Daily Rambam
Mishneh Torah, Marriage 6
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Sugya Map
The sugya of Mishpat HaTenai (the Law of Conditions) serves as the structural foundation for all conditional transactions in Halacha, spanning the realms of marriage (Kiddushin), divorce (Gittin), and civil law (Choshen Mishpat). Derived from the biblical pact between Moses and the tribes of Gad and Reuven regarding the conquest of Transjordan,[^1] these laws impose a highly formalized linguistic framework upon any attempt to suspend or qualify a legal act.
┌────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Mishpat HaTenai (Kiddushin 61a) │
└───────────────────┬────────────────────┘
│
┌───────────────────────────┴───────────────────────────┐
▼ ▼
┌─────────────────────────────────┐ ┌─────────────────────────────────┐
│ Structural Rules (Gad/Reuven) │ │ Substantive Limits (Torah Law) │
└────────┬────────────────────────┘ └────────┬────────────────────────┘
├─► 1. Tenai Kaful (Double Condition) ├─► 1. Davar SheEfshar Lekayemo
├─► 2. Hen Kodem LeLav (Positive first) │ (Possibility of fulfillment)
├─► 3. Tenai Kodem LeMa'aseh (Condition first) └─► 2. Matneh Al Mah SheKatuv
└─► 4. Davar SheEfshar Lekayemo Al Yedei Shaliach (Not contradicting Torah)
(Agency requirement - disputed)
Primary Sources
- Torah Source:
Numbers 32:29-30– The conditional land grant to Bnei Gad and Bnei Reuven. - Talmudic Foundation:
Kiddushin 61a– Extraction of the four rules of conditions;Kiddushin 19b– The principle of Matneh Al Mah SheKatuv BaTorah (stipulating against Torah law). - Codification:
Mishneh Torah, Marriage 6:1–14;Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 38.
Nafka Minot (Practical Ramifications)
- Defective Formulation: If a condition is set but fails to meet any of the formal structural requirements (e.g., it is not a Tenai Kaful), does the entire transaction fail, or does the condition dissolve, leaving the transaction valid and unconditional? Halacha rules that the condition is nullified (batel) and the act (ma'aseh) is immediately effective.[^2]
- Retroactivity (Me'achshav): Does the fulfillment of a condition make the act valid retroactively from the time of the deed, or only from the moment the condition is met? This determines the status of intermediate transactions or a second Kiddushin performed by another man in the interim.[^3]
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Text Snapshot
וכל תנאי שבעולם--בין שבין קידושין וגירושין, בין במקח וממכר ובשאר דיני ממון--צריך להיות בתנאי ארבעה דברים, ואלו הן:
א) שיהיה התנאי כפול;
ב) ושיהיה הן שלו קודם ללאו;
ג) ושיהיה התנאי קודם למעשה;
ד) ושיהיה התנאי דבר שאפשר לקיימו.
ואם חסר אחד מהן--הרי התנאי בטל, וכאילו אין שם תנאי כלל; ותהיה זו מקודשת או מגורשת מיד, או יהיה המקח קיים, כאילו לא היה שם תנאי...
(Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Ishut 6:1-2)
Grammatical & Lexical Nuances
- "וכל תנאי שבעולם" (Every condition in the world): The Rambam's sweeping language asserts that the formal rules of conditions apply universally to all legal acts, including monetary law (Mamon). This directly opposes the school of thought among the Geonim and Rishonim who limit these formal requirements to the realms of ritual status (Kiddushin and Gittin).
- "התנאי קודם למעשה" (The condition precedes the deed): The exact definition of precedence here is the subject of a monumental dispute. Does it mean that the verbal stipulation must be uttered before the physical delivery of the object of acquisition (Rambam's view), or must the conditional clause grammatically precede the main clause within the sentence structure (Ra'avad's view)?[^4]
Readings
1. The Structural vs. Substantive Typology: Yitzchak Yeranen on Maggid Mishneh
A central structural question arises when examining the Rambam’s list of the four rules of conditions: Why did the Rambam omit the rule of Davar SheEfshar Lekayemo Al Yedei Shaliach (that the condition must be something capable of being performed by an agent)?[^5] The Talmud in Gittin 75b explicitly derives this requirement from the prototype of Bnei Gad and Bnei Reuven.
