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Mishneh Torah, Mourning 1
Sugya Map
The Rambam, in Hilchot Aveilut Chapter 1, lays the foundational halachot for mourning, exploring its Scriptural and Rabbinic origins, its duration, and the precise conditions for its commencement. He also delineates categories of individuals for whom mourning rites are either reduced or entirely withheld.
- Core Issue: The source and scope of the mitzvah of aveilut – distinguishing between its de'Oraita and de'Rabanan components, particularly concerning the seven-day period. Crucially, the shiur for aveilut de'Oraita is articulated, alongside a fundamental principle for interpreting halacha pre- and post-Matan Torah.
- Nafka Mina(s):
- The halachic status of aveilut beyond the first day, impacting its dinim on Shabbat and Yom Tov, and considerations like bittul Torah.
- The precise moment aveilut commences, distinguishing it from the pre-burial state of aninut.
- The application of aveilut dinim in complex scenarios: delayed burial, lost bodies, unidentified remains.
- The halachic definition of a viable child for whom aveilut is observed.
- The stark halachic stance on mourning for individuals who deviate from communal norms, including those executed by Beit Din, mumarim, minim, mosrim, and suicides.
- Primary Sources:
- Torah Sheb'Ktav: Vayikra 10:19 (Aharon's statement); Bereishit 50:10 (Yaakov's mourning); Vayikra 21:3 (Kohen's tumah).
- Torah Sheb'Al Peh: Yerushalmi Mo'ed Katan 3:5; Yerushalmi Ketubot 1:1; Masechet Semachot (implicitly for suicides and mumarim).
- Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Aveilut 1:1-11.
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Text Snapshot
The Rambam opens Hilchot Aveilut with a powerful, concise statement that sets the stage for the entire tractate:
מצוַת עֲשֵׂה לְהִתְאַבֵּל עַל קְרוֹבָיו, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: "וְאָכַלְתִּי חַטָּאת הַיּוֹם הַיִּיטַב בְּעֵינֵי ה'" (ויקרא י, יט). וְאֵין אֲבֵלוּת מִן הַתּוֹרָה אֶלָּא בְּיוֹם רִאשׁוֹן בִּלְבַד שֶׁהוּא יוֹם הַמִּיתָה וְיוֹם הַקְּבוּרָה. אֲבָל שְׁאָר הַשִּׁבְעָה יָמִים אֵינוֹ דִּין תּוֹרָה. אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר בַּתּוֹרָה: "וַיַּעַשׂ לְאָבִיו אֵבֶל שִׁבְעַת יָמִים" (בראשית נ, י), נִתְּנָה תּוֹרָה וְנִתְחַדְּשָׁה הֲלָכָה. מֹשֶׁה רַבֵּינוּ תִּקֵּן לָהֶם לְיִשְׂרָאֵל שִׁבְעָה יְמֵי אֲבֵלוּת וְשִׁבְעָה יְמֵי הַמִּשְׁתֶּה.
It is a positive commandment to mourn for one's close relatives, as implied by Leviticus 10:19: "Were I to partake of a sin offering today, would it find favor in God's eyes?" According to Scriptural Law, the obligation to mourn is only on the first day which is the day of the person's death and burial. The remainder of the seven days of mourning are not required by Scriptural Law. Although the Torah states Genesis 50:10: "And he instituted mourning for his father for seven days," when the Torah was given, the laws were renewed. Moses our teacher ordained for the Jewish people the seven days of mourning and the seven days of wedding celebrations.
(Mishneh Torah, Mourning 1:1-2)[^1]
Dikduk / Leshon Nuance
- "מצוַת עֲשֵׂה לְהִתְאַבֵּל עַל קְרוֹבָיו": The Rambam immediately frames aveilut as a mitzvah aseh, a positive commandment. This elevates it beyond mere custom or emotional response, grounding it in the Divine will. The lashon "להתאבל" (to mourn) rather than "לקיים אבלות" (to observe mourning) suggests an internal state of grief that externalizes into halachic practice.
