Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 6:9:9-7:1:2

This is a challenging but exciting request! Delving into the intricate layers of Yerushalmi Nazir requires a rigorous approach. Let's embark on this lomedic journey.

Sugya Map

• Issue 1: The Nature of "Cooking" and its Implications for Nazir Sacrifices.
  • Nafka Mina: Determining whether "scalding" (שליקה - shlikah) is considered "cooking" (בישול - bishul) for the purpose of disqualifying a Nazir's offering, and by extension, the validity of the Nazir's entire process (shaving, completion of vows). This also touches upon the definition of "food" in vows.
  • Primary Sources:
    • Mishnah Nazir 6:9 (Jerusalem Talmud)
    • Numbers 6:19
    • Mishnah Shabbat 7:2
    • Mishnah Nedarim 6:1
    • Baraita quoted in the Jerusalem Talmud
• Issue 2: The Validity of Nazir Sacrifices When One Component is Invalid.
  • Nafka Mina: If a Nazir brings his sacrifices and one is discovered to be invalid (e.g., not brought for its intended purpose), does this invalidate the entire process, including the shaving and the other valid sacrifices? This hinges on the concept of the sacrifices being interdependent.
  • Primary Sources:
    • Mishnah Nazir 6:9 (Jerusalem Talmud)
    • Leviticus 4:33
    • Mishnah Zevachim 1:1
• Issue 3: The Timing of the Nazir's Permitted Actions (Drinking Wine, Defiling for Death) After Sacrifices.
  • Nafka Mina: When precisely does the Nazir become permitted to resume wine consumption and to defile himself for the dead? Is it after the entire sacrificial process, or upon the completion of a specific, pivotal stage? This is debated between the Mishnah and Rabbi Shimon.
  • Primary Sources:
    • Mishnah Nazir 6:9 (Jerusalem Talmud)
    • Numbers 6:19-20
    • Tosefta Nazir 1:5
• Issue 4: The Authority of Waving (Tenupha) and Measurement (She'ur) to Conclude Nazir Status.
  • Nafka Mina: What specific ritual act signifies the completion of the Nazir's vows and permits him to resume normal life? Is it the waving of the sacrifice, or perhaps another related ritual act? This involves reconciling different opinions on the efficacy of these actions.
  • Primary Sources:
    • Mishnah Nazir 6:9 (Jerusalem Talmud)
    • Numbers 6:19-20
    • Leviticus 14:14, 17, 24-28
• Issue 5: The Obligation of a High Priest and Nazir to Defile Themselves for a Corpse of Obligation (Met Mitzvah).
  • Nafka Mina: This is the most extensive section. It probes the hierarchy of holiness and obligation. Who takes precedence when a Nazir and a High Priest encounter a met mitzvah? What are the specific parameters of a met mitzvah? Can a priest defile himself for reasons other than immediate family, such as for the honor of the public, Torah study, or even government officials? This delves into the tension between personal holiness and public need/honor.
  • Primary Sources:
    • Mishnah Nazir 7:1 (Jerusalem Talmud)
    • Leviticus 21:1-3, 11
    • Numbers 6:7
    • Deuteronomy 21:23
    • Tosefta Nazir 4:10
    • Sifra Emor
    • Semahot
    • Yerushalmi Berakhot 3:1
    • Yerushalmi Baba Batra 5:1

Text Snapshot

The text opens with a Mishnah concerning the Nazir's sacrifices and his subsequent permission to drink wine and defile himself.

MISHNAH: "He cooked the well-being offering or scalded²²² it. A Cohen takes the cooked fore-leg of the ram, one unleavened loaf from the basket, and one unleavened thin bread, places it on the nazir's hands and waves it²²³. Afterwards the nazir is permitted to drink wine and to defile himself with the dead. Rebbi Simeon says, when one of the bloods was sprinkled, the nazir is permitted to drink wine and to defile himself with the dead²²⁴."

• Nuance: The phrase " scalded it" (או שולקן - o sholkan) immediately raises a halakhic question about the definition of bishul (cooking). The Gemara will explore this. The connection between the fore-leg, loaf, and thin bread being placed on the Nazir's hands and then waved points to a unified ritual act. The critical distinction between the Mishnah's general statement ("Afterwards") and Rabbi Shimon's specific condition ("when one of the bloods was sprinkled") sets up a debate about the precise moment of consummation of the Nazir's service.

