Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 6:9:1-9

Sugya Map

The Yerushalmi in Nazir 6:9 presents a complex tapestry of halakhic discussions, originating from the Mishnah's description of the Nazir's completion rites. The sugya branches into several distinct, yet interconnected, issues:

Issue 1: The Definition of "Cooked" (בישול) vs. "Scalded" (שליקה)

• Core Question: What constitutes bishul? Is shliqa, a form of intense heating, considered bishul for sacrificial purposes and vows?
• Nafka Mina(s):
  • The validity of the Nazir's shelamim (well-being offering) if shaliqa is not considered bishul as required by the Torah for the zeroa (foreleg)¹.
  • The scope of a vow to abstain from "cooked food" (מאכל מבושל) – does it include roasted or scalded items²?
  • The melakha of bishul on Shabbat – is shaliqa a form of bishul that incurs chiyuv chatat (liability for a sin offering)³?
• Primary Sources: Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 6:9:1; Numbers 6:19 ("The Cohen takes the cooked fore-leg of the ram"); Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 6:1:2-3; Mishnah Shabbat 7:2.

Issue 2: The Timing of the Nazir's Permission (היתר נזיר)

• Core Question: At what point in the completion process is a Nazir permitted to drink wine and defile himself with the dead? Is it after all ceremonies, or after a specific, earlier stage?
• Nafka Mina(s):
  • The practical moment a Nazir is released from his nezirut obligations.
  • The implications for a Nazir who dies mid-process or fails to complete all rites.
• Primary Sources: Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 6:9:1-2; Numbers 6:20 ("Afterwards the Nazir is permitted to drink wine"); Numbers 6:21 ("These are the teachings for the Nazir"); Numbers 6:19-20.

Issue 3: The Waving (תנופה) Requirement for a Nazir

• Core Question: Is the tenufa (waving) of the zeroa and lechem an absolute prerequisite (מעכב) for the Nazir's hetter? What if the Nazir is physically unable to perform tenufa?
• Nafka Mina(s):
  • The status of a Nazir lacking hands – can he ever complete his nezirut?
  • The broader principle of physical capacity affecting ritual performance.
• Primary Sources: Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 6:9:6-9; Tosefta Nazir (Lieberman) 1:5; Numbers 6:21; Leviticus 14:2-28 (Metzora parallel).

Issue 4: Nullification (ביטול) and Degrees of Holiness (זיקי קדושה)

• Core Question: Can the zeroa (foreleg), which has a higher degree of holiness as it belongs to the Kohen, be cooked with the rest of the ram? If so, what are the rules of nullification (bittul) when different degrees of holiness or prohibited substances are mixed?
• Nafka Mina(s):
  • The permissibility of cooking different parts of a korban together.
  • The application of bittul b'rov, bittul b'shishim, and bittul b'me'ah to mixtures of kodshim (sacred items) and chullin (profane items), or items with varying kedusha.
  • The nature of basar b'basar (meat in meat) in bittul calculations.
• Primary Sources: Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 6:9:3-6; Numbers 6:19 ("The Cohen takes the cooked fore-leg of the ram... from the ram"); Jerusalem Talmud Orlah 1:4; Jerusalem Talmud Terumot 10:1:6.

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Text Snapshot

The Mishnah and Halakha in Yerushalmi Nazir 6:9:1-9 present several key lines that form the foundation of our analysis.

1. Mishnah: "היה מבשל השלמים או שולקן. כהן נוטל זרוע בשלה מן האיל..." (Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 6:9:1)

   • "He cooked the well-being offering or scalded it. A Cohen takes the cooked fore-leg of the ram..."
   • Dikduk/Leshon Nuance: The disjunctive "או שולקן" (or scalded it) immediately implies that shliqa (scalding) is considered a valid form of bishul (cooking) for the shelamim. This seemingly innocuous phrase becomes a major pivot point for the subsequent discussion on the nature of bishul in halakha and vows. The Torah explicitly requires "cooked" (מבושל) for the zeroa⁴. The Mishnah's inclusion of shaliqa suggests it meets this requirement.

2. Mishnah: "רבי שמעון אומר כיון שנזרק עליו אחד מן הדמים הותר הנזיר לשתות יין ולהיטמא למתים." (Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 6:9:1)

   • "Rebbi Simeon says, when one of the bloods was sprinkled, the Nazir is permitted to drink wine and to defile himself with the dead."
   • Dikduk/Leshon Nuance: This statement contrasts with the anonymous Tanna Kamma, who implies the hetter (permission) comes "afterwards" (ואחר), which commentators interpret as after all processes, including tenufa and giluach (shaving)⁵. R. Shimon pinpoints a much earlier stage – the sprinkling of the blood of one of the sacrifices (chatat, olah, shlamim). The term "אחד מן הדמים" is precise; it does not require all three bloods, nor any other ceremony.

3. Halakha: "כתיב והכהן יקח את הזרוע הבשלה מן האיל. אם מבושל הייתי סבור לחוד. תלמוד לומר מן האיל." (Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 6:9:3)

   • "It is written: 'The Cohen takes the cooked fore-leg of the ram.' If cooked, I could think separately. The verse says, 'from the ram'."
   • Dikduk/Leshon Nuance: This section initiates the bittul discussion. The phrase "אם מבושל, הייתי סבור לחוד" (If cooked, I could think separately) suggests a hava amina (initial thought) that the zeroa should be cooked alone, due to its unique kedusha. The phrase "מן האיל" (from the ram) then serves as a limud (derivation) that it is cooked with the ram. This immediately raises the question of bittul if the zeroa (a small part) has a higher kedusha than the rest of the ram. The Yerushalmi then clarifies: "כיצד? הוא קוצץ אותה עד שיתחם רוחב שעורה" (How is this? He cuts it off so that only a barley grain's width remains) – which implies a separation, reintroducing the tension.

