Mishneh Torah, Testimony 22

Sugya Map

• Issue: The halachic implications when two groups of witnesses contradict each other regarding their testimony.
• Nafka Mina(s):
  • Determining the validity of testimony from one group when the other group contradicts it.
  • The legal standing of promissory notes signed by such contradictory witnesses.
  • The requirement for oaths when claims are partially admitted or denied.
  • The effect of prior disqualifications of witnesses (e.g., via hazamah) on subsequent testimony.
  • The distinction between a voided document due to witness contradiction versus a document proven to be forged.
  • The impact of the timing of witness testimonies (simultaneous vs. sequential).
  • The permissibility of expropriating property based on documents signed by witnesses whose testimony has been contradicted.
• Primary Sources:
  • Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Edut 22:1-6
  • Talmud Bavli, Sanhedrin 30a-b, Shevuot 41a, Gitin 34a, Bava Metzia 23a, Bava Batra 168b
  • Talmud Yerushalmi, Ketubot 2:5

Text Snapshot

Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Edut 22:1

שתי כתי עדים המכחישות זו את זו — כשיבואו שתי כיתי עדים ויעידו עדות ויכחיש זה את זה, כגון שאמרו זה: “ראובן חייב לשמעון מנה”, ואמרו האחרים: “ראובן חייב לשמעון מאתים זוז”. אם בא עד מאחת הכית הזו עם עד מאחת הכית הזו והעידו שניהם בעדות אחרת, אין עדותן כלום, שהרי בודאי אחד מהן שקר, ואין אנו יודעים איזה מהן.

באו שתי הכית זו בפני עצמה והעידו עדות, וחזרה הכית השניה ובאה בפני עצמה והעידה עדות אחרת, מקבלין כל אחת מהן בפני עצמה.

• Dikduk/Leshon Nuance:
  • "המכחישות זו את זו": The reflexive verb emphasizes the mutual negation of their testimonies. This isn't just one saying "no" to the other, but a reciprocal disqualification.
  • "אין עדותן כלום": "Nothingness" or "void." This is a strong statement of nullification.
  • "שהרי בודאי אחד מהן שקר": The logical deduction based on the contradiction. The certainty ("בודאי") is key; it's not speculation.
  • "ואין אנו יודעים איזה מהן": The fundamental problem – the inability to identify the liar makes it impossible to accept either testimony in isolation when they are combined.
  • "מקבלין כל אחת מהן בפני עצמה": "Accept each one individually." This establishes the principle of separating the testimonies when they are presented independently.

Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Edut 22:2

וכן היה ראובן נושה בשמעון שני שטרות, אחד במנה ואחד במאתים זוז, וכפר שמעון בשני השטרות. באו עדים של אחד מהן, והיו מכלל הכית הללו. ובאו עדי של שטר האחר, והיו מכלל הכית האחרות. חייב שמעון לשלם מנה בלבד, שהיד בעל השטר על התחתונה. וישבע על השאר.

• Dikduk/Leshon Nuance:
  • "והיו מכלל הכית הללו": "And they were from among these groups." This clarifies that the witnesses on each note belong to one of the previously described contradictory groups.
  • "שהיד בעל השטר על התחתונה": A crucial idiom, meaning "the holder of the note is on the lower side" or is disadvantaged. It signifies accepting the lesser of two claims when certainty is impossible.
  • "וישבע על השאר": "And he shall swear concerning the remainder." This introduces the requirement for an oath in situations of partial admission or where proof is incomplete.

Readings

Ohr Sameach on Mishneh Torah, Testimony 22:1

The Ohr Sameach grapples with a profound question regarding the status of witnesses from one of the contradictory groups when their testimony is later needed for a different matter, potentially in their favor. He asks: "If later one of these groups has a claim and the two witnesses who had previously contradicted them now testify in their favor, do we say: 'But according to your testimony then, those witnesses were liars and testified falsely in the Beit Din, and now what they testify for you is also false according to your words?'"¹ This line of reasoning suggests that if witnesses from group A declared witnesses from group B to be liars, then group B's subsequent testimony, even in favor of A, should be disqualified by A’s own prior declaration.

The Ohr Sameach then proposes a resolution: "Perhaps we say that since for everyone else they are valid, we can say that they have since repented and are now valid, because in the Beit Din they are valid."² This implies that a formal disqualification by the Beit Din is necessary for a witness to be permanently rendered invalid. If the Beit Din has not formally disqualified them based on the prior contradictory testimony (perhaps because the contradiction was resolved without such a ruling, or the initial testimony wasn't fully accepted), then they remain kasher (valid).

