Mishneh Torah, Kings and Wars 9

Sugya Map

The Genesis of Mitzvot: Adam to Amram

• Issue: The Rambam's enumeration and historical development of the Seven Noahide Laws (Sheva Mitzvot Bnei Noach) and the progressive revelation of additional mitzvot to the Avot and early Israelites before Matan Torah. Specifically, the precise point at which Issur Ever Min HaChai (prohibition of a limb from a living animal) was commanded, and the source for mitzvot given to Avraham, Yitzchak, Yaakov, and Amram.
• Nafka Mina(s):
  • Halakhic Precedence: Understanding the foundational legal framework binding on all humanity (Bnei Noach) and the unique obligations of Klal Yisrael.
  • Historical Timeline of Revelation: Pinpointing when specific mitzvot were revealed and became binding, informing our understanding of divine pedagogy and the Avot's spiritual status.
  • Nature of Mitzvat Avot: Distinguishing between practices adopted by the Avot out of personal piety and formal, divinely commanded mitzvot binding on their descendants prior to Sinai.
  • Specific Noahide Applications: Clarifying the distinct parameters of Noahide prohibitions (e.g., murder, theft, incest, idolatry, Ever Min HaChai) compared to their Jewish counterparts, as detailed extensively in the halachot that follow this opening statement.
• Primary Sources:
  • Mishneh Torah, Kings and Wars 9:1.
  • Bereishit 2:24 ("על כן יעזב איש את אביו ואת אמו ודבק באשתו והיו לבשר אחד") – source for Noahide arayot.
  • Bereishit 9:4 ("אך בשר בנפשו דמו לא תאכלו") – source for Ever Min HaChai.
  • Bereishit 20:13 ("אחותי בת אבי היא אך לא בת אמי ותהי לי לאשה") – source for specific arayot.
  • Sanhedrin 56a-57b – Gemara's primary discussion of Sheva Mitzvot Bnei Noach and their derivations.
  • Chullin 100a ("בסיני נאמר") – discussion of Gid HaNasheh.
  • Sotah 12a ("וילך איש מבית לוי ויקח את בת לוי") – regarding Amram and Yocheved.
  • Midrashim: Bereishit Rabbah, Yalkut Shimoni on Mishlei, Pirkei D'Rabbi Eliezer, etc., as cited by Acharonim.

Text Snapshot

The Rambam opens Hilchot Melachim U'Milchamot chapter 9 with a seminal statement on the origins of mitzvot:

ששה מצות נצטוה אדם הראשון: עבודת כוכבים, וברכת השם, ושפיכות דמים, וגלוי עריות, וגזל, ומצות הדינין. אף על פי שכולם קבלה הן בידינו ממשה רבינו והדעת נוטה להן, מכלל דברי תורה יראה שאדם הראשון נצטוה עליהן. ונוסף לנח אבר מן החי, הרי שבע מצות. עמדו אלו כך בכל העולם עד אברהם. כיון שעמד אברהם, נוסף לו מצות מילה על אלו, והוא התפלל שחרית. יצחק הפריש מעשרות והתפלל תפלת מנחה. יעקב הוסיף גיד הנשה והתפלל תפלת ערבית. ובמצרים בימי עמרם נצטוו ישראל במצות יתירות. ובא משה ונתנה תורה על ידו ושלמה.

Dikduk/Leshon Nuance:

• "ששה מצות נצטוה אדם הראשון": The immediate and unequivocal statement of six, not seven, mitzvot for Adam. This is a crucial point of departure from a straightforward reading of the Gemara, as we shall see. The verb "נצטוה" (was commanded) implies a formal divine imperative.
• "אף על פי שכולם קבלה הן בידינו ממשה רבינו והדעת נוטה להן": This phrase is key to Rambam's philosophy. Steinsaltz notes that "קבלה הן בידינו ממשה רבינו" emphasizes the Sinaitic tradition as the binding source, even for these primordial laws, while "הדעת נוטה להן" acknowledges their rational, universal appeal (Steinsaltz on MT, Kings and Wars 9:1:3-4). This dual foundation (revelation and reason) is characteristic of Rambam.
• "מכלל דברי תורה יראה שאדם הראשון נצטוה עליהן": The Rambam indicates that these commands are inferable from the Torah itself, even before Sinai, suggesting a deeper, perhaps implicit, revelation.
• "ונוסף לנח אבר מן החי, הרי שבע מצות": The explicit statement that Ever Min HaChai was added for Noach, making it the seventh mitzvah. This is the primary point of contention with some Gemara interpretations.
• "הוא התפלל שחרית... יצחק הפריש מעשרות... יעקב הוסיף גיד הנשה... בימי עמרם נצטוו ישראל במצות יתירות": The language here shifts from "נצטוה" (commanded) to "התפלל" (prayed), "הפריש" (separated), and "הוסיף" (added), indicating a mix of personal initiatives, prophetic decrees, and proto-revelations prior to the full Matan Torah. The "מצות יתירות" (additional mitzvot) given in Amram's time are presented as a collective command to "Israel," hinting at an evolving national halakhic identity. Steinsaltz further clarifies that "הדינין" refers to the command to appoint judges (Steinsaltz on MT, Kings and Wars 9:1:2).

