Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 10:6:1-8:4

Sugya Map

The present sugya in Yerushalmi Nedarim 10:6-8 delves into several interconnected facets of Hafarat Nedarim (annulment of vows) by a husband and Hatarat Nedarim (dissolution of vows) by a chakham (sage). The Gemara meticulously dissects the scope, timing, and qualifications associated with these powers, drawing heavily from Scriptural exegesis and kal vachomer (a fortiori) reasoning.

• Core Issue 1: Husband's Authority over a Yevamah's Vows.

  • Question: Does a yavam (levir) possess the authority to annul the vows of his yevamah (childless sister-in-law) prior to yibum (levirate marriage)?
  • Positions:
    • Rebbi Eliezer: Yes, by a kal vachomer. If he can annul vows for an arusah (betrothed woman) whom he acquired directly, he certainly should for a yevamah whom Heaven acquired for him.
    • Rebbi Akiva: No. An arusah is exclusively his; a yevamah (especially with multiple brothers) is not fully his, as "others have authority over her." He defines complete acquisition as one leading to chiyuv mitah (capital punishment) for adultery.
    • Rebbi Yehoshua: Challenges R. Akiva, questioning his logic in the case of a single yavam.
    • R. Akiva's Refinement: Even with a single yavam, the yevamah is not "גמורה לאישה" (completely belonging to her man) in the same way an arusah is, because adultery with a yevamah before bi'ah (consummation) does not incur a capital penalty.
  • Nafka Mina(s): Whether a yevamah requires her yavam's annulment, or if she must seek a chakham's hatara. This directly impacts the validity of her vows and her actions.
  • Primary Sources: Yerushalmi Nedarim 10:6:1-8:4; Tosefta Nedarim (Lieberman) 6:5⁶³; Bavli Nedarim 74b⁶³; Bamidbar 30:14⁵⁷.

• Core Issue 2: Annulment of Future Vows (Nedarim Sheyavo'u).

  • Question: Can a husband annul vows his wife has not yet made (e.g., "all vows you might vow from now on")?
  • Positions:
    • Rebbi Eliezer: Yes, by a kal vachomer. If he can annul existing vows (which are already prohibited), he should certainly be able to annul future vows (which are not yet prohibited).
    • Sages: No. The verse "her husband may confirm them and her husband may dissolve them" (Bamidbar 30:14) implies a parallel: what can be confirmed can be dissolved; what cannot be confirmed (a non-existent vow) cannot be dissolved.
  • Nafka Mina(s): The validity of pre-emptive annulment clauses, a common legal maneuver.
  • Primary Sources: Yerushalmi Nedarim 10:6:1-8:4; Tosefta Nedarim (Lieberman) 6:5⁶⁸; Bavli Nedarim 75b⁶⁸; Bamidbar 30:14⁵⁷.

• Core Issue 3: Timeframe for Annulment.

  • Question: How long does a husband have to annul a vow after hearing it?
  • Positions:
    • Rabbanan (Mishnah): "The entire day" (עד מחרת היום) – from the moment he hears until the following nightfall (a maximum of 24 hours, but potentially less if heard during the day).
    • Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Yehudah and Rebbi Elazar ben Rebbi Shimon: "From time to time" (מזמן לזמן) – a full 24 hours from the moment he hears the vow.
  • Nafka Mina(s): The precise deadline for annulment, impacting the vow's binding status if the husband remains silent.
  • Primary Sources: Yerushalmi Nedarim 10:6:1-8:4; Bavli Nedarim 76b⁷⁷, 77a⁷⁷; Sifry Bemidbar 156⁷⁸; Bamidbar 30:6,8,13⁸¹, 30:15⁸⁰.

• Core Issue 4: Formalities and Qualifications for Annulment/Dissolution.

  • Questions:
    • Can one annul/dissolve on Shabbat?
    • What is the correct wording for a husband vs. a chakham?
    • Can a husband, having implicitly confirmed a vow, later annul it as a chakham?
    • Can vows be dissolved at night?
    • Can an interpreter be used for hatara?
    • Must one sit and be wrapped in judicial robes for hatara?
    • Can three laymen perform hatara?
    • Can ordination be limited in scope or time?
  • Nafka Mina(s): Practical guidelines for individuals seeking or performing annulment/dissolution, and the nature of rabbinic authority.
  • Primary Sources: Yerushalmi Nedarim 10:6:1-8:4; Yerushalmi Shabbat 24:5:1⁹¹; Bavli Nedarim 77a⁹², 77b⁹⁵; Yerushalmi Sanhedrin 3:9:2-24¹⁰⁸; Yerushalmi Chagigah 1:8:2-14¹¹²; Bavli Bekhorot 36b¹¹⁴; Bavli Sanhedrin 5a¹²¹, 5b¹²⁵; Devarim 19:15,17^105,107; Mishnah Nega'im 2:5¹⁰².

This sugya is a rich tapestry of halakhic reasoning, demonstrating the Sages' intricate textual analysis and their sophisticated understanding of legal principles governing marital status, contractual obligations, and judicial authority.

Text Snapshot

The initial Mishna and its subsequent Halakha in Yerushalmi Nedarim 10:6:1 present a fundamental debate between Rebbi Eliezer and Rebbi Akiva regarding a husband's authority to annul the vows of a yevamah.

Mishnah:

"רבי אליעזר אומר, מה אם אשה שקנה הוא לעצמו, אינו דין שיפר נדריה, קל וחומר לאשה שקנו לו שמים. רבי עקיבה אומר לא, מה לאשה שקנה הוא לעצמו אין לאחרים בה רשות, יבמה שיש לאחרים בה רשות. אמר לו רבי יהושע, עקיבה, דבריך בשני יבמין, מה אתה משיב על יבם אחד? אמר לו אין היבמה גמורה לאישה כשם שהארוסה גמורה לבעלה." (Yerushalmi Nedarim 10:6:1)

Nuance and Dikduk:

• "אשה שקנה הוא לעצמו" (a woman he acquired for himself): Penei Moshe clarifies this refers to an arusah (betrothed woman)^{Penei Moshe Nedarim 10:6:1:1; Korban HaEdah Nedarim 10:6:1:1}. The act of kiddushin (betrothal) establishes a marital bond, granting the husband the power to annul vows, albeit in partnership with the father if she is a na'arah (minor girl)^{Penei Moshe Nedarim 10:6:1:3; Korban HaEdah Nedarim 10:6:1:2}.
• "אשה שקנו לו שמים" (a woman Heaven acquired for him): This refers to a yevamah (childless sister-in-law)^{Penei Moshe Nedarim 10:6:1:2}. Her bond to the yavam arises from her deceased husband's relationship, making it a "Heavenly" acquisition.
• "אין לאחרים בה רשות" (others have no authority over her) vs. "יש לאחרים בה רשות" (others have authority over her): R. Akiva's distinction is crucial. For an arusah, once betrothed, no other man has any claim. For a yevamah with multiple surviving brothers, even if one yavam performs maamar (a declaration of intent to marry), other brothers can still perform maamar on her, indicating a non-exclusive claim^{Penei Moshe Nedarim 10:6:1:4}. This undermines the completeness of the kinyan for R. Akiva.
• "אין היבמה גמורה לאישה כשם שהארוסה גמורה לבעלה" (the yevamah is not completely belonging to her man as the arusah completely belongs to her husband): This is R. Akiva's core principle. Penei Moshe explains that "גמורה" in this context refers to the severity of the marital bond, specifically that a yevamah is not subject to chiyuv mitah (capital punishment) for adultery before bi'ah, unlike an arusah^{Penei Moshe Nedarim 10:6:1:6}. Thus, the absence of this ultimate penalty indicates an incomplete kinyan, and therefore incomplete authority to annul vows.

