Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 6:4:2-8:1

Sugya Map: The Nuances of Vows Regarding Dairy and Derivatives

Issue:

The precise definition and scope of vows related to milk, curd, cheese, and their derivatives. Specifically, when does a vow against one item encompass its related products, and what is the underlying principle guiding these distinctions?

Nafka Mina (Practical Implications):

• Dietary Laws: For individuals under vow, determining what is permitted and forbidden directly impacts their daily sustenance.
• Halakhic Interpretation: The Yerushalmi's approach to the naming convention of derivatives (e.g., "curd" still being called "milk") versus a broader product-based understanding has significant implications for vow annulment and interpretation.
• Rabbinic Authority: The discussion touches upon the authority of Sages to set limits and the principle of "going according to the local custom" (הולכין אחר לשון בני אדם).
• Intercalation of Years: While seemingly a tangent, the detailed discussion on calendar intercalation reveals a parallel principle in rabbinic decision-making: adapting to circumstances and adhering to established norms, even when faced with exceptions or perceived inconsistencies.

Primary Sources:

• Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 6:4-8:1
• Mishnah Nedarim 6:3-4
• Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 7:7
• Jerusalem Talmud Terumot 9:2
• Jerusalem Talmud Kilayim 5:6
• Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 6:5
• Tosefta Nedarim 3:3
• Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 1:2 (referenced for calendar intercalation)
• Jerusalem Talmud Sefer Yovel (Sabbatical Year) 6:3
• Tanakh: Deuteronomy 8:8, Leviticus 23:14, 2 Kings 4:42, 2 Chronicles 30:2, 18, 19, 29:17, 18, 32:30, 2 Kings 16:20, 18:4, 20:20, Numbers 9:9-14, Isaiah 2:3, Jeremiah 29:1, 2 Kings 24:16
• Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Neder (Laws of Vows)
• Shulchan Arukh, Yoreh De'ah 217

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Text Snapshot: The Semantics of Dairy Vows

MISHNAH: If somebody vows not to drink milk, he is permitted curd, but Rebbi Yose forbids. But from curd, he is permitted milk. Abba Shaul says, if he vows not to have cheese, it is forbidden to him whether salted or unsalted. (Nedarim 6:4:2)

HALAKHAH: “If somebody vows not to drink milk, he is permitted curd,” etc. What is curd? Curdled milk. What is the reason of Rebbi Yose? The name of its father is called over it. In the opinion of Rebbi Yose, is one who vows not to taste wine permitted cooked wine? (Nedarim 6:4:2)

MISHNAH: If somebody vows not to eat meat, he is permitted clear bouillon and coagulated fibers, but Rebbi Jehudah forbids. Rebbi Jehudah said, it happened that Rebbi Ṭarphon forbade to me eggs that were cooked in it. They said to him, that is correct; when? If he would say, that piece of meat [is forbidden] to me. (Nedarim 6:5:1)

HALAKHAH: “If somebody vows not to eat meat,” etc. Rebbi Hila said: The moment he said “this one”, he forbade for himself it and its usufruct. (Nedarim 6:5:2)

Nuances to Note:

• Curd (קומא / קום): The Yerushalmi grapples with the definition of "curd" (קומא or קום). The commentary clarifies it as the liquid separated from cheese. This distinction is crucial for Rebbi Yose's reasoning.
• "The name of its father is called over it" (שֵׁם אָבִיהוּ נִקְרָא עָלָיו): Rebbi Yose's rationale for forbidding curd when one vows against milk. This implies that the derivative still carries the essence or name of the original substance. The parallel to wine and cooked wine highlights this principle.
• "This one" (הַאי): Rebbi Hila's explanation that if a vow specifies "this piece of meat," it extends to its usufruct, unlike a general vow against "meat." This points to the specificity of the vow's language.
• Leshon Nuance: The phrase "the name of its father is called over it" is a vivid metaphor. In the context of vows, it signifies an inherent connection that transcends mere physical transformation. The contrast with cooked wine, which might lose its "wine-ness" through the process, is instructive. The Yerushalmi is exploring the linguistic and conceptual boundaries of prohibition.

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Readings: The Principle of Derivative Prohibition

The Yerushalmi's exploration of vows concerning food items and their derivatives hinges on a fundamental question: does a vow against a substance extend to products derived from it? This is not a simple matter of physical presence but rather a complex interplay of nomenclature, perceived essence, and rabbinic decree.

1. Rebbi Yose and the "Name of the Father" (שם אביו נקרא עליו)

The core of the initial discussion revolves around the Mishnaic disagreement regarding vows against milk. The Mishna states that one who vows not to drink milk is permitted curd (קומא), but Rebbi Yose forbids it. The Yerushalmi probes Rebbi Yose's reasoning: "What is the reason of Rebbi Yose? The name of its father is called over it."