Readings

1. Yad Eitan (Rabbi Yisrael Yaakov Algazi, 18th Century) – Reconciling Rambam's "Six" for Adam with Gemara

The Yad Eitan, in his commentary on Hilchot Melachim U'Milchamot 9:1:1, delves into the Rambam's assertion that Adam was commanded in six mitzvot, with Ever Min HaChai (Amah) being added only for Noach. This directly clashes with a passage in Sanhedrin 56b which seems to derive Ever Min HaChai as a prohibition for Adam as well, from the verse "מכל עץ הגן אכול תאכל" (Bereishit 2:16), implying an unspoken restriction on eating from living animals.

The Kesef Mishneh (Rabbi Yosef Karo, 16th Century) had already noted this tension, suggesting that Rambam must hold that the Gemara's derivation for Adam is merely an asmachta (a textual support, not the primary source of the law) (Kesef Mishneh on MT, Kings and Wars 9:1:1). The Lacham Mishneh (Rabbi Avraham di Boton, 16th Century) then challenges the Kesef Mishneh, arguing that the Gemara's language implies a full-fledged derasha, not just an asmachta. He also points to Rab's statement (Sanhedrin 56b) that Adam was not permitted to eat meat at all, which, if taken at face value, would imply that Amah was irrelevant for Adam, as he wouldn't eat any meat, living or dead. However, Lacham Mishneh finds Rab's statement inconclusive, as Rashi and Tosafot interpret Rab to mean that Adam was forbidden only from shechita (slaughter), but could eat meat from an animal that died naturally (neveila). If so, Amah would still be relevant even for Adam concerning neveila (e.g., if a limb detached from a convulsing neveila).

The Yad Eitan comes to the Rambam's defense, offering a multi-pronged response. He first suggests that the Rambam's position is rooted in various Midrashic traditions:

"אמנם י"ל דעת רבינו ע"פ המ"ר פט"ז וכמה דוכתי דר' לוי ור"י ס"ל דלא נצטוה רק על ו' מצות ול"ח אבר מה"ח וכ"ה סוף משלי ומשפטים." (Yad Eitan on MT, Kings and Wars 9:1:1) The Yad Eitan cites Bereishit Rabbah (Chapter 16 and other places), where Rabbi Levi and Rabbi Yochanan state that Adam was commanded only six mitzvot, specifically excluding Ever Min HaChai. This view is also found at the end of Yalkut Shimoni on Mishlei and Midrash Mishpatim. For Rambam, who frequently synthesizes halakha from Gemara and Midrash, these Midrashic sources provide a strong traditional foundation for his enumeration.

Furthermore, the Yad Eitan strengthens his argument by noting that the Midrashic opinion which does hold that Adam was commanded in Ever Min HaChai must then hold that Adam was permitted to eat shechuted (slaughtered) meat. This interpretation contradicts Rashi and Tosafot's understanding of Rab (that Adam could eat neveila but not shechuta), suggesting a deeper disagreement among Chazal that Rambam resolves by following the Midrashic view of six mitzvot for Adam. The implication is that the Gemara in Sanhedrin might be following a different Midrashic stream or that its derivation is indeed an asmachta when weighed against the explicit Midrashic enumerations that Rambam prefers.

In essence, Yad Eitan argues that Rambam is not dismissing the Gemara outright but is choosing to align with a consistent Midrashic tradition that explicitly lists six mitzvot for Adam and designates Amah as a specific addition for Noach. This highlights Rambam's methodology of drawing from the entire corpus of Chazal's literature to construct his halakhic framework, sometimes prioritizing the clarity of Midrashic enumeration over a Gemara's exegetical derivation.

2. Tziunei Maharan (Rabbi Tzvi Hirsh Chajes, 19th Century) – Sourcing Rambam's Midrashic and Historical Claims

The Tziunei Maharan, also commenting on Hilchot Melachim U'Milchamot 9:1:1, echoes and expands upon the Midrashic foundations for Rambam's enumeration of Noahide Laws and his historical progression of mitzvot.

