Mishneh Torah, Testimony 9

Sugya Map

• Issue: Identification and categorization of individuals disqualified from offering testimony (eidus), alongside their respective Scriptural or Rabbinic sources. The sugya specifically explores the pasul of women, servants, minors, the mentally unstable (shoteh), deaf-mutes (cheresh), the blind (suma), the wicked (rasha), debased individuals (ba'alei moom), relatives (krovim), and those with a vested interest (nogea b'davar).
• Nafka Mina(s):
  • Monetary Law (ממונות): The validity of financial claims and transactions hinges entirely on valid testimony. A disqualified witness cannot effect a monetary transfer or obligation.
  • Criminal Law (דיני נפשות): The most stringent application, where capital or corporal punishment is contingent upon unimpeachable testimony. "אין מוציאין ממון בספק, ואין מלקים בספק" (MT, Testimony 9:1), underscoring the burden of proof.
  • Personal Status (אישות): While generally strict, eidus for get (divorce document) cases, particularly concerning agunot (chained women), exhibits unique leniencies, as noted explicitly by Rambam regarding a mute witness.
• Primary Sources:
  • Devarim 17:6: "על פי שנים עדים" – Source for male witnesses.
  • Devarim 19:19: "ועשיתם לו כאשר זמם לעשות לאחיו" – Implies "אחיו כמותו" (his brother is like him), leading to the disqualification of non-members of the covenant (e.g., servants, gentiles).
  • Devarim 19:17: "ועמדו שני האנשים" – Source for adult male witnesses, excluding minors.
  • Vayikra 5:1: "והוא עד או ראה או ידע אם לא יגיד ונשא עונו" – Pivotal verse used for disqualifying the blind (ראה), deaf (שמעה – implicit in עד), mute (אם לא יגיד), and mentally unstable (ידע).
  • Tosefta Shevuot Perek 3: Explicitly provides the drashot for the deaf, blind, mute, and shoteh.
  • Gemara Gittin 71a: Discusses the halakha of an ilem (mute) in the context of get and eidus.
  • Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Eidut Perek 9: The core text under analysis.

Text Snapshot

The Rambam, in Hilchot Eidut, Perek 9, presents a comprehensive list of disqualified witnesses. Our focus is on the cheresh (deaf-mute) and related categories:

החרש כשוטה, שאין דעתו נכונה ואינו בן מצות. ואחד חרש מדבר ואינו שומע, או שומע ואינו מדבר – פסולין להעיד. אף על פי שרואה יפה ודעתו שלמה, צריך למסור העדות בפה בבית דין, או להיות ראוי למסור בפה, וצריך להיות ראוי לשמוע הדיינין והאזהרה שמאזירין אותו.

וכן אם איבד היכולת לדבר, אף על פי שנבדק שכלו כדרך שבודקין לבעל גט, ומעיד בכתב, ועדותו מכוונת – אינה מתקבלת כלל, חוץ מלהתיר אשה מעגונה, שהקלו בה כדי שלא תישב לעולם.

Mishneh Torah, Testimony 9:11

Dikduk/Leshon Nuance: The Rambam's formulation here is notably precise and layered. He begins by equating the cheresh with the shoteh ("החרש כשוטה") based on a lack of "דעתו נכונה ואינו בן מצות" (sound mind and not obligated in mitzvot). This establishes a foundational disqualification stemming from cognitive capacity, aligning the cheresh with other paturim like the shoteh and katan.

However, the text immediately pivots: "ואחד חרש מדבר ואינו שומע, או שומע ואינו מדבר – פסולין להעיד. אף על פי שרואה יפה ודעתו שלמה" (And whether he is deaf but can speak, or can hear but is mute, they are disqualified from testifying. Even though he sees excellently and his mind is sound...). This "אף על פי שרואה יפה ודעתו שלמה" is critical. It signals a shift in the basis of disqualification. For these partially cheresh individuals, their da'at (mind/cognition) is sound, yet they remain disqualified. The reason is then elucidated: "צריך למסור העדות בפה... וצריך להיות ראוי לשמוע הדיינין" (He must deliver testimony orally... and must be fit to hear the judges). This highlights that beyond cognitive capacity, the mode of testimony – oral delivery and aural reception of judicial warnings – is a fundamental halakhic requirement.