The Halakha then delves into the definition of "cooking":

HALAKHAH: "A Mishnah states that scalding is called cooking, as we have stated: “If he cooked the well-being offering or scalded it⁷.” A verse [states] that “roasted” is called “cooked”: “They cooked the pesaḥ”, etc. If you say, against the rules, Rebbi Jonah from Bostra said, “as is the rule”. A Mishnah states that scalded is called cooked: “Is one who makes a vow to abstain from cooked food permitted roasted and scalded food”? Rebbi Joḥanan said, in matters of vows one follows common usage. Rebbi Joshia said, in matters of vows one follows biblical usage."

• Nuance: The phrase "as we have stated" (דברינן - divrei'nan) indicates a prior ruling or established principle being invoked. The comparison to the Pesach offering ("They cooked the pesach") is a scriptural basis for understanding "cooking." The core of the debate here between Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Joshia lies in the hermeneutic principle for understanding vows: chokhmat hadibur (common usage) versus dina de'oraita (biblical law). This distinction has broad implications for vow interpretation.

The text further explores the sanctity of sacrificial parts and potential intermingling:

HALAKHAH: "It is written: “The Cohen takes the cooked fore-leg of the ram.²²⁶” If cooked, I could think separately²²⁷. The verse says, “from the ram”. How is this? He cuts it off so that only a barley grain’s width remains. Does not the sanctified absorb from the profane, or the profane from the sanctified?²²⁸"

• Nuance: The phrase "I could think separately" (סברא - svorah) signifies an inference the Gemara might draw were it not for a limiting factor. The specific detail of cutting off the fore-leg "so that only a barley grain's width remains" suggests a meticulousness in separating parts of differing holiness levels. The question about absorption (hitalfuta - היטלטות, or hatza'ah - הצצה) is a fundamental principle in kashrut and sacrificial law, concerning the transference of status between consecrated and unconsecrated items.

The discussion then shifts to the intricate laws of dema'i and forbidden mixtures, specifically concerning condiments and orlah:

HALAKHAH: "Ḥilfai asked Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, do condiments forbid with more than 200? They said to him, condiments are not in more than 200. But did we not state: “Anything which sours, flavors, or creates dema‘?” If you say about 100 or 200, even if it does not sour, flavor, or create dema‘! But we deal with grapes. Rebbi Assi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, if they were not raisins, but if they were raisins they are condiments in more than 200. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, if they were not cooked, but if they were cooked they are condiments in more than 200."

• Nuance: The term "condiments" (תבלינין - tavlinin) is key here, as their status in prohibition laws is debated. The concept of "creating dema‘" (עושה דמאי - oseh dema'i) refers to produce suspected of being terumah or ma'aser that has not been properly tithed, and thus must be treated with caution. The distinction between "raisins" (צימוקים - tzimukim) and grapes, and between "cooked" and "uncooked," highlights the nuanced criteria for determining what constitutes a significant admixture. The ratios (200, 100, 60) are critical thresholds in these laws.

The text then addresses the concluding acts of Nazirship:

HALAKHAH: "Rav said, waving stops the nazir²³³. But did we not state: “The teachings for the nazir,²³⁴” whether or not he has wings²³⁵? What Rav says, if he does, as it was stated thus: For somebody able to wave, waving stops him; for somebody unable to wave, waving does not stop him. Samuel says, measure²³⁶ stops a nazir, as for the waves and thumbs of a sufferer from skin disease²³⁷."

• Nuance: "Waving stops the nazir" (תנופה מעכבת את הנזיר - tenupha me'akivet et ha'nazir) implies that the waving is a necessary act for the cessation of his vow. The phrase "whether or not he has wings" (בין שהיו לו כנפיים בין שלא היו לו כנפיים - bein shehayu lo kanafayim bein shelo hayu lo kanafayim) is a metaphorical way of asking about the physical capacity to perform the action, referring to hands. Samuel's opinion introduces "measure" (שיעור - shi'ur), which might refer to the prescribed portions of the sacrifices or other measurements, and connects it to the rituals for a metzora (leper), suggesting a parallel in the completion of their purification rites.

The Mishnah then shifts to situations where sacrifices are invalid:

MISHNAH: "If he shaved for one of the sacrifices and it turned out to be invalid, his shaving is invalid²⁴⁰ and his sacrifices are not counted for him. If he shaved for the purification offering not in its name²⁴¹ but brought the other sacrifices in their names, his shaving is invalid and his sacrifices are not counted for him²⁴²."