A. Six Mitzvot for Adam and Amah for Noach: The Tziunei Maharan directly supports the Yad Eitan's claim regarding the Midrashic basis for Rambam's count of six mitzvot for Adam. He notes that while the Kesef Mishneh pointed to Sanhedrin as a source for seven mitzvot for Bnei Noach (which is true for Bnei Noach generally, but not necessarily for Adam specifically), Rambam's unique statement about Adam's six mitzvot is indeed rooted in specific Midrashim:

"ונראה דרבינו סמך על המדרשים מדרש בראשית פי"ז ופכ"ד ומה אדם הראשון שנתתי לו שש מצות ולא קיים ועי' מדרש פ' משפטים ופ' ואתחנן בכל אלו תמצא דשש מצות נצטוה אדה"ר ועי' ר"ן בחי' לסנהדרין שהתעורר ג"כ במדרשים אלו דמשם הוציא רבינו דרק בשש מצות נצטוה אדה"ר ומרן הכ"מ לא הביא אף אחד מאלו, ועי' ילקוט סוף משלי על פסוק רבות בנות עשו חיל ר"י בר סימון אמר אדה"ר נצטוה על שש מצות נח נצטוה על אבמה"ח אברהם על המילה יצחק נימול לשמונה יעקב על גה"נ כו'." (Tziunei Maharan on MT, Kings and Wars 9:1:1) He explicitly cites Bereishit Rabbah (Ch. 17 and 24), Midrash Mishpatim, Midrash Va'etchanan, and Yalkut Shimoni on Mishlei (s.v. "רבות בנות עשו חיל"), all of which unequivocally state that Adam was commanded six mitzvot. He even notes that the Ran (Rabbeinu Nissim Gerondi, 14th Century) in his Chiddushim to Sanhedrin, also recognized these Midrashim as the source for the view that Adam received only six. This further solidifies the argument that Rambam is following a well-established Midrashic tradition, even if it appears to be at odds with a particular Gemara derivation. The Yalkut Shimoni passage is particularly striking as it directly parallels Rambam's timeline: Adam (6), Noach (Amah), Avraham (circumcision), Yaakov (Gid HaNasheh).

B. Mitzvot in Amram's Time: The Tziunei Maharan also addresses the Kesef Mishneh's tz.a.h. (needs clarification) regarding Rambam's statement that "בימי עמרם נצטוו ישראל במצות יתירות" (in Amram's days, Israel was commanded additional mitzvot). He cleverly links this claim to a Gemara in Sotah 12a:

"וילך איש מבית לוי ויקח את בת לוי" (Shemot 2:1) – The Gemara states "ויקח ויחזיר מיבעיא ליה," meaning "it should have said 'and he returned' (his wife)," referring to Amram taking back Yocheved after their separation. Rabbi Yochanan explains "מלמד שעשה בה מעשה ליקוחים" (it teaches that he performed an act of acquisition/marriage). The Tziunei Maharan connects this to Rambam's own description of marriage in Hilchot Ishut 1:2-3. Before Matan Torah, a man simply "took" a woman into his home to marry her without formal kiddushin. However, after Matan Torah, Klal Yisrael was commanded to acquire a wife "בפני עדים" (in front of witnesses) via kiddushin. If Amram performed "מעשה ליקוחים" as understood by R' Yochanan, it implies he was already bound by the mitzvah of formal kiddushin, which is a mitzvah of the Torah. This demonstrates that certain mitzvot were given to Klal Yisrael (or their leaders) before the full revelation at Sinai, thus sourcing Rambam's otherwise unsupported statement about Amram.

C. Avraham's Tithes and Yaakov's Gid HaNasheh: The Tziunei Maharan further engages with the Ra'avad's critique of Rambam regarding Avraham's tithes. The Ra'avad states, "כן היה ראוי לומר והוא התפלל שחרית והפריש מעשר" (It would have been proper to say, "He prayed Shacharit and separated tithes"), implying that both actions were Avraham's innovations, not that tithes were Yitzchak's. The Kesef Mishneh refutes this. The Tziunei Maharan, however, sides with the Ra'avad, citing Pesiqta Rabbati (Piska "Aser Te'aser") and Pesiqta Zutarta (Bereishit 1:1, Parshat Lech Lecha Piska 20), which explicitly state that Avraham was the one who initiated ma'aser (tithes). This demonstrates a nuanced approach to the Avot's practices – some were initiated by one, some by another, reflecting their unique spiritual contributions.