┌───────────────────────────┐
│ Agency Rule Exclusion │
└─────────────┬─────────────┘
│
┌─────────────────────────┴─────────────────────────┐
▼ ▼
┌─────────────────────────┐ ┌─────────────────────────┐
│ Maggid Mishneh │ │ Keseph Mishneh │
└────────────┬────────────┘ └────────────┬────────────┘
│ │
"How to draft" (Structural) "Derived from Gad/Reuven"
vs. "What can be drafted" (Substantive) Should be listed together
│ │
└─────────────────────────┬─────────────────────────┘
│
▼
┌─────────────────────────┐
│ Yitzchak Yeranen │
└─────────────────────────┘
Defends Maggid Mishneh:
Agency is an ontological
limit of the act, not a
linguistic rule of Tenai.
The Maggid Mishneh addresses this omission by distinguishing between the formulaic construction of a condition and the intrinsic nature of the condition itself:
"וכתב הרב המגיד עליו למה לא הביא תנאי שא"א לקיימו ע"י שליח ותירץ וז"ל ואין זו קושיא לפי שכבר ביאר רבינו פ"ד וכו' פי' דבריו שאלו הד' שמנה הם שמלמד לנו היאך יתנה אותם כדי שיועיל התנאי ולא יהא תנאי בטל אבל הא דא"א לקיימו ע"י שליח הוא דבר שלא יועיל התנאי ולא שייך כאן למנותם עם אלו הד' דהד' אלו הם קיום תנאי והך הוא ביטול..."[^6]
Translation: "The Maggid Mishneh wrote regarding why the Rambam did not bring the rule of 'that which cannot be performed by an agent,' and answered: This is no difficulty, for our Master already explained it in Chapter 4... The explanation of his words is that these four rules listed by the Rambam teach us how one must formulate the condition so that it will be effective and not void. However, the rule that a condition cannot be performed by an agent is a matter where the condition itself cannot apply conceptually; it does not belong in the list of these four. For these four are the rules of establishing the structure of a condition, whereas the other is an inherent invalidation of the act's scope..."
The Yitzchak Yeranen defends this distinction against the critique of the Keseph Mishneh. The Keseph Mishneh argued that if the agency requirement is derived from the covenant of Bnei Gad and Bnei Reuven, it should be listed alongside the other four rules.[^7]
The Yitzchak Yeranen clarifies that the four rules listed by the Rambam are purely linguistic and syntactic requirements—they dictate how a person must frame their words to create a valid condition. Shaliach (agency), by contrast, is a substantive legal limitation on the cheftza (object/nature) of the condition. If a deed cannot be executed via agency, it lacks the legal elasticity to be suspended by a condition. It is a defect in the substance of the condition, not its form.
2. The Corporeal Exception: Tzafnat Pa'neach on Kiddushei Biah and Chalitzah
The Rogatchover Gaon, in his Tzafnat Pa'neach, analyzes the metaphysical limits of conditions, focusing on why certain physical acts resist conditional suspension:
"עיין בדברי ה"ה מה שהקשה למה לא הביא הך דצריך שאפשר לקיימו ע"י שליח... ועי' בתוספתא דקדושין פרק ג' דאמר שם רשב"א זה הטעם על קדושי ביאה דלא מהני בה תנאי... אך באמת מלשון התוספתא מוכח וכן מלשון רבינו ז"ל לקמן בפ' ד' מהל' חליצה הל' כ"ד דבכ"מ כתב רבינו לשון חליצה כשירה ושם כתב לשון חליצתה ור"ל כך דנ"מ משום האשה דכיון דגבי חליצה היא עצמה צריכה ליטול חליצה והתנאי היא אינה מתנה רק הוא לכך לא חל התנאי על פעולה שהיא צריכה לעשות בגופה..."[^8]
Translation: "See the words of the Maggid Mishneh who asked why he did not bring the rule that it must be possible to fulfill via an agent... and see Tosefta Kiddushin Chapter 3 where Rabbi Shimon ben Eleazar gives this as the reason why a condition is ineffective in consecration through intercourse (Kiddushei Biah)... But in truth, from the language of the Tosefta and our Master in Hilchot Chalitzah 4:24, where he uses the precise term 'her chalitzah' rather than 'kosher chalitzah,' it is proven that the practical difference concerns the woman: since in Chalitzah she must physically perform the removal of the shoe, and she is not the one making the condition (the brother-in-law is), the condition cannot take effect over a physical action performed on or by her own body..."
