Mishneh Torah, Testimony 5

Sugya Map

• Issue: The fundamental principle of dina d'shnei edim (the requirement for two witnesses) in Jewish law, its exceptions, and the nuanced application of he'emanut (credibility) when a single witness, a woman, or a disqualified witness testifies. Specifically, the Rambam's unique chiddush regarding who can obligate an oath.
• Nafka Mina(s):
  • Identifying scenarios where eid echad (one witness) is effective, either mid'Oraita (Biblically) or mid'Rabbanan (Rabbinically).
  • The impact of a disqualified witness (pasul) on the validity of an entire kat edim (group of witnesses).
  • The distinction between witnesses who intended to testify (lishmah) and those who merely observed (lo lishmah).
  • The capacity of a witness to also serve as a judge or offer legal opinions.
  • The specific question of whether a woman or a pasul witness can obligate an oath, given that eid echad generally can.
• Primary Sources:
  • Devarim 19:15 ("על פי שני עדים או על פי שלשה עדים יקום דבר")¹
  • Bamidbar 35:30 ("לא יקום עד אחד באיש למות")²
  • Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Eidut 5:1-12³
  • Sifri Devarim 188⁴
  • Sifri Vayikra, D'vura D'Chovah Perek 7, Baraita 1-2⁵
  • Bavli, Ketubot 85a⁶
  • Bavli, Shevuot 30a, 32b⁷
  • Bavli, Yevamot 117a⁸
  • Yerushalmi, Sotah 1:1⁹
  • Tosefot, Ketubot 85a s.v. "Pirsum"¹⁰
  • Tosefot, Yevamot 101b s.v. "d'Kim Li"¹¹

Text Snapshot

The Rambam opens Hilchot Eidut, Perek 5, with the bedrock principle of dina d'shnei edim:

"A ruling is never delivered in any judgment on the basis of the testimony of one witness, not in cases involving financial law, nor in cases involving capital punishment, as Deuteronomy 19:15 states: 'One witness should not stand up against any person with regard to any transgression or any sin.'"¹²

He immediately introduces the Oral Tradition's chiddush:

"According to the Oral Tradition, we learned that his testimony is effective with regard to an oath, as stated in Hilchot Toein ViNitan."¹³

The text then lists mid'Oraita exceptions (sotah, eglah arufah) and mid'Rabbanan exceptions (eidut isha). The critical lines for our discussion appear next:

"Whenever the testimony of one witness is effective, a woman and a person disqualified as a witness may also testify. There is, however, an exception: a witness who requires that an oath be taken. We do not require that an oath be taken except on the basis of testimony that is acceptable and fit to be joined with the testimony of another person to obligate the person taking the oath to make financial restitution."¹⁴

Dikduk/Leshon Nuance: The phrase "חוץ מעד אחד של שבועה" (except for a single witness [who obligates] an oath) is pivotal. The Rambam seems to create a sub-category within eid echad where the general rule of isha v'pasul k'asher hu (a woman and a disqualified person are as [the single witness] himself) does not apply. The subsequent clause "אין מחייבין שבועה אלא בעדות שהיא כשרה ועומדת להצטרף עם אחר להוציא ממון מן התורה" (we do not obligate an oath except with testimony that is valid and stands to join with another to extract money mid'Oraita) further clarifies this. The emphasis on "כשרה ועומדת להצטרף" (valid and stands to join) suggests that the chiyuv shvuah (oath obligation) inherent in eid echad is not a standalone he'emanut but rather a diminished form of eidut that could have been full eidut had another witness been present. A woman or a pasul witness, by definition, can never join with another to form valid eidut for mamon or nefashot.