Furthermore, the Ohr Sameach considers the possibility that "since they are valid for other testimonies, they are not disqualified even for their own benefit based on their contradiction."³ This means their general validity for other matters might override the specific contradiction. However, he then brings a significant counter-argument from Tosafot in Nedarim (44a) concerning two promissory notes where witnesses from one group sign a later note. Tosafot suggest that if the recipient of a gift admits that the witnesses are disqualified, then even if they are generally valid, they are disqualified for him. The Ohr Sameach infers from this that "when, according to your words, they testified falsely for your benefit, they are disqualified for you."⁴ This seems to imply that if a party benefits from the prior declaration that the other group's witnesses are liars, then those witnesses become disqualified for that party.

This leads to a "new ruling" according to the Ohr Sameach, where the initial declaration of falsehood renders the witnesses disqualified for the party who benefited from that declaration. He struggles with this, noting that it would mean anyone who denies a claim and has witnesses against him would have those witnesses disqualified if they later testified for his opponent. He resolves this by suggesting that the initial declaration was made by the defendant against the plaintiff, asserting the plaintiff's claim was false. However, when the witnesses testify for the plaintiff, they are now testifying for their own benefit, and their prior declaration of falsehood was against them, not the party who is now benefiting. This distinction is subtle and hinges on who is making the declaration of falsehood. The Ohr Sameach concludes this section by revisiting the Shevuot (41a) case and differentiating it, suggesting that in that instance, the witnesses were still considered valid for the initial loan despite the contradiction regarding repayment.

Steinsaltz on Mishneh Torah, Testimony 22:1-4

Rabbi Adin Steinsaltz's commentary offers a more concise, yet insightful, gloss on the Rambam's rulings. Regarding the initial scenario of two contradicting groups of witnesses, he explains: "Contradicting each other: They contradict the words of the second one (see above 18:2)."⁵ This succinctly captures the essence of the sugya – mutual invalidation.

When two witnesses from one group join with one from another, and they testify about a different matter, "There is no testimony here, for certainly one of them is a liar."⁶ He further clarifies the implication of this impossibility: "And when one group comes by itself and testifies, and the second group comes by itself and testifies about another matter, each one is accepted on its own."⁷ This highlights the principle that the disqualification only occurs when the contradictory elements are combined or directly interact. The reason for accepting them individually is explained as: "Since it is not known which one is disqualified, we consider each one on its own merits, and neither one is disqualified."⁸ This is the principle of safek (doubt), where we do not disqualify witnesses based on uncertainty.

On the second halacha, concerning the promissory notes, Rabbi Steinsaltz explains Shimon's partial payment: "Shimon pays a maneh: It is agreed by all that he is at least obligated for a maneh, but he does not pay more than that."⁹ This reflects the application of the principle of accepting the lesser claim. He further clarifies the rationale: "For certainly one of the witnesses of one of the notes is disqualified, and money is not taken out based on doubt."¹⁰ This reiterates the core principle of safek in monetary matters.

Regarding the oath requirement, the commentary notes: "It appears to me that this oath which he must swear concerning the remainder..."¹¹ This points to the procedural necessity of an oath when certainty is absent, even when some liability is admitted. The commentary also explains the phrase "the holder of the note is on the lower side": "This is because certainly one of the witnesses to one of the notes is disqualified, and money is not taken out based on doubt."¹² This again emphasizes the application of safek and the need for the plaintiff to establish their claim with certainty.

Teshuvah MeYirah on Mishneh Torah, Testimony 22:2

The Teshuvah MeYirah directly addresses the oath mentioned in the second halacha: "It appears to me that this oath which he must swear concerning the remainder..."¹³ He defers to the commentary of the Ra'avad (Rabbi Avraham ben David) on this point, indicating its complexity and the existence of differing opinions among the Rishonim.

He also comments on Shimon's payment of the maneh: "Shimon pays a maneh: It is agreed by all that he is at least obligated for a maneh, but he does not pay more than that."¹⁴ This reiterates the pragmatic approach of accepting the undisputed portion of the claim.

Netyivot HaMishpat (cited by Ohr Sameach)

The Ohr Sameach references the Netyivot HaMishpat (Rabbi Yaakov of Lissa) on the issue of a debtor admitting to a debt but claiming repayment. The Netyivot argues that the debtor's admission of having received the money, even if he claims repayment, is stronger than witness testimony. This is because the note itself is evidence of the debt, and the holder of the note is considered credible regarding its existence. The Netyivot suggests that the debtor is not believed when claiming repayment unless he can prove it, implying that the note holder's claim is generally accepted unless proven otherwise. This is related to the concept of chazakah (presumption of possession) and the idea that a document in one's possession is presumed to be valid and unpaid. The Netyivot also posits that the note holder is believed on the basis of the note itself, even against contradictory testimony, because the entire system of commerce relies on such trust.