4. Halakha: "אמר רב תנופה עוצרת את הנזיר... שמואל אומר משיחה עוצרת את הנזיר..." (Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 6:9:7-8)

   • "Rav said, waving stops the Nazir... Samuel says, measure stops a Nazir..."
   • Dikduk/Leshon Nuance: Rav states tenufa is me'akev (an impediment) for the Nazir's hetter. Samuel's statement "משיחה" is noted by Sefaria's footnote as unclear, and often emended to "תנופה"⁶. However, the text as is presents a potential divergence or a different ritual. The subsequent kushya "והתנינן תורת נזיר, בין שיש לו כנפים בין שאין לו כנפים?" (But did we not state: 'The teachings for the Nazir,' whether or not he has wings?) directly challenges Rav's position by highlighting the Tosefta's universal applicability of nezirut laws, even to a handless Nazir. This sets up the resolution of distinguishing between chiyuv and ikuv.

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Readings

The Yerushalmi’s terse style often requires extensive elucidation from later commentators. Our sugya provides a prime example, with Rishonim and Acharonim grappling with its various halakhic implications.

1. Penei Moshe (Rabbi Moshe Margolies, 18th Century)

The Penei Moshe, a foundational commentary on the Yerushalmi, offers crucial insights into our sugya.

a. On "או שולקן" (or scalded it)

Penei Moshe explains: "שליקה בישול יותר מדאי עד שנימוח וקמ"ל דבשליקה אינו יוצא מתורת בישול"⁷. He defines shliqa as "over-cooking until it dissolves," and states that the Mishnah teaches us that shliqa does not remove the item from the category of bishul. This is a significant chiddush. The simple understanding might be that shliqa is distinct from bishul, perhaps a more intense or different process. However, the Mishnah's phrasing, "cooked... or scalded," would then imply two separate, equally valid methods. Penei Moshe's interpretation implies that shliqa is a subset or an extreme form of bishul. The implication is that for sacrificial requirements (such as the zeroa of the Nazir's ram, which must be bashela – cooked), shliqa suffices. This has ramifications not only for kodshim but also for nedarim and Shabbat laws, where the definition of bishul is paramount. If shliqa is bishul, then a vow to abstain from ma'achal mevushal would include scalded items, and performing shliqa on Shabbat would constitute a violation of the melakha of bishul.

b. On the Nazir's Permission (היתר נזיר)

Regarding the Tanna Kamma's view that the Nazir is permitted "ואח"כ" (afterwards), Penei Moshe clarifies: "דכתיב ואחר ישתה הנזיר יין אחר המעשים כלן אחר הקרבן ואחר התגלחת דס"ל התגלחת מעכבת"⁸. He connects "afterwards" to the verse "וְאַחַר יִשְׁתֶּה הַנָּזִיר יָיִן" (Numbers 6:20), interpreting "afterwards" as encompassing all the preceding actions described in the verses, including the bringing of the sacrifices and the giluach (shaving of the head). Crucially, he adds, "דס"ל התגלחת מעכבת" – that the Tanna Kamma holds giluach to be an indispensable prerequisite (me'akev) for the Nazir's permission. For R. Shimon's view ("כיון שנזרק עליו אחד מן הדמים"), Penei Moshe explains the derivation: "וכתיב התם אחר התגלחו את נזרו מה להלן אחר מעשה יחידי דלאחר גלוח עביד תנופה אף כאן אחר מעשה יחידי וכיון שנזרק עליו אחד מן הדמים מותר לשתות ביין ולהטמא למתים ואע"פ שעדיין לא גלח דתגלחת לא מעכבת וכן הלכה"⁹. R. Shimon makes a hekesh (analogy) between the permission to drink wine (mentioned in Numbers 6:20) and the context of giluach (mentioned in Numbers 6:18, where giluach is followed by tenufa). Just as giluach is a "single act" followed by tenufa, so too the sprinkling of one blood is a "single act" that grants permission. The critical difference is R. Shimon's assertion that giluach is not me'akev for the hetter, only the zerikat dam (sprinkling of blood). Penei Moshe concludes with "וכן הלכה" (and so is the halakha), indicating R. Shimon's view is normative. This is a significant psak within the commentary.

2. Korban HaEdah (Rabbi David Frankel, 18th Century)

The Korban HaEdah, another canonical commentary on the Yerushalmi, often complements or offers alternative perspectives to Penei Moshe.

a. On "או שולקן" (or scalded it)

Korban HaEdah's explanation of shliqa is concise: "בישול יותר מדאי עד שנימוח"¹⁰. This definition aligns perfectly with Penei Moshe, indicating a consensus on shliqa as extreme bishul. This shared understanding is important for establishing the basic meaning before delving into deeper halakhic implications. The simplicity of the definition suggests that for these commentators, the p'shat (plain meaning) of the Mishnah's inclusion of shliqa is that it is a form of bishul, albeit an intense one.

b. On the Nazir's Permission (היתר נזיר)

