Daily Rambam · Expert – Beit Midrash Analysis · Standard
Mishneh Torah, Leavened and Unleavened Bread 4
Sugya Map
The fourth chapter of Maimonides’ Hilchot Chametz U'Matzah Mishneh Torah, Leavened and Unleavened Bread 4 maps the halachic boundaries of ownership (ba'alut), physical presence (reshut), and physical degradation (bitul) of leaven during Pesach. Maimonides constructs a dual-axis framework: one legal-metaphysical (who "owns" the chametz) and one physical-chemical (what constitutes "food").
[CHAMETZ STATUS ON PESACH]
│
┌─────────────────┴─────────────────┐
[LEGAL OWNERSHIP] [PHYSICAL SUBSTANCE]
│ │
┌───────┴───────┐ ┌───────┴───────┐
[Pure Equity] [Financial Liability] [Fit for Dog] [Inedible/Utility]
(Proprietary) (Achrayut/Anas) (Moldy Bread) (Yeast/Starch)
Core Issues Under Analysis
- The Jurisprudence of Liability (Achrayut): How does financial responsibility for a gentile’s chametz transform a Jew's legal relationship to it, triggering the biblical prohibitions of Bal Yera'eh (not to be seen) and Bal Yimatzei (not to be found)?
- The Mechanics of Transfer: The parameters of transferring chametz to a gentile prior to Pesach via debt-security (mashkon) or outright sale, and the avoidance of illusory or conditional transactions (asmakhta).
- The Taxonomy of Degradation: The threshold at which chametz ceases to be classified as food, distinguishing between mixtures (ta'arovert) and pure chametz, and the distinct metrics of "unfit for human consumption" (nifsad me'achilat adam) versus "unfit for canine consumption" (nifsad me'achilat kelev).
Primary Nafka Minot (Practical Ramifications)
- The Validity of Modern Mechirah (Sale): Whether a sale of chametz wherein the Jewish seller retains a pragmatic expectation of repurchasing the goods after Pesach is biblically valid or dismissed as an insincere transaction.
- Cosmetics and Pharmaceuticals: Whether non-edible products containing chametz binders require destruction (bi'ur) before Pesach or may be retained in one's possession.
- Involuntary Bailee Liability: The status of a Jew who is forced by a totalitarian authority or violent extortionist (anas) to guard chametz.
Primary Sources
- Biblical Foundations: Exodus 12:19 ("Sha'or lo yimatzei b'vateichem") and Exodus 13:7 ("V'lo yera'eh lecha chametz... b'chol gvulecha").
- Talmudic Loci: Pesachim 5b (derivation of liability rules), Pesachim 6a (the ship-traveler baraita), Pesachim 31b (loans secured by chametz), and Pesachim 45b (the moldy bread and tanner's trough).
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Text Snapshot
יָכוֹל אִם טָמַן אוֹתוֹ אוֹ הִפְקִיד אוֹתוֹ בְּיַד גּוֹי, לֹא יִהְיה עוֹבֵר?
תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: "שְׂאֹר לֹא יִמָּצֵא בְּבָתֵּיכֶם"—אֲפִילּוּ הִפְקִידוֹ אוֹ הִטְמִינוֹ.
יָכוֹל לֹא יְהֵא עוֹבֵר אֶלָּא בְּתוֹךְ בֵּיתוֹ, אֲבָל חוּץ לְבֵיתוֹ, בַּשָּׂדֶה אוֹ בְּעִיר אַחֶרֶת, לֹא יְהֵא עוֹבֵר?
תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: "בְּכָל גְּבֻלֶךָ".
— Mishneh Torah, Leavened and Unleavened Bread 4:1 [^1]
Philological and Syntactic Nuances
- "יכול... תלמוד לומר" (Perhaps... Scripture teaches): Maimonides adopts the dialectic style of the Mekhilta [^2] to demonstrate that the halachic definition of ownership is not a rabbinic construction but a biblical reality derived from the interplay of overlapping verses.
