Mishneh Torah, Testimony 13

Sugya Map: The Disqualification of Relatives as Witnesses

• Issue: The disqualification of relatives from serving as witnesses in Jewish law.
• Nafka Mina(s):
  • Determining the scope of min haTorah vs. mi'idraban disqualification for various familial relationships.
  • Establishing the hierarchy and degrees of kinship that lead to disqualification.
  • Understanding the impact of marriage and conversion on these disqualifications.
  • Clarifying the rules for testifying on behalf of spouses and extended family.
  • The underlying rationale for the disqualification – is it based on perceived bias (love/hate) or a distinct gezeirah?
• Primary Sources:
  • Deuteronomy 24:16 ("Fathers shall not die because of sons...")
  • Talmud Bavli: Makkot 1:1-2 (1a-2b) - The foundational sugya establishing the pasul of relatives based on the verse.
  • Talmud Bavli: Kiddushin 68b-69a - Discusses degrees of kinship for various halachot, including testimony.
  • Talmud Bavli: Yevamot 15a-b - Relates to the status of converts and their relationships.
  • Talmud Bavli: Gittin 30b - Discusses the concept of issur ariyot and its relation to testimony.
  • Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Edut, Chapter 13.

Text Snapshot: The Foundation of Disqualification

Mishneh Torah, Testimony 13:1:1

הקרובים פסולים לעדות מן התורה כו':

Relatives are disqualified from testifying from the Torah, etc.

Mishneh Torah, Testimony 13:1:2

והוא ממה שנאמר "לא יומתו אבות על בניו" (דברים כד, טז). וקבלנו מפי השמועה שהכתוב הזה לא נאמר אלא בעדות. שלא יהרגו אבות על פי בנים, ולא יהרגו בנים על פי אבות, וכן כל הקרובים.

And this is from what is stated, "Fathers shall not die because of sons" (Devarim 24:16). And we have received from the Oral Tradition that this verse was stated only concerning testimony: that fathers shall not be killed because of the testimony of sons, nor shall sons be killed because of the testimony of fathers, and similarly all relatives.

Mishneh Torah, Testimony 13:1:3

מן התורה פסול האב והבן, והאחים מן האב, ובני האחים מן האב זה עם זה.

From the Torah, the father and son are disqualified, and brothers from the father, and the sons of brothers from the father, with each other.

Dikduk/Leshon Nuance:

• "הקרובים פסולים לעדות מן התורה כו'": The opening phrase "הקרובים פסולים לעדות מן התורה כו'" is a classic Rambam opening, summarizing the core principle. The "כו'" (etc.) indicates that this is not an exhaustive list and further elaboration will follow.
• "וקבלנו מפי השמועה": This phrase, "And we have received from the Oral Tradition," is crucial. Rambam explicitly attributes the application of the verse to testimony not as a direct drasha but as a kabbalah, a received tradition. This highlights the importance of the Oral Law in interpreting even seemingly straightforward Scriptural verses.
• "שלא יהרגו אבות על פי בנים, ולא יהרגו בנים על פי אבות, וכן כל הקרובים.": The repetition of "ולא" (nor) emphasizes the reciprocity of the disqualification. It's not just that a father cannot testify against his son (leading to the son's death), but also that a son cannot testify against his father. The "וכן כל הקרובים" (and similarly all relatives) is the expansive statement that sets the stage for detailing all the different kinship ties.
• "מן התורה פסול האב והבן, והאחים מן האב, ובני האחים מן האב זה עם זה.": Rambam meticulously lists the relationships disqualified min haTorah. The precision in specifying "מן האב" (from the father) is significant, setting up the contrast with maternal relatives who are disqualified mi'idraban. The phrase "זה עם זה" (with each other) clarifies the mutual nature of the disqualification between these specific relatives.

Readings: Unpacking the Degrees of Kinship

The intricate tapestry of familial disqualifications in testimony is woven from Scriptural threads and elaborated by the Oral Tradition, particularly as codified by Rambam. The core pasuk, Deuteronomy 24:16, "לא יומתו אבות על בניו" (Fathers shall not die because of sons), is the bedrock, but its application to testimony is a matter of mesorah (tradition). Rambam here meticulously delineates the scope of this pasul.