Korban HaEdah agrees with Penei Moshe on the Tanna Kamma's interpretation of "ואח"כ" as referring to the completion of all rites: "דכתיב ואחר ישתה הנזיר יין אחר המעשים כולם"¹¹. This reinforces the idea that the Tanna Kamma holds all steps, including giluach, as essential for the hetter. For R. Shimon, Korban HaEdah elaborates on the hekesh: "דכתיב הכא אחר ישתה הנזיר יין וכתיב התם אחר התגלחו את נזרו מה להלן אחר מעשה יחידי אף כאן אחר מעשה יחידי הא למדת כיון שנזרק עליו אחד מן הדמים מותר לשתות יין ולהטמא למתים וגילוח א"צ להזכיר שכך מצותו או שיגלח אז"¹². He explains that R. Shimon draws an analogy from the phrase "אחר התגלחו את נזרו" (Numbers 6:18), where giluach is a singular act leading to subsequent rites. Similarly, the sprinkling of one blood is a singular act that grants the hetter. The final phrase, "וגילוח א"צ להזכיר שכך מצותו או שיגלח אז," is somewhat ambiguous. It could mean giluach is not me'akev, or that giluach is a mitzva in its own right, performed at that time, but not a prerequisite for the hetter. The Penei Moshe's "דתגלחת לא מעכבת" is a clearer statement on this point, but both commentators clearly see R. Shimon as permitting the Nazir earlier than the Tanna Kamma.

3. Sheyarei Korban (Rabbi Tzvi Hirsch Chajes, 19th Century)

The Sheyarei Korban, known for its critical and comparative analysis, often brings in insights from the Bavli and other Rishonim to illuminate the Yerushalmi.

a. On "או שלקן" (or scalded it)

Sheyarei Korban delves much deeper into the definition of shliqa. He references Tosafot in Pesachim 39b (s.v. lo shelukin v'lo mevushalin), which implies that shliqa is more than bishul. This raises a kushya on the Yerushalmi's statement: if shliqa is bishul yoter midai ad she'nimoh (overcooked until dissolved), how can the zeroa of the ram, which must be taken "whole" (שלם) for tenufa, be considered shalem if it's dissolved? He directly states: "וקשה הא אמרי' בת"כ ובחולין פ' ג"ה אין בשלה אלא שלימה ואי נימוח יותר מדאי איך יקח אח"כ הזרוע שלימה וזהו מ"ש נדרים רפ"ו מתני' דהכא קשיא להרא"ש"¹³. He cites the Torat Kohanim and Chullin, which define bashela (cooked) as shleima (whole), posing a direct contradiction. He notes that the Ra'ash (Rabbeinu Asher) in Nedarim 6:1 also found this Mishnah difficult. To resolve this, Sheyarei Korban introduces the Rambam's view (Hilchot Nedarim 9:1): "וההא דתנן בנזיר היה מבשל השלמים או שלקן לח הוי זו ואצ"ל זו דקמ"ל בשליקה אינו יוצא מתורת בישול ע"כ. משמע מדבריהם כל מקום דתני שלוק היינו בישול יותר מדאי ופי' הר"ב שם עד שנימוח. וקשה הא אמרי' בת"כ ובחולין פ' ג"ה אין בשלה אלא שלימה ואי נימוח יותר מדאי איך יקח אח"כ הזרוע שלימה וזהו מ"ש נדרים רפ"ו מתני' דהכא קשיא להרא"ש. והרמב"ם כ' ה' נדרים ריש פ"ט ואם אין דרכם לקרות מבושל אלא לבשר שנתבשל במים ובתבלין ה"ז מותר בצלי ובשלוק ע"כ נראה מדבריו דשלוק מיקרי דבר המתבשל בקדירה בלא מים והשתא ניחא הכל הא דקאמר שלוקה אוסרת ונאסרת היינו מטעם שאין שם מים חוזרת ובולעת מדמה. והא דא"ר יוחנן לית כאן נכבשים אלא שלוקים. הטעם כיון שאין שם מים המבלבלים הטעם חוזרת ובולעת טעמה ולא משל אחרים. וזה כלל גדול בתורה וחקרהו ועמש"ל בד"ה ושניהן"¹⁴. The Rambam, Sheyarei Korban explains, defines shaluk as food cooked in a pot without water. This provides an elegant solution: if shliqa is cooking without water, it doesn't necessarily mean it dissolves; rather, it implies a different cooking method that still falls under the umbrella of bishul. The zeroa could thus remain shalem. This distinction (with/without water) is pivotal, as it clarifies how shliqa can be bishul without leading to a state of being "dissolved" that would contradict the shalem requirement. He then extends this idea to halachot of issur v'hetter (prohibited and permitted mixtures), explaining that shaluk items, because they lack water to dilute or "confuse" the taste, are more prone to absorbing or retaining their own flavor, affecting bittul rules. This is a profound chiddush, connecting the definition of shliqa to the mechanics of ta'am k'ikar (taste is like the substance itself) and bittul.

b. On the Nazir's Permission (היתר נזיר)