The subsequent clause regarding a person who lost the ability to speak further reinforces this: "אף על פי שנבדק שכלו... ומעיד בכתב, ועדותו מכוונת – אינה מתקבלת כלל" (Even though his intellect was checked... and he testifies in writing, and his testimony is precise – it is not accepted at all). This reiterates that written testimony, however accurate, is fundamentally invalid for general eidus. The exception for agunot ("חוץ מלהתיר אשה מעגונה") then introduces a meta-halakhic principle of leniency driven by compassionate concern.

Readings

Kessef Mishneh – Querying the Source (on MT, Testimony 9:11)

Rabbi Yosef Karo, in his Kessef Mishneh on this halakha, initially expresses a degree of perplexity regarding the precise scriptural source for the Rambam's disqualification of a חרש מדבר ואינו שומע (a deaf person who can speak but cannot hear) and a שומע ואינו מדבר (a mute person who can hear but cannot speak). He writes: "ואפשר דמשמע לרבינו דהא דכתיב ושמעה קול אלה פרט למי שאינו יכול לשמוע ובסמוך אמ"ש רבינו דסומא פסול מן התורה שנאמר והוא עד או ראה מי שהוא ראוי לראות הוא שמעיד כתב הכ"מ דצ"ע היכא איתא ראיה זו" (And it is possible that the Rambam understands that what is written "and he heard the voice of the oath" (Vayikra 5:1) excludes one who cannot hear, and nearby the Rambam wrote that a blind person is disqualified Scripturally, as it says "and he is a witness or saw" (Vayikra 5:1), implying that one who is fit to see is the one who testifies. The Kessef Mishneh writes that it requires clarification where this derivation is found).

The chiddush of the Kessef Mishneh here is not necessarily an innovative interpretation, but rather a methodological one: he seeks the explicit drasha that underpins Rambam's ruling. His initial suggestion for the "deaf who can speak" is "ושמעה קול אלה" (from Vayikra 5:1), implying a requirement for aural perception. For the "mute who can hear," the source is less obvious to him, and he connects it to the general requirement of ראיה (seeing) for a witness, which is then explicitly used for the blind. Ultimately, he resolves his query by explicitly citing the Tosefta.

Yad Eitan – Unveiling the Tosefta (on MT, Testimony 9:11)

Rabbi Nachum Duber Freidman, in his Yad Eitan, directly addresses the Kessef Mishneh's inquiry. He emphatically states: "ונעלם ממנו דכל זה איתא בתוספתא בפ"ג דשבועות וז"ל ושמעה להוציא חרש או ראה להוציא הסומא או ידע להוציא שוטה ע"כ" (And it was hidden from him that all of this is found in the Tosefta in Perek 3 of Shevuot, which states: 'And he heard' to exclude the deaf, 'or saw' to exclude the blind, 'or knew' to exclude the mentally unstable).

The chiddush of the Yad Eitan is to provide the precise and explicit Tannaic source for these drashot, thereby vindicating the Rambam and clarifying the Kessef Mishneh's temporary uncertainty. He demonstrates that the Rambam's rulings are not merely logical inferences but are directly rooted in foundational Tannaic derashot, indicating the deep tradition behind these disqualifications. This highlights the importance of Tosefta as a primary text often underlying Rambam's codification.

Tziunei Maharan – Reconciling with Gemara (on MT, Testimony 9:11)

Rabbi Menachem Mendel Schneerson, in his Tziunei Maharan, further elaborates on this point, agreeing with the Yad Eitan against the Kessef Mishneh. He highlights that the Kessef Mishneh's initial struggle to find the source for the Rambam's drashot is surprising, given their clear presence in the Tosefta. He states: "ונראה מדבריו שרבינו המציא דרשא זו מסברתו דגם מדבר ואינו שומע פסול אבל דבריו תמוהין דידוע דלא הוסיף משה דבר מדעתו ובפרט לדרוש דרשות מעצמו שלא נזכרו בש"ס" (It seems from his words [Kessef Mishneh] that the Rambam invented this drasha from his own reasoning, that one who speaks but cannot hear is also disqualified, but his words are puzzling, as it is known that Moshe did not add anything from his own mind, especially to derive drashot not mentioned in the Shas). The Tziunei Maharan emphasizes that the Tosefta is indeed the source and that the Rambam would not innovate such drashot.