Regarding Gid HaNasheh, the Tziunei Maharan addresses the Lacham Mishneh's question from Chullin 100a, where the Gemara states regarding Gid HaNasheh, "בסיני נאמר, אלא שנכתב במקומו" (It was stated at Sinai, but written in its place [in Bereishit]). This seems to contradict Rambam's phrase "יעקב הוסיף גיד הנשה" (Yaakov added Gid HaNasheh). The Tziunei Maharan resolves this by pointing to Rambam's own Peirush HaMishnayot on Chullin 100a. There, Rambam explains that even if a practice like Gid HaNasheh or Ever Min HaChai was observed by the Avot or prohibited before Sinai, its binding halakhic force for Klal Yisrael derives solely from its re-affirmation and command by Moshe at Sinai. The Avot's actions serve as a historical or moral precedent, but the legal obligation stems from Matan Torah. This clarifies that "Yaakov added" refers to its historical genesis, while "B'Sinai Ne'emar" refers to its halakhic implementation for Klal Yisrael.

3. Yitzchak Yeranen (Rabbi Yitzchak Yedidya Frenkel, 20th Century) – The Enigma of Milk for Bnei Noach

The Yitzchak Yeranen, in his commentary on Hilchot Melachim U'Milchamot 9:1:1, focuses intensely on the prohibition of Ever Min HaChai (Amah) for Bnei Noach, particularly in relation to the permissibility of milk. He raises a significant difficulty from a passage in Tosafot Chitzoniyot (a collection of Tosafot manuscripts), Bechorot 6b, concerning Avraham's hospitality to the angels:

"וא"ת אמאי לא ילפינן מדכתיב גבי אברהם ויקח חמאה וחלב ובן הבקר ובודאי לא האכילם איסור דאברהם אבינו קיים כל התורה כולה ואומר ר"י מפריש דהוה סבור שהם בני נח ולא נצטוו ע"ז כי אינה מז' מצות בני נח ואף בירושלמי משמע דאכלו בשר בחלב דקאמר שאמר להם הקב"ה כשבקש שתנתן להם התורה אין אתם ראוים לקבלה שמיד שתינוק בא מבית הספר מביאין לו חלב אוכל מביאים לו בשר נוטל ידיו אבל אתם אכלתם בשר בחלב כדכתיב ויקח חמאה וחלב עכ"ל." (Yitzchak Yeranen on MT, Kings and Wars 9:1:1, quoting Tosafot Chitzoniyot) The Tosafot Chitzoniyot discusses the permissibility of milk from a kosher animal. One suggestion (from R' Yitzchak mi'Parish) is that Avraham, who kept the entire Torah, fed milk and meat to the angels assuming they were Bnei Noach, who are not commanded in the prohibition of Basar B'Chalav (meat and milk). However, the Yitzchak Yeranen notes a glaring problem: If Ever Min HaChai is forbidden to Bnei Noach (as Rambam states and is a halakha pesuka), and milk is sometimes considered as "part of a living animal" (davar ha'ba min ha'chai) – depending on whether "דם נעכר ונעשה חלב" (blood congeals into milk) or "אבריהם מתפרקין" (their limbs separate) is the reason for its permissibility – then how could Avraham feed milk to the angels? Even if milk is permitted, the Gemara in Bechorot grapples with why it's permitted, often invoking the idea that it's an exception to davar ha'ba min ha'chai.

The Yitzchak Yeranen meticulously analyzes the Gemara in Bechorot 6b which discusses the permissibility of milk. The Gemara asks how we know kosher milk is permitted. This question arises because milk, being a product of a living animal, could potentially fall under the prohibition of Ever Min HaChai or dam (blood). There are two main approaches in the Gemara:

1. "דם נעכר ונעשה חלב": Milk is essentially transformed blood, and since Bnei Noach are permitted to consume blood (only dam b'nafsho in the context of meat is forbidden, not free-flowing blood), this would explain its permissibility for them.
2. "אבריהם מתפרקין": Milk is considered distinct from the animal's flesh, similar to how an embryo (ben pekua) is not considered Ever Min HaChai because it doesn't require shechita.

The Yitzchak Yeranen argues that if Ever Min HaChai is forbidden to Bnei Noach, then the problem of Avraham feeding milk to the angels persists. Even if Bnei Noach are permitted blood, that doesn't automatically mean milk is permitted, especially if it's considered Ever Min HaChai. He questions why the Gemara in Bechorot does not simply derive the permissibility of milk for Bnei Noach from Avraham's actions, given that Avraham would not feed them issur. He points out that for the "אבריהם מתפרקין" opinion, milk from a kosher animal would be permitted for Bnei Noach just as it is for Jews.