- "אֵין אֲבֵלוּת מִן הַתּוֹרָה אֶלָּא בְּיוֹם רִאשׁוֹן בִּלְבַד שֶׁהוּא יוֹם הַמִּיתָה וְיוֹם הַקְּבוּרָה": This is a critical chiddush. The de'Oraita component is limited to the very first day, which Steinsaltz notes is contingent on the burial occurring on the day of death.[^2] If burial is delayed, this de'Oraita aveilut might not apply on the day of death itself, but rather on the day of burial. This requires careful parsing.
- "נִתְּנָה תּוֹרָה וְנִתְחַדְּשָׁה הֲלָכָה": This Aramaic phrase (though Rambam uses Hebrew here) is a fundamental principle from the Yerushalmi that explains why earlier Scriptural narratives (like Yaakov's seven days of mourning) are not binding halacha after Matan Torah. It posits a renewal or re-definition of halacha.
- "מֹשֶׁה רַבֵּינוּ תִּקֵּן לָהֶם לְיִשְׂרָאֵל שִׁבְעָה יְמֵי אֲבֵלוּת וְשִׁבְעָה יְמֵי הַמִּשְׁתֶּה": The seven days of mourning, crucial to Jewish practice, are explicitly attributed to a takkanah of Moshe Rabbeinu, making them de'Rabanan. The coupling with "שבעה ימי המשתה" (seven days of celebration) highlights a symmetrical takkanah governing major life events.
Readings
The Rambam's opening statements regarding the source and duration of aveilut are fertile ground for lomdus, drawing extensively from Yerushalmi and eliciting nuanced interpretations from Rishonim and Acharonim.
Rambam's Source for Aveilut de'Oraita (1:1)
The Rambam identifies the positive commandment of aveilut from Vayikra 10:19, Aharon's response to Moshe after the death of Nadav and Avihu: "Were I to partake of a sin offering today, would it find favor in God's eyes?" This implies Aharon was in a state of aveilut that precluded him from partaking of korbanot. The chiddush is that de'Oraita aveilut is restricted to the first day, the day of death and burial.
- Steinsaltz's Elaboration: Steinsaltz clarifies that Aharon's statement demonstrates that aveilut exists as a mitzvah de'Oraita on the day of his sons' death.[^3] However, Steinsaltz also notes an alternative view, citing Kan'ei Sofrim on Sefer HaMitzvot (M.A. 37), who, along with the Lachmei Mishneh (2:6), suggests the mitzvah of aveilut itself is derived from Vayikra 21:3, "לה יטמא", which obligates a Kohen to become tamei for his close relatives upon their death, and consequently to mourn for them.[^4] This implies that while Vayikra 10:19 might establish the duration of aveilut de'Oraita, Vayikra 21:3 establishes its existence. This is a significant point of divergence from the Rambam's explicit sourcing, though it could be seen as a complementary understanding of the underlying mitzvah. The Radbaz offers a different explanation for Rambam's source, indicating the interpretive complexity.[^5]
Reconciling Bereishit 50:10: "נתנה תורה ונתחדשה הלכה" (1:1)
The Torah explicitly states that Yosef "instituted mourning for his father for seven days" (Bereishit 50:10). Rambam explains this apparent contradiction with the Yerushalmi's principle: "נתנה תורה ונתחדשה הלכה" – upon the giving of the Torah, halacha was renewed, meaning pre-Sinaitic practices are not necessarily binding halacha unless re-established.
- Yad Eitan's Chiddush: The Yad Eitan cites the Yerushalmi (via Tosafot Mo'ed Katan 20a) for the principle that "אין למידין מקודם מתן תורה" (we do not derive halacha from before Matan Torah).[^6] He then brings Sefer Livyat Chein (Parshat Vayechi) who explains the ta'am: this principle is applied specifically when it results in a kula (leniency), such as exempting one from aveilut de'Oraita beyond the first day, thereby allowing for bittul Torah and observance of Shabbat without the full rigor of aveilut. This addresses the kushya posed by Sefer Sha'alat Shalom as to why we do learn from before Matan Torah in other contexts. The Livyat Chein's chiddush suggests a nuanced application of this principle, implying it's not a blanket rule but rather context-dependent, particularly when it comes to kula.