• Penei Moshe's Explanation:

  מתני' מותר בקום. הוא נסיובי דחלבא מים היוצאין מן הגבינה: "Mishnah: He is permitted curd. It is the whey of milk, the water that comes out of the cheese." מתני' אסור בה בין מלוחה בין טפלה. דלא תימא מפני שרוב הגבינות מלוחות הן סתמא מלוחה משמע קא משמע לן: "Mishnah: Forbidden in it, whether salted or unsalted. So that you don't say, because most cheeses are salted, it implies salted. He teaches us."

  Penei Moshe clarifies that "curd" (קומא) refers to the whey, the liquid component separated during cheese-making. Rebbi Yose's prohibition stems from the fact that this whey, though separated, still retains the "name of its father" – milk. This principle, "שם אביה נקרא עליה," suggests that if the derivative product is still commonly referred to by a name intrinsically linked to the original substance, the prohibition carries over.

• Korban HaEdah's Parallel Insight:

  מתני' קום. הוא נסיובי דחלבא והן מים היוצאים מן הגבינה: "Mishnah: Curd. It is the whey of milk, and it is the water that comes out of the cheese." מתני' בין מלוחה בין תפילה. דלא תימא מפני שרוב גבינות מלוחות הן סתמא מלוחה משמע קמ"ל: "Mishnah: Whether salted or unsalted. So that you don't say, because most cheeses are salted, it implies salted. He teaches us."

  Korban HaEdah echoes Penei Moshe's definition of curd as whey. The supplementary explanation regarding salted vs. unsalted cheese highlights a related principle: the interpretation of vows must consider common usage and avoid assumptions based on typical characteristics unless explicitly stated.

• The Wine Analogy: The Yerushalmi extends this reasoning: "In the opinion of Rebbi Yose, is one who vows not to taste wine permitted cooked wine?" This question directly tests the "name of the father" principle. Cooked wine, while chemically altered and often lacking alcohol, is still commonly called "wine." Therefore, according to Rebbi Yose's logic, a vow against wine should extend to cooked wine. This demonstrates a consistent application of the principle based on linguistic continuity.

2. Abba Shaul and the Category of Cheese

The Mishnah also presents Abba Shaul's view: if one vows not to have cheese, it is forbidden whether salted or unsalted. The Yerushalmi clarifies this by stating: "So that you don't say, because most cheeses are salted, it implies salted. He teaches us." This implies that Abba Shaul is concerned with the category of "cheese" itself, not just its specific preparation. Even if a particular cheese is unsalted, it falls under the general prohibition of "cheese." This suggests a broader, category-based understanding of vows, as opposed to a nuanced, derivative-focused approach.

3. The "Usufruct" (Itsufract) and Specificity: Rebbi Hila

The discussion on vows against meat introduces the concept of "usufruct" (תועלת), particularly through Rebbi Hila's explanation: "The moment he said 'this one,' he forbade for himself it and its usufruct." This is contrasted with a general vow against "meat."

• Mishnah: "If somebody vows not to eat meat, he is permitted clear bouillon and coagulated fibers, but Rebbi Jehudah forbids."
• Rebbi Jehudah's Reasoning: The anecdote about Rebbi Tarphon forbidding eggs cooked in meat broth illustrates his stringent view. The crucial distinction made by the Rabbis is: "when? If he would say, that piece of meat [is forbidden] to me." This implies that if the vow is specific to a particular piece of meat, then any derivative or byproduct, even if it carries the essence of meat, is forbidden due to the specific prohibition against that piece. This is because the vow created a unique status for that specific item, making all its potential uses forbidden.

This distinction between a general category ("meat") and a specific item ("this piece of meat") is vital. A general vow against "meat" might not encompass things that are made from meat but are no longer considered "meat" in the common vernacular (like bouillon, which is primarily liquid). However, a vow against a specific piece of meat extends to all its potential uses, including its essence being extracted into other forms.

4. The Broader Principle: "Going According to the Language of Men" (הולכין אחר לשון בני אדם)

The Yerushalmi then shifts to a more general discussion about how vows are interpreted, referencing a principle that appears in various contexts: "How do you treat vows? As referring to something that can become permitted or to something that cannot become permitted?" This leads to the introduction of the idea that vows are generally understood according to common parlance.

This principle, "הולכין אחר לשון בני אדם," is elaborated upon in later discussions and is a cornerstone of vow interpretation. It means that the intent of the vow is determined by how people in a given place and time would understand the words used. This is why the Yerushalmi later clarifies cases like "apple wine" versus "wine," or "sesame oil" versus "oil." If "apple wine" is not commonly called "wine" in a particular locale, then a vow against "wine" would not prohibit "apple wine." The converse is also true.