The Rogatchover introduces a profound lomdisch bifurcation between two classes of legal acts:
- Kinyan Chaloisi (Conceptual/Abstract Acquisitions): Acts like Kiddushei Kesef (consecration via money) or land sales are abstract legal shifts. The physical act of handing over money is merely a vehicle to trigger a conceptual status change. Because the act is abstract, it is highly receptive to verbal suspension and structural conditions.
- Ma'aseh בגופה (Physical/Bodily Acts): Acts like Biah (intercourse) or Chalitzah (removal of the shoe) are fundamentally corporeal. A physical act cannot be conceptually suspended because the act itself alters physical reality.
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ The Rogatchover's Bifurcation │
├────────────────────────────────────┬────────────────────────────────────┤
│ Kinyan Chaloisi (Abstract) │ Ma'aseh בגופה (Bodily Act) │
├────────────────────────────────────┼────────────────────────────────────┤
│ • Kiddushei Kesef, Land Sales │ • Kiddushei Biah, Chalitzah │
│ • Physical act is a mere vehicle │ • Physical act is the essence │
│ • Highly receptive to conditions │ • Resists retroactive suspension │
│ • Can be executed via Shaliach │ • Cannot be executed via Shaliach │
└────────────────────────────────────┴────────────────────────────────────┘
If a man consecrates a woman via Biah on condition, and the condition subsequently fails, the retroactive nullification of the Kiddushin would turn a physical act of marital intimacy into an act of be'ilat zenut (fornication). The Talmudic principle that "a person does not make his intercourse an act of promiscuity" (Ein adam oseh be'ilato be'ilat zenut)[^9] means that the physical reality of the act prevents it from being suspended by a condition.
In Chalitzah, the act of removing the shoe is performed by the woman's physical body. Since the Yavam (brother-in-law) is the one stating the condition, his words cannot govern or suspend an act executed by her body. The physical reality of her action overrides his verbal attempts at qualification.
3. The Beautiful Captive Paradox: Ohr Sameach and Teshuvah MeYirah on Yefat Toar
In Mishneh Torah, Marriage 6:10, the Rambam presents a challenging example of a condition that violates Torah law (Matneh Al Mah SheKatuv BaTorah):
"וכן המקדש יפת תואר על תנאי שיתעמר בה הרי זו מקודשת ואין לו להתעמר בה שהרי התורה מנעה אותו."
Translation: "Similarly, if one consecrates a beautiful captive (Yefat Toar) on condition that he may treat her as a servant, she is consecrated, but he is forbidden to treat her as a servant, for the Torah has prevented him from doing so."
Both the Ohr Sameach and the Teshuvah MeYirah point out a major conceptual difficulty with this ruling:
"לא הבנתי, דהא הלאו דלא תתעמר בה וכו' פירש רבינו בהלכות מלכים דלאחר שנבעלה לא יכבשנה לשם שפחה כמו כל שבוית מלחמה, ואימת מצי לכובשה, טרם שנתגיירה אז שייך כיבוש לשם שפחה, ואיך שייך אז קדושין הלא לא תפסי בה קדושין, ואם נפרש לא תתעמר בה היינו שלא ישתמש בה אחרי גירות, זה בתורת עבדות, הלא בכל ישראל זה דבר שאינו אפשר..."[^10]
Translation: "I do not understand: the negative commandment of 'do not treat her as a servant' is explained by our Master in Hilchot Melachim as applying after the initial intercourse, that he may not keep her as a maidservant like other captives of war. But when can he enslave her? Only before she converts, when enslavement is applicable—but at that stage, how could Kiddushin take effect on her, given that she is not yet Jewish? And if we explain 'do not treat her as a servant' as referring to employing her after her conversion, if this is under the category of slavery, that is already impossible with any Jewish person..."
The Ohr Sameach and Teshuvah MeYirah expose an apparent chronological paradox:
- Phase 1 (Captive Status): Before she converts, she is a captive. He can enslave her, but he cannot perform Kiddushin because she is not yet Jewish.
