Mishneh Torah, Kings and Wars 9

Hook

We often think of the Seven Noachide Laws as a static set of universal commands given to all humanity. But what if those laws weren't revealed all at once, and their very existence points to a deeper, evolving relationship between humanity and the Divine? Rambam here unveils a fascinating historical progression, challenging our assumptions about the origins of mitzvot.

Context

The concept of Mitzvot Bnei Noach (Noachide Laws) is foundational to understanding Judaism's view of universal morality. Unlike the 613 mitzvot given to the Jewish people at Sinai, these seven laws are considered incumbent upon all humankind, forming the bedrock of a just and civilized society. Rambam, in his Mishneh Torah, dedicates significant attention to these laws, not merely as a list of prohibitions, but as a historical narrative of divine revelation that predates the Sinaitic covenant. This framework elevates these laws beyond mere human ethics, imbuing them with divine authority and revealing a gradual unfolding of God's will for the world.

Text Snapshot

Six precepts were commanded to Adam: a) the prohibition against worship of false gods; b) the prohibition against cursing God; c) the prohibition against murder; d) the prohibition against incest and adultery; e) the prohibition against theft; f) the command to establish laws and courts of justice. Even though we have received all of these commands from Moses and, furthermore, they are concepts which intellect itself tends to accept, it appears from the Torah's words that Adam was commanded concerning them. The prohibition against eating flesh from a living animal was added for Noah, as Genesis 9:4 states: 'Nevertheless, you may not eat flesh with its life, which is its blood.' Thus there are seven mitzvot.

These matters remained the same throughout the world until Abraham. When Abraham arose, in addition to these, he was commanded regarding circumcision. He also ordained the morning prayers. Isaac separated tithes and ordained an additional prayer service before sunset. Jacob added the prohibition against eating the sciatic nerve. He also ordained the evening prayers. In Egypt, Amram was commanded regarding other mitzvot. Ultimately, Moses came and the Torah was completed by him.

--- Mishneh Torah, Kings and Wars 9:1-2 (https://www.sefaria.org/Mishneh_Torah%2C_Kings_and_Wars%2C_Chapter_9)

Close Reading

Insight 1: The Evolutionary Structure of Divine Command

Rambam doesn't just present the Noachide laws; he meticulously traces their historical development, beginning with Adam and progressing through Noah, Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, and Amram, culminating in Moses and the completion of the Torah. This chronological structure is far from arbitrary. It suggests a progressive revelation of God's will, starting with fundamental societal rules for Adam, expanding with Noah's addition of ever min hachai (limb from a living animal), and then incorporating specific mitzvot and religious practices through the patriarchs.

This structural choice highlights that divine law isn't a static, monolithic entity. Instead, it unfolded gradually, adapted to humanity's evolving capacity for spiritual and moral understanding. For instance, Adam was given six foundational precepts crucial for the very establishment of human society. Noah's world, having experienced the Flood, received an additional command related to the sanctity of life (not eating a limb from a living animal), signaling a heightened awareness of life's value post-cataclysm. The patriarchs then began to introduce mitzvot that bordered on what would become distinctively Jewish practice – circumcision, prayer, tithing, and the prohibition of gid hanasheh (sciatic nerve). This pre-Sinaitic layering of commands and practices sets the stage for Sinai, emphasizing that the Torah was not revealed in a vacuum but built upon a long history of divine interaction with humanity. It's a narrative of continuous revelation, where each generation adds another layer of understanding and commitment.

Insight 2: "Intellect Itself Tends to Accept": The Rationality of Universal Law

Rambam states, regarding the laws given to Adam: "Even though we have received all of these commands from Moses and, furthermore, they are concepts which intellect itself tends to accept, it appears from the Torah's words that Adam was commanded concerning them." This phrase, "והדעת נוטה לָהֶן" (v'hada'at noteh lahen, "the intellect tends toward them"), is profoundly significant. It articulates Rambam's philosophical stance that these universal laws are not arbitrary divine decrees but are, in essence, discoverable through human reason. They are "rational mitzvot" (mitzvot sichliot), as opposed to purely "decreed mitzvot" (mitzvot shim'iyot), whose logic might not be immediately apparent (like kashrut or shatnez).

This insight means that the Noachide laws are not merely for religious adherents; they are inherent moral truths accessible to any thinking human being. While God commanded them, reinforcing their divine authority, their content aligns with what reason dictates for a functioning, ethical society. This idea bridges the gap between natural law and revealed law. For Rambam, the divine command serves to solidify and universalize these inherent moral truths, preventing them from being dismissed as mere human conventions. It transforms what might otherwise be subjective ethical preferences into objective, divinely sanctioned obligations. This approach also explains why these laws are considered binding on all people: their rationality makes them universally applicable, and their divine origin provides the ultimate imperative for their observance, regardless of one's specific faith tradition. Steinsaltz, in his commentary on this line, confirms this understanding, stating that "Man understands through his intellect that he must observe them." (Steinsaltz on Mishneh Torah, Kings and Wars 9:1:4).