He further cites the Eitz HaChaim (Rabbi Chaim Vital, 16th Century) and Shaar HaMelech (Rabbi Yitzchak Nunis-Bilmonte, 18th Century) who also discuss this issue, particularly regarding ben pekua and its relation to Ever Min HaChai. The Yitzchak Yeranen concludes that the question remains strong: why don't we derive the permissibility of milk for Bnei Noach directly from Avraham's actions, if Amah is forbidden to them? This intricate discussion highlights the deep lomdus required to reconcile seemingly disparate Gemara passages and Rishonim with the Rambam's clear psak regarding the Noahide Laws.

Friction

1. The Amah Anomaly: Rambam's "Six for Adam" vs. Sanhedrin's Derasha

The Strongest Kushya: The Rambam's opening statement, "ששה מצות נצטוה אדם הראשון... ונוסף לנח אבר מן החי" (Adam was commanded six mitzvot... and Ever Min HaChai was added for Noach) (MT, Kings and Wars 9:1:1), stands in apparent direct contradiction to the Gemara in Sanhedrin 56b. The Gemara there discusses the sources for the Seven Noahide Laws and states:

"אבר מן החי מנלן? דכתיב 'מכל עץ הגן אכול תאכל'... לרבות אבר מן החי" (From where do we know Ever Min HaChai? As it is written 'From every tree of the garden you may surely eat'... to include Ever Min HaChai). This derasha is explicitly connected to Adam, as the verse "מכל עץ הגן" is from the narrative of Adam in Gan Eden. The Gemara seems to imply that Ever Min HaChai was indeed prohibited to Adam, making it the seventh mitzvah from the outset, not an addition for Noach. The Lacham Mishneh (Kesef Mishneh on MT, Kings and Wars 9:1:1) articulates this tension forcefully, arguing that the Gemara's language ("מנלן") suggests a full-fledged derasha establishing a mitzvah, not merely an asmachta. How can the Rambam, a master of Gemara, seemingly disregard such a direct derivation?

The Best Terutz (Yad Eitan and Tziunei Maharan): The most compelling resolution, championed by the Yad Eitan and the Tziunei Maharan, is that the Rambam is not ignoring the Gemara, but rather following a distinct and authoritative Midrashic tradition. As the Yad Eitan explains:

"אמנם י"ל דעת רבינו ע"פ המ"ר פט"ז וכמה דוכתי דר' לוי ור"י ס"ל דלא נצטוה רק על ו' מצות ול"ח אבר מה"ח וכ"ה סוף משלי ומשפטים." (Yad Eitan on MT, Kings and Wars 9:1:1) And the Tziunei Maharan elaborates: "ונראה דרבינו סמך על המדרשים מדרש בראשית פי"ז ופכ"ד ומה אדם הראשון שנתתי לו שש מצות ולא קיים ועי' מדרש פ' משפטים ופ' ואתחנן בכל אלו תמצא דשש מצות נצטוה אדה"ר ועי' ר"ן בחי' לסנהרין שהתעורר ג"כ במדרשים אלו דמשם הוציא רבינו דרק בשש מצות נצטוה אדה"ר... ועי' ילקוט סוף משלי על פסוק רבות בנות עשו חיל ר"י בר סימון אמר אדה"ר נצטוה על שש מצות נח נצטוה על אבמה"ח..." (Tziunei Maharan on MT, Kings and Wars 9:1:1) These Acharonim demonstrate that numerous Midrashic sources, including Bereishit Rabbah (Ch. 16, 17, 24), Midrash Mishpatim, Midrash Va'etchanan, and Yalkut Shimoni on Mishlei, explicitly enumerate six mitzvot for Adam and attribute Ever Min HaChai as an addition for Noach. Even the Ran, a prominent Rishon, acknowledged these Midrashim.

Rambam's methodology often involves synthesizing the entire corpus of Chazal. When there are conflicting traditions between Gemara and Midrash, Rambam may prioritize the Midrashic enumeration, especially when it provides a clear, consistent historical narrative. The Gemara's derasha from "מכל עץ הגן" could be understood as an asmachta, or as reflecting a minority opinion, or perhaps even as a prohibition on Adam's diet rather than a formal, capital-punishment-carrying mitzvah in the same vein as the other six. The Chiddushim of Rabbi Akiva Eiger (on Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim 60:4) notes that the concept of asmachta allows a pasuk to support a Rabbinic teaching even if it's not its true source. Here, it could be that the pasuk supports a pre-existing understanding that Amah is generally undesirable, but its formal mitzvah status for Bnei Noach (with capital punishment implications) only begins with Noach.