Halakhah's Version of the Debate:

"רבי אליעזר אומר, הואיל ואישה שאין לי בה קנוי קודם שתבוא לרשותי, הרי היא קנויה לי לגמרי משבאה לרשותי, אינו דין לאישה שיש לי בה קנוי קודם שתבוא לרשותי, שתהא קנויה לי לגמרי משבאה לרשותי? רבי עקיבה אומר לו, לא. אם אמרת באשה שאין לך בה קנוי קודם שתבוא לרשותי, אבל משבאה לרשותי הרי היא קנויה לך לגמרי, מה שאין לך בה חלק לאחרים אין בה חלק. מה תאמר באשה שיש לך בה קנוי קודם שתבוא לרשותי, אבל משבאה לרשותי הרי היא קנויה לך לגמרי, מה שיש לך בה חלק לאחרים יש בה חלק! רבי יהושע אמר לו, עקיבה, דבריך בשני יבמין, מה אתה משיב בחד יבם? אמר לו, מה אי אתה מחלק בין יבם אחד לשני יבמין, בין שקידש ובין שלא קידש, לא יהא אלא בנדרים ושבועות? אמר לו, זהו אמת. אמר לו אילו היית בימי רבי אלעזר בן ערך, היה אומר שמאמר אינו קונה לגמרי, שהיה מודה שאינו מיפר עד שתכנס לרשותו." (Yerushalmi Nedarim 10:6:1, Halakhah)

Further Nuances in the Halakhah:

• Rephrased Kal Vachomer: R. Eliezer's argument is rephrased: "אישה שאין לי בה קנוי קודם שתבוא לרשותי" (a woman over whom I had no acquisition before she entered my domain) for an arusah, and "אישה שיש לי בה קנוי קודם שתבוא לרשותי" (a woman over whom I had some acquisition before she entered my domain) for a yevamah. This emphasizes the pre-existing, albeit incomplete, claim of the yavam.
• R. Akiva's Rebuttal: He reiterates the "יש לאחרים בה חלק" (others have a share) for the yevamah, even after maamar.
• R. Yehoshua's Challenge: "מה אתה משיב בחד יבם?" (What do you reply about one yavam?) – This is key, as R. Akiva's original argument about "others having authority" loses force when there's only one potential yavam.
• R. Akiva's Response: "מה אי אתה מחלק בין יבם אחד לשני יבמין, בין שקידש ובין שלא קידש, לא יהא אלא בנדרים ושבועות?" (Just as you make no difference in the rules of one waiting for one levir or for two levirs, whether he ‘bespoke’ her or did not ‘bespeak’ her, can it not be the same for vows and oaths?) This is a subtle and somewhat difficult line. It seems R. Akiva is saying that the halakha concerning yibum (e.g., prohibition of kilayim - marrying two sisters) doesn't differentiate between one or two yevamin, or between maamar or no maamar, regarding the yevamah's general status. Therefore, the power to annul vows should also not differentiate.
• "אמר לו, זהו אמת" (He said to him, that is true): This is R. Yehoshua's acknowledgment, implying he accepts R. Akiva's consistency or reasoning.
• R. Yehoshua's Final Remark: "אמר לו אילו היית בימי רבי אלעזר בן ערך, היה אומר שמאמר אינו קונה לגמרי, שהיה מודה שאינו מיפר עד שתכנס לרשותו." (He said to him, if you had lived in the times of Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh, he would have said that ‘bespeaking’ does not acquire completely since he would agree that he cannot dissolve until she enters his domain.) This is a fascinating conclusion. R. Yehoshua, having conceded R. Akiva's point about the incomplete nature of the yevamah's bond, uses this very principle to argue that even R. Eliezer, had he been alive and heard R. Akiva's reasoning, would have agreed that maamar itself doesn't grant full annulment power. This highlights the Yerushalmi's unique textual flow compared to the Bavli and Tosefta⁶⁶.

Readings

The sugya on Hafarat Nedarim by a yavam is a classic example of halakhic dialectics, where the nature of kinyan and authority is meticulously explored. The Yerushalmi, with its distinct textual nuances, provides a rich ground for commentary. We will delve into the insights of Penei Moshe and Korban HaEdah, two foundational Yerushalmi commentaries, and then broaden our scope to Rishonim who address similar issues in the Bavli, offering a comparative lens.

Penei Moshe: Deconstructing the Kinyan of Yevamah

The Penei Moshe, a comprehensive commentary on the Yerushalmi by Rabbi Moshe Margolies (18th century), provides invaluable elucidation on the linguistic and conceptual underpinnings of our sugya. His primary contribution here is the precise definition of terms and the logical flow of the arguments, particularly regarding the concept of kinyan in yibum.

1. Defining the Parties: Arusah vs. Yevamah Penei Moshe begins by clarifying the foundational distinction drawn by R. Eliezer. "אשה שקנה הוא לעצמו" (a woman he acquired for himself) is unequivocally identified as an arusah (betrothed woman)^{Penei Moshe Nedarim 10:6:1:1}. This kinyan is established through kiddushin (betrothal), an act initiated by the husband. In contrast, "אשה שקנו לו שמים" (a woman Heaven acquired for him) refers to a yevamah (childless sister-in-law)^{Penei Moshe Nedarim 10:6:1:2}. The yibum relationship arises by divine decree (kinyan shamayim) upon the death of a childless brother, creating a unique bond where the surviving brother has a pre-existing claim. This initial clarification is crucial for understanding the premise of R. Eliezer's kal vachomer.