Insight 3: The Enigma of Pre-Sinaitic Mitzvot and the Role of Amram

The passage includes a cryptic line: "In Egypt, Amram was commanded regarding other mitzvot." This statement presents a fascinating tension. While the Torah's giving is traditionally attributed solely to Moses at Sinai, Rambam asserts that Amram, Moses' father, received additional commands before Sinai. What could these mitzvot be, and what is their source? This highlights a broader tension in rabbinic thought: how much of the Torah was truly new at Sinai, and how much was a re-affirmation or expansion of earlier, pre-Sinaitic traditions?

The Kessef Mishneh (R. Yosef Karo), a primary commentator on Rambam, expresses puzzlement over the source for this claim about Amram, noting "צ"ע היכא מייתי לה" (it's puzzling where he derives this from). This tension points to Rambam's unique methodology, where he often draws upon obscure Midrashic or Talmudic allusions to construct a comprehensive historical and halakhic narrative. The idea that Amram received mitzvot suggests that the divine flow of revelation wasn't solely concentrated in the pivotal moment of Sinai but rather a continuous stream, with key figures serving as conduits. It also implies that certain practices, which we consider Sinaitic, might have roots in earlier generations, perhaps being observed as hukim (decrees) or minhagim (customs) that later received formal Sinaitic ratification. This nuanced approach challenges a simplistic view of Sinai as the absolute beginning of all Jewish law, instead presenting it as a culmination and formalization of an ongoing divine dialogue with humanity.

Two Angles

Rambam's assertion that "In Egypt, Amram was commanded regarding other mitzvot" initially perplexed even major commentators. The Kessef Mishneh (R. Yosef Karo), in his commentary on this very passage, questions the source, writing "צ"ע היכי מייתי לה" (it's puzzling where he derives this from). This reflects a common challenge for students of Rambam: he often presents halakhic conclusions without explicit Talmudic citations, leaving commentators to uncover his sources.

However, later commentators like the Tziunei Maharan (R. Chaim Kanievsky) often provide brilliant resolutions to these puzzles. The Tziunei Maharan suggests that Rambam derives this from a passage in Sotah 12a, which states, "ויקח את בת לוי" (And a man from the house of Levi went and took a daughter of Levi). The Talmud comments that the verse implies "ויחזיר" (he returned her), referring to Amram taking back Yocheved. Rabbi Yochanan explains this as Amram performing an act of kiddushin (marital acquisition). The Tziunei Maharan then points to Rambam's own Hilchot Ishut (Laws of Marriage) 1:2, where Rambam states that before the giving of the Torah, a man and woman would simply live together to be considered married, but after the Torah, "Israel was commanded that if a man wishes to marry a woman, he must first acquire her before witnesses... as it is stated, 'כי יקח' – 'when a man takes' (a wife)." Since Amram performed kiddushin even before Sinai, this implies he was commanded a mitzvah regarding marriage that was distinct from the earlier, informal custom. This deep dive by the Tziunei Maharan illuminates how Rambam constructs his historical narrative, often drawing profound legal implications from seemingly narrative-focused Talmudic statements, even when the explicit source isn't immediately obvious.

Practice Implication

Understanding the Noachide laws, particularly their rigorous enforcement and the command to establish courts, has significant implications for how we, as Jews, view our role in the broader world. Rambam emphasizes that Noachides are obligated to "set up judges and magistrates in every major city to render judgement concerning these six mitzvot and to admonish the people regarding their observance" (Kings and Wars 9:14). Furthermore, he notes the severity of their justice, where a Noachide who transgresses these seven commands "shall be executed by decapitation," and can be judged by a single judge and a single witness, without warning.

This implies a profound Jewish responsibility to encourage and even assist non-Jews in upholding these universal laws. It's not enough for Jews to observe their own mitzvot; there's an imperative to ensure that the world at large operates on a foundation of divine justice. This shapes our understanding of secular legal systems and international ethics. While we don't impose our specific halakha on non-Jews, we recognize and validate their own divinely mandated legal framework. It means engaging with society, not just retreating from it, and advocating for justice and morality based on these universal principles. This perspective can inform our civic engagement, our support for ethical governance, and our efforts to promote human rights and moral conduct in the public square, recognizing that all humanity has a divine obligation to create a just world.

Chevruta Mini

Question 1: Rationality and Command

Rambam states that the Noachide laws are "concepts which intellect itself tends to accept," yet they were still "commanded" by God. If these laws are so inherently rational, why was divine command necessary? What does this tell us about the limitations of human reason alone in establishing universal morality, or about the unique power of divine imperative?

Question 2: Differential Justice

The text highlights several instances where the application and punishment of Noachide laws differ significantly from those for Jews (e.g., liability for theft of less than a p'rutah, the specific rules regarding illicit relations, the court procedures). What does this divergence in legal detail and severity teach us about the distinct covenantal relationships God has with various groups, and how might this influence our understanding of justice itself?

Takeaway

The Noachide Laws represent an evolving, rational, and divinely mandated universal moral code, essential for all humanity's just existence.