Friction

The core tension in this sugya lies in reconciling the principle of safek (doubt) with the presumptions of validity and the mechanisms for resolving conflicting evidence. Specifically, when two groups of witnesses contradict each other, how do we proceed when parts of their testimonies might still be valid, or when subsequent evidence emerges?

The Rambam states in 22:1: "If one witness from one group came together with one witness from the other group and they both delivered testimony concerning another matter, the testimony is of no consequence. For certainly one of them lied, but we do not know which one." This establishes that direct combination of contradictory witnesses nullifies their testimony. However, in 22:1, he also states: "If one of these groups comes alone and gives testimony and the other group comes alone and gives testimony regarding another matter, we accept the testimony of both groups individually." This implies that their individual testimonies retain validity as long as they are not directly pitted against each other.

The friction arises when we consider the implications of this distinction. The Ohr Sameach, drawing from Tosafot, raises a crucial point: If Witness A testifies that Witness B lied, then Witness B's subsequent testimony, even if favorable to Witness A's case, should be invalid for Witness A. This is because Witness A has already declared Witness B a liar. This leads to a potential paradox: if Group A declares Group B's witnesses to be liars, and then Group B's witnesses are needed to testify for Group A, their testimony would be invalid according to this logic.

The Ohr Sameach's attempt to resolve this by saying they "repented" or are valid "for everyone else" highlights the difficulty. If the Beit Din has not formally ruled them disqualified, they retain their kosher status. However, the Tosafot's approach, as interpreted by the Ohr Sameach, suggests that a party's own declaration of falsehood against another witness creates a specific disqualification vis-à-vis that party.

This leads to the strongest kushya (objection): If a party benefits from the prior declaration that another group's witnesses are liars, how can those disqualified witnesses then testify in favor of the party who declared them liars? The Ohr Sameach grapples with this by suggesting a distinction: the initial declaration was made by the defendant against the plaintiff, thus disqualifying the plaintiff's witnesses for the plaintiff. But when these witnesses then testify for the plaintiff, they are testifying for their own benefit, and their prior declaration was against them. However, this seems to skirt the issue. The core problem remains: if A declares B a liar, B's testimony for A should be suspect, at best.

A potential terutz (answer) lies in differentiating between a formal Beit Din disqualification and a party's assertion. The Rambam's initial statement that "we do not know which one" is the key. When the witnesses are brought individually, their testimony is accepted because the Beit Din doesn't have definitive proof that these specific witnesses are the liars. They are presumed innocent until proven guilty. However, the Ohr Sameach's interpretation of Tosafot suggests that when a party actively benefits from the declaration of falsehood, this creates a specific impediment.

Perhaps the distinction is between a statement of fact ("X is a liar") and a procedural ruling. If Witness A testifies that Witness B lied, and the Beit Din accepts this as fact, then Witness B is indeed disqualified by that Beit Din. But if Witness A merely asserts that Witness B lied, and the Beit Din doesn't formally rule on it, then Witness B remains kasher in general. The Tosafot's ruling about the recipient of a gift admitting disqualification is powerful. It implies that a party's own admission of disqualification carries weight, even if the Beit Din hasn't formally ruled.

Therefore, the terutz could be:

1. Distinction between Beit Din Ruling and Party Assertion: When a party declares another witness to be a liar, it doesn't automatically disqualify that witness for all purposes unless the Beit Din formally rules so. The individual testimonies are accepted because the Beit Din doesn't have the certainty to disqualify them.
2. The Nature of the "Benefit": The "benefit" derived from declaring witnesses liars might not be enough to create a specific disqualification for the party who benefited. The initial declaration is about the other group's falsehood, not an endorsement of the current group's truthfulness. The subsequent testimony of the initially discredited group, when presented independently, is accepted because the Beit Din cannot pinpoint the liar. The Ohr Sameach's interpretation of Tosafot, however, remains a strong challenge, suggesting that a party’s own declaration of falsehood against a witness can disqualify that witness for them.

A more robust terutz might involve understanding the Rambam's rule (22:1) about individual acceptance as the primary principle. The contradiction exists, but as long as the Beit Din cannot definitively assign the falsehood to one specific witness or group in that instance, they are treated as potentially valid. The Tosafot's scenario might be distinct because it involves a party admitting the disqualification, which is a stronger basis for action than a mere assertion of falsehood.

The Ohr Sameach’s own concluding remark, that "it is certainly the case that the defendant was a liar and denied the money, [and] testifying depends on whether it is possible for him, then he is disqualified]"¹⁵ suggests that the defendant's denial is what creates the initial problematic situation. When witnesses testify for the plaintiff, they are simply testifying. The disqualification only arises when their testimonies clash.