The readings from the Mishneh Torah and Shulchan Arukh, though later commentaries, reflect this fundamental principle. They cite cases where vows are interpreted based on local custom and linguistic usage, demonstrating the enduring relevance of this approach to vow interpretation.

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Friction: The Paradox of Permitted Derivatives

The Yerushalmi grapples with a fundamental tension in interpreting vows: the balance between the literal meaning of a prohibition and the practical reality of derivatives and common usage. This friction is most evident in the contrasting approaches to how prohibitions extend to related substances.

The Core Friction: "Name of the Father" vs. "Permitted Derivative"

The primary point of contention lies in Rebbi Yose's strict interpretation, as articulated by the principle "שם אביה נקרא עליה" (the name of its father is called over it), versus the more lenient approach that permits derivatives if they are no longer commonly identified by the original name or have undergone a significant transformation.

• Rebbi Yose's Stance: For Rebbi Yose, the essence of the prohibition remains as long as the derivative product carries a linguistic or conceptual link to the original forbidden item. This is exemplified by his view that one who vows against milk is forbidden curd (whey), because it is still conceptually tied to "milk." The parallel with wine and cooked wine strongly supports this: even if chemically altered, "cooked wine" is still linguistically "wine," thus falling under the vow. The Yerushalmi explicitly states: "It is reasonable that Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra should agree with Rebbi Yose but Rebbi Yose would not agree with Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra. Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra should agree with Rebbi Yose: The name of its descendant, so certainly also the name of its father. Rebbi Yose would not agree with Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra: He says only, the name of its father. This implies: not the name of its descendant." This highlights the hierarchical application of the "name" principle for Rebbi Yose.

• The Counter-Argument/More Lenient View: The default position of the Mishnah, and the implied reasoning of the Sages in other instances, is that if the derivative is sufficiently distinct in name or common perception, it is permitted. The Mishnah itself states: "If somebody vows not to drink milk, he is permitted curd." This directly contradicts Rebbi Yose. Similarly, "if somebody vows not to eat grapes, he is permitted wine; not to eat olives, he is permitted oil." These examples suggest that the transformation into a distinct product (wine from grapes, oil from olives) renders it permissible, as it is no longer primarily identified as "grapes" or "olives."

The Kusya (The Strongest Objection):

The core kusya arises from the apparent contradiction between the principle of "the name of its father is called over it" (Rebbi Yose's stringent view) and the numerous instances in the Mishnah and Halakha where derivatives are permitted precisely because their names have changed or they are considered distinct categories.

If "the name of its father is called over it" is the operative principle, why are wine (from grapes), oil (from olives), date honey (from dates), and winter grape vinegar (from winter grapes) permitted when one vows against the original fruit? These derivatives, while distinct, are undeniably linked to their source. Why does the "name of the father" not apply here, as it does for Rebbi Yose with milk and curd?

Furthermore, the Yerushalmi itself seems to acknowledge this tension when it states: "It is reasonable that Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra should agree with Rebbi Yose but Rebbi Yose would not agree with Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra." This indicates that even within the rabbinic discourse, there's a debate about the scope and application of the "name" principle. Rebbi Yose's strictness is presented as a specific opinion, while the broader permissibility of derivatives is the default.

The Terutz (The Best Solution/Explanation):

The resolution to this friction lies in understanding that the application of the "name of the father" principle is not absolute but is heavily influenced by the degree of transformation and the common linguistic conventions of the time and place.

1. Distinction in "Name" and "Nature":

   • Curd (קומא) from Milk: The Yerushalmi itself highlights the ambiguity. While Penei Moshe and Korban HaEdah define it as whey, the fact that Rebbi Yose forbids it suggests that in some contexts, the term "curd" is still closely associated with "milk," or perhaps the transformation is not seen as significant enough to break the connection. The phrase "שם אביה נקרא עליה" implies a conceptual continuity that Rebbi Yose insists upon.
   • Wine from Grapes, Oil from Olives, etc.: In these cases, the transformation is more profound, and distinct names ("wine," "oil," "date honey") are universally applied. The product has acquired a new identity in common parlance. The Yerushalmi, in other sections, explicitly states the rule: "If somebody vows not to have grapes, he is permitted wine; not to have olives, he is permitted oil." This is presented as a straightforward application of linguistic distinction. The product is no longer called "grapes" or "olives."
   • The Role of "Usufruct": Rebbi Hila's explanation regarding "this one" (האי) versus a general prohibition against "meat" provides a crucial nuance. When a vow is specific to a particular item, it creates a unique status, and all its potential uses (usufruct) are forbidden. However, when the vow is general ("meat"), the Sages differentiate between the substance itself and things derived from it that have a new name and form (like bouillon or coagulated fibers, which might be permissible unless Rebbi Yehudah forbids them based on a stricter interpretation or specific context).