- Ohr Sameach & Tziunei Maharan: Both Ohr Sameach and Tziunei Maharan corroborate the Rambam's reliance on the Yerushalmi for this principle, specifically Yerushalmi Mo'ed Katan 3:5.[^7] Tziunei Maharan notes the Yerushalmi's phrasing "ולמידין דבר קודם למתן תורה (בתמיה)" which literally means "do we learn a thing from before the giving of the Torah (with a question mark)?" This rhetorical question highlights the Yerushalmi's own struggle and subsequent resolution through the principle of nitna Torah v'nitchadsha halacha.[^8]
Source for Sheva Yemei Aveilus de'Rabanan: "משה רבינו תיקן" (1:2)
After limiting de'Oraita aveilut to the first day, Rambam attributes the seven days of mourning (and seven days of wedding celebration) to a takkanah of Moshe Rabbeinu. This establishes the de'Rabanan nature of the remaining six days.
- Yad Eitan's Chiddush (and Resolution of Beit Hillel's Kushya): The Yad Eitan initially points out that the Rambam does not provide a source for this statement, and Beit Hillel (in Yoreh De'ah) noted he could not find it anywhere.[^9] However, Yad Eitan proudly declares, "ואני מצאתי דאיתא בירושלמי פ"א דכתובות" – "I found it, for it is stated in Yerushalmi Ketubot Chapter 1."[^10] He promises further elaboration in Hilchot Ishut. This is a significant contribution, providing the textual bedrock for a fundamental halacha.
- Ohr Sameach & Tziunei Maharan's Confirmation: Both Ohr Sameach and Tziunei Maharan confirm Yad Eitan's finding, citing Yerushalmi Ketubot 1:1 as the source for Moshe Rabbeinu's takkanah regarding both seven days of aveilut and seven days of mishteh.[^11] The Tziunei Maharan explicitly quotes Beit Hillel's kushya regarding the lack of source for Moshe Rabbeinu's takkanah for sheva yemei mishteh, making the Yerushalmi reference a comprehensive answer.
The Steinsaltz commentary on 1:2 also provides a subtle but important clarification on the Rambam's phrasing "שהוא יום המיתה ויום הקבורה" (which is the day of death and the day of burial). Steinsaltz highlights a nafka mina: "אבל אם הקבורה ביום אחר, אין אבלות מן התורה לא ביום המיתה ולא ביום הקבורה" – if burial occurs on a different day, there is no de'Oraita aveilut on either the day of death or the day of burial, according to Aruch HaShulchan (YD 398:1).[^12] This interpretation means the de'Oraita aveilut requires the simultaneity of death and burial. However, Steinsaltz immediately notes that the Lachmei Mishneh (to Rambam) disagrees, holding that de'Oraita aveilut applies on the day of burial even if it's not the day of death. This internal Rishon debate on Rambam's exact meaning underscores the precision required in understanding the commencement of aveilut.
Friction
The Rambam's succinct yet profound statements often conceal deep lomdishe complexities. Two major areas of friction arise from his opening halachot: the principle of nitna Torah v'nitchadsha halacha and the attribution of sheva yemei aveilut to Moshe Rabbeinu.
