Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 6:1:2-4:2

Sugya Map

• Issue: The precise definition of "cooked food" (מְבוּשָּׁל) in the context of vows (נדרים) and the distinction between common usage (מנהג העולם) and biblical usage (לשון מקרא). This also extends to other culinary terms like scalding (שָׁלוּק), roasting (צָלִי), and various preparations like thick (עָבֶה) and soft (רַךְ) dishes.
• Nafka Mina(s):
  • Determining the scope of a vow. Does a vow against "cooked food" include roasted or scalded items?
  • The weight given to vernacular understanding versus the literal meaning of biblical terms in interpreting vows.
  • Delineating the boundaries between different cooking methods and their halakhic implications (e.g., smoking, frying, cooking in hot springs).
  • Understanding the nuance of vows related to specific food items like fish or dairy products (curd vs. milk).
  • The conceptualization of how a vow, once transgressed, can be annulled or its effects mitigated, and whether it pertains to things that can become permitted or inherently prohibited.
• Primary Sources:
  • Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 6:1 (Mishnah and Halakha)
  • Jerusalem Talmud Eruvin 3:1
  • Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 6:9
  • Jerusalem Talmud Terumot 10:6
  • Jerusalem Talmud Challah 1:3
  • Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 7:2
  • Jerusalem Talmud Avodah Zarah 2:9
  • Jerusalem Talmud Ma'aserot 4:1
  • Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 2:1
  • Jerusalem Talmud Pe'ah 8:7
  • Jerusalem Talmud Demai 1:3
  • Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 7:7
  • Jerusalem Talmud Kilayim 5:6
  • Numbers 6:18
  • 2 Chronicles 35:13
  • Exodus 12:9
  • Genesis 45:23
  • Deuteronomy 2:28, 14:21, 23:19, 34:26
  • Mishnah Shabbat 7:2
  • Mishnah Ma'aserot 4:1
  • Mishnah Uqtsin 2:6
  • Tosefta Nedarim 3:2, 3:5

Text Snapshot

The core of the discussion revolves around the interpretation of vows regarding food preparation. The Mishnah in Nedarim 6:1 states: "One who makes a vow to abstain from cooked food is permitted roasted and scalded food." (הַנּוֹדֵר מִן הַמְבוּשָּׁל מֻתָּר בַּצָּלִי וּבַשָּׁלוּק). The Gemara (Halakha) immediately grapples with this, citing scriptural verses and rabbinic precedents to define these terms. It highlights a tension: "A Mishnah states that scalding is called cooking, as we have stated: 'If he cooked the well-being offering or scalded it' [Numbers 6:18 implies this equivalence in Nazir 6:9]. A verse [states] that 'roasted' is called 'cooked': 'They cooked the pesaḥ in the fire as is the rule' [2 Chron. 35:13, referencing Exodus 12:9 'roasted in fire']." (תנינן שלוק קרוי מבושל, דתנן: אם בשל את איל העמים או שלקו. ופסוק קרוי מבושל, צלו את הפסח באש כהלכה). This creates an apparent contradiction: if scalding and roasting are considered forms of "cooked" by certain sources, why does the Mishnah permit them for someone who vowed against "cooked food"?

This leads to the crux of the debate: "Rebbi Joḥanan said, in matters of vows one follows common usage. Rebbi Joshia said, in matters of vows one follows biblical usage." (רבי יוחנן אמר בדיני נדרים הולכין אחר לשון בני אדם. רבי חושיה אמר הולכין אחר לשון מקרא). The nuances of dikduk (grammar) and leshon (wording) are crucial here. "Leshon bnei adam" refers to the everyday understanding and parlance of people, while "leshon mikra" refers to the specific terminology and usage found in the Torah and other biblical texts. The Yerushalmi emphasizes that for vows, which affect a person's private commitment, the vernacular is paramount, as it reflects the speaker's intent more accurately than a strict, perhaps archaic, biblical definition.