Intertext

Talmud Bavli, Sanhedrin 30a-b

The foundational sugya for this entire discussion is found in Sanhedrin 30a-b, dealing with the disqualification of witnesses. The Gemara discusses the scenario of two groups of witnesses, one testifying that Reuven owes Shimon a maneh, and another testifying that Reuven owes Shimon two hundred zuz. If one witness from the first group and one from the second group testify about a third matter, their testimony is void because one of them is a liar, but we don't know which. This is the exact scenario the Rambam codifies. The Gemara then states: "If one group comes by itself and testifies, and the other group comes by itself and testifies about another matter, we accept the testimony of each group individually."¹⁶ This confirms the Rambam's ruling and its underlying principle: the absence of direct confrontation or certainty of falsehood prevents disqualification. The Gemara grapples with the nafka mina of this, exploring the status of such witnesses for other matters.

Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Edut 21:1

This section of Hilchot Edut directly precedes the laws concerning contradictory witnesses and provides the context for their disqualification. It states: "If two witnesses testify concerning one thing, and two other witnesses testify concerning the same thing, and they contradict each other, the testimony of both groups is void, for it is impossible for both groups to be truthful."¹⁷ This establishes the general principle of contradiction leading to voidance. The subsequent laws in chapter 22 then detail the nuanced applications of this principle, particularly when the contradiction is not direct or when the testimonies are separated. The contrast between a direct contradiction (21:1) and the more complex scenarios in chapter 22 is crucial. In 21:1, when two groups directly contradict each other on the same matter, both are void. In 22:1, when the contradiction is implicit or when they testify on different matters, the rules become more nuanced, allowing for individual acceptance.

Talmud Yerushalmi, Ketubot 2:5

The Yerushalmi offers a parallel discussion concerning contradictory testimonies, specifically in the context of marriage and divorce. It discusses a situation where two witnesses contradict each other regarding a woman's divorce. Rabbi Yossi asks: "Regarding two contradictory witnesses, if two witnesses contradict each other, are we believed concerning her divorce?"¹⁸ The implication is that if the witnesses contradict each other, their testimony becomes suspect. The Yerushalmi, like the Bavli, highlights the difficulty in accepting testimony when the credibility of witnesses is in doubt due to mutual contradiction. This parallel underscores that the problem of contradictory witnesses is not limited to monetary matters but extends to fundamental aspects of Jewish law like marital status.

Psak/Practice

The rulings in Mishneh Torah, Testimony 22, have significant implications for how claims are processed and validated.

Firstly, the principle of accepting individual testimonies from contradictory groups when presented separately (*"Mekablin kol achat bifnei atzmah"*¹⁹) is paramount. This means that if one party presents a promissory note signed by witnesses from Group A, and later another party presents a note signed by witnesses from Group B for a different debt, both claims may be pursued. The Beit Din will not automatically nullify the second claim because the witnesses are from a group that contradicted Group A; rather, each claim is judged on its own merit.

Secondly, when a claim is partially admitted or denied, and the remaining portion requires an oath, the Rambam's instruction that the oath should be taken while holding a sacred article ("while holding a sacred article, as is required of a person who admits a portion of the claim lodged against him")²⁰ is significant. This elevates the seriousness of the oath, especially when there is already conflicting witness testimony involved. It emphasizes that even in situations of doubt, there are mechanisms to reach a definitive resolution.

Thirdly, the distinction between documents voided by witness contradiction and those proven forged is critical. The Rambam states: "When, by contrast, there is a legal document concerning which a protest has been sustained, i.e., two witnesses came and said that the plaintiff told them to forge this legal document, we never use that legal document to expropriate property even if the authenticity of the signatures of the witnesses is validated."²¹ This establishes a clear hierarchy: a document tainted by proven forgery is irredeemably invalid, whereas a document signed by witnesses whose testimonies have been contradicted in other instances may still have some legal standing, albeit with limitations and potential oaths.

Finally, the rule that "if afterwards, he brings other witnesses regarding that same claim and the testimony of these witnesses is found to be accurate, the case is adjudicated on this basis"²² demonstrates a commitment to truth-finding. Even if multiple prior groups of witnesses are disqualified through hazamah (a process where witnesses are proven to have lied), new, reliable testimony will override previous failures. This reflects a meta-heuristic: the pursuit of truth in the Beit Din is paramount, and the system is designed to accommodate the discovery of accurate evidence.

Takeaway

The halacha navigates the treacherous waters of conflicting testimony by prioritizing certainty. When doubt is unavoidable due to contradictions, the law favors caution, often requiring oaths and accepting the lesser claim. Yet, the system allows for individual testimonies to stand when direct confrontation is absent, and remains open to the discovery of truth, even after multiple failures.