- "לך" (Lecha - "For you"): Maimonides emphasizes the classic talmudic exegesis: "Shelcha ee attah ro'eh, aval attah ro'eh shel acherim v'shel gavoah" (You may not see your own chametz, but you may see that which belongs to others or to the Sanctuary) [^3]. The word lecha acts as a limiting pronoun, restricting the scope of the prohibition to personal property.
- "בכל גבלך" (B'chol gvulecha - "In all your territory"): This verse functions as an expansive modifier. If the home ("b'vateichem") limits the physical space, "your territory" expands the prohibition to any spatial coordinate wherein the Jew maintains legal jurisdiction, including another city or a field.
Readings
1. The Ohr Sameach: Issur Chal Al Issur and the Ontology of Post-Pesach Chametz
In a remarkable display of analytical depth, Rabbi Meir Simcha of Dvinsk [^4] addresses a silent anomaly in the talmudic sugya of chametz owned by a gentile during Pesach. The Talmud in Pesachim 28b records a dispute regarding whether one who eats a gentile's chametz after Pesach is subject to lashes (lokei) according to Rabbi Yehuda (who holds that chametz left over Pesach is biblically forbidden for benefit).
[OHR SAMEACH: ISSUR CHAL AL ISSUR]
│
┌───────────────┴───────────────┐
[STAGES OF CHAMETZ] [LEGAL STATUS]
│ │
1. Pre-Pesach (Permitted) No Issur Chametz exists
│ │
2. Pesach Onset ───────────────► Conflict: Hekdesh/Gentile
│ (Already prohibited by Me'ilah/
│ non-ownership; Issur Chametz
│ cannot fall upon it)
│ │
3. Post-Pesach No lingering "imprint" of
Pesach-level Issur Chametz
The Ohr Sameach asks: why does the Gemara frame the entire debate around the transition of ownership, rather than directly assessing chametz shel hekdesh (consecrated chametz) or chametz shel nokhri (gentile's chametz) that was redeemed or purchased post-Pesach?
His chiddush (novel interpretation) rests on the mechanics of Issur Chal Al Issur (the principle that a prohibition cannot take effect upon an already existing prohibition) [^5]. For Rabbi Yehuda, the post-Pesach prohibition of chametz is not a new, independent decree; rather, it is an extension or "lingering imprint" of the prohibition that existed during the seven days of the festival.
The Torah states in Exodus 13:3, "No chametz shall be eaten," which Rabbi Yehuda interprets as extending to post-Pesach. However, this extension can only apply to an object that was biblically subject to the prohibition of chametz during Pesach.
If the chametz was hekdesh (consecrated to the Temple Treasury) during Pesach, it was already forbidden under the severe laws of Me'ilah (sacrilegious misappropriation of sanctuary property) [^6]. Because Me'ilah is a pre-existing, comprehensive prohibition, the legal status of issur chametz could not conceptually take effect on the hekdesh during Pesach (ein issur chal al issur).
Consequently, if the hekdesh is redeemed after Pesach, it does not carry any lingering post-Pesach chametz prohibition, as the Pesach-level prohibition never successfully latched onto the object in the first place.
The same applies to a gentile's chametz: since it was excluded from the biblical prohibitions of Bal Yera'eh and Bal Yimatzei during Pesach by the word lecha ("for you"), it never entered the category of "forbidden Pesach chametz." Thus, it cannot retain any post-Pesach prohibition.
This conceptual move allows the Ohr Sameach to resolve a glaring difficulty in Chullin 4b regarding Cuthites who exchanged their leaven with gentiles.
He demonstrates that because the Cuthites' grain was tevel (untithed produce) prior to Pesach, the prohibition of tevel (which carries the penalty of death by heavenly hand) blocked the issur chametz from taking effect on a biblical level due to ein issur chal al issur.