2. The Nature of Annulment Authority: Shutafut and Rishut Penei Moshe notes that a husband's ability to annul an arusah's vows is "בשותפות עם האב" (in partnership with the father)^{Penei Moshe Nedarim 10:6:1:3}. This is a critical detail, as it highlights that even in a direct acquisition (kinyan gamur), the husband's authority might not be entirely exclusive if the wife is still a na'arah (minor girl) under her father's domain. However, the thrust of the argument is the husband's right to annul, even if shared. R. Akiva's counter-argument hinges on "שיש לאחרים בה רשות" (others have authority over her). Penei Moshe brilliantly unpacks this by referring to the possibility of "מאמר אחר מאמר" (a maamar after a maamar)^{Penei Moshe Nedarim 10:6:1:4}. If there are multiple brothers, and one yavam performs maamar (a formal declaration of intent to marry the yevamah), another brother can still perform maamar on the same yevamah. This demonstrates that the first yavam's claim, even after maamar, is not exclusive or complete. This non-exclusivity is precisely what R. Akiva leverages to reject R. Eliezer's kal vachomer, arguing that the yevamah's status is fundamentally different from an arusah where no other man has any claim.

3. The "Single Yavam" Challenge and "גמורה לאישה" R. Yehoshua's astute challenge to R. Akiva, "מה אתה משיב על יבם אחד?" (What do you reply about one yavam?)^{Penei Moshe Nedarim 10:6:1:5}, directly addresses the weakness in R. Akiva's "others have authority" argument when there's only a single potential yavam. Here, Penei Moshe highlights that R. Akiva's initial response (as explained in the Mishna) is that "אין היבמה גמורה לאישה" (the yevamah is not completely belonging to her man)^{Penei Moshe Nedarim 10:6:1:6}. The commentary clarifies that "גמורה" here refers to the status of being liable for chiyuv mitah (capital punishment) for adultery. An arusah incurs chiyuv mitah upon violation, signifying a complete, exclusive marital bond. A yevamah, however, is not subject to chiyuv mitah before bi'ah (consummation), even after maamar. This means her connection to the yavam is of a lesser, incomplete nature, insufficient to grant him the power of annulment. Penei Moshe thus reveals R. Akiva's deep-seated principle: the power of hafara is not merely a function of a "husband" status, but of a complete marital kinyan as defined by the severity of its violation.

Korban HaEdah: Reinforcing the Yerushalmi's Voice

The Korban HaEdah by Rabbi David Frankel (18th century), often read alongside Penei Moshe, offers a concise yet insightful parallel commentary, frequently reinforcing or slightly rephrasing the Penei Moshe's explanations. While it largely concurs with Penei Moshe on the definitions, its value lies in solidifying the Yerushalmi's unique interpretations and providing an additional layer of textual understanding.

1. Concurrence on Basic Definitions Korban HaEdah echoes Penei Moshe's identification of "אשה שקנה לעצמו" as an arusah^{Korban HaEdah Nedarim 10:6:1:1} and confirms the husband's annulment power for an arusah is "בשותפות" (in partnership)^{Korban HaEdah Nedarim 10:6:1:2}. This consistent interpretation across both major Yerushalmi commentaries underscores the accepted understanding of these foundational terms within the Yerushalmi tradition. While not adding a novel chiddush in these instances, it reinforces the textual stability.

2. Emphasis on the Source of Power Where Korban HaEdah subtly contributes is by implicitly emphasizing that the husband's power of annulment is intrinsically linked to the specific nature of his kinyan over his wife. The shared authority with the father for an arusah (if a na'arah) already hints at gradations of kinyan. For the yevamah, the lack of "גמורה לאישה" status, as defined by chiyuv mitah, is not just a detail but a fundamental legal distinction that precludes the husband's unilateral annulment power. Korban HaEdah's more succinct style often distills the essence of the argument, making R. Akiva's position on the incomplete kinyan of a yevamah particularly stark. It highlights that the Yerushalmi's framing of the debate, especially R. Akiva's definition of "גמורה," is central to its legal reasoning.

Rashba: The Bavli's Lens on Kinyan Yibum

Rabbi Shlomo ben Avraham Aderet (Rashba, 13th-14th century), a prominent Rishon, comments extensively on the Bavli. While his commentary is on Nedarim 74b (the Bavli's parallel sugya), his insights into the nature of yibum and maamar are highly relevant to our Yerushalmi text, offering a broader perspective on the shared principles.

1. The Distinction between Kiddushin and Yibum Rashba Nedarim 74b, s.v. "אמר לו רבי עקיבא לא", delves into the fundamental difference between kiddushin and yibum. He explains that kiddushin creates a complete marital bond (kinyan gamur) from its inception, which is why an arusah is subject to chiyuv mitah for adultery. This completeness is the basis for the husband's power to annul vows. Yibum, on the other hand, is a unique relationship. The yevamah is initially forbidden to all men, including the yavam, as an eshet achiv (brother's wife). It is only through yibum or chalitza that she becomes permitted. The initial bond of yibum is a "זיקה" (zika – attachment), a pre-existing claim by Heaven, but not a full kinyan. Rashba emphasizes that this zika does not immediately confer the rights and responsibilities of a fully married husband, including the power of hafara.

2. The Status of Maamar Rashba extensively discusses maamar (the yavam's declaration of intent). He notes that while maamar strengthens the yavam's claim, it does not consummate the marriage or elevate the yevamah's status to that of a nesu'ah (fully married woman). It is a preparatory step, a kinyan for yibum, but not yibum itself. Crucially, Rashba aligns with R. Akiva's point (as understood by Penei Moshe) that maamar does not render the yevamah subject to chiyuv mitah for adultery. He explains that the prohibition of eshet achiv before yibum or chalitza is not equivalent to the prohibition of eshet ish (married woman) which carries capital punishment. Therefore, the kinyan established by maamar is insufficient for the husband to annul vows. This directly supports R. Akiva's understanding of "אין היבמה גמורה לאישה."

3. The "Others Have Authority" Argument Rashba also addresses the concept of "יש לאחרים בה רשות" (others have authority over her). While the Bavli's discussion might differ in its specific examples, Rashba's general principle is that as long as the yevamah remains bound to multiple yevamin (even if maamar has been performed by one), the claim of any single yavam is not exclusive. Even if there is only one yavam, the very nature of yibum means she is still considered "זקוקה ליבם" (zekukah l'yavam) – beholden to the yavam – rather than fully married. This nuanced understanding of her status under yibum, before bi'ah, is key to why the husband's power of annulment is withheld. The power of hafara requires an undisputed, complete marital authority, which yibum before bi'ah does not provide.

Ramban: Logical Structure and Scriptural Basis

Rabbi Moshe ben Nachman (Ramban, 13th century) is another giant among the Rishonim whose commentary on Bavli Nedarim 74b provides a profound analysis of the sugya's logical structure and Scriptural foundations, complementing the Yerushalmi's approach.

