Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 3:4:1-5:3

Sugya Map

• Issue: The duration of nezirut and the consequences of impurity on the final days. Specifically, how impurity on the day of fulfillment (day 100) or the day after (day 101) affects the nezirut period, and the differing opinions of Rebbi Eliezer and the Rabbanan.
• Nafka Mina:
  • Determining the precise number of days of nezirut that must be re-observed after impurity.
  • The validity of the nezirut period when a vow is made while in a cemetery.
  • The application of Rabbinic decrees (gezeiros) and their scope.
  • The interplay between impurity and the potential for fulfilling nezirut.
  • The distinction between being warned about impurity versus the prohibition itself.
• Primary Sources:
  • Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 3:4-5:3
  • Numbers 6:1-21 (Parashat Nazir)
  • Leviticus 21:1-4 (Kohanim and impurity)

Text Snapshot

MISHNAH: “I am a nazir for 100 days,” if he became impure on day 100 he invalidated everything but Rebbi Eliezer said, he invalidated only 30. If he became impure on day 101, he invalidated 30; Rebbi Eliezer said, he invalidated only seven.

• Nuance: The core of the dispute lies in how to interpret "day of his fulfilling" (yom me’loto) and the subsequent day. Rebbi Eliezer’s approach is consistently more lenient, particularly regarding the number of days invalidated. The commentary highlights that for impurity on day 101, the Rabbanan decree the invalidation of 30 days by analogy (gezeirah shavah) to day 100, but do not equate it to the full invalidation of day 100. Rebbi Eliezer, however, does not make this analogy, leading to his stricter interpretation of seven days.

MISHNAH: If somebody made a vow of nazir while he was in a cemetery, even if he stayed there for thirty days, they are not counted and he does not bring a sacrifice for impurity. If he left and re-entered, they are counted and he has to bring a sacrifice for impurity. Rebbi Eliezer said, not on that day, since it is said: “The earlier days fall away,” until he has earlier days.

• Nuance: This section introduces a new parameter: the location of the vow. The default ruling is that a vow made in a cemetery, even for 30 days, is nullified. However, the Gemara explores the why. Is the vow itself invalid, or does it simply not count? The critical distinction emerges when the person leaves and re-enters. Rebbi Eliezer’s objection hinges on the verse in Numbers 6:12, which speaks of "earlier days falling away." He argues this applies only when there are preceding valid days of nezirut to be invalidated, implying a period of purity must have existed first.

Readings

Penei Moshe: The Logic of Rebbi Eliezer and the Rabbanan on Invalidation

The Penei Moshe offers a detailed exposition of the differing rationales behind the mishnayot regarding impurity on the final days of nezirut.

Regarding impurity on day 100, the Penei Moshe explains Rebbi Eliezer's position: “Rebbi Eliezer said, he invalidates only thirty days, because he derives it from the verse which is written, 'This is the teaching for the nazir on the day of his fulfilling' (Numbers 6:13). The Torah said, if one becomes impure on the day of his fulfilling, give him the teaching of a nazir as [a standard] nezirut of thirty days.”¹

This interpretation of Rebbi Eliezer is crucial. He sees the verse "This is the teaching for the nazir on the day of his fulfilling" not as a general statement, but as a specific directive for how to treat impurity on that very day. This directive, for Rebbi Eliezer, equates the situation to a standard, thirty-day nezirut, thus invalidating only those thirty days. The Rabbanan, conversely, "do not hold by this exegesis and say that one who becomes impure on the day of his fulfillment invalidates everything."² They understand the verse as referring to the sacrifices brought on that day, and impurity then negates the entire period.

When impurity occurs on day 101, the Penei Moshe notes: "He invalidates thirty. For the Rabbanan, they decree on the 101st day, which is the day of shaving, by analogy to the 100th day. However, they did not make it as stringent as the 100th day, which invalidates everything, but rather decreed that he invalidates only thirty days, the measure of a standard nezirut."³

This highlights a gezeirah (rabbinic decree). The Rabbanan are concerned that if impurity on day 101 is treated leniently, people might neglect the sanctity of the final day. Thus, they decree that it is akin to impurity on the 100th day, but not entirely so. They don't equate it to invalidating "everything" (i.e., the entire nezirut), but rather to invalidating the standard thirty days.