Sheyarei Korban also addresses the hetter for the Nazir, specifically the Tanna Kamma's view. He refers to an earlier discussion in Yerushalmi Nazir 4:5, where he raised a kushya on R. Yochanan's statements, linking it to the concept of hadar le'milta kama'ita (reverting to the original state) from Bavli Bekhorot 26. The kushya is: if the hetter is conditional on the final acts, what if those acts are performed by a disqualified person? Does the Nazir revert to his original state of prohibition? He resolves this by citing Tosafot Beitzah 12 (s.v. kol hikha d'chtiv heteira meforash): "כל היכא דכתיב היתירא מפורש לא אמרי' דהדר למלתא קמייתא ניחא דה"נ ההיתר מפורש דלת"ק אי לאו דכתב ואחר ישתה ה"א דשרי מיד ועדיין הדבר צ"ע ועמ"ש שם בתו' בד"ה רש"א כו' וצריכין להגיה וכצ"ל וקשה קרא ל"ל תיפוק ליה מדכתיב ונתן כו' וי"ל מכאן ליכא למילף כו'"¹⁵. The principle is that where an explicit permission (hetter meforash) is stated in the Torah, we do not say that the issur (prohibition) reverts. In the case of the Nazir, "וְאַחַר יִשְׁתֶּה הַנָּזִיר יָיִן" is an explicit permission. Even for the Tanna Kamma, without this verse, one might have thought the Nazir is permitted immediately after the sacrifices. The verse clarifies the timing of the hetter meforash. While he notes "ועדיין הדבר צ"ע" (the matter still requires clarification), this approach suggests that the hetter is robust once attained, even if some elements were problematic. He then poses a further question: why is the verse necessary, couldn't we derive it from "וְנָתַן" (and he shall give...)? He replies that it cannot be derived from there. This shows Sheyarei Korban's characteristic deep textual analysis and his willingness to engage with both Bavli and Yerushalmi perspectives on a single issue.

4. Ra'ash (Rabbeinu Asher ben Yechiel, c. 1250 – 1327) – as cited by Sheyarei Korban

While the Ra'ash does not have a direct, continuous commentary on the Yerushalmi, Sheyarei Korban’s reference to him regarding the difficulty of shliqa in Nedarim 6:1 is invaluable. The Ra'ash, in his commentary on Bavli Nedarim 6:1, encounters the very Mishnah cited by our Yerushalmi: "נדרים רפ"ו מתני' דהכא קשיא להרא"ש"¹⁶. The difficulty, as articulated by Sheyarei Korban, is the apparent contradiction between defining shliqa as nimoch (dissolved) and the requirement that the zeroa be shleima (whole). The Ra'ash's recognition of this kushya confirms that this is a genuine textual and conceptual tension, not merely an invention of later commentators. His concern likely stemmed from the explicit requirements for korbanot, where integrity of the offering is often paramount. While Sheyarei Korban offers Rambam's solution, the Ra'ash's initial kushya highlights the interpretive challenge presented by the Mishnah's terse language. His perspective, though indirect, underscores the profundity of the Yerushalmi's seemingly simple statement about shliqa.

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Friction

The Yerushalmi’s concise and often elliptical style naturally generates significant points of friction, inviting deep analytical engagement. Our sugya presents several such challenges, particularly concerning the definition of shliqa and the tenufa requirement.

1. The Paradox of "Shaluk" and "Whole" (שלם)

a. The Kushya: How can a "dissolved" foreleg be "whole"?

The Mishnah states, "היה מבשל השלמים או שולקן" (He cooked the well-being offering or scalded it)¹⁷. The subsequent Halakha discusses the zeroa bashela (cooked foreleg) that the Kohen takes. Penei Moshe and Korban HaEdah define shliqa as "בישול יותר מדאי עד שנימוח" (over-cooking until it dissolves)¹⁸. This creates a severe difficulty. The Torat Kohanim and the Gemara in Chullin (cited by Sheyarei Korban¹⁹) explicitly state "אין בשלה אלא שלימה" (cooked means only whole). How can the zeroa be considered shalem (whole) if, by definition of shliqa, it is nimoch (dissolved)? The act of tenufa (waving) requires a physical, intact object. If the zeroa is dissolved, it cannot be waved, nor could it be considered shalem for the korban itself. This kushya was recognized by the Ra'ash on Nedarim 6:1, as noted by Sheyarei Korban, indicating its widespread impact beyond this specific sugya.

b. Terutz 1: Rambam's Redefinition of "Shaluk"

The most compelling terutz is offered by Sheyarei Korban, citing the Rambam in Hilchot Nedarim 9:1. The Rambam posits that shaluk refers to meat cooked in a pot without water²⁰.

• Analysis: This redefinition elegantly resolves the paradox. If shliqa means cooking without water, it does not necessarily imply "dissolved" (נימוח). Instead, it describes a method of cooking (perhaps roasting in its own juices, or steaming with minimal liquid) that is distinct from bishul (cooking with water) but still falls under the general category of bishul for the purpose of the korban. The zeroa could then remain intact and shalem, fulfilling both the requirement of being bashela (cooked) and shleima (whole), and thus suitable for tenufa.
• Implications: This terutz shifts our understanding of the Mishnah's "או שולקן." Instead of shliqa being an extreme form of bishul (overcooked to dissolution), it becomes a different method of bishul (cooked without water). This distinction has broader implications for halachot related to cooking, such as bishul akum (cooking by a non-Jew) or the melakha of bishul on Shabbat, where the presence or absence of water can be a significant factor.

b. Terutz 2: "Nimoch" as "Very Soft" Rather Than "Dissolved"

Another possible terutz, though not explicitly stated by the commentators here, is to reinterpret the term nimoch (נימוח).

• Analysis: Perhaps nimoch does not mean literally "dissolved into liquid" but rather "extremely soft" or "tender to the point of falling apart easily." In this interpretation, the zeroa would still retain its form and substance, albeit in a very tender state. It would still be physically present and identifiable as a zeroa, allowing for tenufa and maintaining its shleima status. This approach would maintain the Penei Moshe/Korban HaEdah definition of shliqa as "over-cooking" but mitigate the extreme implication of "dissolved."
• Challenge: The term nimoch generally implies a loss of structural integrity, often to a liquid or mushy state. While "very soft" is plausible, it might strain the common usage of the word to fully reconcile it with the strong requirement of shleima. The Rambam's solution, which redefines the process of shliqa rather than the result of nimoch, seems more robust.