Readings

Rav Yehudah's Approach (Implicit in the Mishnah) and Rabbi Yochanan's Rationale

The Mishnah itself, by permitting roasted (צָלִי) and scalded (שָׁלוּק) food to one who vowed against cooked (מְבוּשָּׁל) food, implicitly adopts a distinction. Penei Moshe explains this distinction: "Roasted and scalded, which are not included in cooked." (שאינן בכלל מבושל). This implies that in common parlance, "cooked" refers to a specific method, distinct from roasting or scalding. The Halakha further elaborates on this by citing the example of the pesach offering, where "roasted in fire" is equated to "cooked" in 2 Chronicles 35:13. However, the Yerushalmi clarifies that this biblical usage doesn't override the vernacular for vows.

Korban HaEdah notes on the permitted items: "Everything that is cooked more than its proper cooking is called scalded." (כל שנתבשל יותר מבישולו כראוי נקרא שלוק). This suggests a nuanced understanding of "scalding" as potentially a more intensive form of cooking, but the Yerushalmi's initial distinction suggests it's viewed as separate in the context of the vow.

Rabbi Yochanan's Chiddush: "In matters of vows one follows common usage."

Rabbi Yochanan's statement, "בדיני נדרים הולכין אחר לשון בני אדם" (In matters of vows, one follows the language of people), is a foundational principle for interpreting vows. His chiddush lies in prioritizing the vernacular over strict biblical definitions. This is because a vow is a personal declaration, and its binding force stems from the speaker's intent, which is best reflected in how they would naturally express themselves. The Yerushalmi then applies this principle to explain why roasted and scalded are permitted. While biblical texts might sometimes equate these with cooking, common usage distinguishes them, thus exempting them from a vow against "cooked food."

Rabbi Yoshiyah's Chiddush: "In matters of vows one follows biblical usage."

Rabbi Yoshiyah, conversely, argues for adhering to "לשון מקרא" (biblical usage). His chiddush is that even in vows, the more precise, perhaps etymologically rooted, biblical definition should prevail. This would mean that if the Torah or a prophetic book uses "cooked" to encompass roasting or scalding, then a vow against "cooked" should also include these. The Yerushalmi presents a scenario that seems to challenge Rabbi Yoshiyah: "If you say, against the rules, Rebbi Jonah from Bostra said, 'as is the rule.' A Mishnah states that scalded is called cooked, and a verse that roasted is called cooked; but did we not state: 'One who makes a vow to abstain from cooked food is permitted roasted and scalded food'?" This highlights the tension between explicit rabbinic rulings and scriptural references. Rabbi Yoshiyah's position, therefore, is a principled stance that biblical language holds a higher authority in defining terms, even within the framework of personal vows.

Rashba's Reading of the Mishnah

The Rashba (Novellae ad loc.) offers a textual analysis to support the Mishnah's allowance of "thick dishes" (עָבֶה) for someone who vowed against "cooked food." He queries: "Is one who makes a vow to abstain from cooked food permitted a thick dish?" (הַנּוֹדֵר מִן הַמְבוּשָּׁל מָהוּ שֶׁיְּהֵא מוּתָּר בְּעָבֶה). He then brings a proof from the Mishnah itself: "He is forbidden soft dishes (רַךְ) and permitted thick ones (עָבֶה)." (אָסוּר בְּמַעֲשֵׂה קְדֵרָה רַךְ וּמוּתָּר בְּעָבֶה). The Rashba's reasoning is that if a dish that is forbidden when roasted or scalded is permitted when "thick," then surely a "cooked" dish, which is permitted roasted and scalded, should also be permitted as "thick." His chiddush lies in using the distinction between "soft" and "thick" dishes, as presented in the Mishnah itself, to reinforce the broader permissibility of certain preparations under a vow against "cooked food." He argues that the logic of qal vachomer (a fortiori argument) applies here: "Since a dish which would be forbidden roasted or scalded is permitted as a thick dish, regarding 'cooked food' which permits roasted and scalded, is it not logical that he be permitted the thick dish?" (מָה אִם תַּבְשִׁיל שֶׁהוּא אָסוּר בִּצְלִי וּבְשָׁלוּק מוּתָּר בְּמַעֲשֵׂה קְדֵרָה עָבֶה. מְבוּשָּׁל שֶׁהוּא מוּתָּר בִּצְלִי וּבְשָׁלוּק אֵינוֹ דִין שֶׁיְּהֵא מוּתָּר בְּעָבֶה).