• Nuance: This Mishnah presents a strict view on the interdependence of the Nazir's sacrifices. The phrase "not in its name" (שלא לשמן - shel o shem'an) is crucial, indicating that a sacrifice intended for one purpose (e.g., a purification offering) cannot be used for another, even if it's a valid type of sacrifice. The consequence is the invalidation of both the shaving and the sacrifices, highlighting the need for perfect execution of the entire ritual.

The text then introduces the debate about the blood sprinkling:

MISHNAH: "If one of the bloods had been sprinkled for him²⁴⁷ when he became impure, Rebbi Eliezer says, he has to repeat everything²⁴⁸. But the Sages say, he shall bring his remaining sacrifices once he became pure again²⁴⁹."

• Nuance: The act of sprinkling blood on the altar (hakzasat damim - הקזת דמים) is a pivotal moment in the sacrificial process, often considered to irrevocably establish the sacrifice's validity. The question is whether this partial completion is sufficient to salvage the Nazir's process when he becomes impure. Rabbi Eliezer's stringent view contrasts with the Sages' more lenient approach, emphasizing the concept of hafka'at ha'korban (the sacrifice becoming irrevocably valid) versus the need for the entire kashrut of the Nazir's state.

The final section tackles the complex issue of met mitzvah:

MISHNAH: "The High Priest and the nazir do not defile themselves for their relatives¹. If they were walking on a road and found a corpse of obligation, Rebbi Eliezer says, the High Priest² shall defile himself but the nazir shall not defile himself. But the Sages say, the nazir shall defile himself but the High Priest shall not defile himself."

• Nuance: The opening statement establishes a baseline prohibition for both the High Priest and the Nazir: they do not defile themselves for relatives. However, the introduction of the "corpse of obligation" (met mitzvah - מת מצוה) immediately creates a tension. The debate between Rabbi Eliezer and the Sages hinges on whose holiness is considered more inviolable, or whose obligation to attend to the met mitzvah is paramount. The phrase "corpse of obligation" itself requires extensive definition and exploration within the text.

Readings

Penei Moshe on the Nature of "Cooking"

The Penei Moshe, in his commentary on Nazir 6:9 (referencing his commentary on Nedarim), immediately tackles the definition of "scalding" (שליקה - shlikah). He explains that "scalding is an excessive cooking, to the point of disintegration" (שליקה בישול יותר מדאי עד שנימוח). His point in citing this is that the Torah explicitly mentions "cooked" offerings (e.g., the fore-leg), and the Mishnah adds "or scalded." This addition, k'mamash (as it were), teaches us that scalding is not a separate category of forbidden preparation but rather a degree of cooking, thus falling under the general prohibition. The purpose of stating this is to clarify that shlikah does not exempt the Nazir from the rules of bishul.

Furthermore, regarding the Nazir's permission to drink wine, the Penei Moshe explains that the phrase "Afterwards the Nazir is permitted to drink wine" (ואח"כ הותר הנזיר לשתות ביין) refers to the completion of all the rituals. He bases this on the verse "And afterwards the Nazir may drink wine" (Numbers 6:20), linking it to the subsequent phrase "after the completion of his Nazirite vow" (לאחר התגלחו את נזרו). This implies that the entire process, including the sacrifices and shaving, must be completed.

Finally, addressing Rabbi Shimon's opinion, the Penei Moshe clarifies that the critical moment is the sprinkling of the blood. He connects the verse in Numbers 6:20 ("And afterwards the Nazir may drink wine") with the verse in Numbers 6:19 ("after the shaving of his Nazirite vow"). He interprets the structure of the verses to mean that just as the waving (tenupha) in the latter verse is a single, significant act following the shaving, so too the sprinkling of one of the bloods is a single, significant act that validates the sacrifice and permits the Nazir's subsequent actions. Therefore, according to Rabbi Shimon, the sprinkling of even one blood signifies the completion of a critical stage, allowing the Nazir to drink wine and defile himself, even if the shaving has not yet occurred. He concludes by stating that this is the practical halakha (וכן הלכה - v'chen halakha).

Korban Ha'Edah on the Nature of "Cooking"

The Korban Ha'Edah, echoing the Penei Moshe in defining shlikah, states that it is "excessive cooking, to the point of disintegration" (בישול יותר מדאי עד שנימוח). He also links the Nazir's permission to drink wine to the completion of all the rituals, citing Numbers 6:20 ("And afterwards the Nazir may drink wine") and connecting it to "after all the acts" (אחר המעשים כולם).

