Shulchan Arukh, Orach Chayim 108:8-10

Sugya Map

• Issue: The laws and parameters of Tefilah B'dieved (post-facto prayer), specifically concerning make-up prayers (Tefilah Zakah or Tefilat Tzuraf). This encompasses when a missed prayer can be rectified by praying the subsequent prayer twice, and the conditions under which a make-up prayer is permissible or invalid.
• Nafka Mina(s):
  • Distinguishing between intentional omission (b'mezid) and unintentional omission (b'shogeg or b'ones).
  • Defining the temporal proximity required for a make-up prayer (immediately preceding prayer).
  • Determining the permissibility of a make-up prayer for Musaf or other special prayers.
  • The parameters of "extenuating circumstances" (ones) versus negligence (p'shia).
  • The distinction between making up a missed prayer and praying a voluntary prayer (nedavah) with innovative elements.
  • The halachic implications of errors in make-up prayers, particularly regarding special insertions like Ya'aleh V'yavo or Ata Chonantanu.
• Primary Sources:
  • Shulchan Arukh, Orach Chayim 108:8-10
  • Tur, Orach Chayim 108
  • Rambam, Hilchot Tefilah 1:13-15, 3:11-15
  • Talmud Bavli, Berachot 21b, 26b, 31a

Text Snapshot

Shulchan Arukh, Orach Chayim 108:8: "If one erred or was forced [by circumstance] and did not pray the morning prayer, one should pray the afternoon prayer twice: the first is the afternoon prayer, and the second as a make-up. If one inverted [the order], one has not fulfilled one obligation in prayer for the prayer which is a make-up, and one needs to go back and pray it [again]. And the same law applies in every case in which one must pray a make-up prayer."

• Leshon Nuance: The phrase "נִתְחַיֵב בְּתְפִלָּה” (lit. "became obligated in prayer") is implied, referring to the obligation of the Amidah prayer. The term "תּוֹרָתוֹ" (lit. "its Torah") in the context of the make-up prayer refers to the essence or obligation of that prayer. The critical point here is the distinction between the temporal obligation of the current prayer and the retrospective obligation of the missed prayer.

Shulchan Arukh, Orach Chayim 108:10: "If one erred and did not pray the afternoon prayer on Shabbat, one should pray it upon the [immediately after the end of] Shabbat (two weekday prayers); one separates [Shabbat from weekday i.e. the insertion of "ata chonantanu" into the 4th blessing of the Amidah] in the first, but one does not separate in the second. If one did not separate in the first, but separated in the second, the second prayer counts, but the first prayer does not count. If one separated in both of them, or did not separate in either of them, one has fulfilled one's obligation [for both recitations of the Amidah]."

• Dikduk/Leshon Nuance: The phrase "מְבַדֵּל בָּרִאשׁוֹנָה" (lit. "separates in the first") refers to the inclusion of "Atah Chonantanu" (אתה חוננתנו), the specific prayer for the conclusion of Shabbat. The structure emphasizes the critical nature of correctly identifying and fulfilling the specific parameters of the make-up prayer, especially when it carries a different temporal or liturgical character (weekday vs. Shabbat). The permutations highlight the precision required in fulfilling the mitzvah even in a b'dieved scenario.

Readings

Magen Avraham (MA) on 108:8 (based on the provided commentary fragments, assuming it's referencing the broader context of 108:6-8)

The Magen Avraham, in his commentary on 108:11 (which likely reflects the principles discussed earlier in the siman), delves into the nature of ones (extenuating circumstances) versus negligence (p'shia). He grapples with the concept of forgetting prayer, asking whether it's considered ones. He cites the Beit Yosef (BY) in Choshen Mishpat 221:10 and the Mabit in K'lalei HaTefilah 132, as well as Be'er Hagolah 232:12, indicating a debate on this matter. The MA notes that the Taz (in the relevant section) ultimately rules in accordance with the Shulchan Arukh here, which implies that forgetting prayer is indeed considered ones, thus permitting a make-up prayer. He further clarifies that the Agudah's proof-text, as brought by the Beit Yosef in Choshen Mishpat 207, is not a valid analogy. The analogy concerns a situation where one loans money, with the condition of redemption within three years, and an ones prevents redemption; in such a case, the loan becomes irrevocably lost. The MA distinguishes this from prayer, arguing that the concept of ones in prayer is intended to allow for rectification, not to declare the obligation permanently void.