Readings

Kessef Mishneh (R' Yosef Karo) on Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Eidut 5:3

The Kessef Mishneh (KM) expresses significant difficulty with the Rambam's assertion that a woman or a disqualified witness cannot obligate an oath.¹⁵ He points to the gemara in Yevamot 117a, which establishes the principle: "כל מקום שהאמינה תורה עד אחד, אשה ופסול כשרים להעיד" (wherever the Torah believes one witness, a woman and a disqualified person are valid to testify).¹⁶ The KM argues that since the Torah believes eid echad to obligate an oath, it should logically follow that a woman or a disqualified witness should also be able to do so. He suggests that the gemara's language "לכל עון ולכל חטאת אינו קם אבל קם הוא לשבועה" (for any transgression or sin, he does not stand, but he stands for an oath) implies that we are dealing with a witness who is otherwise fit for eidut in mamon or nefashot, albeit only when joining another. This interpretation implies that eidut isha or pasul for an oath might be outside the scope of that drasha. Ultimately, the KM states, "איני יודע מהיכן הוציא רבינו דין זה" (I do not know from where our master derived this law), indicating a profound challenge to the Rambam's position.

Noda BiYehudah (R' Yechezkel Landau, Mahadura Kama, Even HaEzer 33) & Tziunei Maharan on Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Eidut 5:3

The Noda BiYehudah (NBY), cited and elaborated upon by the Tziunei Maharan, vigorously defends the Rambam against the Kessef Mishneh's kushya.¹⁷ The NBY argues that the Rambam's position is firmly rooted in the Sifri, Yerushalmi, and Bavli.

His primary argument, as articulated by Tziunei Maharan, is that the he'emanut of eid echad l'shvuah (one witness to obligate an oath) is not a standalone he'emanut given to any single individual. Rather, it is a diminished form of eidut keshérah (valid testimony). The pasuk "לא יקום עד אחד באיש לכל עון ולכל חטאת" (Devarim 19:15) implies that while eid echad is not enough for mamon or nefashot, he could potentially be part of a kat for such matters. Therefore, when the Torah states "אבל קם הוא לשבועה" (but he stands for an oath) (Sifri Devarim 188), it refers specifically to a witness who is kashér (valid) in principle, meaning he could join with another kashér witness to form a kat for full testimony. A woman or a pasul witness, by definition, can never join to form such a kat for mamon or nefashot. Thus, their he'emanut is of a different nature and does not extend to obligating an oath.

The Tziunei Maharan cites several sources to substantiate this:

1. Sifri Vayikra, D'vura D'Chovah Perek 7, Baraita 1-2: The Tosefta (cited as Tosefta Zevachim 10:1) and Sifri discuss the requirement of "הודע לו" (it was made known to him) regarding an asham talui (suspense offering). The baraita states: "אוציא את שאמרה לו אשה שאין אשה כשרה לעדות מניין אפי' אמרו לו קרובים אוציא את שאמרו לו קרובים שאין כשרים להעיד בו מניין אפי' אמר לו עד אחד אוציא את שאמר לו ע"א שאין מחייבו אלא שבועה" (I will exclude what a woman told him, for a woman is not fit for testimony. From where [do I know to exclude] even if relatives told him? I will exclude what relatives told him, for they are not fit to testify in it. From where [do I know to exclude] even if one witness told him? I will exclude what one witness told him, for he only obligates an oath).¹⁸ The Sifri explicitly differentiates the he'emanut of eid echad from that of a woman or relatives, implying that the latter's limited he'emanut does not extend to chiyuv shvuah.
2. Yerushalmi Sotah 1:1: The Yerushalmi discusses whether eid echad can obligate a sotah to drink the bitter waters. It queries: "מה אם פיו שאינו זוקקו לשבועת ממון הרי הוא משקה עד אחד שהוא זוקקו לשבועת ממון לא כש"כ קרוב מהו שישקה" (If his [her husband's] mouth, which does not obligate a monetary oath, behold, it makes her drink; a single witness, who does obligate a monetary oath, is it not all the more so? What about a relative, can he make her drink?).¹⁹ The Yerushalmi's kal vachomer (a fortiori argument) for eid echad explicitly hinges on his ability to obligate a monetary oath. The fact that it then separately asks about a relative ("קרוב מהו שישקה") implies that a relative does not obligate an oath, otherwise the kal vachomer would apply to him as well. The Tziunei Maharan concludes that this explicitly supports the Rambam's distinction that a pasul witness (like a relative) does not obligate an oath.
3. Bavli, Ketubot 85a: The gemara discusses a case where Rava overturns an oath based on a woman's testimony ("בת ר"ח ידענא בה דחשידא אשבועה")²⁰ and another case where R' Papa testifies a shtar (document) is paid ("ידענא ביה דשטרא פריעא").²¹ When asked if there's another witness with him, R' Papa is told "אע"ג דאיכא מר ע"א לאו כלום הוא" (even if you are present, a single witness is nothing). R' Papa then argues "השתא דאמר מר קים לי בגווה מילתא היא" (Now that the master says 'I am certain of her,' it is something), implying his testimony could have an effect if he has a kim li (personal certainty). The Tosefot there explain that even if R' Papa was a karev (relative), his kim li could cause the shtar to be weakened, requiring an oath from the claimant.²² This sugya, especially as interpreted by Tosefot, shows that even a pasul witness (like a relative) can't fully obligate an oath in the same way a kashér eid echad can, but their he'emanut is limited to a "re'eina" (weakening) of the document.
4. Bavli, Shevuot 30a, 32b: The gemara discusses shvuat ha'eidut (oath of testimony) and states it does not apply to women, relatives, or pesulim. While this refers to the specific karban shvuah, the NBY (cited by Tziunei Maharan) notes that even there, in cases like "שניהם חשודין" (both parties are suspect) or "עד אחד דר' אבא" (the case of R' Abba's single witness), a woman or relative would not be obligated. This further reinforces the idea that women and pesulim are not equivalent to a kashér eid echad for all oath-related obligations.

In summary, the Noda BiYehudah, through these comprehensive textual analyses, demonstrates that the Rambam's chiddush is not an arbitrary exclusion but rather a precise application of the Torah's definition of eidut and he'emanut. The he'emanut of eid echad l'shvuah is intrinsically linked to the witness's potential to form a valid kat, a potential absent in women and pesulim.

Friction

The Strongest Kushya

The most potent kushya against the Rambam, as articulated by the Kessef Mishneh, stems from the apparent contradiction with the gemara in Yevamot 117a. The gemara states unequivocally: "כל מקום שהאמינה תורה עד אחד, אשה ופסול כשרים להעיד."²³ This general principle, often understood as a sweeping rule, suggests that any scenario where eid echad is trusted by the Torah automatically extends that credibility to a woman or a pasul witness. Since the he'emanut of eid echad l'shvuah is explicitly mid'Oraita (derived from Sifri Devarim 188's "אבל קם הוא לשבועה"),²⁴ it would seem that a woman or a pasul witness should also be able to obligate an oath. The Rambam's exclusion of "חוץ מעד אחד של שבועה"²⁵ for women and pesulim appears to directly contravene this established gemaraic dictum, leaving the Kessef Mishneh to exclaim, "איני יודע מהיכן הוציא רבינו דין זה."²⁶

The Best Terutz

The most compelling terutz, effectively championed by the Noda BiYehudah and elaborated by the Tziunei Maharan, reconciles the Rambam's position with the gemara by drawing a crucial distinction in the nature of he'emanut. The gemara in Yevamot 117a refers to situations where the Torah confers a specific, limited credibility upon eid echad for a specific purpose (e.g., eidut isha to permit marriage, eid echad for sotah or eglah arufah). In these contexts, the he'emanut is granted to the testimony itself, regardless of the witness's full kesherut for mamon or nefashot. Thus, a woman or a pasul witness, who are generally disqualified, can fill that specific, limited role.