Rebbi Eliezer's position on day 101 is then clarified: "Rebbi Eliezer says, he invalidates only seven. This follows his reasoning, as he holds in the previous mishnah concerning one who says, 'I am a nazir for an indeterminate period' ( nezirut statua), that even if he becomes impure on the thirtieth day, he invalidates only seven days. Therefore, here too, he does not decree the 101st day by analogy to the 100th day."⁴

Rebbi Eliezer's leniency here is consistent with his view on nezirut statua. He previously argued that even in a standard thirty-day nezirut, impurity on the thirtieth day only invalidates seven days. His reasoning is that the seven days of purification, shaving, and sacrifice are integral to the process, and therefore, even on the final day, these must be completed. Thus, he doesn't see a need for a decree on day 101, as his fundamental approach already limits the invalidation significantly. The Penei Moshe concludes this section by stating, "And in all these matters where Rebbi Eliezer and the Sages disagree, the halakha is according to the Sages."⁵ This indicates that for the primary ruling in the Mishnah, the Rabbanan's more stringent view prevails.

Korban Ha'edah: The Rationale of Analogy and Decree

The Korban Ha'edah offers a complementary perspective, focusing on the principles of analogy and decree in the halakha.

On impurity on day 100: "The Rabbanan, according to their reasoning, say: One who becomes impure on the day of fulfillment is as if one became impure within the period of fulfillment, and invalidates everything."⁶ This emphasizes the Rabbanan's view that the final day is intrinsically linked to the fulfillment of the nezirut, and any impurity on this day retroactively nullifies the entire period.

Concerning impurity on day 101: "He invalidates thirty. This is because they decree on the 101st day, which is the day of shaving, by analogy to the 100th day. However, they did not make it as stringent as the 100th day itself, to invalidate everything. Rather, he invalidates the amount of a standard nezirut, which is thirty days."⁷

This reinforces the gezeirah concept. The Rabbanan extend the concern from day 100 to day 101, recognizing that day 101 is the day the nazir would complete his obligations in purity. The analogy is drawn, but the decree is calibrated: not a full invalidation, but a partial one, equivalent to a standard thirty-day nezirut.

Regarding Rebbi Eliezer's position on day 101: "He invalidates only seven. This is according to his reasoning, who does not have a decree, and even concerning impurity on the thirtieth day in a standard nezirut."⁸

The Korban Ha'edah succinctly captures Rebbi Eliezer's consistent approach. He does not engage in the same analogical decrees as the Rabbanan. His leniency on day 101 stems from his established principle that even on the final day of a standard nezirut, only seven days are invalidated. Therefore, he sees no basis for a more severe invalidation on day 101.

Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Nezirut 6:4: The Halachic Outcome

Maimonides synthesizes the halakha concerning impurity on day 101, reflecting the prevailing opinion derived from the Gemara: "If he contracted impurity on the day after he completed [his nazirite vow], i.e., the day on which he would have brought the sacrifices... he invalidates only 30 days."⁹ This aligns with the Rabbanan's decree.

Maimonides further elaborates on the practical implications: "What should he do? He must bring the sacrifices... He then observes the nazirite laws for 30 days, he performs the shaving... and brings the appropriate sacrifices."¹⁰ This details the process of renewal: purification sacrifices, a new thirty-day nezirut period, followed by the final purification and sacrifices.

Crucially, Maimonides addresses the scenario of impurity after the sprinkling of sacrifices: "If he contracts ritual impurity after the blood [of any of the sacrifices] was sprinkled upon him, none [of the days] are invalidated. For once the blood is sprinkled upon him, he is considered to have completed his nazirite vow."¹¹ This marks the absolute boundary; post-sprinkling impurity does not affect the completed vow, though remaining sacrifices still need to be brought.

Friction

The Kushya: The Paradox of Rebbi Eliezer's Seven Days

A significant tension arises within Rebbi Eliezer’s position, particularly concerning impurity on day 101 of a 100-day vow. The Gemara states that Rebbi Eliezer holds he invalidates only seven days. This seems remarkably lenient, especially when contrasted with the Rabbanan's invalidation of thirty days. The kushya is this: If one vows to be a nazir for 100 days, the expectation is that upon reaching day 101, the nezirut is complete and sacrifices are brought in purity. If impurity strikes on day 101, why would Rebbi Eliezer permit the nezirut to be salvaged by merely observing seven days? This appears to negate the very purpose of setting a specific, lengthy period like 100 days, reducing it to a mere formality if impurity strikes just after the designated completion.