Kushya 1: The Scope of "נתנה תורה ונתחדשה הלכה"
The Problem: The Rambam, following the Yerushalmi, employs the principle of "נתנה תורה ונתחדשה הלכה" to explain why Yosef's seven days of mourning for Yaakov (Bereishit 50:10) do not establish a de'Oraita obligation for seven days of aveilut post-Matan Torah. Instead, de'Oraita aveilut is limited to the first day, with the remaining six days being de'Rabanan. However, this principle — that we don't learn halacha from before Matan Torah — is not universally applied in Chazal. Many halachot are derived from pre-Sinaitic narratives and practices, such as the mitzvah of brit milah (Yevamot 71b) or the prohibition of gid hanasheh (Chullin 97a). The Yerushalmi itself, in Mo'ed Katan 3:5, frames the question as "ולמידין דבר קודם למתן תורה (בתמיה)?" – "Do we learn something from before the giving of the Torah (with a rhetorical question mark)?" This suggests the principle is not self-evident and requires justification. Why is aveilut singled out for this treatment, implying a complete renewal rather than continuity? The Sha'alat Shalom, cited by Yad Eitan, directly raises this kushya by asking why we do learn from before Matan Torah in other instances.[^13]
The Best Terutz (or two):
Teleological Application (Livyat Chein via Yad Eitan): One powerful terutz, proposed by Sefer Livyat Chein and cited by Yad Eitan, suggests that the principle "אין למידין מקודם מתן תורה" is applied specifically in cases where it results in a kula (leniency) within halacha.[^14] In the context of aveilut, limiting the de'Oraita obligation to one day results in significant leniencies, particularly regarding bittul Torah and the observance of Shabbat. If aveilut for seven days were de'Oraita, its prohibitions would potentially override bittul Torah even on Shabbat, a much more stringent scenario. By making the additional six days de'Rabanan, the halacha achieves a balance, allowing for the dinim of aveilut to be observed without unduly impinging on other fundamental mitzvot like Talmud Torah and oneg Shabbat. This terutz implies a pragmatic or teleological dimension to the application of halachic principles, where the outcome (a kula) influences the choice of interpretive tool. While this approach might seem problematic to some who seek a more intrinsic reason, it provides a functional explanation for the Yerushalmi's particular application here.
Specific Renewal of Kedusha and Tumah at Matan Torah: A deeper lomdishe terutz might argue that aveilut, unlike milah or gid hanasheh, is intimately connected to the concepts of tumah (ritual impurity) and kedusha (holiness), which underwent a fundamental redefinition and institutionalization at Matan Torah. Before Matan Torah, the concepts of tumah and tahara existed, but their halachic parameters, especially concerning kohanim and korbanot, were not fully revealed. The Rambam's own source for aveilut de'Oraita (Aharon's statement regarding korbanot and tumah) highlights this connection. The mitzvah of aveilut is not merely an expression of grief, but a prescribed state of tumah and separation from certain kedushot. With Matan Torah, and the establishment of the Mishkan and Kohanim, the entire system of tumah and tahara was solidified and given its specific divine parameters. Therefore, any pre-Sinaitic practices relating to these concepts required a fresh mandate or re-evaluation in light of the renewed Torah. The Yerushalmi's rhetorical question ("בתמיה") might reflect the recognition that while ancestral practices are generally respected, aveilut falls into a category fundamentally reshaped by Matan Torah's revelation of the kedusha and tumah system. Thus, Moshe Rabbeinu's takkanah for seven days is not merely an addition, but a re-establishment of a de'Rabanan framework within the new Torah paradigm.
Kushya 2: The Uncited Source for Moshe Rabbeinu's Takkanah
The Problem: The Rambam states definitively, "מֹשֶׁה רַבֵּינוּ תִּקֵּן לָהֶם לְיִשְׂרָאֵל שִׁבְעָה יְמֵי אֲבֵלוּת וְשִׁבְעָה יְמֵי הַמִּשְׁתֶּה" (1:2). However, as Beit Hillel (cited by Yad Eitan and Tziunei Maharan) noted, the Rambam himself does not provide a source, and it was historically difficult to locate one for this foundational claim.[^15] While Yad Eitan and Ohr Sameach eventually point to Yerushalmi Ketubot 1:1, the Yerushalmi's statement "משה התקין שבעת ימי המשתה ושבעה ימי האבל" appears almost as an assertion without an explicit pasuk or Midrash Halacha cited within the Yerushalmi itself as its source. How can such a fundamental halacha, attributed directly to Moshe Rabbeinu, rely on what appears to be a bare Amoraic statement in the Yerushalmi, without further textual backing, especially given Rambam's rigorous approach to sources? What is the authority of a "takkanah" attributed to Moshe Rabbeinu in this manner? Is it Halacha l'Moshe miSinai or a unique form of takkanat Chachamim?