2. The Universal Application of Nezirut vs. the Specificity of Tenufa

a. The Kushya: How can tenufa be essential if some Nazirim lack hands?

The Mishnah discusses the tenufa (waving) of the zeroa "על ידי הנזיר" (on the Nazir's hands)²¹. The Yerushalmi then presents Rav's view: "תנופה עוצרת את הנזיר" (waving stops the Nazir), meaning it is me'akev (an indispensable prerequisite) for his hetter. This is immediately challenged: "והתנינן תורת נזיר, בין שיש לו כנפים בין שאין לו כנפים?" (But did we not state: 'The teachings for the Nazir,' whether or not he has wings/hands?)²². This Tosefta (Nazir 1:5) implies that the laws of nezirut apply universally, regardless of physical disabilities. If tenufa is me'akev and requires hands, how could a Nazir without hands ever complete his nezirut and become permitted? This creates a direct contradiction between the specific requirement of tenufa and the universal applicability of nezirut.

b. Terutz 1: Rav's Distinction - Ability Dictates Obligation (מי שיש לו כנפים)

The Yerushalmi provides Rav's own resolution: "מה רב אמר אם יש לו כנפים כדאתמר כן: למי שיש לו כנפים תנופה עוצרתו. למי שאין לו כנפים תנופה אינה עוצרתו"²³.

• Analysis: Rav distinguishes between a Nazir who is able to wave ("מי שיש לו כנפים") and one who is not ("מי שאין לו כנפים"). For the able-bodied Nazir, tenufa is indeed me'akev. However, for a Nazir without hands, tenufa is not me'akev. This is a nuanced approach to halakhic obligation, where physical capacity directly impacts the ikuv (impeding) nature of a mitzva. The obligation itself (being a Nazir) is universal, but the specific requirements for its completion are tailored to individual capabilities. This demonstrates a principle of halakha that divine commandments are generally not imposed in a way that is physically impossible to fulfill (אין אונס רחמנא פטר).
• Implications: This terutz suggests a hierarchy of requirements. The core mitzva (e.g., nezirut) applies to all. However, certain procedural mitzvot that are usually me'akvim may be waived for those with ones (unavoidable impediment). This is a foundational principle for many areas of halakha, from tefillin for a one-armed person to sukkah for the ill.

c. Terutz 2: Samuel's Approach and R. Eliezer's Parallel (משיחה במקום)

Samuel's view, "משיחה עוצרת את הנזיר" (measure stops a Nazir), is presented as an alternative. While the Sefaria footnote suggests emending "משיחה" to "תנופה," the text as is prompts a different line of inquiry. The Yerushalmi then brings a parallel from the metzora (leper): "כגון תנופות ואגודלין של מוציא שפתיים" (like the wavings and thumbs of a sufferer from skin disease)²⁴. For the metzora, blood and oil are placed on the right thumb and great toe. The kushya is then raised: "והתנינן תורת מצורע, בין שיש לו אגודלין בין שאין לו אגודלין?" (But did we not state: 'The teachings for the sufferer from skin disease,' whether or not he has thumbs?)²⁵. The terutz given is R. Eliezer's view: "הוא מספג על מקומן" (he puts it on their place)²⁶.

• Analysis: If we take Samuel's "משיחה" as a distinct ritual (perhaps anointing), or even if we assume it means tenufa (waving), the metzora parallel offers a different solution to physical incapacity. R. Eliezer's "על מקומן" implies that if the limb is missing, the ritual is performed on the place where the limb should be. This suggests a symbolic performance where the physical act is impossible.
• Comparison to Rav's Terutz: Rav's terutz for the Nazir effectively waives the ikuv for the disabled. R. Eliezer's terutz for the metzora suggests a substituted performance. For the Nazir, if tenufa is me'akev, the "על מקומן" approach might mean the Kohen waves the offering over the Nazir's shoulder or where his hands would be. This is a more literal adherence to the ritual, adapting the physical execution rather than exempting the disabled.
• Which is preferred? The Yerushalmi presents Rav's solution first and directly for the Nazir, suggesting it's the primary approach in this context. R. Eliezer's view for the metzora is a parallel that illuminates alternative ways of dealing with ritual disability. The Bavli (Nazir 47b) indeed presents a similar debate about the metzora, with R. Eliezer holding that he cannot be purified, while R. Shimon allows "על מקומן". This suggests that the "על מקומן" approach might not be universally accepted or might apply only to certain types of rituals (e.g., where application of substance is key, rather than an active motion like waving).

3. The Mixing of Kedushot and the Rules of Bittul

a. The Kushya: How can the zeroa retain its distinct kedusha if cooked with the entire ram?

The Yerushalmi introduces the idea that the zeroa bashela (cooked foreleg) is taken "מן האיל" (from the ram), implying it's cooked together. However, the zeroa belongs to the Kohen and has a higher degree of holiness than the rest of the ram (which is eaten by the Nazir and his family). The Gemara then asks, "לא הות הקודש בולע מן החול, והחול בולע מן הקודש?" (Does not the sanctified absorb from the profane, or the profane from the sanctified?)²⁷. This question highlights the kushya: if items of different degrees of holiness are cooked together, there's a concern of bittul (nullification) or transfer of taste. Specifically, if the zeroa is a small part of the ram, could its specific kedusha be nullified by the larger (albeit less holy) body of the ram? Or, could the chullin (profane) parts of the ram absorb from the kedusha of the zeroa in a way that compromises the kedusha?

b. Terutz: Applying Bittul Rules (1:60, 1:100) and Basar B'Basar

The Yerushalmi then immediately pivots to a lengthy discussion of bittul rules, specifically bittul b'shishim (nullification in 1/60) and bittul b'me'ah (nullification in 1/100), as applied to tavlins (condiments) and basar b'basar (meat in meat).