1. Critique of the Kal Vachomer Ramban Nedarim 74b, s.v. "אמר לו רבי עקיבא לא", focuses on the logical flaw in R. Eliezer's kal vachomer. He agrees with R. Akiva that the two cases are not analogous. The strength of R. Eliezer's argument rests on the idea that a pre-existing "קנוי" (acquisition/claim) should logically lead to stronger rights once the woman "enters his domain." However, Ramban points out that the quality of the kinyan is what matters. The "קנוי" of a yevamah (the zika) is fundamentally different from the direct kinyan of an arusah. One is a potential relationship, the other an actual, albeit unconsummated, marriage. The kal vachomer fails because the tzad hashaveh (common denominator) is not strong enough, or rather, the tzad hashaveh (some form of acquisition) is outweighed by the tzad hashoneh (difference in the nature of acquisition and exclusivity).

2. The Meaning of "אִישָׁהּ" in Bamidbar 30 Ramban, like other Rishonim, anchors the discussion in the Biblical text of Bamidbar 30, which grants the husband the power to annul: "אִישָׁהּ יְקִימֶנּוּ וְאִישָׁהּ יְפֵרֶנּוּ" (her husband may confirm them and her husband may dissolve them)^{Bamidbar 30:14}. He would likely interpret "אִישָׁהּ" as referring to a woman who is unequivocally "his wife" in the fullest sense, with all the accompanying rights and obligations. This complete status, for Ramban, would necessarily include the chiyuv mitah for adultery as the ultimate expression of the marital bond's exclusivity. Thus, the yevamah before bi'ah, lacking this definitive status, does not fit the Scriptural definition of "אִישָׁהּ" for the purpose of annulment. This directly supports R. Akiva's definition of "גמורה לאישה" as the benchmark for hafara power.

3. The Yerushalmi's Unique Attribution on Nega'im Later in the sugya, Sefaria footnote 103 points to Ramban (Nedarim 11:1) as holding that practice follows the Yerushalmi regarding a chakham's ability to annul his wife's vows concerning others, given that the Bavli does not discuss the theme. This highlights Ramban's careful consideration of Yerushalmi's unique positions. While not directly related to the yevamah discussion, it demonstrates his methodology of consulting both Talmuds and sometimes giving precedence to one based on the specific context or lack of parallel discussion in the other. This meta-halakhic approach is characteristic of the Rishonim.

In summary, these Rishonim and Yerushalmi commentators collectively build a robust understanding of why a yavam does not possess the power of hafara before bi'ah. They highlight the unique nature of yibum's kinyan as distinct from kiddushin, the non-exclusive claim even after maamar, and the critical role of chiyuv mitah as an indicator of a "complete" marital bond that grants the husband full annulment authority. The Yerushalmi's distinct phrasing and R. Akiva's emphasis on "גמורה לאישה" are central to this nuanced halakhic discourse.

Friction

The Yerushalmi sugya presents several points of intellectual friction, demanding careful analysis to reconcile apparent contradictions or logical leaps. We will focus on two significant kushyot (difficulties) and explore their potential terutzim (resolutions).

Kushya 1: R. Akiva's Chiyuv Mitah Criterion for Hafara

The Difficulty: Rebbi Akiva's pivotal argument against the yavam's power of annulment hinges on his assertion: "אין היבמה גמורה לאישה כשם שהארוסה גמורה לבעלה" (the yevamah is not completely belonging to her man as the arusah completely belongs to her husband)^{Yerushalmi Nedarim 10:6:1}. Penei Moshe clarifies that "גמורה" here refers specifically to the chiyuv mitah (capital punishment) for adultery^{Penei Moshe Nedarim 10:6:1:6}. Thus, for R. Akiva, the husband's power of hafara (annulment) is directly contingent upon the wife's status as one whose adultery would incur a capital penalty.

The kushya arises from the seemingly disparate nature of these two concepts. The power to annul vows (Bamidbar 30) is a specific marital right, related to the husband's general authority (ba'al) over his wife's spiritual and personal autonomy. Why should this power be tied to the criminal consequence of violating the marital bond, specifically chiyuv mitah for adultery? There are many aspects of marital law where the arusah and yevamah (after maamar) are treated similarly, even if chiyuv mitah doesn't apply to the latter. For instance, both an arusah and a yevamah are forbidden to other men. If the yavam has some form of kinyan (even if incomplete), and the Torah grants hafara power to "אִישָׁהּ" (her husband), why isn't this lesser kinyan sufficient for hafara? R. Akiva's criterion seems overly stringent and specific, connecting a civil/religious authority (annulment) to a penal one (chiyuv mitah).

Terutz 1: The Holistic Nature of Kinyan Ba'al One terutz suggests that R. Akiva views the kinyan ba'al (husband's acquisition/authority) as a holistic concept, not a mere aggregation of rights. For the Torah to grant the husband the unique power of hafara, it must stem from a complete and exclusive proprietary claim over his wife's guf (body) and, by extension, her actions and commitments. The chiyuv mitah for adultery is not merely a penalty; it is the ultimate legal expression of this complete, exclusive kinyan. When a woman is fully "קנויה לבעלה" (acquired by her husband), her guf is so intrinsically bound to him that its violation by another man is considered a capital offense. This completeness is precisely what grants the husband the unilateral authority to override her vows.

In the case of a yevamah before bi'ah, even with maamar, the kinyan is not absolute. As R. Akiva himself states, "יש לאחרים בה רשות" (others have authority over her), at least in the case of multiple yevamin. Even with a single yavam, the zika (attachment) is a kinyan shamayim (Heavenly acquisition) that creates an obligation for yibum or chalitza, but it doesn't immediately transform her into an eshet ish (married woman) in the same way kiddushin does. The possibility of chalitza itself indicates that the bond is not yet fully consummated as a marital kinyan. Without the chiyuv mitah for adultery, the yevamah's bond to the yavam is deemed insufficient to meet the Torah's standard of "אִישָׁהּ" for hafara. R. Akiva is not just looking at the penalty, but at what the penalty represents about the fundamental nature of the marital bond. It signifies the highest degree of kinyan and exclusivity, which is the prerequisite for hafara.

Terutz 2: Exegesis of "אִישָׁהּ" in Bamidbar 30 A second terutz delves into the precise exegesis of the word "אִישָׁהּ" ("her husband") in Bamidbar 30:14. R. Akiva might be interpreting this term to refer exclusively to a man who is her "husband" in the most definitive and comprehensive sense known to the Torah. In the Torah's legal framework, the ultimate indicator of a complete marital bond, distinguishing it from all other relationships, is the capital punishment for adultery.

Consider the various stages of a woman's relationship with a man:

1. Na'arah Arusah (betrothed minor girl): Her father and husband both have hafara power. Adultery with her is chiyuv mitah (stoning).
2. Bogeret Arusah (betrothed adult woman): Only her husband has hafara power. Adultery with her is chiyuv mitah.
3. Nesu'ah (fully married woman): Only her husband has hafara power. Adultery with her is chiyuv mitah.
4. Yevamah (before bi'ah): The sugya is debating her status. However, adultery with her is not chiyuv mitah.