His explanation of Rabbi Shimon's view is similar to the Penei Moshe's. He notes that the verse "afterwards the Nazir may drink wine" is juxtaposed with "after the shaving of his Nazirite vow." He argues that just as the waving (tenupha) is a single, significant act performed after the shaving, so too the sprinkling of one of the bloods is a single, significant act that allows the Nazir to drink wine and become impure. This is because, in Rabbi Shimon's view, the sprinkling of the blood irrevocably validates the sacrifice. He adds that the shaving is not necessarily a prerequisite for this permission, implying that the critical act is the validation of the sacrifice itself.

Sheyarei Korban on the Nature of "Cooking" and Intermingling

The Sheyarei Korban offers a more detailed analysis of the definition of shlikah and its relation to bishul. He cites the Gemara in Pesachim 39b regarding pas (bread) that is neither shlukin nor m'vushalin, suggesting that shlikah might be considered more severe than bishul. However, he quickly clarifies that in the context of Nazir, the intention is to teach that shlikah is not considered outside the realm of bishul. The phrase "it does not emerge from the category of cooking" (אינו יוצא מתורת בישול - eino yotzeh mitorat bishul) means that it is still considered cooking.

He then grapples with a potential contradiction. If shlikah means disintegration, how can the fore-leg, which has been scalded, still be fit to be taken? He references Rambam (Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Nedarim 8:9) who states that if people do not call something "cooked" except for meat boiled in water and spices, then roasted and scalded food is permitted. From this, the Sheyarei Korban infers that shlikah refers to something that is cooked in a pot without water. This explanation resolves the issue of disintegration, as it's not necessarily complete disintegration but rather a specific type of cooking.

Crucially, he then addresses the concept of absorption and prohibition. He explains that when the shlikah is done without water, it becomes "sticky" and "absorbs" its own flavor (bol'et t'ama). This is why it is forbidden. This absorption is more potent when there is no water to "dilute" the flavor. He ties this to a general principle in the Torah: "Anything that sours, flavors, or creates dema‘." He notes that Rabbi Yochanan's statement ("there are no pickled [foods] here, only scalded") implies that scalded food itself is the issue, not necessarily other flavors being added. This absorption of its own flavor is the reason for the prohibition.

Regarding the Nazir's permission, he notes that the explicit permission to drink wine ("And afterwards the Nazir may drink wine") implies that without this explicit statement, one might assume he is still forbidden. This is a common hermeneutic principle: explicit permissions override general prohibitions.

Friction

Friction 1: The Interplay of Bishul and Shlikah and its Impact on the Nazir's Status

Kushya: The text presents a seeming contradiction regarding the definition and implication of shlikah (scalding). The Penei Moshe and Korban Ha'Edah define shlikah as "excessive cooking, to the point of disintegration." Yet, the Sheyarei Korban, citing Rambam, posits that shlikah refers to cooking without water, which makes the food "sticky" and capable of absorbing its own flavor, thus being prohibited. If shlikah leads to disintegration, how can the scalded fore-leg still be ritually significant and part of the Nazir's offering? Furthermore, the Gemara itself quotes a Mishnah stating "If he cooked the well-being offering or scalded it," implying shlikah is a distinct, forbidden act alongside bishul. If it's merely a degree of bishul, why is it listed separately?

Terutz 1 (Sheyarei Korban's approach): The Sheyarei Korban's resolution hinges on a more precise definition of shlikah. He suggests that the disintegration mentioned by the Penei Moshe and Korban Ha'Edah might refer to a result of the cooking process without water, rather than the process itself being inherently destructive. The primary concern, according to his interpretation of Rambam, is the "stickiness" and the absorption of flavor when cooked without water. This makes the food susceptible to prohibitions by imparting its forbidden flavor. The fore-leg, even if scalded, would still retain its structure for the ritual, but the process of scalding itself is what's being prohibited for the Nazir's offering because of this flavor-absorption property. The separate mention of shlikah alongside bishul in the Mishnah is then to highlight a specific form of prohibited cooking that might not be immediately obvious as bishul in common parlance. It's a clarification that this specific method also carries the prohibition.