This approach highlights Rambam's unique skill in constructing a coherent halakhic system by weighing different traditions within Chazal and selecting the one that best fits his systematic understanding of the development of halakha.

2. Amram's "Additional Mitzvot": The Unattributed Revelation

The Strongest Kushya: The Rambam states, "ובמצרים בימי עמרם נצטוו ישראל במצות יתירות" (And in Egypt, in the days of Amram, Israel was commanded in additional mitzvot) (MT, Kings and Wars 9:1:1). The Kesef Mishneh, characteristically seeking sources, remarks "צ"ע היכא מייתי לה" (It needs clarification where he brings this from), indicating that this claim appears without an explicit Gemara or Midrashic source. This is a significant challenge for Rambam, who is known for his systematic sourcing. How could Israel be commanded "additional mitzvot" by Amram, a human leader, prior to the direct divine revelation at Sinai, and what were these mitzvot? This assertion implies a progressive revelation of mitzvot to the community of Israel even before the definitive Matan Torah.

The Best Terutz (Tziunei Maharan): The Tziunei Maharan offers an ingenious and satisfying resolution, linking Rambam's statement to a subtle Gemara in Sotah 12a and Rambam's own Hilchot Ishut:

"ונראה דרבינו הוציא כן מן מה שאמרו בסוטה דף י"ב ע"א וילך איש מבית לוי ויקח את בת לוי ואמרו חכז"ל ויקח ויחזיר מיבעיא ליה אר"י מלמד שעשה בה מעשה ליקוחים... והנה רבינו ז"ל כתב בפ"א מהל' אישות קודם מ"ת היה אדם פוגע אשה בשוק אם רצה הוא והיא לישא אותה הכניסה לתוך ביתו כו' כיון שנתנה תורה נצטוו ישראל שאם ירצה האיש לישא אשה יקנה אותה תחלה בפני עדים כו' שנאמר כי יקח ולקוחין אלו מ"ע של תורה הם ע"ש וא"כ כיון שמעשה הלקוחין הם מ"ע של תורה וקודם מ"ת לא היו צריכין לזה א"כ למה עשה עמרם מעשה ליקוחין מוכח שנצטוה ע"ז." (Tziunei Maharan on MT, Kings and Wars 9:1:1) The Gemara in Sotah 12a interprets the verse "וילך איש מבית לוי ויקח את בת לוי" (Shemot 2:1) about Amram and Yocheved. R' Yochanan states that "ויקח" (and he took) implies "מלמד שעשה בה מעשה ליקוחים" (it teaches that he performed an act of kiddushin / acquisition).

Rambam himself, in Hilchot Ishut 1:2-3, explains that prior to Matan Torah, marriage was a simple act of a man taking a woman into his home if both desired. However, after Matan Torah, Israel was commanded that a man wishing to marry a woman must first acquire her "בפני עדים" (in front of witnesses) through kiddushin, as implied by the verse "כי יקח" (when a man takes). This formal kiddushin is a positive mitzvah from the Torah.

The Tziunei Maharan connects these two points: If Amram, before Matan Torah, performed "מעשה ליקוחים" (a formal act of kiddushin) when taking back Yocheved, it could only be because he, and by extension, Klal Yisrael at that time, had already been commanded in this mitzvah. This demonstrates a specific "מצות יתירות" (additional mitzvah) – the formalization of marriage through kiddushin – that was revealed to Israel through their prophets or leaders even before the full Sinaitic revelation. This provides a concrete example and a strong source for Rambam's otherwise unsupported assertion, showcasing a gradual and progressive unfolding of halakha to the nascent nation of Israel.

Intertext

1. Bereishit 2:16-17 & 9:3-4: The Evolving Dietary Laws

The foundational narrative for the Noahide Laws, particularly Ever Min HaChai, rests on the earliest dietary commands in Bereishit. To Adam, God commanded, "מכל עץ הגן אכול תאכל ומעץ הדעת טוב ורע לא תאכל ממנו" (From every tree of the garden you may surely eat, but from the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil you shall not eat) (Bereishit 2:16-17). This implies a purely vegetarian diet. The Gemara in Sanhedrin 56b derives Ever Min HaChai for Adam from "מכל עץ הגן אכול תאכל" by interpreting it restrictively, meaning "eat only from what is from the garden," i.e., plants, and not from living animals. This is precisely the point of tension with Rambam's enumeration of six mitzvot for Adam.