The commentary of Penei Moshe and Korban Ha'edah attempts to resolve this by linking Rebbi Eliezer's ruling to his position on nezirut statua (an indeterminate vow) or nezirut katan (a short vow, implicitly 30 days). They explain that Rebbi Eliezer maintains that even in a standard thirty-day nezirut, impurity on the thirtieth day only invalidates seven days. This is because the seven days of purification, shaving, and sacrifice are intrinsically part of the nezirut process. Thus, for Rebbi Eliezer, the period of impurity and subsequent purification is an unavoidable component, even on the final day.

However, this explanation doesn't fully resolve the paradox. The kushya remains: if the entire point of a 100-day vow is to achieve a higher level of sanctity for that specific duration, does a single day of impurity after completion truly warrant such a minimal consequence (seven days)? It feels as though Rebbi Eliezer is prioritizing the minimal requirements of impurity purification over the explicit intent of the vow. The Penei Moshe's note that "in all these matters where Rebbi Eliezer and the Sages disagree, the halakha is according to the Sages"¹² suggests that the mainstream halakha finds Rebbi Eliezer's position problematic, or at least less compelling, than the Rabbanan's more stringent approach. The Rabbanan's decree of thirty days, even on day 101, reflects a concern for the sanctity of the vow and the potential for a nazir to fall short of his commitment. Rebbi Eliezer's seven days, while consistent with his interpretation of impurity requirements, seems to undercut the significance of the nazir's stated duration.

The Terutz: The Nature of the "Fulfilling" Day and its Impurity

A potential terutz can be offered by carefully dissecting the phrase "the day of his fulfilling" (yom me’loto) and the nature of the impurity on that specific day. Rebbi Eliezer might be positing that the "day of his fulfilling" is the culmination of the nezirut, the day the process is completed. Impurity on this day is not impurity during the nezirut, but rather impurity at the moment of completion. The verse "This is the teaching for the nazir on the day of his fulfilling" (Numbers 6:13) can be interpreted, as Rebbi Eliezer seems to, as a specific halachic instruction for this singular moment.

The Penei Moshe states Rebbi Eliezer derives this from the verse, "give him the teaching of a nazir as [a standard] nezirut of thirty days."¹³ This suggests that for Rebbi Eliezer, the instruction for impurity on the day of fulfillment defaults to the standard nezirut period of thirty days. However, the Gemara later extends this to seven days for day 101. The critical distinction might be the type of impurity and its implications.

If a nazir becomes impure on day 100, he has clearly violated the terms of his vow during its currency. This necessitates starting anew, hence the invalidation of "everything" according to the Rabbanan. However, on day 101, the nazir has already completed the 100 days. If he becomes impure on day 101, he is not impure during the declared nezirut period, but rather after it. The impurity he incurs is on the day he would have brought his sacrifices in purity.

Rebbi Eliezer's "seven days" might be understood as the minimum period required to rectify any impurity that occurs immediately after the fulfillment of the vow. It's the standard purification period. He is not invalidating the entire 100 days because the 100 days have already passed in purity. He is only addressing the transgression that occurred after the fulfillment. The "earlier days fall away" (Num. 6:12) verse, which Rebbi Eliezer invokes when a nazir vows in a cemetery and leaves and re-enters, could also be applied here. If the nezirut is considered "completed" on day 100, then day 101 is a new phase. Impurity on day 101 doesn't invalidate prior days of nezirut (as they are already completed), but necessitates the standard purification and a minimal period of nezirut to rectify the post-fulfillment impurity. The seven days represent the absolute minimal time to become pure again and bring the required sacrifices, thus salvaging some aspect of the nezirut process even after a transgression on the day of completion. This interpretation emphasizes Rebbi Eliezer's focus on the technicalities of impurity and purification rather than the full sanctity of the declared vow period.

Intertext

Numbers 6:9-12: The Foundation of Impurity Consequences

The entire discussion on the consequences of impurity for a nazir is rooted in the Torah itself. Numbers 6:9-12 lays the groundwork:

"And if any man die very suddenly before him, and he defile the head of his separation; then he shall defile the head of his separation on the day of his cleansing he shall be cleansed. And on the eighth day he shall bring two turtledoves, or two young pigeons, to the priest, to the door of the tent of meeting. And the priest shall prepare one for a sin-offering, and the other for a burnt-offering; and make atonement for him, for that he sinned by the dead, and shall sanctify his head on that day. And he shall separate his days of nezirut and shall bring a male lamb of the first year for a guilt-offering: and the former days shall be void, because his nezirut was defiled."