When the grain was tithed after Pesach, the tevel status vanished, leaving the chametz completely permissible to eat, as no Pesach-level issur had ever legally resided within the substance.
2. Yitzchak Yeranen: The Mechanics of Financial Liability (Achrayut)
The commentator Rabbi Yitzchak Nuñez Belmonte [^7] dissects the legal fiction of achrayut (financial liability) as a generator of ownership. Under Maimonides’ formulation in Halachah 3, if a Jew accepts responsibility for a gentile's chametz—agreeing to compensate the gentile if the chametz is stolen or lost—the Jew is biblically obligated to destroy it before Pesach. Maimonides writes: "it is considered as though it were his."
The Yitzchak Yeranen focuses on the commentary of the Maggid Mishneh, who suggests a logical kal va-chomer (a fortiori argument):
- If a gentile's chametz for which a Jew has accepted achrayut must be destroyed,
- then surely a Jew's own chametz for which a gentile has accepted achrayut must still be destroyed!
The Yitzchak Yeranen asks: is the mechanism of achrayut based on the talmudic principle of davar ha-gorem le-mamon ke-mamon dami (an object that causes financial consequences is treated as having the legal status of money/property) [^8]? Or is it a unique, local decree (gzerat ha-katuv) limited specifically to the laws of Pesach?
[THEORIES OF LIABILITY (ACHRAYUT)]
│
┌────────────────────┴────────────────────┐
[Davar HaGorem LeMamon] [Gzerat HaKatuv]
│ │
* Liability = Ownership * Physical object remains the
* Jew's exposure makes it gentile's on a civil level.
"his" for all halachic * Torah uniquely expands "yours"
purposes. to include anything that drains
your pocket if destroyed.
If we argue davar ha-gorem le-mamon ke-mamon dami, the chametz is treated as the Jew's actual property because its destruction directly impacts his financial sheet.
However, if it is a gzerat ha-katuv derived from the word "yimatzei" (shall be found in your homes), then the physical object remains the gentile's on a civil level, but the Torah expands the prohibition of Bal Yera'eh to encompass any foreign object that resides within the Jew's financial orbit.
The Yitzchak Yeranen demonstrates that Maimonides views this as a biblical decree of ownership. By phrasing it as "it is considered as though it were his," Maimonides indicates that financial exposure creates a de facto proprietary relationship (kinyan) for the duration of Pesach.
Consequently, if the chametz is destroyed by forces beyond the Jew's control (oness), for which a standard bailee might be exempt, the Jew still violates the prohibition if he does not destroy it beforehand, because the exposure to liability is what defines the legal link of "yours."
3. Sefer HaMenucha: The Spatial vs. Proprietary Dialectic
Rabbi Manoach of Narbonne [^9] provides a structural analysis of Maimonides’ opening halachah. He addresses the apparent redundancy in the biblical verses: why does the Torah require both lo yera'eh lecha (no leaven shall be seen for you) and sha'or lo yimatzei (leaven shall not be found)?
[SPATIAL vs. PROPRIETARY DIALECTIC]
│
┌────────────────────────┴────────────────────────┐
[LO YERA'EH LECHA] [SHA'OR LO YIMATZEI]
│ │
* Focus: Proprietary ("Lecha" = Ownership) * Focus: Spatial ("B'vateichem" = Domain)
* Triggered even if hidden or out of sight. * Triggered even if buried or entrusted.
The Sefer HaMenucha explains that the two prohibitions target different dimensions of possession:
- The Spatial Axis (Sha'or Lo Yimatzei): This prohibition targets the physical presence of leaven within one's domestic domain (b'vateichem). One might have assumed that if chametz is buried deep in the earth (taman) or entrusted to a gentile (hifkid), it is no longer "found" because it is out of sight. The verse teaches that as long as it remains within one's physical or legal domain, it is deemed "found."