Terutz 2 (Distinguishing Ritual vs. General Prohibition): A possible alternative terutz could differentiate between the general prohibition of bishul for a Nazir's offering and the specific context of shlikah. The Mishnah in Nazir 6:9 states "If he cooked the well-being offering or scalded it." This is in the context of the Nazir's sacrifice. The broader discussion in the Halakha section about vows ("Is one who makes a vow to abstain from cooked food permitted roasted and scalded food?") might be teaching a general principle about the definition of bishul in different contexts. Rabbi Yochanan's opinion that in vows, common usage prevails, suggests that in everyday language, shlikah might not always be considered bishul. However, for the holiness of the sacrificial offering, the Sages are more stringent and consider even shlikah as a form of bishul that renders the offering invalid. The fore-leg, while scalded, remains recognizable as a fore-leg, and the prohibition stems from the method of preparation, not necessarily from its complete disintegration.

Friction 2: The Interdependence of Nazir Sacrifices and the Impact of Invalidity

Kushya: The Mishnah states: "If he shaved for one of the sacrifices and it turned out to be invalid, his shaving is invalid and his sacrifices are not counted for him." This is further elaborated: "If he shaved for the purification offering not in its name but brought the other sacrifices in their names, his shaving is invalid and his sacrifices are not counted for him." This implies an extreme interdependence where the invalidity of any part of the sacrificial set invalidates the entire process, including the shaving. However, Rabbi Shimon offers a seemingly contradictory opinion: "Rebbi Simeon says, that sacrifice is not counted for him but the others are counted for him." This suggests a partial validity, where the other sacrifices are counted. How can this be reconciled with the earlier, seemingly absolute statement of invalidity?

Terutz 1 (Distinguishing the Source of Invalidity): One approach is to differentiate the reason for the invalidity. The initial statement, "If he shaved for one of the sacrifices and it turned out to be invalid," might refer to an invalidity that stems from an external factor (e.g., the animal was found to be a tereifa after the shaving). In such cases, the entire process is nullified because the foundation upon which the shaving was performed was flawed. Rabbi Shimon's view, conversely, might apply when the invalidity stems from an internal error in designation, such as "not in its name" (שלא לשמן - shel o shem'an). In this specific case, Rabbi Shimon posits that while the improperly designated sacrifice is lost, the other sacrifices, if properly designated and brought, can still be counted. This would mean that some errors lead to complete nullification, while others allow for partial salvage.

Terutz 2 (Interpreting "Not Counted"): Another possibility is to interpret "his sacrifices are not counted for him" in the initial statement as referring to the immediate completion of the Nazir's obligation. However, Rabbi Shimon's statement "but the others are counted for him" might imply that they are counted towards some purpose, perhaps as voluntary offerings (nedavah), even if they don't fulfill the specific Nazirite obligation. The shaving, however, remains invalid. This would mean that the initial statement refers to the complete failure of the Nazirite completion, while Rabbi Shimon allows for a partial "counting" of the valid sacrifices, albeit not for the purpose of concluding the Nazir's vow in that instance. The invalid shaving, in either case, necessitates a new period of Nazirite abstinence.

Friction 3: The Status of the Met Mitzvah and the Hierarchy of Holiness

Kushya: The Mishnah introduces a stark disagreement between Rabbi Eliezer and the Sages regarding who defiles themselves for a met mitzvah (corpse of obligation) when both a High Priest and a Nazir encounter it. Rabbi Eliezer states the High Priest defiles himself, but the Nazir does not. The Sages say the Nazir defiles himself, but the High Priest does not. This immediately creates a dilemma: whose obligation takes precedence? The reasoning provided for the Sages' view is that "the Nazir shall defile himself, whose holiness is temporary, but the Priest shall not defile himself, whose holiness is permanent." This reasoning seems counterintuitive. One would expect the permanent, higher holiness of the High Priest to preclude him from defilement more strongly than the temporary holiness of the Nazir. Why would the temporary nature of the Nazir's holiness compel him to defile himself, while the permanent holiness of the High Priest allows him to avoid it?