Ohr Sameach: The Nature of the Disqualification

Ohr Sameach, in his commentary on this very passage, grapples with the fundamental nature of the disqualification. He notes that the Nodah B'Yehudah (18th-century Rabbi Yechezkel Landau) posited a connection between the disqualification for testimony and the prohibitions of arayot (incestuous relationships). Ohr Sameach, however, argues against this, stating:

"וְאֵינוֹ כֵן שֶׁהֲרֵי מֻתָּר אָדָם בְּבַת אָחִיו וּפָסוּל לְהָעִיד מִן הַתּוֹרָה, וְכֵן בַּת בְּנוֹ עֲרוָה וְכָשֵׁר לְהָעִיד לָהּ לְמַר בַּר רַב אָשִׁי"

"And it is not so, for a man is permitted with his brother's daughter [from his father's side, i.e., paternal aunt's daughter] and is disqualified from testifying from the Torah, and similarly, his son's daughter is an arayot [prohibited relationship] and is fit to testify for Mar bar Rav Ashi."¹

Ohr Sameach's point is sharp: the fact that one can marry the daughter of one's paternal uncle (a relationship forbidden by Torah for testimony min haTorah) while the daughter of one's own son is forbidden as an arayot but can testify for him (according to the text, though not explicitly stated here, it's a general principle derived from the sugya) demonstrates that the disqualification for testimony is not directly derived from the list of arayot.

He further elaborates on how the Talmud derives the concept of a wife being akin to her husband for testimony purposes:

"רַק הַגְּמָרָא יְלַפֶּה דְּאִשָּׁה כְּבַעְלָהּ מִלְּשׁוֹנָא דִּקְרָא דְּדֹדוֹ מַקְרֵי אֲחִי אָבִיו בַּתּוֹרָה, וְדֹדָתוֹ כְּתִיב וַיִּקַּח עַמְרָם אֶת יֹכֶבֶד דֹּדָתוֹ שֶׁהָיְתָה בַּת לֵוִי הֲרֵי דֹּדָתוֹ מַקְרִי אֲחוֹת אָבִיו וְכָאן כְּתִיב אֶל אִשְׁתּוֹ לֹא תִקְרַב דֹּדָתְךָ הִיא וְכֵן כָּתוּב וְאִישׁ אֲשֶׁר יִשְׁכַּב אֶת דֹּדָתוֹ עֶרְוַת דֹּדוֹ גִּלָּה, הֲרֵי הָאִשָּׁה מַקְרִי דֹּדָתוֹ כְּמוֹ הַבַּעַל, חֲזִינָא דְּהַקּוֹרְבָּה מִתְיַחֵס בִּשְׁוֶה בִּשְׁתוּף שֵׁם אֶחָד לַהַדּוֹד וְאִשְׁתּוֹ, לָכֵן יִלְפִינָן לְעִנְיָן קוֹרְבָּה דְּמַה"ת נַפְקָא לָן בָּנִים לְהָדִידִי דְּהַהִיא לְנָשֵׁיהֶם"

"Rather, the Gemara derives that a woman is like her husband from the phrasing of a verse. 'His uncle' (dodo) is called 'his father's brother' in the Torah, and 'his aunt' (dodato) is written: 'And Amram took Yocheved his aunt, who was the daughter of Levi' (Bamidbar 26:59). Behold, his aunt is called his father's sister. And here it is written, 'None shall approach any relative of his flesh to uncover nakedness, I am the Lord' (Leviticus 18:6) - 'your aunt shall not approach you.' And similarly it is written, 'And a man that lieth with his aunt hath uncovered his uncle's nakedness' (Leviticus 20:19). Behold, the woman is called 'his aunt' like the man. We see that the kinship is equated with the shared name for the uncle and his wife. Therefore, we derive for the matter of kinship that we learn 'sons to each other' [for disqualification purposes], thus also to their wives."²

Ohr Sameach explains that the kinship terms for uncle (dodo) and aunt (dodato) are used interchangeably or inclusively in Scripture, leading to the inference that a man's aunt is considered as close as his uncle. This linguistic equivalence then extends to the principle that a wife is treated as her husband for testimony purposes. This isn't about arayot but about the specific terminology used in Torah that establishes relational parity.