Later, after the Flood, God gave Noach and his descendants a new dietary allowance: "כל רמש אשר הוא חי לכם יהיה לאכלה כירק עשב נתתי לכם את כל" (Every moving thing that lives shall be food for you; as the green herb I have given you all) (Bereishit 9:3). This verse explicitly permits meat. Crucially, it is immediately followed by the caveat: "אך בשר בנפשו דמו לא תאכלו" (But flesh with its life, its blood, you shall not eat) (Bereishit 9:4). This is the explicit pasuk from which the prohibition of Ever Min HaChai is derived for Noach and his descendants.

Rambam's formulation in Hilchot Melachim 9:1:1 ("ונוסף לנח אבר מן החי") directly aligns with this textual progression. Adam was vegetarian, so Ever Min HaChai was irrelevant or implicit within a broader dietary restriction. Only when meat was permitted to Noach did the specific prohibition of Ever Min HaChai become a distinct, enumerated mitzvah. This intertextual analysis shows Rambam's deep engagement with the peshat and derash of the Torah to construct his historical halakhic timeline, often preferring the explicit narrative development over potentially more abstract derashot for foundational enumerations.

2. Sanhedrin 56a-57b: The Gemara's Exposition of Noahide Laws

The Gemara in Masechet Sanhedrin, particularly on dafim 56a-57b, serves as the bedrock for the rabbinic understanding of the Seven Noahide Laws. This passage systematically lists the mitzvot and provides their scriptural derivations. For example, it derives the command for Dinim (laws and courts) from "ויצו ה' אלקים על האדם לאמר מכל עץ הגן אכול תאכל" (Bereishit 2:16), interpreting "ויצו" (and He commanded) as a general command for governance. Idolatry is derived from "לאמר" (saying), implying a prohibition against saying "there is another god." Shefichut Damim (murder) is derived from "שופך דם האדם באדם דמו ישפך" (Bereishit 9:6).

The Gemara's discussion on Ever Min HaChai for Adam ("מכל עץ הגן אכול תאכל... לרבות אבר מן החי") is, as discussed, the primary point of tension with Rambam's initial enumeration. However, the overall framework of Sanhedrin 56a-57b is crucial for understanding the specifics of each Noahide mitzvah that Rambam expounds upon in the subsequent halachot of Kings and Wars chapter 9. For instance, the Gemara details the chiyuv (liability) for various forms of murder, theft, and arayot for Bnei Noach, often differentiating them from Klal Yisrael.

For Rambam, Sanhedrin is paramount. His decision to follow a Midrashic tradition for the number of mitzvot for Adam, while relying on Sanhedrin for the details of the Noahide Laws, reflects a sophisticated approach. He uses the Gemara for the intricate legal specifics and the Midrash for the broader historical-theological framework. This intertextual relationship between Rambam's Mishneh Torah and Sanhedrin is a prime example of how halakhic codification synthesizes diverse rabbinic sources to create a comprehensive legal system for both Jews and Bnei Noach.

3. Chullin 100a: "בסיני נאמר" and the Avot's Practices

The Gemara in Chullin 100a addresses the prohibition of Gid HaNasheh (sciatic nerve) and contains a pivotal statement: "אמרו לו בסיני נאמר אלא שנכתב במקומו" (They said to him, it was stated at Sinai, but it was written in its place [in Bereishit]). This statement is made in response to a question about the source of Gid HaNasheh, which is found in Bereishit 32:33 following Yaakov's wrestling match with the angel.

Rambam states in our text, "יעקב הוסיף גיד הנשה" (Yaakov added Gid HaNasheh) (MT, Kings and Wars 9:1:1). This appears to attribute the mitzvah to Yaakov. The Gemara's declaration "בסיני נאמר" seems to contradict this, asserting that its legal force for Klal Yisrael derives from Sinai, not merely from Yaakov's practice.

This intertext highlights a fundamental principle in Rambam's understanding of mitzvot: while the Avot (Patriarchs) observed various mitzvot (e.g., Avraham's circumcision, Yaakov's Gid HaNasheh), and some were even commanded to them (the Noahide Laws), their binding legal status for Klal Yisrael as a collective nation ultimately stems from Matan Torah at Sinai. As the Tziunei Maharan explained (quoting Rambam's Peirush HaMishnayot on Chullin 100a), "כל מה שאנו מרחיקים או עושים היום אין אנו עושין אלא במצות הקב"ה ע"י משה רע"ה לא שהקב"ה אמר זה לנביאים שלפניו" (All that we avoid or do today, we do only by the command of God through Moshe Rabbeinu, not because God told it to the prophets before him).