- Phase 2 (Post-Conversion/Marriage): Once she undergoes conversion and Kiddushin, she is a full Jewish woman. At this point, the general laws of the Torah prevent him from enslaving her, just as they prevent him from enslaving any other Jewish woman.
If so, what is the Rambam's unique case of "consecrating a Yefat Toar on condition of treating her as a servant"? If she is Jewish, the restriction is not specific to Yefat Toar; if she is not Jewish, Kiddushin is invalid.
┌────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ The Yefat Toar Chronology │
└───────────────────┬────────────────────┘
│
┌───────────────────────────┴───────────────────────────┐
▼ ▼
┌─────────────────────────────────┐ ┌─────────────────────────────────┐
│ Phase 1: Pre-Conversion │ │ Phase 2: Post-Conversion │
├─────────────────────────────────┤ ├─────────────────────────────────┤
│ • Status: Captive Gentility │ │ • Status: Full Jewish Wife │
│ • Enslavement: Halachically fit │ │ • Enslavement: Prohibited │
│ • Kiddushin: Ontologically void │ │ (General Jewish Status) │
└─────────────────────────────────┘ └─────────────────────────────────┘
To resolve this, the Ohr Sameach suggests that the prohibition of it'amrut (servile labor) regarding a Yefat Toar is a permanent, personal trace of her captive origin that persists even after she converts and marries.
Normally, if a husband stipulates that his wife must perform labor beyond her marital obligations, the condition is valid because it is a purely financial arrangement (Mamon), which a person can waive.[^11] However, regarding a Yefat Toar, the Torah issued a specific negative commandment: "You shall not treat her as a servant."[^12] This prohibition is a personal status restriction, not a financial one.
Therefore, even if she consents to the condition during Kiddushin, her waiver is ineffective because the prohibition is an absolute decree (Issur) rather than a personal monetary claim (Mamon). The condition is void, but the marriage remains valid.
Friction
Kushya 1: The Syntax of Suspensation: Rambam vs. Ra'avad on Tenai Kodem LeMa'aseh
The third rule of conditions, Tenai Kodem LeMa'aseh (the condition must precede the deed), is the source of a major dispute between the Rambam and the Ra'avad:
┌────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Tenai Kodem LeMa'aseh │
├───────────────────────────────────┬────────────────────────────────────┤
│ Rambam's View │ Ra'avad's View │
├───────────────────────────────────┼────────────────────────────────────┤
│ • Chronological Precedence │ • Syntactic Precedence │
│ • Verbal stipulation must be │ • Conditional clause ("If...") │
│ uttered before physical deed │ must precede consequence │
│ is executed. │ within the spoken sentence. │
└───────────────────────────────────┴────────────────────────────────────┘
The Rambam rules:
"Behold, you are consecrated to me with this dinar," gave her the dinar in her hand and then made a stipulation... the stipulation is of no consequence, because he performed the deed first by giving it to her, and then making the stipulation.[^13]
The Ra'avad immediately objects, arguing that precedence refers to the grammatical structure of the spoken sentence, not the chronological order of the physical action:
"א"א: אין זה אמת... אלא שיהיה התנאי קודם בדבורו למעשה שיאמר אם תעשה לי כך הרי פרוטה זו קדושין..."[^14]
Translation: "The Ra'avad says: This is not true... Rather, the condition must precede the deed in his speech, meaning he must say: 'If you do this for me, behold this coin is your Kiddushin' [stating the condition before the consequence]."
The Beit Shmuel notes that later authorities accept the Ra'avad's interpretation over the Rambam's.[^15]
The Underlying Conceptual Clash
The dispute between the Rambam and the Ra'avad hinges on how they define the term Ma'aseh (deed) in the context of a condition:
- The Rambam's View (Physical/Chronological): Ma'aseh refers to the physical act of acquisition (e.g., handing over the coin). For a condition to work, the verbal framework must exist in the world before the physical act occurs. If the coin is delivered before the condition is stated, the physical act immediately creates an unconditional legal status (Chalut). Any subsequent words are ineffective because they attempt to modify an action that has already been completed.