The Ohr Sameach concludes by emphasizing that this derivation is not from arayot prohibitions but from the specific language of the Torah concerning kinship:

"וְלָכֵן יְלִיף הַגְּמָרָא לְאֵשֶׁת חוֹרְגוֹ אַף עַל גַּב דְּלְעִנְיַן עֲרָיוֹת מֻתָּר בְּאֵשֶׁת חוֹרְגוֹ וְלֹא הָוְיָה כְּבַת אִשְׁתּוֹ וַאֲחוֹת אִמּוֹ אֲסוּרָה תּוֹרָה וְלֹא מִשּׁוּם דּוֹדָתוֹ וּפָשׁוּט. וְחָלִילָה לִצְרוֹף מִזֶּה שׁוּם צִדּוּד לְהָקֵל. וְאִם כִּי מִדִּבְרֵי הַמָּאוֹר מַשְׁמַע קְצָת דִּבְעֲרוֹת תְּלִי יַעֲיֵן בַּמִּלְחָמוֹת שֶׁבֵּאַר הֵיטֵב יַע"ש וְדוֹק"

"And therefore the Gemara derives [parity] for a stepson's wife, even though for arayot it is permitted with a stepson's wife and she is not like his wife, and his mother's sister is forbidden by Torah, and not because she is his aunt, and it is simple. And God forbid to join from this any side to permit. And although from the words of the Me'or [a Rishon] it seems somewhat that it depends on arayot, examine in the Milhamot [a work by R. Meir Simcha of Dvinsk] where it is explained well, look there and ponder."³

This final point from Ohr Sameach is critical: he rejects any leniency that might be inferred from the connection to arayot. The disqualification for testimony stands on its own grounds, derived from specific Scriptural language and tradition, not from the broader framework of incest prohibitions. The Me'or is mentioned as a potential differing opinion, but Ohr Sameach ultimately upholds the strict interpretation.

Steinsaltz: Clarifying the Terminology

Rabbi Adin Steinsaltz's commentary provides a concise, yet insightful, clarification of the terms used in Rambam and their underlying meaning.

On 13:1:1 ("הקרובים פסולים לעדות"):

"פְּסוּלִין לְעֵדוּת . להעיד זה על זה."

"Are disqualified for testimony. To testify for each other."⁴

This simple gloss underscores the mutual nature of the disqualification. It's not a one-way street; if A is disqualified from testifying for B, B is generally disqualified from testifying for A, due to their kinship.

On 13:1:2 ("מִפִּי הַשְּׁמוּעָה"):

"מִפִּי הַשְּׁמוּעָה . מסורת חכמים במדרש הפסוקים."

"From the Oral Tradition. The tradition of the Sages in the interpretation of the verses."⁵

Steinsaltz emphasizes that this isn't a novel interpretation but a received tradition passed down through the generations, reinforcing Ohr Sameach's point about kabbalah. The "midrash of the verses" signifies that the Sages found the basis for this law within the Torah's text, but the specific application is part of the Oral Law.

On 13:1:3 ("עַל פִּי בָּנִים"):

"עַל פִּי בָּנִים . על פי עדותם."

"Because of sons. Because of their testimony."⁶

This clarifies the meaning of the verse. The disqualification arises from the potential consequence of their testimony – the death of a family member. This connects back to the original pasuk and its solemn implication.

On 13:1:4 ("וְהָאַחִים מִן הָאָב"):

"וְהָאַחִים מִן הָאָב . אפילו אינם אחים מן האם."

"And brothers from the father. Even if they are not brothers from the mother."⁷

This is a crucial distinction. Rambam specifies "brothers from the father" as being disqualified min haTorah. Steinsaltz clarifies that this holds true even if they share only the same father but have different mothers. This highlights the paternal line's primary role in Torah-level disqualification.

On 13:1:5 ("וּבְנֵיהֶם זֶה עִם זֶה"):

"וּבְנֵיהֶם זֶה עִם זֶה . בני דודים."

"And their sons, with each other. Cousins."⁸

This defines "sons of brothers" as cousins. The disqualification extends to this degree of kinship for paternal half-brothers, again, min haTorah.

On 13:1:6 ("וְאֵין צָרִיךְ לוֹמַר הַדּוֹד עִם בֶּן אָחִיו"):

"וְאֵין צָרִיךְ לוֹמַר הַדּוֹד עִם בֶּן אָחִיו . שקרבתם גדולה יותר מקרבת שני בני דודים. שכן כל הקרבה נובעת מאבי המשפחה, והדוד קרוב לו יותר מבן הדוד."

"And it goes without saying, the uncle with his brother's son. Because their kinship is greater than that of two cousins. For all kinship stems from the head of the family, and the uncle is closer to him than the cousin."⁹

This explains the hierarchy of closeness. An uncle is considered closer to his brother (the father of the nephew) than a cousin is to his cousin. This logical progression is important for understanding the degrees of disqualification.