- The Proprietary Axis (Lo Yera'eh Lecha): This prohibition targets ownership (lecha). One might have assumed that if chametz is stored in a distant field or another city, far outside one's home, the prohibition is not violated. The verse "b'chol gvulecha" (in all your territory) teaches that physical distance does not sever the legal bond of ownership.
Maimonides synthesizes these two axes to establish that the prohibition is violated if either axis is active: if the chametz is yours (regardless of where it is physically located) or if the chametz is in your domain under your financial liability (regardless of who holds the formal title).
4. Ra'avad and Ohr Sameach on Halachah 10: Yeast vs. Bread
In Halachah 10, Maimonides introduces the rule that mixtures containing chametz that are unfit for human consumption (nifsad me'achilat adam) may be kept on Pesach. However, bread itself must be degraded to the point of being unfit for canine consumption (nifsad me'achilat kelev) to escape the obligation of destruction.
The Ra'avad [^10] launches a fierce critique, arguing that Maimonides conflates chametz (leavened bread) with se'or (yeast/leavening agent). The Ra'avad posits that se'or is never intended for human consumption; its entire utility is functional—to leaven other doughs.
Therefore, even if se'or is completely unfit for canine consumption, if it can still perform its chemical function of leavening, it must be destroyed. Conversely, bread (chametz) is defined solely by its edible status; once it is unfit for human consumption before Pesach, it is no longer classified as "food" and should be permitted.
The Ohr Sameach defends Maimonides by introducing a chemical-halachic distinction. He explains that Maimonides views "degradation" not as a subjective loss of food status, but as a total metaphysical transformation (afra d'ara - dust of the earth) [^11].
[METAPHYSICAL TRANSFORMATION (AFRA D'ARA)]
│
┌────────────────────────┴────────────────────────┐
[PURE CHAMETZ] [CHAMETZ MIXTURES]
│ │
* High Halachic Charge * Low Halachic Charge
* Requires extreme degradation * Requires lower threshold of
(Unfit for Dog / Kelev) degradation (Unfit for Human / Adam)
to strip its "Shem Chametz" to neutralize the taste transfer
Pure chametz has a high halachic charge; its "name" (shem chametz) is robust. To strip pure chametz of its halachic identity, it must undergo extreme degradation until a dog would refuse to eat it.
A mixture of chametz (ta'arovert), however, is only forbidden because of the taste (ta'am) of chametz infused within it. According to the principle of Ta'am Ke-Ikkar (the taste of a forbidden substance is treated like the substance itself) [^12], the mixture is only forbidden as long as that taste is edible.
Once the mixture is unfit for human consumption, the taste of the chametz is spoiled (ta'am pagum), and a spoiled taste cannot render a mixture forbidden. Therefore, the lower threshold of nifsad me'achilat adam suffices for mixtures, whereas pure chametz demands the higher threshold of nifsad me'achilat kelev.
Friction
The Kushya: The Maimonidean Self-Contradiction on Financial Liability
Maimonides’ ruling in Halachah 3 presents a major legal challenge. He states that if a Jew accepts financial liability (achrayut) for a gentile’s chametz, "it is considered as though it were his," and he violates the biblical prohibitions of Bal Yera'eh and Bal Yimatzei if he fails to destroy it.
This implies that Maimonides rules in accordance with the talmudic view that davar ha-gorem le-mamon ke-mamon dami (financial liability is equivalent to actual ownership) [^13].
However, in Hilchot Gezeilah VeAvedah Mishneh Torah, Theft 2:1 and Hilchot Me'ilah Mishneh Torah, Trespass 1:4, Maimonides explicitly rules that davar ha-gorem le-mamon is not treated as actual property!
For example, if a person steals consecrated property (hekdesh) for which he has accepted financial responsibility, he is exempt from paying the double-damages penalty (kefel). Why? Because the Torah restricts kefel to the theft of "his neighbor's" property Exodus 22:8, and consecrated property is not considered "his neighbor's" despite the thief's financial liability to replace it.