- The Ra'avad's View (Syntactic/Conceptual): Ma'aseh refers to the consequence clause within the spoken formula (e.g., "...you are consecrated"). Speech is what creates legal reality. Therefore, the conditional clause ("If you give me...") must grammatically precede the consequence clause ("...you are consecrated"). If the consequence clause is stated first, it creates an immediate conceptual focus on the result, making the subsequent conditional clause look like an afterthought rather than a structural part of the agreement.
Kushya 2: The Al Menat Paradox: Why does "On Condition" Bypass the Four Rules?
In Mishneh Torah, Marriage 6:14, the Rambam rules that if a person uses the specific term Al Menat ("on condition that") or Me'achshav ("from now onward"), they do not need to follow the formal rules of Tenai Kaful, Hen Kodem LeLav, or Tenai Kodem LeMa'aseh:
"כל המקנה על תנאי מעת עתה... אינו צריך לכפול התנאי ולא להקדים הן ללאו... וכן המקדש או המגרש בעל מנת... הרי זה כמי שהתנה מעכשיו..."[^16]
This presents a major difficulty: If these four rules are biblical requirements derived from the treaty with Bnei Gad and Bnei Reuven, how can a simple change of wording from "If" (Im) to "On condition that" (Al Menat) bypass the entire biblical framework?
┌─────────────────────────────┐
│ The Al Menat Bypass │
└──────────────┬──────────────┘
│
┌──────────────────────────┴──────────────────────────┐
▼ ▼
┌──────────────────────────┐ ┌──────────────────────────┐
│ The "If" (Im) Route │ │ The "Al Menat" Route │
├──────────────────────────┤ ├──────────────────────────┤
│ • Suspensive Condition │ │ • Resolutive Condition │
│ • Hesitant statement │ │ • Immediate transaction │
│ • Requires formal rules │ │ • Bypasses formal rules │
│ (Tenai Kaful, etc.) │ │ (Self-resolving) │
└──────────────────────────┘ └──────────────────────────┘
Resolution
The Rishonim offer two primary ways to resolve this paradox:
The Syntactic/Semantic Approach (Rampan/Rashba): The word Im ("If") creates a suspensive condition. It indicates that the transaction is incomplete and hesitant. Because the statement is hesitant, the Torah requires highly formalistic language (Tenai Kaful, etc.) to prove that the speaker is serious and has resolved to go through with the act.
By contrast, Al Menat ("On condition") is grammatically equivalent to Me'achshav ("From now onward").[^17] It creates a resolutive condition. The transaction is executed immediately, but it remains subject to retroactive cancellation if the condition is not met. Because the act takes effect right away, there is no hesitation, and the formal protective rules of Mishpat HaTenai are unnecessary.
The Ontological Approach (Ra'avad): An "If" condition attempts to split the transaction into two steps: the physical deed now, and the legal effect later. This split requires precise formal language to bridge the gap.
Al Menat, however, embeds the condition directly into the transaction itself as an inherent limitation. The transaction does not wait for the condition to be met to take effect; it is already active, but it carries a self-destruct mechanism. Because the condition is an internal modifier rather than an external bridge, it does not need the formal scaffolding derived from Bnei Gad and Bnei Reuven.[^18]
Intertext
The biblical source for these rules, the agreement between Moses and the tribes of Gad and Reuven, is recorded in Numbers 32:29-30:
"וַיֹּאמֶר מֹשֶׁה אֲלֵהֶם אִם־יַעַבְרוּ בְנֵי־גָד וּבְנֵי-רְאוּבֵן... וּנְתַתֶּם לָהֶם אֶת־אֶרֶץ הַגִּלְעָד לַאֲחֻזָּה. וְאִם־לֹא יַעַבְרוּ חֲלוּצִים אִתְּכֶם וְנֹאחֲזוּ בְתֹכְכֶם בְּאֶרֶץ כְּנָעַן."
Translation: "And Moses said to them: If the children of Gad and the children of Reuven pass over... then you shall give them the land of Gilead for a possession. But if they do not pass over armed with you, they shall have possessions among you in the land of Canaan."
This passage contains all four structural elements of a valid condition:
- Tenai Kaful: Moses states both the positive outcome (if they cross over, they get Gilead) and the negative outcome (if they do not, they must settle in Canaan).
- Hen Kodem LeLav: The positive option (crossing over) is stated before the negative option (not crossing over).
- Tenai Kodem LeMa'aseh: The condition (crossing over) is stated before the consequence (giving them the land).