R. Akiva posits that the Torah's grant of hafara power to "אִישָׁהּ" implicitly refers to a legal status that is fully analogous to that of an arusah or nesu'ah, where the kinyan is so profound that its violation carries the gravest consequence. The yevamah before bi'ah, while forbidden to others, does not incur chiyuv mitah if she lies with another man. This means her kinyan to the yavam is not of the same legal category as a typical marital bond. Therefore, she does not fall under the precise definition of "אִישָׁהּ" that confers hafara power. This interpretation elevates the chiyuv mitah from being merely a consequence to being a defining characteristic of the specific type of "husband" relationship that the Torah had in mind for hafara.

Kushya 2: The Yerushalmi's Concluding Dialogue on Maamar

The Difficulty: The Yerushalmi's Halakha concludes the R. Eliezer vs. R. Akiva debate with a perplexing exchange:

"רבי יהושע אמר לו, עקיבה, דבריך בשני יבמין, מה אתה משיב בחד יבם? אמר לו, מה אי אתה מחלק בין יבם אחד לשני יבמין, בין שקידש ובין שלא קידש, לא יהא אלא בנדרים ושבועות? אמר לו, זהו אמת. אמר לו אילו היית בימי רבי אלעזר בן ערך, היה אומר שמאמר אינו קונה לגמרי, שהיה מודה שאינו מיפר עד שתכנס לרשותו." (Yerushalmi Nedarim 10:6:1, Halakhah)

The kushya here has two layers:

1. "זהו אמת" (that is true): Who is saying "that is true" to whom, and what is being affirmed? If R. Yehoshua is saying it to R. Akiva, it implies R. Yehoshua concedes R. Akiva's point about the yevamah not being gemurah even for a single yavam. This seems to conclude the debate with R. Akiva prevailing.
2. R. Yehoshua's Subsequent Statement: Immediately following this concession, R. Yehoshua says: "If you had lived in the times of Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh, he would have said that ‘bespeaking’ [מאמר] does not acquire completely since he would agree that he cannot dissolve until she enters his domain." This statement seems to undermine the very premise of the debate or R. Akiva's position. If R. Yehoshua just conceded R. Akiva's point, why is he introducing R. Eleazar ben Arakh's view, which seems to imply that even maamar (R. Eliezer's implicit argument for kinyan) is insufficient? It creates a circular or confusing flow, especially given that the Tosefta and Bavli versions of this sugya have a different ending, often implying R. Akiva's position is more directly challenged or not entirely accepted in the same way^{Tosefta Nedarim (Lieberman) 6:5; Bavli Nedarim 74b}.

Terutz 1: R. Yehoshua's Strategic Concession and Refinement This terutz interprets the dialogue as R. Yehoshua making a strategic concession to R. Akiva, then using R. Akiva's own logic to strengthen the rejection of R. Eliezer's initial kal vachomer.

1. "זהו אמת": R. Yehoshua is indeed acknowledging the logical consistency of R. Akiva's position. R. Akiva had argued that the yevamah is not "גמורה לאישה" even for a single yavam, because her status does not incur chiyuv mitah. R. Yehoshua, though initially challenging R. Akiva on the "two yevamin" point, ultimately accepts R. Akiva's deeper principle about the nature of kinyan for hafara. He concedes that R. Akiva's definition of "גמורה" applies even to the single yavam case. Thus, "זהו אמת" means "your point about the yevamah not being gemurah is correct and consistent."

2. R. Yehoshua's Subsequent Statement: Having affirmed R. Akiva's principle, R. Yehoshua then turns it around, not against R. Akiva, but against R. Eliezer. He is essentially saying: "R. Akiva, your profound insight into the incomplete nature of the yevamah's kinyan (even after maamar) is so compelling that even R. Eliezer ben Arakh (a great Sage) would have been swayed by it. Had he heard your argument that maamar doesn't create a complete kinyan sufficient for hafara until bi'ah (which is what 'she enters his domain' implies), he would have conceded his own kal vachomer." In this reading, R. Yehoshua is not introducing a new counter-argument to R. Akiva. Instead, he is praising R. Akiva's clarity and demonstrating the strength of his argument by hypothetically retrofitting it onto an earlier authority (R. Eleazar ben Arakh, perhaps chosen for his intellectual stature and independence, or as a textual variant for R. Eliezer himself). The statement is a rhetorical flourish, showing that R. Akiva's definition of kinyan for hafara is so robust that it would have convinced even those who initially held a different view. The Yerushalmi thus presents a more definitive resolution to the debate, with R. Akiva's position being ultimately affirmed and even used to reformulate R. Eliezer's potential stance.

Terutz 2: Textual Variant and Interpreting "זהו אמת" Differently A second terutz might consider the possibility of a textual variant or a slightly different interpretation of "זהו אמת."

1. "זהו אמת" as a Concession to R. Yehoshua: It's plausible that "זהו אמת" is R. Akiva's concession to R. Yehoshua's original challenge. R. Yehoshua asked, "מה אתה משיב בחד יבם?" and R. Akiva's response ("מה אי אתה מחלק...") was itself a question or an attempt to redirect. Perhaps R. Akiva realized the weakness of his analogy regarding kilayim (marrying two sisters) and conceded R. Yehoshua's point that the single yavam case does present a difficulty for his initial "others have authority" argument. However, this reading is less likely given the flow of R. Akiva's argument about the yevamah not being gemurah.

2. "זהו אמת" as referring to R. Yehoshua's subsequent statement (less likely but possible): One could argue that "זהו אמת" is R. Yehoshua affirming his own subsequent point, i.e., "It is true that R. Eleazar ben Arakh would have agreed..." This would make the intervening statement by R. Akiva somewhat of a non-sequitur or a brief thought before R. Yehoshua continues his own line of reasoning. However, this requires a strained reading of the narrative flow and the attribution of statements.

The first terutz, where R. Yehoshua affirms R. Akiva's consistent application of the "not gemurah" principle and then uses it to argue R. Eliezer would have conceded, seems to be the strongest interpretation. It provides a coherent narrative where R. Akiva's nuanced understanding of kinyan ultimately prevails and even reshapes historical opinions. This Yerushalmi unique ending emphasizes the power of rigorous halakhic reasoning to clarify and sometimes even overturn prior assumptions.

Intertext

The sugya in Yerushalmi Nedarim 10:6-8 is profoundly intertextual, drawing its foundational principles from the Torah and resonating throughout the vast corpus of Halakha. We will explore connections to Tanakh, Shulchan Aruch, and a broader responsa context.

1. Tanakh: Bamidbar Chapter 30 – The Magna Carta of Vows

The entire discussion in our sugya is an elaborate exposition and application of the laws of vows and annulment as presented in Bamidbar Chapter 30 (Parshat Matot). This chapter is the primary Scriptural source for the husband's power of hafara and the chakham's power of hatara.