The Best Terutz (or two):
Implicit Mesora and Authority of Moshe Rabbeinu's Takkanah: The Rambam, as a codifier of Torah Sheb'Al Peh, operates on the basis of an authoritative mesora (tradition) that predates and informs the textual records. Many halachot l'Moshe miSinai, for instance, are passed down without explicit Scriptural mention or even direct Gemara derivation. The Yerushalmi Ketubot 1:1, by stating "משה התקין", is not necessarily deriving the halacha but rather recording a known mesora. For Rambam, the very attribution to Moshe Rabbeinu imbues this takkanah with a unique and unquestionable authority, placing it above the level of a mere takkanat Chachamim instituted by later Sanhedrin. Such a takkanah by Moshe Rabbeinu would be binding for all generations unless explicitly abrogated by an equally authoritative (or greater) Beit Din, a condition rarely met for takkanot of this caliber. It functions as a foundational de'Rabanan element that shapes the entire structure of aveilut, reflecting the unique spiritual and social needs of Klal Yisrael as understood by Moshe Rabbeinu.
Context of Communal Structure and Derech Eretz: The coupling of sheva yemei aveilut with sheva yemei mishteh is instructive. These are not merely individual observances but communal institutions designed to structure social life around significant events. Moshe Rabbeinu, as the ultimate leader and lawgiver, was responsible for establishing the fundamental social and spiritual framework for the nascent Klal Yisrael. These takkanot for seven-day periods of both mourning and celebration reflect a divinely inspired understanding of human psychology and communal cohesion. They provide a structured way for individuals and the community to process grief and joy, ensuring that these profound experiences are integrated into the Torah framework. The Yerushalmi's attribution to Moshe may not be a derasha from a pasuk but a recognition of his role in establishing the fundamental social fabric of the Jewish people, parallel to his role in establishing the legal code. Thus, the authority for this takkanah stems from Moshe Rabbeinu's unique prophetic and leadership status, making it a foundational element of Torah Sheb'Al Peh that guides the communal experience of life and death.
Intertext
The Rambam's inaugural chapter on aveilut is deeply intertwined with broader halachic and philosophical concepts found across Tanakh and Torah Sheb'Al Peh.
1. Kedusha, Tumah, and the Kohen Gadol's Unique Aveilut
- Source: Vayikra 21:1-4 and 21:10-12, which delineates the tumah restrictions for regular Kohanim and the Kohen Gadol. The Kohen Gadol is uniquely forbidden to become tamei for any deceased, even his closest relatives, and consequently, does not observe aveilut for them. Regular Kohanim are commanded to become tamei for specific relatives and thus observe aveilut.
- Connection to Rambam: The Steinsaltz commentary, referencing Kan'ei Sofrim, suggests that the mitzvah of aveilut itself (its very existence) is derived de'Oraita from Vayikra 21:3 ("לה יטמא") where a Kohen is permitted to become tamei for his relatives, implying a general obligation to mourn.[^16] While the Rambam uses Vayikra 10:19 (Aharon's statement) to establish the de'Oraita duration of aveilut (one day), the underlying mitzvah of mourning is rooted in the Kohen's relationship with tumah and kedusha. This highlights that aveilut is not merely a human emotional response, but a halachically defined spiritual state, intricately linked to the concepts of tumah and tahara that are central to Torah life. The Kohen Gadol's exception underscores the extreme kedusha required of him, even overriding the fundamental mitzvah of mourning for one's parents. This shows the halachic system's ability to prioritize different mitzvot based on circumstance and spiritual status.
2. The Distinction between Aninut and Aveilut
- Source: Masechet Shabbat 152a (and other sources like Mo'ed Katan 23b), which discusses the dinim of an onen (one whose relative has died but has not yet been buried). An onen is forbidden from eating korbanot, ma'aser sheni, and engaging in Talmud Torah, but is not yet subject to the full prohibitions of aveilut (e.g., she'eilat shalom, sitting on a low stool).
- Connection to Rambam: The Rambam implicitly (and explicitly in later halachot) distinguishes between aninut and aveilut. In 1:3, he states, "But until the corpse has been buried, a mourner is not bound by any of the prohibitions incumbent on a mourner."[^17] This pre-burial period is the state of aninut, which he later clarifies is an expression of "feelings in one's heart" (tza'ar halev) as opposed to formal aveilut prohibitions (1:11). This distinction is crucial: aninut represents the immediate, raw grief and the halachic limbo prior to the formal commencement of aveilut. It's a natural, human state of being preoccupied with the deceased, hence the exemptions from mitzvot that require a clear mind and joy. Aveilut, conversely, is the structured, post-burial, halachically defined period with specific prohibitions and customs. The very existence of aninut highlights that aveilut is not merely an extension of immediate grief but a distinct halachic institution that begins only once the deceased has been committed to the earth.