This passage is pivotal. The phrase "defile the head of his separation" (yitema et rosh neziruto) is the basis for the concept of invalidation. The requirement to bring sacrifices for impurity, and the principle that "the former days shall be void" (v'heyamu hayamim harishonim me'orarin), directly informs the soter (invalidates) language in the Mishnah and Gemara.

Rebbi Eliezer's reliance on "the earlier days fall away" when discussing the cemetery vow (Y.T. Nazir 3:4:5:7) explicitly demonstrates his engagement with this verse. He interprets it to mean that these prior days can only fall away if there were valid prior days. This implies that the status of the days preceding the impurity is crucial. If the days themselves were not validly counted as nezirut (as in the cemetery scenario), then there are no "earlier days" to fall away, and the consequence might be different.

Conversely, the Rabbanan's interpretation that impurity on the day of fulfillment invalidates "everything" is a strong application of the principle that the entire period is compromised. The gezeirah on day 101, invalidating thirty days, is a Rabbinic extension of this principle, ensuring that the sanctity of the completed vow is not entirely disregarded.

Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De'ah 204:1-2: The Practical Implication of Impurity

The Shulchan Aruch, codifying the halakha, reflects the Gemara's conclusions regarding impurity and nezirut. In Yoreh De'ah 204:1, it states:

"If a nazir became impure on the day he was to complete his nezirut, or the day after, he invalidates thirty days. He then brings the sacrifices for impurity and begins a new nezirut of thirty days, and then brings the sacrifices for completion."

This directly reflects the Rabbanan's position that impurity on day 100 or 101 results in the invalidation of thirty days. The subsequent actions – bringing impurity sacrifices, starting a new thirty-day nezirut, and then performing the completion sacrifices – are the practical application of this invalidation.

Yoreh De'ah 204:2 addresses the issue of a vow made in impurity:

"If one took a vow of nezirut while impure, e.g., while in a cemetery, the days do not count until he leaves the impurity and becomes pure. However, if he entered the cemetery and took a vow, and then left and re-entered, he is held accountable for the time he was impure if he had left and re-entered."

This echoes the Jerusalem Talmud's discussion in the second half of the passage. The initial vow made while impure in a cemetery doesn't count. However, the distinction between leaving and re-entering highlights the culpability for subsequent actions. The Shulchan Aruch does not explicitly mention Rebbi Eliezer's leniency of seven days, indicating that the accepted halakha follows the Rabbanan. This underscores the importance of the gezeirot and the desire to uphold the sanctity of the nazir vow.

Psak/Practice

The prevailing halakha, as reflected in the Shulchan Aruch, follows the Rabbanan. If a nazir becomes impure on the day he is to fulfill his vow (day 100) or the day immediately following (day 101), he invalidates thirty days of his nezirut. He must then bring the sacrifices for impurity, begin a new nezirut period of thirty days, and subsequently bring the sacrifices for the completion of this new nezirut.

This ruling emphasizes the sanctity of the nazir vow and the consequences of transgression, even on the cusp of fulfillment. The lenient view of Rebbi Eliezer, while theoretically interesting and consistent with his approach to nezirut statua, is not the accepted practice. The gezeirot enacted by the Sages are designed to prevent a relaxation of standards and to ensure the integrity of the nazir's commitment.

In situations where a vow is made while in a state of ritual impurity (such as in a cemetery), the days do not count until the individual leaves the impurity and becomes pure. This means the clock on nezirut only begins when the nazir is in a state to observe the laws of nezirut. The distinction drawn in the Y.T. between simply being in a cemetery and leaving and re-entering highlights the Rabbinic concern for active transgression versus passive continuation of a state of impurity.

The overarching principle is that nezirut requires a sustained period of purity and adherence to its laws. Any lapse, particularly close to completion, incurs significant consequences, necessitating a renewal and recommitment to the vow.

Takeaway

The precise boundaries of sanctity and transgression are meticulously debated, with Rabbinic decrees often serving to safeguard the integrity of a vow.

Even on the threshold of fulfillment, impurity carries substantial weight, demanding renewed commitment and a re-observance of the sacred period.