• Husband's Authority and the "Day of Hearing": The verses "וְאִישָׁהּ יְקִימֶנּוּ וְאִישָׁהּ יְפֵרֶנּוּ" (her husband may confirm them and her husband may dissolve them)^{Bamidbar 30:14} are the bedrock of the husband's power. The repeated mention of "בְּיוֹם שָׁמְעוֹ" (on the day of his hearing)^{Bamidbar 30:6,8,13} is central to the debate about the timeframe for annulment. The Mishnah's ruling that "הפרת נדרים כל היום" (the dissolution of vows may take place the entire day)^{Yerushalmi Nedarim 10:7:1} and the subsequent halakha's discussion between the Rabbis ("עד מחרת היום") and R. Yose ben R. Yehudah ("מזמן לזמן" – 24 hours) directly stems from the interpretation of "בְּיוֹם שָׁמְעוֹ" and "וְאִם הֱקִים אֹתָם אִישָׁהּ אַחֲרֵי שָׁמְעוֹ... מִיּוֹם אֶל יוֹם" (and if her husband confirms them after his hearing... from day to day)^{Bamidbar 30:15}. The tension between "בְּיוֹם" (on the day) suggesting until nightfall, and "מִיּוֹם אֶל יוֹם" (from day to day) potentially suggesting a full 24-hour period, is precisely what the Amoraim are grappling with.
• Confirmation and Annulment Parallelism: The Sages' argument against R. Eliezer's view on annulling future vows, "מה שמוקם מיפר, מה שאינו מוקם אינו מיפר" (what can be confirmed can be dissolved; what cannot be confirmed cannot be dissolved)^{Yerushalmi Nedarim 10:6:2}, is directly derived from the parallelism in Bamidbar 30:14 between "יְקִימֶנּוּ" (confirm) and "יְפֵרֶנּוּ" (dissolve). This hermeneutical principle – hakama (confirmation) and hafara (annulment) operating on the same ontological plane – is a cornerstone of the sugya.
• "ראשי המטות" (Heads of the Tribes): The Yerushalmi later discusses the authority of "שלשה שיודעין לפתוח" (three who know how to find an opening) to permit vows, linking it to "ראשי המטות" (heads of the tribes)^{Yerushalmi Nedarim 10:8:8}, citing Bamidbar 30:2: "דַּבֵּר אֶל רָאשֵׁי מַטּוֹת בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל" (Speak to the heads of the tribes of the children of Israel). This verse, which introduces the laws of vows, is understood to empower the leaders (i.e., chakhamim or, in some interpretations, even qualified laymen) to dissolve vows. This connection emphasizes the communal and authoritative nature of hatarat nedarim.

2. Shulchan Aruch: Codification of Annulment Laws

The practical conclusions of these debates are largely codified in the Shulchan Aruch, primarily in Even HaEzer Siman 155 for husband's annulment, and Yoreh De'ah Siman 228 for hatarat nedarim by a chakham.

• Yavam's Power: Shulchan Aruch Even HaEzer 155:10 explicitly states that a yavam does not have the power to annul his yevamah's vows before bi'ah (consummation), even if he performed maamar. This ruling squarely aligns with Rebbi Akiva's position as elucidated in our Yerushalmi sugya, demonstrating the halakha follows his view on the incomplete nature of the yevamah's kinyan.
• Future Vows: Even HaEzer 155:7 rules that a husband cannot annul vows that his wife has not yet made ("כל נדרים שאדור מכאן ועד שובך ממקום פלוני הרי הן מופרים"). This codifies the Sages' position against Rebbi Eliezer, based on the principle that only what can be confirmed can be dissolved.
• Timeframe for Annulment: Even HaEzer 155:1 states that the husband has "כל היום" (the entire day) until nightfall to annul the vow, meaning he must annul it on the day he hears it. This follows the Rabbis' view in the Mishnah, rejecting R. Yose ben R. Yehudah's 24-hour interpretation.
• Wording of Annulment: Even HaEzer 155:17 and Yoreh De'ah 228:1 delineate the distinct wording for a husband's annulment ("מופר לך," "בטל לך" - dissolved for you, nullified for you) versus a chakham's dissolution ("מותר לך," "היתר לך" - permitted for you, allowance for you). This distinction is based on the Yerushalmi's discussion (Nedarim 10:8:7) and reflects the different nature of their powers – the husband annuls a vow within his marital domain, while the chakham permits it through a broader judicial authority.
• Qualifications for Hatarat Nedarim: Yoreh De'ah 228:1 states that three ordinary individuals (הדיוטות) who are מומחים לדבר (experts in the matter) can dissolve vows, but a single chakham mumcheh (expert sage) can do so alone. This relates directly to the Yerushalmi's discussion about "שלשה שיודעין לפתוח" (three who know how to find an opening)^{Yerushalmi Nedarim 10:8:8}. The Yerushalmi's debate between the rabbis of Caesarea (even at a place of an Elder) and the initial assumption (only where no Elder is available) points to the scope of this authority.

3. Responsa Literature: Refining the Nuances of Authority

Responsa literature often grapples with the intricate details and edge cases arising from these foundational laws, providing practical application and further conceptual refinement.

• The Chatam Sofer on Kinyan Yibum: The Chatam Sofer (Rabbi Moshe Sofer, 18th-19th century) in his responsa (e.g., Even HaEzer, siman 118) discusses the unique status of a yevamah and the nature of zika. He frequently emphasizes that zika is a kinyan of Kedusha (holiness/marital bond) but not a complete kinyan for all intents and purposes until bi'ah. He would likely align with the Yerushalmi's R. Akiva, highlighting that the zika grants certain prohibitions (e.g., to others) but not all marital rights, such as hafara. His analysis often distinguishes between different forms of kinyan in Jewish law, providing a meta-halakhic framework for understanding R. Akiva's distinction.
• Rambam's View on Limited Ordination and Hatarat Nedarim: The Yerushalmi discusses whether one can appoint Elders for selected topics or a fixed time (Nedarim 10:8:8). While the Rambam (Maimonides, 12th century) in Hilchot Sanhedrin (e.g., 4:1) speaks of comprehensive ordination (semikha), his commentary on Mishnah Nedarim 11:1 (related to Nega'im 2:5) and Hilchot Shevuot 6:6 (cited in footnote 103) shows his engagement with the question of who can annul vows. He seems to prioritize the majority opinion of the Mishnah over the Yerushalmi's unique attribution in Nega'im regarding a chakham annulling his wife's vows to others. This reflects a broader meta-halakhic principle regarding the weight given to different Talmudic traditions when they diverge. The Yerushalmi's nuanced discussion on Rav's limited ordination (to see stains but not firstlings) and R. Yehoshua ben Levi's one-eyed student ordained for "selected topics" underscores the complexities of rabbinic authority and its limitations. The Rambam's codification often reflects a synthesis, but also a decisive choice when faced with divergent traditions.