3. Non-Mourning for Transgressors: Mumarim, Minim, and Suicides
- Source: Masechet Semachot (also known as Evel Rabbati) 2:6-10 and Sanhedrin 47a-b. These texts discuss the dinim for those executed by Beit Din, mumarim (apostates), minim (heretics), mosrim (informers), and suicides.
- Connection to Rambam: Rambam's detailed halachot in 1:10-11, where he lists categories of individuals for whom one does not observe aveilut (e.g., those executed by Beit Din, mumarim, minim, mosrim, and suicides), directly reflect the Tannaitic and Amoraic discussions in Masechet Semachot. The Rambam's stark statement that for mumarim and similar individuals, "their brothers and their other relatives wear white clothes, robe themselves in white, eat, drink, and celebrate for the enemies of the Holy One, blessed be He, have perished. Concerning them, Psalms 139:21 states: 'Those who hate You, O God, will I hate'" is a powerful expression of the halachic community's stance against those who abandon Torah. This demonstrates that aveilut is not a universal, unconditional human right or emotional expression, but a halachically regulated practice, conditional on the deceased's adherence to Klal Yisrael and Torah. It underscores that aveilut is a mitzvah to honor the deceased within the framework of Torah, and when that framework is rejected, the mitzvah is abrogated. The nuanced din for suicides (1:11-12), where one does not mourn or eulogize but does comfort the relatives, further refines this by distinguishing between the deceased's actions and the living's grief, allowing for kavod l'chaim.
Psak/Practice
The Rambam's foundational halachot regarding aveilut in Chapter 1 are universally accepted and form the bedrock of halachic practice, as codified in the Shulchan Aruch and subsequent poskim.
1. Source and Duration of Aveilut
- The Rambam's distinction between de'Oraita aveilut (first day only) and de'Rabanan aveilut (the remaining six days, by takkanat Moshe Rabbeinu) is a cornerstone of halacha. The Shulchan Aruch (YD 398:1-2) adopts this understanding explicitly.[^18]
- Practical Implications: This distinction is critical for dinim on Shabbat and Yom Tov. On Shabbat, the public prohibitions of aveilut are suspended, and the mourner observes aveilut b'tzi'na (privately), precisely because Shabbat is de'Oraita and aveilut beyond the first day is de'Rabanan (YD 400:1). On Yom Tov, aveilut is completely pushed off (נדחית), and the seven days begin after the Yom Tov (YD 399:1). This directly affirms the kula (leniency) rationale suggested by Livyat Chein and Yad Eitan for the principle of nitna Torah v'nitchadsha halacha.
2. Commencement of Aveilut
- The Rambam's ruling that aveilut commences only after burial is universally accepted. The period before burial is aninut, with its own distinct dinim (YD 341:1). This means the practical prohibitions of aveilut (e.g., not wearing leather shoes, not washing, not greeting others) do not apply until the met is laid to rest.
- Practical Implications: This is why one is exempt from mitzvot (except tefilah) during aninut, as their focus is entirely on the deceased and funeral arrangements. The moment the golel (earth covering the grave) is placed, the aveilut begins.
3. Mourning for "Outsiders" and Suicides
- Rambam's psak not to observe aveilut for mumarim, minim, mosrim, and those executed by Beit Din is codified in Shulchan Aruch (YD 340:5 for mumar, 345:5 for suicide). This reflects a profound halachic statement about communal allegiance and the nature of the mitzvah of aveilut.