Friction

The central friction arises from the apparent contradiction between different sources regarding the classification of roasted and scalded foods in relation to "cooked food." The Mishnah explicitly permits roasted and scalded for someone vowing against mevushal (cooked). Yet, the Halakha cites sources that seem to equate these methods with cooking: "A Mishnah states that scalding is called cooking... A verse states that 'roasted' is called 'cooked'..." (תנינן שלוק קרוי מבושל... ופסוק קרוי מבושל). This creates a kushya: If scalding and roasting are indeed considered forms of cooking according to some authorities or biblical verses, how can the Mishnah permit them to someone who vowed against mevushal?

The terutz (resolution) offered by the Yerushalmi is the fundamental principle articulated by Rabbi Yochanan: "In matters of vows one follows common usage" (בדיני נדרים הולכין אחר לשון בני אדם). This resolves the friction by prioritizing the vernacular understanding of "cooked" over stricter, perhaps more encompassing, biblical or rabbinic classifications. The common understanding, as Rabbi Yochanan posits, distinguishes between mevushal (boiling/simmering) and tzali (roasting) or shaluk (scalding). Therefore, even if biblical verses or other Mishnayot might use "cooked" more broadly, the vow is interpreted according to how people generally speak and understand these terms.

A secondary layer of friction emerges when considering Rabbi Yoshiyah's opposing view, that vows should follow biblical usage. This view seems to imply that the Mishnah's permissibility of roasted and scalded is problematic. However, the Yerushalmi doesn't explicitly resolve this friction by refuting Rabbi Yoshiyah. Instead, it presents his view as an alternative perspective, and the subsequent discussion seems to lean towards Rabbi Yochanan's approach as the operative principle for the Yerushalmi's own reasoning. The underlying tension remains: what is the hierarchy of authority when interpreting vows – common parlance or precise textual definition? The Yerushalmi implicitly privileges the former for the practical application of vows.

Intertext

Vows and Vernacular: Nedarim 30b

The principle that "in matters of vows one follows common usage" is a recurring theme throughout Talmudic literature. In the Babylonian Talmud, Nedarim 30b (and elsewhere, e.g., Nedarim 49a, 51b), this concept is central to understanding the scope of vows. For example, if someone vows not to eat "bread," does this include pastries or cakes made from flour? The Gemara there debates this, ultimately leaning towards the vernacular meaning of "bread" as the primary determinant. The Yerushalmi here in Nedarim 6:1 directly echoes this principle, applying it to the specific culinary distinction between mevushal, tzali, and shaluk. This cross-reference highlights a consistent methodology for interpreting personal prohibitions.

The Definition of "Food": Berakhot 35b

The discussion in Nedarim 6:1 touches upon the definition of "food" itself, particularly in the context of Rabbi Aha bar Ulla's interpretation of Genesis 45:23. He derives from "grain, bread, and food" that "food" is distinct from grain and bread, implying a broader category. This contrasts with the Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 35b, which defines mazon (food) as any food made from grain. This intertextual comparison reveals differing approaches to defining basic categories of sustenance, which could have implications for the scope of vows related to general terms like "food" versus specific items. While Nedarim 6:1 focuses on preparation methods, the underlying principle of definition is relevant.

Psak/Practice

The operative principle derived from Rabbi Yochanan's dictum is that for halachic rulings concerning vows, the common understanding and usage of the terms are paramount. Thus, if someone vows not to eat "cooked food," they would generally be permitted roasted and scalded items, as these are typically understood as distinct preparations in everyday language. This principle guides the interpretation of all personal vows.

A meta-heuristic emerges: when interpreting vows, always consider the leshon bnei adam (vernacular). This requires an understanding not just of halakhic texts but also of how people actually speak and categorize food and other items. In cases of ambiguity, the common usage serves as the default interpretation. The Yerushalmi's approach underscores a practical, user-centered halakha in the realm of vows, aiming to align the vow's scope with the vow-maker's probable intent.

Takeaway

The interpretation of vows hinges on the speaker's intended meaning, best gauged by common usage rather than strict textual definitions. Distinguishing between culinary terms like "cooked," "roasted," and "scalded" in everyday parlance is crucial for determining the scope of such vows.