• Explanation of the Terutz: The Gemara presents a debate among amoraim regarding the ratio required for nullification. R. Assi and R. Chiyya, in the name of R. Yochanan, discuss raisins as tavlins that nullify in more than 200 parts if cooked (suggesting a stronger flavor). R. Yasa in the name of Bar Pedaiah says "כל מקורות הטעם אחד במאה" (all sources of flavor are nullified in 1/100), while R. Chiyya in the name of Bar Pedaiah says "אחד בשישים" (1/60)²⁸. The terutz for the zeroa then becomes: "למאן דאמר כל מקורות הטעם אחד במאה, אתה נוטל את הזרוע כאחד במאה מן האיל. למאן דאמר כל מקורות הטעם אחד בשישים, אתה נוטל את הזרוע כאחד בשישים מן האיל"²⁹. The zeroa is treated as the "source of flavor" (מקור טעם) within the ram. If the zeroa is less than 1/60 (or 1/100, depending on the opinion) of the entire ram, its distinct kedusha (or its taste, which carries its kedusha) is nullified.
• Further Nuance: Basar B'Basar: R. Yose says "בשר בבשר הרי הוא כשאר כל האיסורין" (meat in meat is like all other prohibitions)³⁰, implying that bittul ratios apply similarly. R. Abbahu, in the name of R. Yochanan, adds that one estimates "כאילו הן בצל או כרישין" (as if they were onion or leeks), meaning one estimates the intensity of the flavor as if it were a strong condiment, which might require a higher bittul ratio. This suggests that even within basar b'basar, the bittul is not automatic but depends on the strength of the flavor (or kedusha).
• Challenge to the Terutz and its Resolution: The Gemara then raises a further kushya: if the zeroa is nullified, what if you remove the bones from the zeroa to reduce its volume and facilitate bittul? "אלא אם אתה נוטל עצמות מן הזרוע, נוטל אתה עצמות מן האיל!" (But if you remove the bones from the foreleg, remove them from the ram!)³¹ This rhetorical question implies that you cannot simply reduce the zeroa's volume without also reducing the ram's, thereby maintaining the ratio. The Yerushalmi then brings a rule regarding terumah: "פסולת תרומה אינה מצטרפת עם התרומה לאסור את החולין, אבל פסולת חולין מצטרפת עם החולין להרים את התרומה" (The waste of heave does not combine with heave to forbid the profane, but the waste of profane combines with the profane to lift the heave)³². This indicates that "waste" or inedible parts might not count towards the bittul calculation for the prohibited item, but they do count for the permitted item. This complex discussion underscores that bittul is not a simple volumetric calculation but depends on the nature of the items, their edibility, and their respective kedusha.

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Intertext

The Yerushalmi Nazir 6:9 is rich with intertextual connections, drawing from various parts of Tanakh, Mishnah, Tosefta, and even the Bavli. These parallels illuminate the sugya by providing context, comparative halakha, and shared logical principles.

1. Mishnah Nedarim 6:1: "הנודר מן המבושל..." (He who vows to abstain from cooked food...)

The Yerushalmi itself explicitly references Mishnah Nedarim 6:1: "תנינן תמן: הנודר מן המבושל, מותר בצלי ובשלוק" (We learned there: He who made a vow to abstain from cooked food is permitted roasted and scalded food)³³.

• Connection: This Mishnah directly informs the discussion about the definition of bishul (cooking) and shliqa (scalding). The Mishnah in Nedarim states that shaluk is not considered bishul for the purpose of vows. This immediately creates a tension with our Mishnah in Nazir, which implies shliqa is a form of bishul for korbanot.
• Resolution in Yerushalmi: The Yerushalmi resolves this apparent contradiction by introducing the concept of leshon bnei adam (common usage) vs. leshon Torah (biblical usage). R. Yochanan states that in matters of vows, one follows common usage ("בענייני נדרים הולכין אחר לשון בני אדם"), while R. Yoshia says one follows biblical usage ("בענייני נדרים הולכין אחר לשון תורה")³⁴. This distinction explains why shliqa might not be considered bishul for a vow (common usage might differentiate them) but is considered bishul for a korban (biblical usage, as implied by the Nazir Mishnah, might categorize shliqa under bishul). This highlights a fundamental hermeneutic principle in halakha – the interpretation of terms can vary depending on the context (vows vs. sacrifices).

2. Mishnah Shabbat 7:2: The 39 Melachot (Forbidden Labors)

The Yerushalmi indirectly references Mishnah Shabbat 7:2, which lists the 39 melachot: "Mishnah Shabbat 7:2 states that on the Sabbath, 39 different activities are forbidden. This means that a person who violates the Sabbath unintentionally may be liable for up to 39 purification sacrifices"³⁵.