Turei Zahav (Taz) on 108:8 (based on the provided commentary fragments)

The Turei Zahav, in the beginning of this siman (108), as well as in siman 108:7 (referencing Torah Ha'Etz and Siman 140), states that even when one is a scholar (talmid chacham), the concept of "time of prayer is separate" (zman tefillah l'chud), meaning one cannot pray at any time, applies. However, he also notes the principle that one can consider the reward for the mitzvah against the loss incurred (machshev sachar mitzvah k'neged ha'hafseda). This suggests a nuanced approach: while the strict time constraints for prayer remain, the severity of missing prayer due to specific circumstances, particularly for a talmid chacham, might be mitigated by the potential reward of fulfilling the make-up prayer. The Torah Ha'Etz in Siman 140 is cited as concluding that even for a talmid chacham, the time of prayer is a strict boundary, but the concept of machshev sachar mitzvah is also considered. The Taz's position seems to lean towards the strictness of time, yet acknowledges the mitigating factors that might allow for a make-up prayer in certain scenarios, implying a careful balancing act between the temporal obligation and the practical realities of human failing.

Mishnah Berurah (MB) on 108:10 (based on the provided commentary fragments)

The Mishnah Berurah, in section 23, clarifies the phrase "אותו עסק" (that business/affair). He explains that this encompasses situations where the business itself is prohibited (issur), as outlined in Siman 232, if one commenced this prohibited activity before the prayer time arrived, and then forgot to pray. The crucial factor is that the person did not deliberately neglect prayer (b'sha'at nefesh) but rather intended to pray after finishing the business. The forgetting that ensued is what triggers the possibility of a make-up prayer. Similarly, in section 24, he elaborates on "שלא יבוא וכו'" (so that one does not come...), explaining that being preoccupied with buying and selling merchandise, thereby missing prayer time, also falls under extenuating circumstances (ones), permitting a make-up. This highlights the MB's focus on the intent and circumstance surrounding the missed prayer, distinguishing between wilful neglect and unintended consequences of legitimate (or even illegitimate, if commenced before prayer time) activities.

Friction

The central friction in this Sugya revolves around the precise definition and boundaries of ones (extenuating circumstances) versus p'shia (negligence), particularly as it pertains to prayer. The Shulchan Arukh, in 108:8, states that if one erred or was forced (ones) and missed prayer, a make-up is permissible. However, 108:10 explicitly states that if one missed prayer on purpose (b'mezid), there is no make-up, even at the prayer that is immediately adjoining it. This creates a sharp dichotomy.

The difficulty arises when one misses prayer due to being engrossed in business or monetary concerns. The Mishnah Berurah (108:23-24) explains that being occupied with business, even if it leads to missing prayer, is considered ones if the intention was to pray afterward and the forgetting was subsequent. The Biur Halacha on 108:8:1, citing the P'nei Yehoshua, discusses whether being troubled with monetary needs that could lead to loss (haziaka) constitutes ones. If the loss is uncertain (ein barur ha'ziaka), it's considered p'shia. If it's certain, the Magen Avraham suggests it might be ones, but the Biur Halacha notes the P'nei Yehoshua's position that even then, it could be considered p'shia unless one explicitly stipulates (mitaneh) that the prayer is offered as a voluntary offering (nedavah) if one is obligated.

The Kushya: If being engrossed in monetary concerns, even to the point of potential loss, can be argued as ones (as suggested by the potential for loss), why does the Shulchan Arukh in 108:10 explicitly rule out make-up prayers for intentional omission, which could arguably stem from placing monetary concerns above prayer? Is there a qualitative difference between shogeg (unintentional) and b'mezid (intentional), even if the intentionality stems from seemingly valid worldly concerns? Furthermore, what is the precise threshold for an "extenuating circumstance" that overrides the strict time constraints of prayer? If a businessman foresees a significant financial loss if he stops to pray, and consequently misses the prayer time, is this ones or p'shia?

The Terutz: The distinction lies not in the reason for missing prayer, but in the nature of the omission. B'mezid implies a conscious decision to forgo prayer entirely, a deliberate disregard for the mitzvah. Even if this disregard stems from a fear of financial loss, the act of choosing the financial concern over the prayer obligation itself is a wilful act of omission. Ones, on the other hand, refers to circumstances that prevent one from praying, or cause one to forget, despite an underlying desire and intention to fulfill the obligation. The Mishnah Berurah's explanation that the person intended to pray after finishing the business and then forgot is key. This indicates a lack of deliberate intent to skip prayer.