If liability does not constitute ownership in the realm of civil damages, how can it generate biblical ownership in the realm of Pesach prohibitions?
[THE JURISPRUDENTIAL CONFLICT]
│
┌────────────────────────┴────────────────────────┐
[HILCHOT CHAMETZ 4:3] [HILCHOT THEFT 2:1]
│ │
* Liability = Ownership * Liability ≠ Ownership
* "It is considered as though * Thief exempt from Kefel on
it were his" (Biblical) guaranteed consecrated property
The Terutzim
Terutz 1: The Sha'agat Aryeh's Resolution (Local Biblical Inclusion)
The Sha'agat Aryeh [^14] resolves this contradiction by analyzing the talmudic discussion in Pesachim 5b. The Gemara offers two ways to derive the prohibition against possessing a gentile’s chametz under liability:
- The general legal principle of davar ha-gorem le-mamon ke-mamon dami.
- A specific biblical inclusion (gzerat ha-katuv) based on the verse, "Leaven shall not be found in your homes" Exodus 12:19. The word "found" (yimatzei) is interpreted as applying to any leaven that is financially "found" on your balance sheet, even if the physical title belongs to a gentile.
The Sha'agat Aryeh argues that Maimonides holds that, as a general rule across the Torah, davar ha-gorem le-mamon is indeed not treated as actual property. This is why a thief is exempt from kefel on guaranteed consecrated property in Hilchot Gezeilah.
However, the laws of chametz are an exception. The Torah writes a unique, local decree (gzerat ha-katuv) specifically for Pesach to expand the scope of ownership. Because of the severity of the chametz prohibition—which carries the penalty of spiritual excision (karet)—the Torah did not rely on standard civil definitions of property.
Instead, it used the word "yimatzei" to establish that any chametz whose destruction would cause a Jew financial loss is biblically considered "his" for the duration of the holiday.
Terutz 2: Rabbeinu Chaim Soloveitchik’s Conceptual Dichotomy
Rabbi Chaim Soloveitchik of Brest [^15] offers a classic lomdish (analytical) distinction that reshapes our understanding of halachic ownership. He argues that there are two distinct categories of ownership in Jewish law:
- Kinyan Mamon (Monetary Ownership): This refers to the proprietary equity and asset value of an object. This is the standard definition of property in civil law (Choshen Mishpat).
- Kinyan Issur (Prohibitive/Existential Affiliation): This refers to the halachic relationship of responsibility that links an object's physical existence to an individual.
[REB CHAIM'S DUAL-CATEGORY OWNERSHIP THEORY]
│
┌────────────────────────┴────────────────────────┐
[KINYAN MAMON] [KINYAN ISSUR]
│ │
* Civil Law (Choshen Mishpat) * Prohibitive Law (Issurim)
* Focus: Proprietary Equity * Focus: Existential Link
* Who holds the title & asset value? * Who is responsible for its presence?
* Liability ≠ Ownership here. * Liability = Ownership here.
In standard civil law, such as the laws of theft and double damages, the Torah's definitions are governed strictly by Kinyan Mamon.
Because the physical object of guaranteed hekdesh belongs to the Temple, the thief does not hold Kinyan Mamon over it, despite his liability to pay if it is lost. Therefore, davar ha-gorem le-mamon cannot generate the civil status of "his neighbor's property."
However, the prohibitions of Bal Yera'eh and Bal Yimatzei are not civil laws; they are existential prohibitions. The Torah does not care who holds the financial equity of the chametz; it cares about who is responsible for its presence in the world.
If a Jew accepts achrayut for a gentile's chametz, the physical preservation of that chametz is legally attributed to the Jew. This responsibility creates a Kinyan Issur—an existential link that makes the chametz "his" regarding the prohibition against keeping it.