Citations

• Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 6:1:2-4:2: https://www.sefaria.org/Jerusalem_Talmud_Nedarim_6%3A1%3A2-4%3A2
• Jerusalem Talmud Terumot 10:6:2: https://www.sefaria.org/Jerusalem_Talmud_Terumot.10.6.2
• Nedarim 50b: https://www.sefaria.org/Nedarim.50b
• Jerusalem Talmud Eruvin 3:1: https://www.sefaria.org/Jerusalem_Talmud_Eruvin.3.1
• Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 6:9:2-9: https://www.sefaria.org/Jerusalem_Talmud_Nazir.6.9.2-9
• Nedarim 49a: https://www.sefaria.org/Nedarim.49a
• Numbers 6:18: https://www.sefaria.org/Numbers.6.18
• 2 Chronicles 35:13: https://www.sefaria.org/II_Chronicles.35.13
• Exodus 12:9: https://www.sefaria.org/Exodus.12.9
• Numbers 29:35: https://www.sefaria.org/Numbers.29.35
• Jerusalem Talmud Challah 1:3:14: https://www.sefaria.org/Jerusalem_Talmud_Challah.1.3.14
• Berakhot 44a: https://www.sefaria.org/Berakhot.44a
• Genesis 45:23: https://www.sefaria.org/Genesis.45.23
• Berakhot 35b: https://www.sefaria.org/Berakhot.35b
• Shabbat 7:2: https://www.sefaria.org/Mishnah_Shabbat.7.2
• Avodah Zarah 2:9: https://www.sefaria.org/Jerusalem_Talmud_Avodah_Zarah.2.9
• Avodah Zarah 37b-38a: https://www.sefaria.org/Avodah_Zarah.37b-38a
• Ma'aserot 4:1: https://www.sefaria.org/Mishnah_Ma'aserot.4.1
• Deuteronomy 2:28: https://www.sefaria.org/Deuteronomy.2.28
• Exodus 23:19: https://www.sefaria.org/Exodus.23.19
• Deuteronomy 14:21: https://www.sefaria.org/Deuteronomy.14.21
• Nedarim 51a: https://www.sefaria.org/Nedarim.51a
• Tosefta Nedarim (Lieberman) 3:2: https://www.sefaria.org/Tosefta_Nedarim_(Lieberman).3.2
• Jerusalem Talmud Pe'ah 8:7:6: https://www.sefaria.org/Jerusalem_Talmud_Peah.8.7.6
• Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 2:1:11: https://www.sefaria.org/Jerusalem_Talmud_Sotah.2.1.11
• Yoma 47a: https://www.sefaria.org/Yoma.47a
• Nedarim 41b: https://www.sefaria.org/Nedarim.41b
• Jerusalem Talmud Demai 1:3:16: https://www.sefaria.org/Jerusalem_Talmud_Demai.1.3.16
• Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 2:4:2: https://www.sefaria.org/Jerusalem_Talmud_Nedarim.2.4.2
• Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 6:8:13: https://www.sefaria.org/Jerusalem_Talmud_Nedarim.6.8.13
• Nedarim 51b: https://www.sefaria.org/Nedarim.51b
• Tosefta Nedarim (Lieberman) 3:5: https://www.sefaria.org/Tosefta_Nedarim_(Lieberman).3.5
• Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 7:7:2-6: https://www.sefaria.org/Jerusalem_Talmud_Ketubot.7.7.2-6
• Jerusalem Talmud Terumot 9:2:1-2: https://www.sefaria.org/Jerusalem_Talmud_Terumot.9.2.1-2
• Nedarim 60a: https://www.sefaria.org/Nedarim.60a
• Jerusalem Talmud Kilayim 5:6:4: https://www.sefaria.org/Jerusalem_Talmud_Kilayim.5.6.4
• Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 6:5:2: https://www.sefaria.org/Jerusalem_Talmud_Nedarim.6.5.2
• Penei Moshe on Nedarim 6:1:1:1: https://www.sefaria.org/Penei_Moshe_on_Jerusalem_Talmud_Nedarim.6.1.1.1 (Hebrew link)
• Korban HaEdah on Nedarim 6:1:1:1: https://www.sefaria.org/Korban_HaEdah_on_Jerusalem_Talmud_Nedarim.6.1.1.1 (Hebrew link)
• Nedarim 30b: https://www.sefaria.org/Nedarim.30b
• Nedarim 49a: https://www.sefaria.org/Nedarim.49a
• Nedarim 51b: https://www.sefaria.org/Nedarim.51b