The Biur Halacha's discussion on haziaka highlights this. If the loss is uncertain, it's p'shia because one is gambling with the mitzvah based on speculation. If the loss is certain, the debate continues, but the stipulation to pray as a nedavah if obligated acts as a safeguard. This stipulation acknowledges the potential p'shia in prioritizing the financial concern and converts any subsequent prayer into a voluntary act, thus circumventing the issue of making up a prayer that was intentionally skipped. Therefore, the b'mezid prohibition is absolute because it signifies a rejection of the mitzvah's imperative, whereas ones or a situation that leads to forgetting, even if rooted in worldly concerns, retains the possibility of fulfilling the obligation if the underlying intent to pray was present.

Intertext

Talmud Bavli, Berachot 21b:

The Gemara states: "Rava said: Whoever prays on Shabbat afternoon, the day is as if he prayed on a weekday. Rava said: Whoever prays after the time of the afternoon prayer, it is as if he prayed on a weekday. And Rava said: Whoever prays after the time of the evening prayer, it is as if he prayed on a weekday." The Gemara then questions this, citing a Baraita: "If one missed the morning prayer, one should pray the afternoon prayer twice. If one missed the afternoon prayer, one should pray the evening prayer twice. If one missed the evening prayer, one should pray the morning prayer twice." The Gemara resolves this by distinguishing between praying within the time of the next prayer (which Rava permits as a make-up, though it's like a weekday prayer in its essence for that day's prayers) and praying after the time of the next prayer has passed, which is what Rava implies is like a weekday prayer in that it doesn't have the same sanctity or fulfillment for the specific day's prayer.

This directly informs the Shulchan Arukh's ruling that make-up prayers are only permissible for the immediately adjoining prayer. The Sages established a system of make-up prayers to ensure the obligation of prayer is met. Rava's statement highlights that while a make-up prayer can be offered, its character might be different if performed outside the ideal temporal window of the subsequent prayer. The Shulchan Arukh synthesizes this by permitting the make-up prayer within the time of the next prayer, but ruling out any make-up for prayers missed beyond that immediate window.

Rambam, Hilchot Tefilah 3:11-15:

The Rambam codifies these laws extensively. In 3:11, he states: "If one did not pray the morning prayer, one prays the afternoon prayer twice, and the second is a make-up for the first. And if one did not pray the afternoon prayer, one prays the evening prayer twice, and the second is a make-up for the first. And if one did not pray the evening prayer, one prays the morning prayer twice, and the second is a make-up for the first." This mirrors the core principle of the Shulchan Arukh. In 3:12, he elaborates on the temporal limit: "There is no make-up prayer other than for the prayer immediately preceding it." He further states in 3:13 that if one intentionally missed prayer, there is no make-up. In 3:14, he discusses ones: "And these are those who have a make-up prayer: he who was forced by circumstances, or forgot, or slept through the prayer time." This aligns with the Shulchan Arukh's distinction between intentional omission and unintentional ones. The Rambam's detailed codification serves as a foundational source for the Shulchan Arukh's presentation.

Psak/Practice

The primary psak derived from this section is that a missed Amidah prayer can be made up by praying the subsequent Amidah prayer twice, provided the omission was due to error (shogeg) or extenuating circumstances (ones), and not intentional (b'mezid). This make-up is only valid for the immediately preceding prayer. For example, if one misses Maariv, there is no make-up for it.

A critical practical implication concerns the definition of ones. While financial loss can be considered, one must be cautious not to allow worldly concerns to override the prayer obligation. As the Biur Halacha suggests, if the potential loss is uncertain, it leans towards negligence. Furthermore, the practice of stipulating (mitaneh) that one's prayer be considered voluntary if one is found to be obligated (as discussed in the Biur Halacha regarding financial loss) is a meta-halachic heuristic to navigate potential p'shia when dealing with circumstances that blur the line between ones and negligence. This stipulation converts a potentially problematic make-up into a voluntary prayer, thus avoiding the halachic pitfalls of an invalid make-up.

Finally, the detailed laws regarding make-up prayers for Shabbat and Rosh Chodesh, particularly concerning the inclusion of specific insertions like Atah Chonantanu and Ya'aleh V'yavo, highlight the meticulousness required. If these insertions are missed in the primary prayer, they generally must be corrected in the make-up prayer. The specific rules about which prayer counts if there are errors in these insertions emphasize the need for careful adherence to halachic procedure even in b'dieved situations.

Takeaway

The halacha surrounding make-up prayers prioritizes intention and circumstance, drawing a sharp line between wilful neglect and unavoidable omission. Even when extenuating circumstances are present, the temporal proximity of the make-up prayer remains a strict boundary, underscoring the unique and time-bound nature of each tefillah.