In sum, the Yerushalmi's sugya on Hafarat Nedarim is not an isolated legal discussion but a deeply integrated part of Jewish law, rooted in the Torah and meticulously developed through the layers of Rabbinic literature, culminating in the practical rulings of the Shulchan Aruch and the intricate analyses of later poskim. It showcases the dynamic process of halakhic interpretation and application.

Psak/Practice

The intricate debates presented in Yerushalmi Nedarim 10:6-8 have profound implications for practical Halakha, shaping how vows are annulled and by whom. The rulings largely reflect the consensus reached by the Sages, often favoring one opinion over another, and providing clear guidelines for both husbands and chakhamim.

1. Husband's Authority Over a Yevamah's Vows

• The Halakha follows Rebbi Akiva: A yavam does not have the power to annul the vows of his yevamah prior to bi'ah (consummation), even if he has performed maamar (declaration of intent to marry).
  • Source: Shulchan Aruch Even HaEzer 155:10-11: "יבם שקידש את יבמתו במאמר, אינו מיפר נדריה עד שיבעול" (A yavam who betrothed his yevamah with maamar, does not annul her vows until he consummates). This means the yevamah must seek hatarat nedarim from a chakham or beit din. This ruling confirms R. Akiva's principle that the yevamah's kinyan is not "גמורה" (complete) enough to grant the yavam this specific marital right.

2. Annulment of Future Vows (Nedarim Sheyavo'u)

• The Halakha follows the Sages: A husband cannot annul vows that his wife has not yet made. If he says, "all vows that you might vow from now until I return from place X shall be dissolved," his statement is ineffective.
  • Source: Shulchan Aruch Even HaEzer 155:7: "האומר לאשתו כל נדרים שתדורי מכאן ועד שאבא ממקום פלוני הרי הם בטלים, אינו כלום" (One who says to his wife, 'all vows you vow from now until I return from place X are null,' it is nothing). This reflects the Sages' argument that what cannot be confirmed (a non-existent vow) cannot be dissolved, upholding the parallelism derived from Bamidbar 30:14.

3. Timeframe for Annulment

• The Halakha follows the Rabbis of the Mishnah: A husband has "the entire day" (עד מחרת היום) to annul his wife's vow. This means from the moment he hears it until nightfall of that day. If he hears it at night, he has until nightfall of the following day. If he remains silent past this deadline, the vow is confirmed.
  • Source: Shulchan Aruch Even HaEzer 155:1: "יש לבעל להפר נדרי אשתו כל היום, דהיינו מעת ששמען עד הלילה" (A husband has the entire day to annul his wife's vows, meaning from when he heard them until nightfall). This rejects the more lenient "מזמן לזמן" (24 hours) view of R. Yose ben R. Yehudah, adhering to the interpretation of "ביום שומעו" as referring to the calendrical day.

4. Formalities and Qualifications for Annulment/Dissolution

• Annulment on Shabbat:
  • The Halakha allows it: Vows that "intrude on the Sabbath" (i.e., cause a problem for Shabbat observance) may be dissolved on Shabbat by a chakham.
  • Source: Shulchan Aruch Orach Chaim 339:3 and Even HaEzer 155:19: "מפרים נדרים בשבת, אם הוא דבר הצריך לשבת" (Vows are annulled on Shabbat if it is something needed for Shabbat). This aligns with the Yerushalmi's discussion on Shabbat 24:5, prioritizing the alleviation of distress (tzorech Shabbat) over the general prohibition of judicial activity on Shabbat.
• Wording of Annulment/Dissolution:
  • Distinct Wording: The Halakha maintains a distinction: a husband says "מופר לך" or "בטל לך" (dissolved/nullified for you), while a chakham says "מותר לך" or "היתר לך" (permitted/allowance for you).
  • Source: Shulchan Aruch Even HaEzer 155:17 and Yoreh De'ah 228:1. This reflects the Yerushalmi's teaching from R. Abbahu in the name of R. Yochanan (Nedarim 10:8:7), emphasizing the different nature of their respective authorities.
• Annulment by Three Laymen:
  • The Halakha permits it: Three ordinary individuals (הדיוטות) who are מומחים לדבר (expert in the laws of vows and finding openings for annulment) can dissolve vows. A single expert chakham can do so alone.
  • Source: Shulchan Aruch Yoreh De'ah 228:1. This follows the Yerushalmi's discussion (Nedarim 10:8:8), particularly the view of the rabbis of Caesarea that this is permissible even in the presence of an ordained Elder, indicating it does not infringe upon rabbinic privilege but expands accessibility to hatara.
• Sitting and Wrapped:
  • Not a Me'akev (Essential): While the Yerushalmi discusses that hatarat nedarim should ideally be performed while sitting and wrapped in judicial robes, this is considered a hiddur mitzvah (enhancement of the mitzvah) or a mark of respect for the beit din, not an absolute requirement that invalidates the hatara if unobserved.
  • Source: Rambam, Hilchot Nedarim 6:7 implies leniency, focusing on the substance of the hatara. The Yerushalmi's own stories of R. Aḥa bar Pappus and R. Mana standing to annul vows in Babylonia (Nedarim 10:8:8) highlight the variations in practice and the underlying principle that the core requirement is the chakham's knowledge, not strict adherence to external formalities.

Meta-Psak Heuristics

• Halakha k'Rabbim: A dominant heuristic is halakha k'Rabbim (the law follows the majority). This is evident in the rulings regarding future vows (Sages vs. R. Eliezer) and the timeframe for annulment (Rabbis vs. R. Yose ben R. Yehudah).
• Yerushalmi vs. Bavli: The sugya demonstrates that while the Bavli is often the primary source for psak, the Yerushalmi's unique discussions are crucial. For example, the Ramban (Nedarim 11:1) is cited as giving precedence to the Yerushalmi's view on a chakham annulling his wife's vows to others, where the Bavli is silent¹⁰³. This highlights the importance of comprehensive Talmudic study in forming psak.
• Nature of Kinyan: The debates, particularly on the yevamah, showcase how the psak is deeply informed by a nuanced understanding of kinyan (acquisition/authority) in Jewish law. The completeness and exclusivity of the marital bond are decisive factors in determining the scope of spousal authority.

In essence, the Yerushalmi, through its rigorous analysis and unique textual traditions, provides the conceptual bedrock for many practical halakhic rulings concerning vows, underscoring the dynamic interplay between Scriptural interpretation, logical reasoning, and the overarching principles of Jewish legal thought.