Thus, "Yaakov added Gid HaNasheh" refers to the historical origin and the first instance of its observance, perhaps as a prophetic decree or personal chumra. But its transformation into a universally binding mitzvah for Klal Yisrael, with its full halakhic implications, occurred at Sinai. This distinction is crucial for understanding the nature of mitzvat avot and the unique authority of Matan Torah.

Psak/Practice

1. Meta-Psak Heuristics: Rambam's Harmonious System Building

Rambam's initial enumeration and historical development of mitzvot in Hilchot Melachim 9:1 provides a profound insight into his meta-psak heuristics, particularly his approach to synthesizing disparate rabbinic traditions. He does not merely list halachot; he constructs a coherent, chronological narrative of divine revelation.

• Prioritizing Midrashic Enumeration: As seen with the "six mitzvot for Adam," Rambam demonstrates a willingness to prioritize clear Midrashic enumerations (e.g., Bereishit Rabbah, Yalkut Shimoni) over a Gemara's exegetical derivation (Sanhedrin 56b on Ever Min HaChai for Adam) when establishing foundational principles. This is not a rejection of Gemara, but rather a selection of the most fitting source for the specific task of historical codification, treating the Gemara's derivation as potentially an asmachta or an opinion among others. This shows that for Rambam, the psak is not always derived from the most prominent Gemara passage alone, but from a holistic understanding of kol haTorah kulah.
• Progressive Revelation: The detailed timeline – Adam, Noach, Avraham, Yitzchak, Yaakov, Amram, and finally Moshe – reveals Rambam's belief in a progressive unfolding of divine will. Mitzvot were not given ex nihilo at Sinai but built upon prior revelations and prophetic decrees. The examples of Avraham's Shacharit, Yitzchak's Ma'aser, Yaakov's Gid HaNasheh, and Amram's Kiddushin illustrate how the Avot and early leaders gradually introduced and formalized mitzvot that would later be codified at Sinai. This provides a framework for understanding the continuity of tradition and the evolving relationship between God and humanity.
• Rationality and Revelation: The phrase "אף על פי שכולם קבלה הן בידינו ממשה רבינו והדעת נוטה להן" (even though all of them are a tradition in our hands from Moshe Rabbeinu, and reason inclines towards them) encapsulates Rambam's dual appreciation for revealed halakha and its rational underpinnings. The Noahide Laws, being universal, are inherently logical, yet their binding force ultimately derives from divine command transmitted through Moshe. This fusion of intellect and tradition is a cornerstone of Rambam's philosophy.

2. Practical Halacha: Distinctives for Bnei Noach

While this initial halakha lays out the historical framework, the subsequent halachot in Kings and Wars chapter 9 detail the practical applications of the Noahide Laws. Several key distinctions emerge for Bnei Noach compared to Klal Yisrael:

• Severity of Punishment: A Noachide who transgresses any of the seven commands is executed by decapitation (MT, Kings and Wars 9:14:1). This is a single, severe punishment, unlike the varied capital punishments for Jews.
• Evidentiary Standards: A Noachide can be executed based on the testimony of one witness and the verdict of a single judge, without prior warning (hatra'ah), and even relatives can testify (MT, Kings and Wars 9:14:2). These are significantly relaxed standards compared to Jewish law.
• Scope of Prohibitions:
  • Murder: Broader for Bnei Noach, including killing a fetus, a person about to die, starving someone, or placing someone before a lion (MT, Kings and Wars 9:4:1-2).
  • Theft: Bnei Noach are liable for stealing less than a p'rutah (MT, Kings and Wars 9:9:1).
  • Incest: While the list of arayot is shorter (mother, father's wife, married woman, maternal sister, male, animal), the liability extends to situations where a Jew might not be liable (e.g., father's wife after his death, or a seduced/raped mother) (MT, Kings and Wars 9:5:1-3).
  • Ever Min HaChai: Bnei Noach are liable for any amount, from kosher or non-kosher animals, whether domestic or wild, but not from birds (MT, Kings and Wars 9:12:1-2).

These detailed differences underscore that the Noahide Laws are not merely diluted versions of Jewish mitzvot but constitute a distinct legal system, reflecting the universal yet fundamental obligations placed upon all humanity. Rambam's work here serves as the authoritative codification of this system, guiding Jewish courts in their interactions with Bnei Noach and defining humanity's most basic covenant with God.

Takeaway

Rambam's exposition on the origins of mitzvot reveals a dynamic, progressive history of divine revelation, meticulously constructed from diverse rabbinic sources. His work provides a definitive framework for the universal Noahide Laws while illustrating the unique, evolving spiritual journey of Klal Yisrael towards Sinai.