) an animal. These prohibitions are derived from the verse Genesis 2:24: 'Therefore, a man shall leave his father and his mother and cling to his wife and they shall become one flesh.') Mishneh Torah, Kings and Wars 9:5

The Rambam then proceeds to parse the pasuk:

• "אביו" (his father) – alludes to his father's wife.
• "אמו" (his mother) – understood simply.
• "ודבק באשתו" (and cling to his wife) – excludes his colleague's wife (a married woman).
• "באשתו" (his wife) – excludes a male.
• "והיו לבשר אחד" (and they shall become one flesh) – excludes a domesticated animal, beast, or fowl.

For "אחותו מן האם" (his maternal sister), Rambam adds another pasuk: "נלמד מן הפסוק (בראשית כ, יג) 'אחותי בת אבי היא אך לא בת אמי ותהי לי לאשה'" (derived from the verse Genesis 20:13: 'She is my sister, my father's daughter, but not my mother's. Thus, she became my wife.') This highlights the precise textual exegesis used to establish these fundamental laws for humanity. The use of specific words and their omissions in pesukim from the early chapters of Bereishit demonstrates how Chazal understood the foundational legal framework given to all mankind.

Psak/Practice

The Rambam's detailed exposition of Mitzvot Bnei Noach forms the authoritative psak halacha for these laws.

Core Halachic Implications

1. Universal Obligation: The Seven Noachide Laws are universally binding on all humanity, independent of their acceptance of the Sinaitic covenant. This underscores a meta-halachic principle: a moral and legal framework exists for all people, with specific consequences for transgression.
2. Judicial System: The command "מנין הדינין" (to establish laws and courts of justice) implies that Bnei Noach are obligated to create judicial systems to enforce these six mitzvot and admonish against their transgression (Mishneh Torah, Kings and Wars 9:14). This is unique in that it's a positive command to establish a legal infrastructure. The Rambam even uses the example of the people of Shechem being liable for death because they "observed and were aware of his deeds, but did not judge him" (Mishneh Torah, Kings and Wars 9:14), emphasizing the communal responsibility to enforce justice.
3. Capital Punishment Differences: The psak details stark differences in judicial procedure for Bnei Noach compared to Jews. A Noachide is executed based on the testimony of one witness and the verdict of a single judge, without the need for hatra'ah (warning), and even relatives can serve as witnesses (Mishneh Torah, Kings and Wars 9:14). This contrasts sharply with Jewish halacha requiring two witnesses, a court of 23, hatra'ah, and excluding relatives. This reflects a different judicial philosophy and a more immediate, less procedural application of justice for Bnei Noach.
4. Specific Prohibitions:
   • Theft: A Noachide is liable for stealing an object worth less than a p'rutah, unlike a Jew (Mishneh Torah, Kings and Wars 9:9). This emphasizes the absolute nature of the prohibition against theft for Bnei Noach.
   • Ever Min Ha'Chai: While forbidden from domesticated animals and beasts, a Noachide is not executed for eating a limb from a living bird (Mishneh Torah, Kings and Wars 9:12). This fine distinction, based on the Rambam's interpretation, is a practical nafka mina.
   • Arayot: The detailed list of six arayot for Bnei Noach (Mishneh Torah, Kings and Wars 9:5) is significantly narrower than the comprehensive list for Jews, yet still strictly enforced with capital punishment.

Meta-Psak Heuristics

The Rambam's approach to pre-Sinaitic mitzvot—distinguishing between ancestral observance and Sinaitic re-enactment as the source of universal Jewish obligation—provides a critical heuristic for understanding the evolution of halacha. It teaches that a mitzvah observed by a Patriarch is not necessarily binding on their descendants in the same way until it is formally commanded at Sinai. This framework helps reconcile apparent contradictions between early biblical narratives and later halachic codification.

Takeaway

The Rambam meticulously charts the historical development and detailed halachot of the Seven Noachide Laws, highlighting their universal moral foundation and the distinct judicial procedures for their enforcement, while simultaneously clarifying the unique nature of Sinaitic mitzvot as the ultimate source of Jewish obligation. This sugya underscores the dual halachic track for humanity, rooted in both primordial commands and divine revelation.