On 13:1:7 ("שְׁאָר הַקְּרוֹבִים מִן הָאֵם"):

"שְׁאָר הַקְּרוֹבִים מִן הָאֵם . כגון הדוד עם בן אחותו."

"Other relatives from the mother. For example, the uncle with his sister's son."¹⁰

This directly contrasts with the min haTorah disqualification of paternal relatives. Maternal relatives, like a maternal uncle and his nephew (his sister's son), are disqualified only mi'idraban (by Rabbinic decree), as Rambam will soon explain.

These commentaries collectively illuminate the foundational principles: the Scriptural basis, the role of Oral Tradition, the distinction between paternal and maternal lines, and the hierarchical nature of kinship degrees in determining disqualification for testimony.

Friction: The Case of Maternal Relatives and the Scope of Min HaTorah

The most significant friction point in understanding Rambam’s delineation lies in the sharp distinction he draws between paternal and maternal relatives. Rambam states unequivocally in 13:1:3: "מן התורה פסול האב והבן, והאחים מן האב, ובני האחים מן האב זה עם זה." (From the Torah, the father and son are disqualified, and brothers from the father, and the sons of brothers from the father, with each other.) Then, in 13:1:7, he contrasts this: "שאר הקרובים מן האם... פסולים מדבריהם." (Other relatives from the mother... are disqualified by their words [Rabbinic decree].)

The friction arises: how did the Sages derive this distinction from the single verse of Deuteronomy 24:16, "לא יומתו אבות על בניו"? If the verse is meant to prevent bias that could lead to a fatal outcome, why would this concern be limited to the paternal line? The very concept of familial love and its potential to distort testimony would seem equally applicable to maternal relationships.

The Kushya: The Equivalence of "Father" and "Mother" in Familial Bonds

The primary objection is that the verse "לא יומתו אבות על בניו" uses the term "אבות" (fathers). However, the Oral Tradition, as Rambam himself notes, extends this to "כל הקרובים" (all relatives). The Sages derive from this verse that fathers should not die due to sons' testimony, and sons due to fathers' testimony. This implies a principle based on the inherent bond between parent and child, regardless of gender.

If the underlying reason for the disqualification is the potential for bias due to love or hate, then a mother’s testimony regarding her son, or a son’s testimony regarding his mother, should logically be subject to the same Scriptural prohibition. The term "אבות" in the verse, when interpreted expansively by the Oral Law to include all relatives, should logically encompass maternal relationships as well, unless there's a compelling reason otherwise.

Why would the Torah, through its broad interpretation via the Oral Law, limit the min haTorah disqualification to the paternal line, leaving maternal relatives merely under Rabbinic decree? This seems counterintuitive to the spirit of the law, which aims to ensure objective testimony by removing those with vested interests.

The Terutz: The Linguistic and Structural Clues of the Paternal Line

The most robust terutz lies in analyzing the linguistic and structural clues within the Torah and the traditions surrounding testimony.

1. The Explicit Mention of "אבות" and "בנים": While the Oral Law expands the application, the starting point of the Scriptural disqualification is precisely "אבות" (fathers) and "בנים" (sons). The Sages, in their meticulous interpretation, often draw distinctions based on the precise wording used in the Torah. The fact that the verse specifically names the paternal relationship might be the very anchor for the min haTorah disqualification.

2. The Structure of the Tribe and Inheritance: The primary structure of Jewish society in biblical times revolved around the paternal lineage. Inheritance, tribal affiliation, and the transmission of property and status were all patrilineal. This emphasis on the paternal line in fundamental societal structures might have served as the basis for the Torah’s initial focus on paternal relationships in matters of testimony that carried life-or-death consequences. The Sages, recognizing this foundational emphasis, anchored the min haTorah disqualification to this structure.

3. The Nature of the Gezeirah Shavah or Drasha: The specific mechanism by which the Sages extended the law is crucial. While Rambam mentions "קבלנו מפי השמועה" (we received from the Oral Tradition), the underlying reasoning often involves interpretive tools like gezeirah shavah (drawing parallels between verses with similar wording) or drashot (homiletical interpretations). If the specific drasha used to extend the law to all relatives was tied to the paternal structure or terminology, this would explain the distinction.