- Davar SheEfshar Lekayemo: The condition was physically possible for them to perform.
In post-talmudic halacha, the Shulchan Aruch codifies this framework in both family law and civil law:
Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 38:2: Applies these rules strictly to Kiddushin, following the view that marital status requires the highest level of formal precision.Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 241:9: Applies the same rules to gifts and sales, ruling in accordance with the Rambam that even monetary transactions require these formal structures unless the term Al Menat is used.
Modern Legal Analogy: Condition Precedent vs. Condition Subsequent
In modern contract law, we find a similar distinction to the one between Im and Al Menat:
┌────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Halachic vs. Secular Contracts │
├───────────────────────────────────┬────────────────────────────────────┤
│ Halachic Category │ Secular Category │
├───────────────────────────────────┼────────────────────────────────────┤
│ • Im (If) │ • Condition Precedent │
│ (Suspends the contract until │ (No obligation arises until the │
│ the event occurs) │ event occurs) │
│ │ │
│ • Al Menat (On condition) │ • Condition Subsequent │
│ (The contract is active now, │ (Obligation is active, but │
│ but terminates if the event │ terminates if the event │
│ fails) │ occurs/fails) │
└───────────────────────────────────┴────────────────────────────────────┘
Psak/Practice
In contemporary halachic practice, the laws of Mishpat HaTenai are applied with extreme caution, particularly in cases of marriage and divorce, where errors can lead to severe complications (Mamzerut and Agunah).
1. The Agunah Problem and Conditional Marriage (Kiddushin Al Tenai)
Historically, various scholars have proposed using conditional marriages to prevent women from becoming Agunot (e.g., if a husband disappears in war or refuses to give a get, the marriage would be retroactively annulified because a pre-stated condition was not met).
However, contemporary halachic consensus rejects this approach due to several structural issues:
- The Problem of Biah: As noted by the Tzafnat Pa'neach, the physical act of marital intimacy resists conditional suspension. Under the rule of Ein adam oseh be'ilato be'ilat zenut, any subsequent act of intimacy is assumed to waive the original verbal condition, rendering the marriage unconditional.^19
- Formal Defects: It is exceptionally difficult to draft a conditional agreement that perfectly satisfies all four rules of Mishpat HaTenai without any defects. If even one rule is missed, the condition is void and the marriage remains fully binding.
2. Gittin (Divorce Bills)
In contrast to marriage, conditional clauses are sometimes used in bills of divorce (Gittin), such as a conditional get given by a terminally ill husband or a soldier going out to war.^20
In these cases, the scribes and rabbinic judges must be highly trained in the laws of Mishpat HaTenai. They typically write the get using the language of Me'achshav or Al Menat to bypass the complex structural requirements of Tenai Kaful and Hen Kodem LeLav, while ensuring the condition is clear, possible to fulfill, and legally binding.
Takeaway
The laws of Mishpat HaTenai demonstrate that in Halacha, language is not merely a tool for communication, but a precise instrument for shaping legal reality. By mastering the formal syntax of conditions, we gain the ability to navigate the delicate balance between the physical actions we perform and the conceptual commitments we make.
References
[^1]: Kiddushin 61a.
[^2]: Mishneh Torah, Marriage 6:2.
[^3]: Mishneh Torah, Marriage 6:13.
[^4]: Beit Shmuel 38:2.
[^5]: Gittin 75b.
[^6]: Yitzchak Yeranen on Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Ishut 6:1:1.
[^7]: Keseph Mishneh, Hilchot Ishut 6:1.
[^8]: Tzafnat Pa'neach on Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Ishut 6:1:1.
[^9]: Gittin 81b.
[^10]: Ohr Sameach on Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Ishut 6:10:1.
[^11]: Kiddushin 19b.
[^12]: Deuteronomy 21:14.
[^13]: Mishneh Torah, Marriage 6:3.
[^14]: Ra'avad, Gloss to Hilchot Ishut 6:3.
[^15]: Beit Shmuel 38:2.
[^16]: Mishneh Torah, Marriage 6:14.
[^17]: Gittin 74a.
[^18]: Ra'avad, Gloss to Hilchot Ishut 6:14.
[^19]: Yebamot 107a.
[^20]: Ketubot 9b.
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