- Practical Nuances and Meta-Psak: While the Rambam's stance is strict, later poskim (e.g., Rema on YD 345:5 for suicides) introduced significant leniencies, particularly for suicides. The Rema states that we presume da'ato meshubeshet (their mind was disturbed) unless proven otherwise, thereby allowing for aveilut to be observed. This reflects a crucial meta-psak heuristic: the tension between rigid halachic classification and compassionate pastoral care. Poskim often seek paths to kula when dealing with tragic human circumstances, especially regarding mental health, to ensure that the living are not unduly burdened and that kavod ha'briyot (human dignity) is maintained where possible. The Rambam himself, by allowing nichum aveilim (comforting mourners) and kavod l'chaim (respect for the living) for suicides, demonstrates an awareness of this balance.
Takeaway
Aveilus is a meticulously structured positive commandment, whose specific duration, commencement, and even applicability are defined by a complex interplay of Torah Sheb'Ktav, Torah Sheb'Al Peh, and takkanot. It is not merely an emotional response but a halachically regulated spiritual state, sensitive to both the deceased's relationship with Torah and the living's communal obligations.
[^1]: Mishneh Torah, Mourning 1:1-2. [^2]: Steinsaltz on Mishneh Torah, Mourning 1:1:2 s.v. "שהוא יום המיתה ויום הקבורה". [^3]: Steinsaltz on Mishneh Torah, Mourning 1:1:1 s.v. "שנאמר ואכלתי חטאת היום היטב בעיני ה'". [^4]: Steinsaltz on Mishneh Torah, Mourning 1:1:1 s.v. "שנאמר ואכלתי חטאת היום היטב בעיני ה'", citing Kan'ei Sofrim on Sefer HaMitzvot M.A. 37, Lachmei Mishneh 2:6. [^5]: Steinsaltz on Mishneh Torah, Mourning 1:1:1 s.v. "שנאמר ואכלתי חטאת היום היטב בעיני ה'", citing Radbaz. [^6]: Yad Eitan on Mishneh Torah, Mourning 1:1:1 s.v. "אין אבילות מה"ת אלא ביום ראשון כו'". [^7]: Ohr Sameach on Mishneh Torah, Mourning 1:1:1 s.v. "נתנה תורה ונתחדשה הלכה"; Tziunei Maharan on Mishneh Torah, Mourning 1:1:1 s.v. "אבל שאר השבעה ימים אינו דין תורה". [^8]: Tziunei Maharan on Mishneh Torah, Mourning 1:1:1 s.v. "אבל שאר השבעה ימים אינו דין תורה", citing Yerushalmi Mo'ed Katan 3:5. [^9]: Yad Eitan on Mishneh Torah, Mourning 1:1:2 s.v. "ומשה רבינו תיקן להם לישראל שבעה ימי אבילות ושבעה ימי המשתה", citing Beit Hillel. [^10]: Ibid., citing Yerushalmi Ketubot 1:1. [^11]: Ohr Sameach on Mishneh Torah, Mourning 1:1:2 s.v. "ומשה רבינו תקן כו'"; Tziunei Maharan on Mishneh Torah, Mourning 1:1:1 s.v. "ומשה רבינו תקן להם לישראל כו'", citing Yerushalmi Ketubot 1:1. [^12]: Steinsaltz on Mishneh Torah, Mourning 1:1:2 s.v. "שהוא יום המיתה ויום הקבורה", citing Aruch HaShulchan 398:1 and Lachmei Mishneh. [^13]: Yad Eitan on Mishneh Torah, Mourning 1:1:1 s.v. "אין אבילות מה"ת אלא ביום ראשון כו'", citing Sefer Sha'alat Shalom. [^14]: Ibid., citing Sefer Livyat Chein Parshat Vayechi. [^15]: Yad Eitan on Mishneh Torah, Mourning 1:1:2 s.v. "ומשה רבינו תיקן להם לישראל שבעה ימי אבילות ושבעה ימי המשתה", citing Beit Hillel; Tziunei Maharan on Mishneh Torah, Mourning 1:1:1 s.v. "ומשה רבינו תקן להם לישראל כו'", citing Beit Hillel. [^16]: Steinsaltz on Mishneh Torah, Mourning 1:1:1 s.v. "שנאמר ואכלתי חטאת היום היטב בעיני ה'", citing Kan'ei Sofrim on Sefer HaMitzvot M.A. 37. [^17]: Mishneh Torah, Mourning 1:3. [^18]: Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De'ah 398:1-2.
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