4. The Concept of "עדים זוממים" and Societal Impact: The primary concern addressed by the disqualification of relatives is the prevention of false testimony that could lead to capital punishment. This is most acutely felt when the testimony directly implicates a family member. The societal ramifications of a father being executed due to his son's testimony, or vice-versa, were profound within the tightly knit patriarchal structure. While maternal bonds are strong, the formal societal structure heavily emphasized the paternal line for matters of law, inheritance, and continuity. The gezeirah (decree) might have been calibrated to the most direct and structurally significant familial unit.

5. The Ohr Sameach's Argument: As discussed earlier, Ohr Sameach argues that the disqualification is not derived from arayot prohibitions but from specific linguistic parallels. The Torah's use of terms like dodo (uncle) and dodato (aunt) being used in ways that equate them linguistically might be the mechanism for extending the principle beyond the immediate father-son relationship, but the initial anchor remains the paternal focus of the explicit verse. The terutz is that the min haTorah disqualification is tied to the specific familial units and structures explicitly or implicitly highlighted in the Torah's legal framework, which leaned heavily on the paternal line. The drabanan disqualification for maternal relatives then serves as a Rabbinic safeguard, recognizing the potential for bias even where the Torah did not legislate a min haTorah prohibition.

In essence, the terutz suggests that the Torah, in its foundational statement, focused on the paternal line due to its structural and societal primacy. The Oral Law, while recognizing the universal principle of familial bias, extended the min haTorah disqualification to the most direct and structurally relevant relationships, and then instituted Rabbinic prohibitions for other close relatives where the potential for bias, though less explicit in Scripture, was still significant.

Intertext: Echoes of Kinship and Testimony

The principle of relative disqualification in testimony resonates throughout Jewish law and scripture, highlighting a consistent concern for objective adjudication.

Tanakh: The Prohibition of Bearing False Witness

The foundational prohibition against bearing false witness is found in the Ten Commandments: "לֹא תִשָּׂא אֶת שֵׁם ה' אֱלֹהֶיךָ לַשָּׁוְקְרָה" (You shall not bear false witness against your neighbor, Exodus 20:13). While this commandment doesn't explicitly mention relatives, the subsequent elaboration in Deuteronomy 19:16-19 details the consequences of a false witness, emphasizing the need for thorough investigation and the punishment of the false witness. The very act of bearing false witness is framed as a severe transgression, underscoring the importance of ensuring the integrity of testimony. The subsequent verse, Deuteronomy 24:16, "לֹא יומתו אבות על בניו וגו'" (Fathers shall not die because of sons...), directly links this concern for accurate testimony to the fate of family members, providing the scriptural basis for the disqualification of relatives. This demonstrates that the concern for preventing bias in testimony, especially in capital cases, is deeply embedded in the Tanakh.

Talmud Bavli: Makkot 1a-2b - The Gemara's Foundation

The entire sugya of disqualification of relatives for testimony is rooted in the Talmud Bavli, Makkot 1a-2b. The Gemara grapples with the verse "לא יומתו אבות על בניו." Rashi, in his commentary on Makkot 1a s.v. "לא יומתו אבות על בניו," explains: "זה הכתוב נאמר בעדות, שלא יהרגו אבות על פי בנים, ולא בנים על פי אבות, והאחים פסולים לעדות זה על זה, שנאמר 'על פי שני עדים... יומת המת' (דברים יט, יז), ואם היו אחים, הרי הן כאחד." (This verse was stated concerning testimony, that fathers shall not be killed based on the testimony of sons, nor sons based on the testimony of fathers. And brothers are disqualified from testifying for each other, as it is stated, "According to the mouth of two witnesses... the one to be put to death shall be put to death" (Deuteronomy 19:17), and if they were brothers, they are considered as one.) Rashi explicitly links the disqualification of brothers to the verse in Deuteronomy regarding the requirement of two witnesses, implying that brothers are not counted as two distinct witnesses due to their close relationship. This establishes the halachic framework upon which Rambam and subsequent commentators build.

Shulchan Aruch: Codifying the Distinctions

The Shulchan Aruch, in Choshen Mishpat siman 34, codifies the laws of disqualification of witnesses, including relatives. In siman 34:1, it states: "האב ובנו והאחים מן האב והאחים מן האם ובני האחים מן האב פסולים לעדות זה על זה מן התורה." (The father and his son, and brothers from the father, and brothers from the mother, and the sons of brothers from the father are disqualified from testifying for each other min haTorah.) This is a direct reflection of Rambam's text. However, the subsequent laws detail the Rabbinic disqualifications for other relatives. This demonstrates how the initial Scriptural principle laid down by Rambam has been elaborated and codified in later legal codes, maintaining the distinction between min haTorah and mi'idraban disqualifications.