• Connection: The discussion of shliqa as bishul has direct implications for the melakha of bishul on Shabbat. If shliqa is bishul, then performing it on Shabbat would constitute a violation of one of the 39 melachot. This provides a practical nafka mina for the definition of bishul beyond korbanot and nedarim.
• Elaboration: The Yerushalmi's inquiry into whether multiple chatatot are necessary for multiple melachot points to the severity and distinctness of each melakha. If shliqa is merely an intense form of bishul, it's one chatat. If it's a distinct category, it could potentially be a different chatat (though the gemara seems to imply it's a form of bishul). This connection underscores the rigorous precision required in defining actions in halakha.

3. Jerusalem Talmud Orlah 1:4 / Terumot 10:1: Bittul Rules and Basar B'Basar

The Yerushalmi directly references parallels in Orlah 1:4 and Terumot 10:1 for the detailed discussion of bittul b'shishim and bittul b'me'ah in the context of the zeroa and the ram³⁶.

• Connection: These sugyot are the primary sources for the general rules of bittul (nullification) of prohibited items in a mixture. The discussion of "condiments" (תבלין) and whether they nullify in more than 200 parts (if they sour, flavor, or create dema) is central to Orlah and Terumot, which deal with prohibited produce. Applying these rules to the zeroa and the ram extends the principles of bittul to items with different kedusha levels.
• Elaboration: The debate between R. Yasa (1:100) and R. Chiyya (1:60) for "all sources of flavor" is a cornerstone of bittul halakha. The statement by R. Yose that "meat in meat is the same as all other prohibitions" confirms that these general bittul rules apply even when the prohibited and permitted items are of the same type (meat). R. Abbahu's estimation "as if they were onion or leeks" further refines this, suggesting that the bittul ratio for basar b'basar might be higher if the prohibited meat has a very strong, pervasive flavor. This entire section demonstrates how fundamental bittul principles from issurei achilah (prohibitions of eating) are applied to the complex scenario of mixing items with different kedusha levels in sacrificial law.

4. Bavli Nazir 46a-47b: The Tenufa Requirement and the Handless Nazir

The Yerushalmi's discussion of Rav and Samuel regarding tenufa being me'akev for the Nazir's hetter and the challenge from the Tosefta "תורת נזיר, בין שיש לו כנפים בין שאין לו כנפים" is directly paralleled in the Bavli (Nazir 46a-47b)³⁷.

• Connection: Both Talmuds grapple with the same fundamental kushya: how can a universal obligation (nezirut) have a requirement (tenufa) that is impossible for some (handless Nazir)? The Bavli also quotes Rav's view and raises the same Tosefta.
• Comparison/Contrast: While the Yerushalmi presents Rav's solution ("למי שיש לו כנפים תנופה עוצרתו. למי שאין לו כנפים תנופה אינה עוצרתו"), the Bavli (Nazir 46a) presents different interpretations of Rav's view, and ultimately rejects it as halakha l'ma'aseh. The Bavli concludes that tenufa is not me'akev for the Nazir's permission, even for an able-bodied Nazir. Instead, the hetter for wine and impurity comes from the zerikat damim (sprinkling of blood) and giluach (shaving), with tenufa being a mitzvat asseh (positive commandment) but not an impediment. This stark difference in psak between the two Talmuds (Yerushalmi accepting Rav's distinction, Bavli rejecting the ikuv altogether) is a classic example of their divergent approaches.

5. Sifra Metzora Pereq 3(11) / Bavli Yoma 61b: The Metzora Without Thumbs

The Yerushalmi uses the metzora (leper) as a parallel for the Nazir without hands, quoting R. Eliezer's view regarding the application of blood and oil: "הוא מספג על מקומן" (he puts it on their place)³⁸.

• Connection: This ruling for the metzora (found in Sifra and Bavli Yoma 61b, and also in Mishnah Negaim 14:9) serves as a paradigm for dealing with physical disability in ritual. The metzora ritual involves placing blood and oil on the right thumb and great toe. If these limbs are missing, R. Eliezer suggests performing the ritual on their anatomical location.
• Elaboration: This parallel explores the nature of ikuv and physical impossibility. For the metzora, the sifra (and R. Eliezer) provides a method of "substitute performance" for the ritual. This stands in contrast to Rav's approach for the Nazir, which is more of an exemption for the disabled. The existence of both approaches (exemption vs. substitution) in halakha indicates a nuanced understanding of how mitzvot apply to individuals with physical limitations. It forces an analyst to consider whether a mitzva requires the physical act itself, or if its essence can be achieved symbolically or by proxy, depending on the specific mitzva and the halachic source.

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Psak/Practice

The Yerushalmi Nazir 6:9, while dealing with kodshim (sacrifices) not directly applicable today, provides foundational principles that echo throughout contemporary halakha.

1. Definition of "Bishul" and "Shaliqa" in Vows and Kashrut

The discussion regarding bishul (cooking) and shliqa (scalding) and the distinction between leshon bnei adam (common usage) and leshon Torah (biblical usage) remains highly relevant.

• Nedarim: For modern vows, the principle that nedarim follow leshon bnei adam is normative. If someone vows to abstain from "cooked food," the interpretation will depend on what is commonly understood as "cooked" in their community, rather than a strict biblical definition that might include shliqa or other forms of heating. This allows for flexibility and context-sensitivity in vow interpretation³⁹.
• Kashrut (Bishul Akum): The precise definition of bishul is crucial for bishul akum (food cooked by a non-Jew), which is prohibited for certain types of food. The Rambam's definition of shliqa as cooking without water, discussed by Sheyarei Korban, could subtly influence how certain foods prepared by non-Jews are categorized. For instance, if a food is "roasted" without water, is it considered "cooked" for bishul akum purposes? Generally, bishul akum applies to food that is "fit for a king's table" and cooked (not merely roasted or smoked)⁴⁰. The nuances of shliqa as a form of bishul are therefore implicitly relevant to determining which dishes fall under this prohibition.
• Shabbat: The melakha of bishul on Shabbat also hinges on the definition of "cooking." While shliqa is generally considered a form of bishul for Shabbat, the degree of heat and transformation are critical. The chiddush that shliqa is "over-cooking until dissolved" emphasizes that even extreme forms of heat application constitute bishul on Shabbat, incurring chiyuv chatat if done intentionally.