Terutz 1 (The Nature of the Obligation): The Sages' reasoning might be interpreted not as a measure of their inherent holiness, but of the nature of their respective obligations. The High Priest's holiness is permanent and derives from his office itself. The Nazir's holiness, while also significant, is a self-imposed vow, a temporary state of heightened sanctification. The obligation to bury a met mitzvah is a fundamental, albeit difficult, commandment. Perhaps the Sages are suggesting that the self-imposed nature of the Nazir's holiness makes him more obligated to suspend it for a paramount public duty like burying a met mitzvah. His holiness is a choice, and this choice can be overridden by a more pressing communal imperative. The High Priest, whose holiness is inherent to his position and carries the weight of the entire priesthood, is forbidden to defile himself even for his own parents, indicating a higher barrier to defilement, regardless of the temporary nature of the Nazir's state. His permanent holiness is a more absolute constraint.

Terutz 2 (The Concept of "Consecration to the Service"): Alternatively, the Sages might be emphasizing the Nazir's immediate engagement with the sacrificial service. The Nazir has just completed, or is in the process of completing, his sacrifices. His holiness is tied to these specific, active rituals. The met mitzvah represents a pressing need that interrupts this service. The Sages might argue that the Nazir, being in a state of active, temporary sanctification for specific rituals, is more directly called upon to interrupt that state for the ultimate mitzvah of burial. The High Priest, while permanently holy, might be seen as having a different, perhaps more symbolic, role that requires him to remain untouched by impurity, thereby preserving the sanctity of the Temple itself, which is a greater entity than even the obligation to bury a single corpse. The Nazir's holiness is personal and ritualistic; the High Priest's holiness is communal and symbolic of the entire nation's connection to God.

Intertext

1. The Definition of Bishul in Vows and Kashrut

The debate in the Yerushalmi Nazir 6:9 regarding whether "scalding" (shlikah) constitutes "cooking" (bishul) for the purpose of a Nazir's vow echoes a broader discussion in Jewish law concerning the definition of bishul. This is particularly relevant in the context of kashrut (dietary laws).

• Babylonian Talmud Hullin 106a: Discusses various degrees of cooking. It states that something that has been "cooked" (m'vashal) is forbidden for one who vows not to eat cooked food. The question arises whether shlikah falls under this. The Gemara in Hullin 106a, in its discussion of permitted and forbidden foods, touches upon the degrees of cooking. The Yerushalmi's explicit mention of shlikah as akin to bishul for the Nazir's offering underscores the stringency applied to sacred matters. In kashrut, the definition of bishul is crucial for determining what is forbidden to eat or to cook on Shabbat. The Yerushalmi's exploration of whether shlikah is bishul is a microcosm of this larger legal inquiry.

2. The Interdependence of Sacrifices and the Concept of Shem (Name/Purpose)

The Mishnah in Nazir 6:9, stating that if one sacrifice is invalid, "his shaving is invalid and his sacrifices are not counted for him," and Rabbi Shimon's dissent, highlights the critical importance of offering sacrifices "in their name" (l'shem'an). This principle extends beyond the Nazir to all sacrifices.

• Mishnah Zevachim 1:1: "If one slaughtered an elevation offering for a well-being offering, or a well-being offering for an elevation offering, or an animal intended for an elevation offering for a sacrifice of peace-offerings, or vice versa, these are invalid." This Mishnah directly supports the Yerushalmi's premise that the specific purpose for which a sacrifice is slaughtered is paramount. The Yerushalmi then applies this stringent principle to the Nazir's unique situation, where the entire ritualistic process is interconnected. The invalidity of one component has a cascading effect.

3. The High Priest and Nazir's Obligation to Defile for a Met Mitzvah

The extensive debate in Nazir 7:1 concerning the High Priest and Nazir's obligation to defile themselves for a met mitzvah is a prime example of the tension between personal sanctity and communal responsibility, and the hierarchy of various forms of holiness.

• Leviticus 21:11: "And he shall not go in unto a dead body, nor defile himself for his father, or for his mother." This verse forms the basis for the prohibition of defilement for the High Priest, even for his closest relatives. The Yerushalmi then grapples with how this absolute prohibition can be reconciled with the obligation to bury a met mitzvah.
• Numbers 6:7: "Nor shall he defile himself for his father, or for his mother, or for his brother, or for his sister, if they die: because the consecration of his God is upon his head." This parallels the prohibition for the Nazir. The Yerushalmi's debate is precisely about how these prohibitions interact when confronted with the overriding obligation of kibbud met (honoring the dead) in the form of a met mitzvah. The discussion on whether the High Priest or Nazir defiles himself first is a sophisticated legal argument about the relative weight of these different commandments and forms of sanctity.

