Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 6:4:2-8:1

Sugya Map

• Issue: The precise definition and scope of forbidden substances under vows, particularly concerning derivatives and processed forms of food and drink. This includes questions of whether a vow against a primary substance also forbids its processed byproducts or related items, and the role of common parlance in defining the scope of a vow.
• Nafka Mina:
  • Determining the halakhic permissibility of consuming items like curd, cheese, wine vinegar, date honey, or bouillon when one has vowed against the primary substance (milk, grapes, dates, meat).
  • Establishing the principle of Kinyan Shem (name acquisition) – how the name of the original substance attaches to its derivatives, and when that attachment is strong enough to be included in a vow.
  • Understanding the interplay between explicit vows and the general practice of language (lashon bnei adam) in defining the boundaries of a prohibition.
  • The broader implications for vows concerning agricultural produce, calendar intercalation, and even purity laws, as the text expands into these seemingly disparate areas.
• Primary Sources:
  • Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 6:4-8:1
  • Jerusalem Talmud Shevi'it 6:3-4
  • Jerusalem Talmud Terumot 9:2
  • Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 7:7
  • Jerusalem Talmud Kilayim 5:6
  • Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 5:2
  • Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 1:2
  • Jerusalem Talmud Rosh Hashanah 3:1
  • Mishnah Nedarim 6:3-4

Text Snapshot

Mishnah Nedarim 6:4: "If somebody vows not to drink milk, he is permitted curd, but Rebbi Yose forbids. But from curd, he is permitted milk."

• Nuance: The Mishnah presents a basic dichotomy: milk vs. curd. The core of the dispute lies in whether "curd" (קומץ / קום) is considered distinct enough from "milk" (חלב) to be permitted under a vow against milk. Rebbi Yose's position hinges on a linguistic principle, as explained in the Gemara: "The name of its father is called over it" (שם אביו קרוי עליו), indicating that the derivative still carries the essence of the original. This highlights the importance of nomenclature and linguistic connection in defining vows.

Mishnah Nedarim 6:8: "If somebody vows not to drink wine he is permitted a dish prepared with wine. If he said, a qônām that I shall not taste this wine, if it fell into a dish and it can be tasted, that is forbidden."

• Nuance: This section introduces the concept of qônām, a severe form of vow (issur). The distinction is between a general vow against a substance ("not to drink wine") and a specific, potent vow against tasting it (qônām that I shall not taste this wine). The former allows for permitted derivatives where the original substance is no longer the primary taste or component, while the latter, even in minute, detectable amounts, remains forbidden due to the intensity of the qônām vow.

Readings

Penei Moshe on Nedarim 6:4:1:1

The Penei Moshe clarifies the identity of "curd" (קום), explaining it as "נסיובי דחלבא" (nisyuv de'halba), which are the watery components that separate from cheese during its production. He further elaborates, stating it's "מים היוצאין מן הגבינה" (mayim hayotzin min hagvina), the water that exits from the cheese. This commentary establishes the physical nature of curd as a byproduct of milk processing, setting the stage for the debate on its status relative to the original vow against milk.

Korban HaEdah on Nedarim 6:4:1:1

Echoing the Penei Moshe, the Korban HaEdah also defines qom as "נסיובי דחלבא" (nisyuv de'halba), "the watery whey of milk," and "מים היוצאים מן הגבינה" (mayim hayotzin min hagvina), "water that comes out of the cheese." This consistent definition across commentaries underscores the precise understanding of the substance in question. The Korban HaEdah’s commentary focuses on the physical separation, reinforcing the idea that curd is a distinct entity derived from milk.

Mishneh Torah, Vows 9:8

Maimonides, in his Mishneh Torah, addresses the issue of vows concerning milk and its derivatives. He states, "A person who vows [not to partake] of milk is permitted to partake of the whey, i.e., the liquid that is separated from the milk. If he vows [not to partake] of whey, he is permitted to partake of milk." This directly aligns with the initial part of the Yerushalmi Mishnah, permitting curd (whey) when one vows against milk. However, Maimonides also states, "If he vows [not to partake] of cheese, he is forbidden to partake of both salted cheese and unsalted cheese." This aligns with Abba Shaul's opinion in the Mishnah, emphasizing that cheese, a more processed form, is encompassed even if the vow was general. The Rambam's inclusion of the salted/unsalted distinction reflects the common practice and the underlying principle that such distinctions do not negate the substance's identity as "cheese" for the purpose of a vow.