2. The Nazir's Permission and the Role of Tenufa

The specific psak regarding the timing of the Nazir's hetter and the ikuv of tenufa (waving) is a point of divergence between the Yerushalmi and Bavli.

• Bavli's Psak: The Bavli (Nazir 46a) ultimately rejects Rav's view that tenufa is me'akev for the Nazir's hetter. The normative halakha follows the view that the Nazir is permitted to drink wine and defile himself with the dead after the giluach (shaving) and zerikat damim (sprinkling of blood), even if tenufa has not yet occurred⁴¹. Tenufa remains a mitzvat asseh (positive commandment), but its omission does not prevent the Nazir's release.
• Meta-Psak Heuristics: This divergence highlights a key meta-halakhic principle: when there is a dispute between the Bavli and Yerushalmi, the halakha generally follows the Bavli, especially in areas where it explicitly discusses and rejects the Yerushalmi's position. This rule applies here, making the Yerushalmi's discussion valuable for theoretical understanding and lomdus, but not for practical psak on this specific point. However, the Yerushalmi's reasoning, particularly Rav's distinction between the able-bodied and disabled Nazir, still offers profound insight into the flexibility of halakha in the face of ones (unavoidable circumstances).

3. Bittul Rules and Kedusha

The elaborate discussion of bittul b'shishim and bittul b'me'ah for kodshim (sacred items) is a direct application of fundamental kashrut principles.

• General Applicability: The rules of bittul are central to all areas of kashrut today. The debates about 1:60 versus 1:100, and particularly the nuances of basar b'basar (meat in meat), are directly relevant to contemporary kashrut practice, especially in cases of prohibited fats, blood, or mixtures of different types of meat (e.g., basar b'chalav – meat and milk). The Yerushalmi's analysis, informed by other sugyot like Terumot and Orlah, reinforces the intricate calculations and considerations involved in determining whether a prohibited item has been nullified in a mixture.
• Zikkei Kedusha (Degrees of Holiness): While the specific scenario of mixing a Kohen's zeroa with the Nazir's ram is not applicable, the principle of mixing items with different kedusha levels (or prohibitions) and the potential for bittul or mutual absorption remains relevant. This helps understand the complexity of handling consecrated items in the Temple period and the meticulousness required to prevent desecration or improper use, a mindset that informs halakha even today concerning sacred objects (e.g., sefarim, mezuzot).

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Takeaway

This sugya masterfully demonstrates the interpretive tension between textual precision, practical application, and the dynamic principles of halakha concerning physical ability and the nature of ritual acts. It reveals how foundational definitions (like bishul) and procedural requirements (like tenufa) are rigorously tested against internal contradictions and universal ethical considerations, often leading to nuanced distinctions in psak and a deep appreciation for the multi-faceted nature of Torah law.

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¹ Numbers 6:19. ² Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 6:1:2-3. ³ Mishnah Shabbat 7:2. ⁴ Numbers 6:19. ⁵ Penei Moshe on Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 6:9:1:2. ⁶ Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 6:9:8, Sefaria footnote 236. ⁷ Penei Moshe on Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 6:9:1:1. ⁸ Penei Moshe on Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 6:9:1:2. ⁹ Penei Moshe on Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 6:9:1:3. ¹⁰ Korban HaEdah on Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 6:9:1:1. ¹¹ Korban HaEdah on Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 6:9:1:2. ¹² Korban HaEdah on Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 6:9:1:3. ¹³ Sheyarei Korban on Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 6:9:1:1. ¹⁴ Sheyarei Korban on Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 6:9:1:1. ¹⁵ Sheyarei Korban on Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 6:9:1:2. ¹⁶ Sheyarei Korban on Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 6:9:1:1. ¹⁷ Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 6:9:1. ¹⁸ Penei Moshe on Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 6:9:1:1; Korban HaEdah on Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 6:9:1:1. ¹⁹ Sheyarei Korban on Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 6:9:1:1. ²⁰ Rambam, Hilchot Nedarim 9:1, as cited by Sheyarei Korban on Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 6:9:1:1. ²¹ Numbers 6:19. ²² Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 6:9:7. ²³ Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 6:9:7. ²⁴ Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 6:9:8. ²⁵ Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 6:9:8. ²⁶ Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 6:9:9; Mishnah Negaim 14:9. ²⁷ Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 6:9:3. ²⁸ Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 6:9:5. ²⁹ Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 6:9:6. ³⁰ Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 6:9:6. ³¹ Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 6:9:6. ³² Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 6:9:6. ³³ Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 6:9:2; Mishnah Nedarim 6:1. ³⁴ Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 6:9:2. ³⁵ Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 6:9:2, Sefaria footnote 7. ³⁶ Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 6:9:3, Sefaria footnote 228. ³⁷ Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 6:9:7, Sefaria footnote 233. ³⁸ Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 6:9:9. ³⁹ Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De'ah 217:1, based on Bavli Nedarim 2a. ⁴⁰ Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De'ah 113:1. ⁴¹ Bavli Nazir 46a, Rashi s.v. "דלא מעכבא"; Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De'ah 217:1.