4. The Principle of "Exclusion upon Exclusion" and Permitting What Seems Forbidden

The Yerushalmi's halakha section exploring the interpretation of Leviticus 21:11 regarding the High Priest and met mitzvah mentions the principle of "an exclusion on top of an exclusion means an inclusion" (וזהו הכלל הכלל המוציא את הכלל). This is a well-established hermeneutic tool in Talmudic literature.

• Sifra, Vayikra, Parashat Emor, Perek 10, Parah 4: The Sifra, in its commentary on Leviticus 21:1-4, discusses the prohibitions for priests. It explains that the verse "He shall not defile himself for his father, or for his mother, or for his brother, or for his sister" is an exclusion. Then, when the verse states "but for his near kin that is nearest unto him, shall he be unclean," it seems to be an exclusion upon an exclusion, implying that for certain relatives (which are then clarified), he is permitted. The Yerushalmi uses this same principle to argue that the repetition of the prohibition for the High Priest implies an obligation in specific, unstated cases, which is then identified as the met mitzvah. This demonstrates how the Yerushalmi employs established hermeneutic principles to derive rulings.

5. The Definition and Handling of a Met Mitzvah

The extensive discussion on the met mitzvah in Nazir 7:1 draws upon and expands upon the definition and practical implications of this category of corpse.

• Mishnah Semahot 4:1: Defines a met mitzvah as "anyone who has no one to bury him." This forms the foundation of the Yerushalmi's discussion. The Yerushalmi adds further conditions and nuances, such as the deceased not being recognized or the burial not being according to his honor, all of which contribute to the definition of a met mitzvah and the corresponding obligations. The detailed descriptions of how to handle such a corpse, where to bury it, and the rights associated with its burial (e.g., the four cubits in a field) are all rooted in this foundational concept.

Psak/Practice

The Yerushalmi Nazir, particularly in its latter half (7:1 onwards), grapples with complex scenarios that have significant ramifications for practice, especially concerning the obligations of kohanim and nazirites.

On the Met Mitzvah: The most striking halakhic implication of this sugya is the hierarchy of obligations when a priest or Nazir encounters a met mitzvah. The consensus, as reflected in the later Mishnah and the Yerushalmi's discussion, leans towards the Sages' view. This means that a Nazir is generally obligated to defile himself for a met mitzvah, even if it means interrupting his Nazirite vows. The High Priest, however, is more strictly prohibited, with the obligation to bury a met mitzvah falling on others if possible. This ruling reflects a meta-halakhic principle: the communal need for burial (a paramount mitzvah) can, in certain circumstances, override personal sanctity, especially when that sanctity is self-imposed (Nazir) or when the individual is not the absolute highest level of sanctity (High Priest).

Practical Heuristics:

• Priority of Burial: The obligation to bury a met mitzvah is so weighty that it can compel a Nazir to defile himself, effectively resetting his Nazirite period. This emphasizes the primal importance of respecting the dead.
• Hierarchy of Holiness: While both High Priests and Nazirites are holy, the High Priest's permanent, office-based sanctity is considered a higher barrier to defilement than the temporary, self-imposed sanctity of a Nazir. The Nazir's chosen path of holiness makes him more amenable to interrupting it for a pressing communal need.
• Defining Met Mitzvah: The detailed discussions on what constitutes a met mitzvah highlight the practical challenges of identifying such a situation. The principle of "if he shouts and no one comes" and the considerations of recognition and honor are crucial for determining when this obligation truly arises.

On Sacrifices and Vows: The earlier sections on shlikah and the invalidity of sacrifices also inform practice:

• Stringency in Sacred Matters: The Yerushalmi's strictness regarding shlikah as a form of bishul for Nazir sacrifices implies a higher standard for Temple offerings than for general vows or kashrut. This reinforces the idea that what might be permissible in one context is forbidden in another, more sacred one.
• Interdependence of Rituals: The consequence of an invalid sacrifice invalidating the entire Nazirite process underscores the holistic nature of such vows. A single error can necessitate starting anew, emphasizing meticulousness and careful planning in fulfilling such commitments.

Takeaway

The Yerushalmi meticulously dissects the Nazir's path, revealing how even self-imposed holiness is subject to the demands of communal duty and the hierarchy of religious obligation. In matters of sacred ritual and personal vows, precision is paramount, as even a single misstep can necessitate a complete recommencement, a testament to the profound significance of each step in drawing closer to the Divine.