Therefore, Maimonides can consistently rule that liability does not constitute ownership for civil damages (Kinyan Mamon), while ruling that it does constitute ownership for the prohibition of possessing chametz on Pesach (Kinyan Issur).
Intertext
1. The Dispute on Asmakhta: Pre-Pesach Collateral
In Halachah 5, Maimonides details the law of a Jew who gives his chametz to a gentile as security (mashkon) for a loan. If the Jew tells the gentile, "If I do not repay the loan by a certain date, you acquire the chametz retroactively from this moment (me'achshav)," and that date passes before Pesach, the chametz is considered the gentile's property.
However, if the Jew did not use the specific word "me'achshav," the transaction is void due to Asmakhta (an unreliable commitment made on the assumption that the condition will never have to be fulfilled) [^16]. Consequently, the chametz remains the Jew's property, and he violates Bal Yera'eh.
[THE COLLATERAL DEBATE (MASHKON)]
│
┌────────────────────────┴────────────────────────┐
[RAMBAM: UNIFIED SYSTEM] [RA'AVAD: SYSTEMIC SPLIT]
│ │
* Halachic contract rules are universal. * Gentiles are not subject to the
* If Asmakhta voids a contract between subtle psychological rules of
Jews, it also voids a contract Asmakhta.
with a gentile. * The transfer of collateral is
immediate upon default.
The Ra'avad [^17] strongly disagrees, arguing that the talmudic rules of Asmakhta do not apply to transactions between a Jew and a gentile. In the gentile's legal system, collateral is acquired immediately upon default, without the need for the specific formulation of me'achshav.
The Ra'avad posits that halacha recognizes the legal reality of the gentile's system for transactions involving them (dina d'malchuta dina or the internal logic of gentile commerce) [^18]. Therefore, even without "me'achshav," the chametz should be considered the gentile's property once the deadline passes.
This dispute reflects a fundamental debate between Maimonides and the Ra'avad:
- Maimonides' Unified View: Halachic contract rules are universal. If a transaction lacks the necessary legal resolve (gemirat da'at) due to Asmakhta, it is invalid in the eyes of the Torah, regardless of whether the other party is a Jew or a gentile.
- The Ra'avad's Pragmatic View: Halacha acknowledges the commercial realities of the surrounding world. If a gentile legally owns the collateral under secular law, the Torah does not maintain a legal fiction to declare it "yours" for Pesach.
2. Shulchan Aruch Orach Chayim 440:1 & 441:1
The Shulchan Aruch adjudicates this dispute by adopting a split approach that balances Maimonides' stringency with the Ra'avad's leniency:
ישראל שהפקיד חמצו אצל עובד כוכבים, אם קיבל עליו אחריות, עובר עליו.
— Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 440:1 [^19]
In Orach Chayim 440:1, Rav Yosef Caro rules in accordance with Maimonides that accepting achrayut for a gentile's chametz violates Bal Yera'eh.
However, in Orach Chayim 441:1, regarding the collateral dispute, the Mishnah Berurah [^20] notes that if the chametz is worth less than or equal to the value of the loan, one may post-facto (b'di'avad) rely on the Ra'avad's lenient opinion that the gentile acquired the chametz upon default, even if the word "me'achshav" was not explicitly stated.
Psak/Practice
1. The Halachic Mechanics of Mechirat Chametz
The contemporary practice of selling chametz (Mechirat Chametz) is rooted in the ship-traveler baraita cited by Maimonides in Halachot 6 and 7. Maimonides permits a Jew to sell or gift his chametz to a gentile before Pesach, even if he intends to buy it back after the holiday, provided it is an absolute transfer (matanah gemurah) without formal conditions.
[MODERN MECHIRAT CHAMETZ VALIDITY MATRIX]
│
┌────────────────────────┴────────────────────────┐
[FORMAL CONDITION] [UNSPOKEN EXPECTATION]
│ │
* "I sell this on condition that * "I sell this absolutely. I hope
you sell it back to me." you will choose to sell it back."