However, the he'emanut of "עד אחד לשבועה" is fundamentally different. It is not an independent grant of credibility to any single individual. Rather, as the Rambam explicitly states, it requires "עדות שהיא כשרה ועומדת להצטרף עם אחר להוציא ממון מן התורה."²⁷ The ability of eid echad to obligate an oath is a derivative form of full eidut keshérah. The pasuk "לא יקום עד אחד באיש לכל עון ולכל חטאת, אבל קם הוא לשבועה" (Sifri Devarim 188) should be understood as referring to a witness who would be fully kashér for mamon or nefashot if a second witness were present. His he'emanut l'shvuah is a reflection of his potential for full eidut.

A woman or a pasul witness, by definition, lacks this fundamental "potential to join." They can never combine with another witness to form a kat for mamon or nefashot mid'Oraita. Therefore, the basis for deriving their he'emanut l'shvuah from the pasuk is absent. The Sifri on Vayikra, Yerushalmi Sotah, and the sugya in Ketubot 85a (as understood by Tosefot) all support this nuanced distinction, demonstrating that the Torah does differentiate between the various forms of he'emanut and the types of individuals to whom they apply. The principle in Yevamot 117a is thus not a blanket statement, but rather applies where the he'emanut is for a specific, limited purpose not dependent on the witness's capacity for full eidut.

Intertext

Devarim 19:15 & Bamidbar 35:30: The Bedrock of Dina D'Shnei Edim

The entire discussion of eidut begins with the explicit biblical mandate for two witnesses. Devarim 19:15 states: "לא יקום עד אחד באיש לכל עון ולכל חטאת על פי שני עדים או על פי שלשה עדים יקום דבר"²⁸ (One witness shall not stand up against any person with regard to any transgression or any sin. On the basis of the testimony of two witnesses or on the basis of the testimony of three witnesses a matter shall be established). Similarly, Bamidbar 35:30, in the context of capital cases, states: "לא יקום עד אחד באיש למות"²⁹ (One witness shall not make a statement with regard to a case involving capital punishment). These verses are the foundation for the halacha that any legal decision, whether monetary or capital, requires the testimony of at least two kashér witnesses. The Rambam's entire perek builds upon these foundational pesukim, first establishing the rule and then exploring the mid'Oraita and mid'Rabbanan exceptions, such as the he'emanut of eid echad l'shvuah.

Sifri Devarim 188 & Tosefta Zevachim 10:1: The Source for Eid Echad L'Shvuah

The chiddush that eid echad can obligate an oath, despite not being able to establish a full legal claim, is derived from the very language of Devarim 19:15. The Sifri Devarim 188 expounds: "לא יקום עד אחד באיש לכל עון ולכל חטאת, אבל קם הוא לשבועה."³⁰ This drasha highlights that the pasuk's limitation ("לא יקום") applies specifically to the establishment of the matter (i.e., extracting money or imposing capital punishment), but not to the lesser consequence of obligating an oath. This is the explicit mid'Oraita source for the Rambam's initial statement about eid echad l'shvuah. The Tosefta Zevachim 10:1 (cited by the Tziunei Maharan as Sifri Vayikra) provides further clarity by explicitly distinguishing the he'emanut of eid echad from that of women or relatives in the context of asham talui, strengthening the Rambam's specific exclusion.³¹

Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 80:1: The Normative Psak's Silence

The Shulchan Aruch, in Choshen Mishpat 80:1, codifies the halacha regarding eid echad l'shvuah: "עד אחד נאמן להשביע את הנתבע שאין לו עליו כלום."³² (One witness is believed to obligate the defendant to swear that he owes him nothing). However, the Shulchan Aruch does not explicitly mention the Rambam's chiddush that a woman or a pasul witness cannot obligate an oath. This omission is highly significant in the world of psak. While the Shulchan Aruch generally follows the Rambam in many areas, its silence here is often interpreted as either disagreeing with the Rambam on this specific point or adopting a position that does not require this distinction. This leads to a situation where the common halachic practice is to allow a woman or a pasul witness to obligate an oath, contra the Rambam, unless specific poskim explicitly rule otherwise, relying on the Noda BiYehudah's defense. This tension highlights the ongoing dialectic between the foundational texts and their later codifications.