Takeaway

The Yerushalmi's deep dive into Hafarat Nedarim reveals that a husband's authority to annul vows is not a blanket right, but rather intimately bound to the specific nature and completeness of the marital kinyan. This authority, along with the chakham's power of hatara, is meticulously governed by Scriptural exegesis and precise legal distinctions regarding timing, wording, and qualifications, showcasing the profound intellectual rigor inherent in Jewish law.

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Footnotes:

⁵² Yerushalmi Nedarim 10:6:1. ⁵³ Yerushalmi Nedarim 10:6:1. ⁵⁴ Yerushalmi Nedarim 10:6:2. ⁵⁵ Yerushalmi Nedarim 10:6:2. ⁵⁶ Yerushalmi Nedarim 10:6:2. ⁵⁷ Bamidbar 30:14. ⁶³ Tosefta Nedarim (Lieberman) 6:5; Bavli Nedarim 74b. ⁶⁴ Yerushalmi Nedarim 10:6:1, Halakhah. ⁶⁵ Yerushalmi Nedarim 10:6:1, Halakhah. ⁶⁶ Yerushalmi Nedarim 10:6:1, Halakhah; Tosefta Nedarim (Lieberman) 6:5. ⁶⁸ Tosefta Nedarim (Lieberman) 6:5; Bavli Nedarim 75b. ⁶⁹ Yerushalmi Nedarim 10:6:2, Halakhah. ⁷⁰ Yerushalmi Nedarim 10:6:2, Halakhah. ⁷¹ Yerushalmi Nedarim 10:6:2, Halakhah; Tosefta Nedarim (Lieberman) 6:6; Bavli Nedarim 76b. ⁷² Yerushalmi Nedarim 10:6:2, Halakhah. ⁷³ Yerushalmi Nedarim 10:6:2, Halakhah; Tosefta Nedarim (Lieberman) 6:6. ⁷⁴ Tosefta Nedarim (Lieberman) 6:6; Bavli Nedarim 76b. ⁷⁵ Yerushalmi Nedarim 10:7:1. ⁷⁶ Yerushalmi Nedarim 10:7:1. ⁷⁷ Bavli Nedarim 76b, 77a; Shabbat 157a. ⁷⁸ Sifry Bemidbar 156. ⁷⁹ Yerushalmi Nedarim 10:7:1, Halakhah. ⁸⁰ Bamidbar 30:15. ⁸¹ Bamidbar 30:6,8,13. ⁸² Yerushalmi Nedarim 10:7:1, Halakhah. ⁸³ Yerushalmi Nedarim 10:7:1, Halakhah. ⁸⁴ Yerushalmi Nedarim 10:7:1, Halakhah. ⁸⁵ Yerushalmi Nedarim 10:7:1, Halakhah. ⁸⁶ Yerushalmi Nedarim 10:7:1, Halakhah. ⁸⁷ Yerushalmi Nedarim 10:7:1, Halakhah. ⁸⁸ Yerushalmi Nedarim 10:7:1, Halakhah. ⁸⁹ Yerushalmi Nedarim 10:7:1, Halakhah. ⁹⁰ Yerushalmi Nedarim 10:7:1, Halakhah. ⁹¹ Yerushalmi Shabbat 24:5:1. ⁹² Bavli Nedarim 77a. ⁹³ Yerushalmi Nedarim 10:7:1, Halakhah. ⁹⁴ Bavli Nedarim 77a. ⁹⁵ Bavli Nedarim 77b. ⁹⁹ Yerushalmi Nedarim 10:8:8, Halakhah. ¹⁰⁰ Yerushalmi Nedarim 10:8:8, Halakhah. ¹⁰¹ Yerushalmi Nedarim 10:8:8, Halakhah. ¹⁰² Mishnah Nega'im 2:5. ¹⁰³ Yerushalmi Nedarim 10:8:8, Halakhah; Ramban Nedarim 11:1; Rambam Commentary to Nega'im 2:5; Hilchot Shevu'ot 6:6. ¹⁰⁴ Bavli Nedarim 77b; Eruvin 62b. ¹⁰⁵ Devarim 19:15; Makkot 1:9; Sifry Devarim 188. ¹⁰⁶ Yerushalmi Nedarim 10:8:8, Halakhah. ¹⁰⁷ Devarim 19:17. ¹⁰⁸ Yerushalmi Sanhedrin 3:10 (21c 1. 15ff.); Yoma 6:1 (43b 1. 51 ff.); Shevu'ot 4:1 (35b, 1. 30 ff.); Bavli Shevu'ot 30a; Sifry Devarim 190. ¹⁰⁹ Yerushalmi Nedarim 10:8:8, Halakhah; Bavli Nedarim 77b. ¹¹⁰ Yerushalmi Nedarim 10:8:8, Halakhah. ¹¹¹ Yerushalmi Nedarim 10:8:8, Halakhah. ¹¹² Yerushalmi Chagigah 1:8, 76c 1. 62. ¹¹³ Yerushalmi Nedarim 10:8:8, Halakhah. ¹¹⁴ Bavli Nedarim 78a; Bekhorot 36b; R. Nissim Gerondi, Nedarim 78a s.v. "אמר רב אחא בר יעקב". ¹¹⁵ Bavli Nedarim 78a. ¹¹⁶ Bamidbar 30:2. ¹¹⁷ Yerushalmi Nedarim 10:8:8, Halakhah. ¹¹⁸ Yerushalmi Nedarim 10:8:8, Halakhah. ¹¹⁹ Yerushalmi Nedarim 10:8:8, Halakhah. ¹²⁰ Yerushalmi Nedarim 10:8:8, Halakhah. ¹²¹ Bavli Sanhedrin 5a. ¹²² Yerushalmi Nedarim 10:8:8, Halakhah; Lev. 13-14. ¹²³ Yerushalmi Nedarim 10:8:8, Halakhah. ¹²⁴ Yerushalmi Nedarim 10:8:8, Halakhah. ¹²⁵ Bavli Sanhedrin 5b. ¹²⁶ Yerushalmi Nedarim 10:8:8, Halakhah. ¹²⁷ Yerushalmi Nedarim 10:8:8, Halakhah. ¹²⁸ Yerushalmi Nedarim 10:8:8, Halakhah. Penei Moshe Penei Moshe on Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 10:6:1:1. Penei Moshe on Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 10:6:1:2. Penei Moshe on Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 10:6:1:3. Penei Moshe on Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 10:6:1:4. Penei Moshe on Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 10:6:1:5. Penei Moshe on Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 10:6:1:6. Korban HaEdah Korban HaEdah on Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 10:6:1:1. Korban HaEdah on Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 10:6:1:2. Rashba Rashba Nedarim 74b s.v. "אמר לו רבי עקיבא לא". Ramban Ramban Nedarim 74b s.v. "אמר לו רבי עקיבא לא". Ramban Nedarim 11:1 (as cited in Yerushalmi footnote 103).