* Halachically VOID (Rambam 4:7). * Halachically VALID.
* Violates Bal Yera'eh. * Real legal transfer occurs.
To ensure the sale is valid and not dismissed as a sham transaction, modern rabbinic contracts employ several halachic mechanisms:
- Multi-Tiered Kinyanim (Acquisition Acts): The sale utilizes multiple forms of acquisition to satisfy all halachic opinions, including Shtar (contract), Kessef (monetary down payment), Situmta (commercial custom), and Kinyan Agav (acquiring the chametz by leasing the physical space in which it resides) [^21].
- Avoidance of Conditions: The bill of sale is drafted as an absolute, unconditional transfer of ownership. The gentile is legally free to consume or destroy the chametz during Pesach. The expectation that the rabbi will repurchase the chametz after Pesach remains an unspoken, non-binding understanding, preserving the integrity of the sale.
2. Inedible Chametz in Modern Products
Applying the rules of Halachot 10 and 12, contemporary halachic authorities categorize modern consumer products containing chametz binders (such as grain alcohol in cosmetics or wheat starch in paper) based on their edibility:
| Product Category | Chametz Status | Halachic Ruling | Source / Principle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Solid Medicines / Pills | Inedible to humans (nifsad me'achilat adam) | Permitted to keep and consume for medical needs | Mishneh Torah, Chametz U'Matzah 4:10 (unfit mixture) |
| Liquid Cosmetics / Perfumes | Denatured alcohol (unfit for dogs / kelev) | Permitted to keep and use topically | Mishneh Torah, Chametz U'Matzah 4:11 (fully degraded) |
| Pet Foods | Fit for canine consumption (fit for kelev) | Strictly forbidden to keep or benefit from | Mishneh Torah, Chametz U'Matzah 4:11 (retains "shem") |
Takeaway
Halachic ownership on Pesach is not determined by formal title, but by financial exposure: if its destruction hurts your pocket, it is legally "yours." Conversely, the physical presence of chametz is governed by its utility; once a substance is unfit for a dog, it is no longer considered food, but merely dust.
Footnotes
[^1]: Mishneh Torah, Leavened and Unleavened Bread 4:1. [^2]: Mekhilta d'Rabbi Yishmael, Bo, Parashah 14. [^3]: Pesachim 5b. [^4]: Ohr Sameach, Hilchot Chametz U'Matzah 4:1, s.v. "יכול יהא חייב לבער". [^5]: See Yevamot 32a for the foundational talmudic discussion of ein issur chal al issur. [^6]: See Mishneh Torah, Trespass 1:1. [^7]: Yitzchak Yeranen, Hilchot Chametz U'Matzah 4:1:1. [^8]: See Bava Kama 98b regarding whether liability is treated as ownership. [^9]: Sefer HaMenucha, Hilchot Chametz U'Matzah 4:1:1. [^10]: Hassagot HaRa'avad, Hilchot Chametz U'Matzah 1:2. [^11]: Ohr Sameach, Hilchot Chametz U'Matzah 4:10, s.v. "וכן הקילור והרטיה". [^12]: See Pesachim 44b for the derivation of Ta'am Ke-Ikkar. [^13]: Pesachim 5b and Bava Metzia 43a. [^14]: Sha'agat Aryeh, Responsa, Siman 81. [^15]: Chiddushei Rabbeinu Chaim HaLevi al HaRambam, Hilchot Chametz U'Matzah 4:3. [^16]: See Bava Metzia 66b for the definition of Asmakhta. [^17]: Hassagot HaRa'avad, Hilchot Chametz U'Matzah 4:5. [^18]: See Gittin 10b regarding dina d'malchuta dina. [^19]: Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 440:1. [^20]: Mishnah Berurah 441:3. [^21]: See Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 448:3 and the commentaries of the Be'er Heitiv and Sha'arei Teshuvah there.
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