His main chiddush comes in applying this Tosefta to resolve a difficulty in Tosafot and Rashba on Gittin 71a. The Gemara there brings a beraita: "אם לא יגיד פרט לאלם שאינו יכול להגיד" (if he does not declare, to exclude a mute who cannot declare). Tosafot and Rashba question if "אלם" (mute) refers to a חרש (deaf-mute) or specifically to someone who can hear but cannot speak. The Tziunei Maharan argues that since the Tosefta already disqualifies the deaf from "ושמעה" (and he heard), the drasha "אם לא יגיד" must necessarily refer to a person who can hear but cannot speak. This provides a more precise understanding of the scope of each drasha and clarifies the intent of the Tannaic text, resolving a significant kushya posed by Rishonim.

Friction

The Apparent Contradiction in Disqualifying the Cheresh

Kushya: The Rambam's rationale for disqualifying the cheresh (deaf-mute) appears to contain an internal tension. He begins by stating: "החרש כשוטה, שאין דעתו נכונה ואינו בן מצות" (The deaf-mute is like a mentally unstable person, for his mind is not sound and he is not obligated in the mitzvot). This firmly grounds the disqualification in a lack of da'at (cognitive capacity) and resultant exemption from mitzvot. However, immediately thereafter, he discusses partial chereshim – "חרש מדבר ואינו שומע, או שומע ואינו מדבר" (a deaf person who can speak, or a mute person who can hear) – and explicitly states that they are disqualified "אף על פי שרואה יפה ודעתו שלמה" (even though he sees excellently and his mind is sound).

This raises a strong kushya: If the fundamental reason for disqualifying a cheresh is a deficiency in da'at and lack of chiyuv mitzvot, how can individuals with "sound minds" and presumably chiyuv mitzvot (e.g., a cheresh who can speak and understand, but simply cannot hear court proceedings) also be disqualified? Is the da'at issue primary, or are there other, independent factors at play? The Rambam seems to shift his reasoning mid-paragraph without explicit clarification.

Resolving the Apparent Contradiction

Terutz: The Rambam is not presenting a contradictory position, but rather distinguishing between two distinct categories of disqualification for different types of chereshim, both ultimately rooted in halakha l'Moshe miSinai and Scriptural drashot.

1. Disqualification due to Da'at (Cognitive Capacity): The initial statement, "החרש כשוטה, שאין דעתו נכונה ואינו בן מצות," refers to the classical, complete cheresh (deaf-mute from birth or early childhood), who traditionally lacked full cognitive development due to their inability to communicate effectively with the outside world. For such an individual, the disqualification is indeed akin to a shoteh – a fundamental lack of intellectual capacity that renders them incapable of being a ben mitzvah and thus, unfit for the weighty responsibility of testimony. Their testimony cannot be relied upon because their understanding of reality, and thus the facts they relate, is inherently compromised.

2. Disqualification due to the Mode of Testimony (Procedural Requirements): The second part of the Rambam's statement, concerning the חרש מדבר ואינו שומע or שומע ואינו מדבר "אף על פי שרואה יפה ודעתו שלמה," addresses individuals whose cognitive faculties are sound. Their disqualification stems not from a lack of da'at, but from the halakhic procedural requirements for testimony. The Torah mandates that testimony be delivered orally (מפיהם ולא מפי כתבם) and that the witness must be able to hear the hatra'ah (warning) from the dayanim (judges). As the Rambam himself explains: "צריך למסור העדות בפה בבית דין... וצריך להיות ראוי לשמוע הדיינין והאזהרה שמאזירין אותו."

   The sources for these procedural requirements are the drashot from Vayikra 5:1, as detailed in Tosefta Shevuot 3: "ושמעה להוציא חרש" (requiring aural capacity) and "אם לא יגיד ונשא עונו להוציא את האלם" (requiring oral articulation). These drashot establish specific sensory and communicative prerequisites for testimony, independent of the witness's general intelligence or chiyuv mitzvot. Even a brilliant scholar who happens to be deaf cannot testify if he cannot hear the court's warnings, and a person who is perfectly lucid but mute cannot testify if he cannot speak his testimony.

Thus, the Rambam is not contradicting himself. He is simply delineating that a cheresh can be disqualified for two distinct reasons: either a fundamental lack of da'at (for the classical deaf-mute), or a failure to meet the specific oral and aural requirements for valid testimony (for those partially deaf or mute, even if cognitively sound). Both are min ha-Torah disqualifications, but based on different underlying principles.

Intertext

Tosefta Shevuot Perek 3

The foundational text for many of the Rambam's drashot regarding disqualification is the Tosefta. As highlighted by the Yad Eitan and Tziunei Maharan, the Tosefta in Shevuot Perek 3 provides the explicit Scriptural derivations:

"והוא עד או ראה או ידע אם לא יגיד ונשא עונו" (Vayikra 5:1) –

ושמעה – להוציא את החרש.