Shulchan Arukh, Yoreh De'ah 217:11

The Shulchan Arukh, citing various opinions, elaborates on the milk and whey dichotomy. It states, "Lorsqu’on a fait vœu de ne pas boire de lait, le petit lait est permis; si on a fait vœu de ne pas boire de petit lait, le lait est permis." This mirrors the Mishnah's allowance of curd (petit lait/whey) when milk is vowed against, and vice versa. The commentary then introduces a crucial nuance: "D’après certains auteurs, quand on a l’habitude de donner au petit lait clair le nom qui renferme le mot «lait», le lait et le petit lait sont défendus dans les deux cas." This highlights the Kinyan Shem principle – if the derivative is commonly referred to in a way that includes the original name (e.g., "curdled milk"), then a vow against the original may include the derivative. The halakha here leans on linguistic practice (lashon bnei adam), a recurring theme in vow cases.

Tur, Yoreh De'ah 217

The Tur delves into the application of lashon bnei adam (common parlance) in vow interpretation. He elaborates on the example of vows against cooked food (tavshil). If a locale calls roasted and boiled food "cooked," then a vow against cooked food forbids both. Crucially, the Tur cites the Yerushalmi's discussion on vows against wine, noting the debate regarding cooked wine and the Yerushalmi's questioning whether this principle extends to smoked or fried items. The Tur concludes by stating that Maimonides permits "egg rolled in batter" (beitza megulegelet) even if the Yerushalmi seemingly forbids it, emphasizing that the final decision rests on local custom and language. This illustrates the complex application of vow principles, where explicit textual statements are interpreted through the lens of contemporary usage.

Friction

The Strongest Kushya

The core tension arises from the differing criteria for what constitutes a forbidden derivative under a vow. The Mishnah, and the initial Halakha, presents a clear distinction: a vow against "milk" permits "curd," but Rebbi Yose forbids it. The reason provided for Rebbi Yose's position is that "the name of its father is called over it" (שם אביו קרוי עליו). This linguistic principle appears to conflict with the general approach to vows that often relies on lashon bnei adam (common parlance) and the physical nature of the substance.

A strong kushya emerges: If the criterion is simply the retention of the original name, then why isn't all milk-derived product forbidden under a vow against milk? Why does the Mishnah permit curd in the first place, and why does Rebbi Yose's view seem to be the minority opinion initially? Conversely, if the principle is that the name of the derivative must be distinct, then Rebbi Yose's reasoning seems sound. The Yerushalmi itself grapples with this, asking, "In the opinion of Rebbi Yose, is one who vows not to taste wine permitted cooked wine?" (In the Aramaic vernacular, it still is called wine, hence forbidden). This suggests that Rebbi Yose’s principle of name retention is applied consistently, but its scope and application are debated.

The underlying friction is the tension between a strict, name-based interpretation of vows and a more practical, usage-based interpretation. How do we reconcile the idea that a derivative "carries the name of its father" with the reality that language evolves and products change form?

The Best Terutz

The Yerushalmi's subsequent discussion offers a nuanced terutz that reconciles these viewpoints by emphasizing the degree of transformation and the strength of the linguistic connection. The key lies in differentiating between a derivative that is still fundamentally "milk" in essence and name, and one that has become a distinct entity.

Rebbi Yose's rationale, "the name of its father is called over it," is not simply about the literal presence of the word "milk" in the derivative's name, but about its essential identity. Curd (קומץ/קום), while derived from milk, is seen by the majority as a processed product with a distinct name and function, no longer primarily identified as "milk" in common parlance. Rebbi Yose, however, argues that the process of curdling hasn't sufficiently distanced it from its origin; it's still "milk that has been curdled," and the name reflects this close relationship.