Psak/Practice

The Rambam's chiddush that a woman or a pasul witness cannot obligate an oath, despite the general principle of eid echad l'shvuah, represents a profound conceptual distinction. In practical halacha, however, this specific nuance is a subject of debate among poskim. As noted, the Shulchan Aruch (CM 80:1) states the general rule of eid echad l'shvuah without mentioning the Rambam's exception for women or pesulim.³³ This omission has led many poskim to assume that the normative halacha does not follow the Rambam on this point, and thus a woman or pasul witness can obligate an oath.

However, the powerful defense of the Rambam by the Noda BiYehudah and others means that this is not a universally accepted stance. Some poskim might still lean towards the Rambam's position, especially given the strength of the textual proofs adduced by the NBY. This creates a fascinating meta-psak heuristic: how much weight does a chiddush of the Rambam carry when it is not explicitly adopted or is seemingly contradicted by a later posek like the Mechaber (R' Yosef Karo) in the Shulchan Aruch, especially when the Mechaber himself, in his Kessef Mishneh, expressed doubt about the Rambam's source? In cases of doubt or where leniency is favored (e.g., to avoid an oath), one might rely on the Shulchan Aruch's implicit position. However, in contexts where a strict interpretation of eidut is paramount, a beit din might consider the Rambam's rigorous approach. The prevailing practice, however, tends to follow the broader interpretation that isha and pasul can indeed obligate an oath.

Takeaway

The Rambam's intricate analysis of eidut reveals that not all he'emanut is created equal; the capacity of eid echad to obligate an oath is a derivative of full eidut keshérah, a potential absent in women and pesulim. This deep dive into the nature of testimony underscores that even seemingly minor exceptions are rooted in fundamental conceptual distinctions in Torah Sheb'al Peh.

---

¹ Devarim 19:15. ² Bamidbar 35:30. ³ Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Eidut 5:1-12. ⁴ Sifri Devarim 188. ⁵ Sifri Vayikra, D'vura D'Chovah Perek 7, Baraita 1-2. ⁶ Bavli, Ketubot 85a. ⁷ Bavli, Shevuot 30a, 32b. ⁸ Bavli, Yevamot 117a. ⁹ Yerushalmi, Sotah 1:1. ¹⁰ Tosefot, Ketubot 85a s.v. "Pirsum". ¹¹ Tosefot, Yevamot 101b s.v. "d'Kim Li". ¹² Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Eidut 5:1. ¹³ Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Eidut 5:1. ¹⁴ Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Eidut 5:3. ¹⁵ Kessef Mishneh on Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Eidut 5:3 s.v. "וז"ל רבינו וכ"מ". ¹⁶ Bavli, Yevamot 117a. ¹⁷ Tziunei Maharan on Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Eidut 5:3 s.v. "וכ"מ שע"א מועיל אשה". Citing Noda BiYehudah, Mahadura Kama, Even HaEzer 33. ¹⁸ Sifri Vayikra, D'vura D'Chovah Perek 7, Baraita 1. ¹⁹ Yerushalmi, Sotah 1:1. ²⁰ Bavli, Ketubot 85a. ²¹ Bavli, Ketubot 85a. ²² Tosefot, Ketubot 85a s.v. "Pirsum". ²³ Bavli, Yevamot 117a. ²⁴ Sifri Devarim 188. ²⁵ Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Eidut 5:3. ²⁶ Kessef Mishneh on Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Eidut 5:3 s.v. "וז"ל רבינו וכ"מ". ²⁷ Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Eidut 5:3. ²⁸ Devarim 19:15. ²⁹ Bamidbar 35:30. ³⁰ Sifri Devarim 188. ³¹ Sifri Vayikra, D'vura D'Chovah Perek 7, Baraita 1. ³² Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 80:1. ³³ Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 80:1.