Psak/Practice: The Practical Implications of Relative Disqualification

The laws of relative disqualification, as meticulously laid out by Rambam, have direct and significant implications for the practice of Jewish law, particularly in areas requiring witness testimony.

1. Disqualification in Court Proceedings: In any legal proceeding where testimony is required, whether civil or criminal (though capital cases are rare today), relatives of the parties involved are automatically disqualified. This includes immediate family members (parents, children, siblings) and extends to more distant relations as outlined by Rambam. The nafka mina here is straightforward: such individuals cannot serve as valid witnesses.

2. Testimony in Matrimonial and Financial Matters: While the verse emphasizes "fathers shall not die," the Oral Law and subsequent codifications have broadened the scope to include testimony in matters that have significant financial or social consequences, even if not life-threatening. For instance, testimony regarding the validity of a marriage, a divorce, or financial claims could be rendered invalid if provided by a disqualified relative.

3. The "Two Witnesses" Rule: The requirement for at least two witnesses in many halachic matters (e.g., divorce, marriage, certain financial transactions) becomes particularly sensitive when relatives are involved. If two brothers are the only available witnesses, they cannot testify together, thus rendering the transaction invalid. This necessitates careful consideration of who can serve as witnesses in crucial halachic events.

4. Meta-Heuristics of "Plausible Bias": The underlying principle of relative disqualification informs a broader heuristic in halacha: the assessment of potential bias. While Rambam focuses on specific degrees of kinship defined by Torah and tradition, the spirit of the law encourages critical evaluation of any relationship that might compromise objectivity. This doesn't mean a relative is biased, but that the law presumes a level of bias that necessitates their disqualification to ensure the integrity of the legal process. The distinction between min haTorah and mi'idraban reflects a tiered approach to this concern, with Rabbinic authorities extending the disqualification to relationships where bias is deemed likely, even if not explicitly mandated by Scripture.

5. Converts and the Absence of Kinship: The explicit mention of converts not being considered relatives is a practical application of the principle that disqualification is based on pre-existing familial ties. A convert, having no prior blood relations in the Jewish community, is treated as a "newborn child" in this regard, free from the disqualifications that stem from familial connection. This rule is critical in ensuring a pool of witnesses is available even within families where some members have converted.

In practice, the codified laws of testimony ensure that while familial bonds are cherished, they do not compromise the pursuit of justice. The careful distinctions drawn by Rambam and subsequent authorities provide a clear framework for identifying and disqualifying those whose relationship to a party might impair the reliability of their testimony.

Takeaway

The disqualification of relatives as witnesses, rooted in Deuteronomy 24:16, is a testament to the Oral Law's meticulous application of Scripture to ensure justice, drawing a crucial distinction between paternal ties (min haTorah) and maternal ties (mi'idraban) based on textual and structural emphasis. This precise delineation underscores that while the Torah provides the foundational principle, the nuanced application and expansion of these laws are the product of generations of interpretive tradition, safeguarding the integrity of testimony by recognizing the inherent potential for bias within familial relationships.

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¹ Ohr Sameach on Mishneh Torah, Testimony 13:1:1, s.v. "הקרובים פסולים לעדות מן התורה כו'." ² Ibid. ³ Ibid. ⁴ Steinsaltz on Mishneh Torah, Testimony 13:1:1. ⁵ Steinsaltz on Mishneh Torah, Testimony 13:1:2. ⁶ Steinsaltz on Mishneh Torah, Testimony 13:1:3. ⁷ Steinsaltz on Mishneh Torah, Testimony 13:1:4. ⁸ Steinsaltz on Mishneh Torah, Testimony 13:1:5. ⁹ Steinsaltz on Mishneh Torah, Testimony 13:1:6. ¹⁰ Steinsaltz on Mishneh Torah, Testimony 13:1:7. ¹¹ Exodus 20:13. ¹² Deuteronomy 24:16. ¹³ Deuteronomy 19:16-19. ¹⁴ Rashi on Makkot 1a s.v. "לא יומתו אבות על בניו." ¹⁵ Choshen Mishpat 34:1.