The Yerushalmi's quoted baraita (from Shevi'it 6:3) provides a framework: "For everything that may become permitted through some action... the Sages did not fix any limits, but a kind with its own is forbidden in the minutest amount, a kind with a different kind if it can be tasted." This suggests that the determining factor is whether the derivative is considered a "kind with its own" or merely a variation of the original. Curd, for Rebbi Yose, is not yet a "kind with its own" in the same way that cheese is.

The terutz, therefore, is that the debate between the Sages and Rebbi Yose hinges on the definition of "distinct entity." The Sages view curd as sufficiently distinct, while Rebbi Yose sees it as too closely tied to its origin by name and essence. This aligns with the principle of Kinyan Shem being applied with varying degrees of strictness based on the perceived transformation. Cooked wine, for instance, is forbidden to Rebbi Yose because its name, "wine," persists despite the transformation, unlike curd which, for him, still fundamentally is milk in a modified state. The intensity of a qônām vow, as seen later, further sharpens these distinctions, making even a detectable trace forbidden.

Intertext

Tanakh: Leviticus 11:34 (Dietary Laws)

The principles discussed in Nedarim echo the foundational laws of kashrut in Leviticus. For example, Leviticus 11:34 states, "But if any water is put on it, it shall become unclean, and all drink that may be drunk from it shall become unclean." This verse deals with the impurity of a carcass that has come into contact with water. While not directly about vows, it demonstrates a rabbinic concern for the state and transformation of substances, and how contact with other elements can alter their status, a theme resonant with the derivative status of items under vows. The Talmudic approach to vows often mirrors the careful categorization and distinctions found in the dietary laws, where the definition of what constitutes a forbidden substance is paramount.

Mishnah Terumot 10:1 (Admixtures)

The Mishnah in Terumot (10:1) deals with admixtures of forbidden and permitted produce. It states, "If terumah fell into terumah, it is permitted. If terumah fell into ḥullin, it is permitted, unless it is the majority. If ḥullin fell into terumah, it is permitted, unless it is the majority. If ḥullin fell into ḥullin, it is permitted, unless it is the majority." This principle of roiv (majority) and detectability is a cornerstone of admixture laws. While Nedarim focuses on vows, the underlying logic of what remains forbidden when mixed with permitted substances often draws parallels. The Yerushalmi's discussion on whether a forbidden item can be tasted in a mixture, and its comparison to terumah and ḥullin, shows a shared conceptual space. The question of whether a forbidden derivative can be "tasted" within a larger mixture, or if its "name" is still dominant, connects directly to these admixture principles.

Psak/Practice

The primary halakhic outcome from this section of Nedarim is the establishment of the principle that vows are interpreted according to lashon bnei adam (common parlance) and the prevailing custom of a place and time. This is not merely a theoretical discussion; it has direct practical implications.

When someone vows not to eat or drink something, the scope of that vow is not determined by a hyper-literal or scientific definition of the substance, but by how people generally refer to it and its derivatives. For instance, if a vow is made against "wine," and in a particular region, "apple wine" is commonly understood as a type of wine, then the vow would likely include it. Conversely, if it's considered a distinct beverage, the vow might not.

The Yerushalmi’s detailed examples—curd from milk, wine vinegar from grapes, date honey from dates—illustrate this. The Halakha generally permits the derivative unless the name of the original remains strongly attached, or if the vow was particularly stringent (like a qônām).

Furthermore, the discussions on calendar intercalation, while seemingly distant, underscore the rabbinic method of deriving practical rulings from textual interpretation and historical precedent. The need to intercalate the year, and the debates around when and where this could be done, demonstrate how abstract principles are applied to concrete communal needs, often involving complex calculations and authorities. This highlights a meta-heuristic: that halakhic decision-making is dynamic, responsive to context, and requires careful consideration of both textual authority and practical reality.

Takeaway

The boundaries of prohibition under vows are not fixed by nature but by human language and custom, demanding a sensitive application of lashon bnei adam. Ultimately, halakhic interpretation prioritizes practical understanding and communal norms, ensuring that vows resonate with the lived experience of the people.