או ראה – להוציא את הסומא.

או ידע – להוציא את השוטה.

אם לא יגיד ונשא עונו – להוציא את האלם.

Tosefta Shevuot 3:2

This Tosefta directly links the disqualifications of the deaf (cheresh), blind (suma), mentally unstable (shoteh), and mute (ilem) to specific phrases within Vayikra 5:1. This is crucial because it demonstrates that these disqualifications are not Rabbinic enactments or logical inferences, but rather derive from drashot (exegetical interpretations) of Scriptural verses, placing them within the category of de'Oraita (Scriptural Law). The chiddush of this Tosefta is its precise articulation of the textual basis for these categories of pesul.

Gemara Gittin 71a and the Agunah Leniency

The Rambam's explicit exception for agunot ("חוץ מלהתיר אשה מעגונה, שהקלו בה כדי שלא תישב לעולם") has deep roots in the Gemara. Gittin 71a discusses the halakha of an ilem (mute) in relation to a get (divorce document) and eidus. The Gemara states:

רב כהנא סבר אלם שיכול לדבר מתוך הכתב פקח הוא, וכותבין ונותנין גט לאשתו. והא תניא אם לא יגיד פרט לאלם שאינו יכול להגיד כו'. עדות קאמרת שאני עדות דרחמנא אמר מפיהם ולא מפי כתבם.

Gittin 71a

Rabbi Kahana held that a mute person who can communicate in writing is considered intelligent, and thus one may write and give a get to his wife. The Gemara challenges this from a beraita that disqualifies a mute person from testifying ("אם לא יגיד"). The Gemara resolves this by distinguishing: "עדות קאמרת? שאני עדות דרחמנא אמר מפיהם ולא מפי כתבם" (Are you speaking of testimony? Testimony is different, for the Merciful One said "from their mouths," not "from their writing").

This passage highlights two significant points:

1. For general eidus, the principle of "מפיהם ולא מפי כתבם" (from their mouths, not from their writing) is paramount, disqualifying a mute witness even if intellectually sound.
2. For a get, however, the da'at of the giver is primary. If the ilem is demonstrably lucid (e.g., through written communication), the get can be valid. This forms the basis for the leniency in agunah cases, where the goal is to free a woman from a marital bond, even if the testimony regarding the husband's death or the get itself (if from a lucid mute) doesn't meet the strict standards for mammon or nefashot. The Gemara's distinction provides the bedrock for the meta-halakhic principle of kula l'agunot.

Psak/Practice

The Rambam's codification in Hilchot Eidut 9:11 forms the accepted halakha regarding the disqualification of the deaf and mute. For all matters requiring standard testimony (monetary disputes, criminal law, etc.), individuals who cannot hear the judicial warnings or cannot orally deliver their testimony are unequivocally disqualified, regardless of their intellectual capacity. This stricture applies even if they can communicate perfectly through other means (e.g., sign language, writing), as the halakha insists on the specific mode of oral and aural interaction within the Beit Din.

However, the crucial meta-psak heuristic surfaces in the exception for agunot. The Rambam explicitly allows for a relaxation of these stringent testimonial requirements "להתיר אשה מעגונה" (to free a woman from her plight as an agunah). This is a profound example of rachmanut (compassion) within Halakha. While Halakha demands an exceedingly high standard of evidence for expropriating money (mammon) or inflicting punishment (nefashot), it prioritizes the alleviation of severe personal distress in cases of agunah. The principle "שהקלו בה כדי שלא תישב לעולם" (that they were lenient in this matter so that she would not remain bound forever) establishes that the pesul of a mute witness, while de'Oraita for general testimony, can be set aside in this specific context due to the immense tzara (distress) of a woman chained to a marriage. This illustrates that Halakha is not merely a rigid system of rules, but one that actively seeks to find pathways for compassion when human suffering is involved, within the bounds of permissible halakhic interpretation and tradition.

Takeaway

The disqualification of a cheresh demonstrates a nuanced halakhic understanding where pesul can stem from both inherent cognitive capacity (da'at) and specific procedural requirements for testimony. The leniency for agunot underscores a vital meta-halakhic principle: strict evidentiary standards for monetary and criminal law, yet compassionate flexibility to alleviate profound personal suffering.