2. The "Name of the Descendant" vs. "Name of the Father": The Yerushalmi's discussion comparing Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Yehudah ben Bathyra is key.

   • Rebbi Yose focuses on the "name of the father" (milk -> curd).
   • Rebbi Yehudah ben Bathyra considers vows against things "called by the name of its derivative" (e.g., dates called "honey" in Devarim 8:8). He states that in such a case, the derivative is forbidden.
   • The Yerushalmi's reconciliation: "Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra should agree with Rebbi Yose: The name of its descendant, so certainly also the name of its father. Rebbi Yose would not agree with Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra: He says only, the name of its father. This implies: not the name of its descendant." This suggests that Rebbi Yose's principle is focused on the direct lineage from the forbidden item. Rebbi Yehudah ben Bathyra might be extending this to include cases where the biblical text itself uses a derivative name for the original item. The Yerushalmi implies that Rebbi Yose's rule is narrower, focusing only on the immediate "parent-child" naming.

3. "Going According to the Language of Men" as the Overarching Principle: Ultimately, the more lenient approach, which permits derivatives when they have acquired new names, is rooted in the principle of "הולכין אחר לשון בני אדם" (we go according to the language of men). This means that the common understanding and nomenclature of a society dictate the scope of a vow. If "wine" is a distinct category from "grapes," and "oil" from "olives," then a vow against the former does not automatically include the latter. Rebbi Yose's position, while valid within its framework, represents a more stringent interpretation that prioritizes conceptual continuity over common linguistic distinction. The Yerushalmi does not necessarily invalidate his reasoning but presents it as one opinion within a broader spectrum of interpretation.

Therefore, the friction is resolved by recognizing that the permissibility of derivatives hinges on a multi-faceted analysis: the linguistic distinctiveness of the derivative, the degree of physical or chemical transformation, the specific wording of the vow, and the prevailing customs and terminology of the community. Rebbi Yose's view represents an extreme end of the spectrum, emphasizing the inherent connection, while the broader rabbinic view balances this with the practicalities of everyday language and usage.

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Intertext: Parallel Lines of Reasoning

The principles debated in Nedarim regarding the interpretation of vows and the scope of prohibitions find resonance in other areas of Halakha and even in Tanakh.

1. The Principle of "Mi'ut She'eino Makir" (A Non-Recognizable Minority)

The Yerushalmi's discussion on vows, particularly when a forbidden item becomes mixed with permitted food, relates to the broader principle of mi'ut she'eino makir (a minority that is not recognized/identifiable). This principle, primarily discussed in Terumot and Chullin, determines when a mixture of forbidden and permitted food is still considered forbidden.

• Yerushalmi Nedarim 6:4:2-8:1 (referencing Terumot 9:2): The text states: "We have stated on this: When has this been said? Anything whose seeds disappear. But in produce whose seeds do not disappear, the growth from their growth is forbidden." This directly links the concept of transformation and identifiability to permissibility. If the forbidden element disappears or becomes unrecognizable, the mixture might become permitted.
• Yerushalmi Terumot 9:2 (as referenced): This section discusses the status of growths from various types of sacred produce. The distinction between growths from heave-offering and growths from tevel (un-tithed produce) often hinges on whether the original prohibition is still discernible. If the forbidden element is no longer recognizable (e.g., its "seeds disappear"), the prohibition might be lifted.
• Connection to Nedarim: In Nedarim, when a vow is made against a substance, and it becomes mixed with other things, the question of whether it is still "tastable" or "recognizable" (a key factor in mi'ut she'eino makir discussions) becomes relevant. If a forbidden food is so diluted that it's no longer identifiable or its taste is completely masked, it might be permitted. This parallels the idea that the "name of the father" is no longer clearly discernible.

2. The Authority of Sages and Local Custom: The Calendar Intercalation

The extensive digressions on the intercalation of the calendar, particularly in the latter part of the text (referencing Sanhedrin 1:2), reveal a parallel rabbinic methodology. The decision-making process for intercalation often involves balancing established principles with practical realities and local customs.

• Yerushalmi Nedarim 6:4:2-8:1 (Sanhedrin 1:2): The discussions on when and where to intercalate the year, and the debates between different rabbinic figures like Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel and Rebbi, demonstrate a dynamic process. For instance, the rule that one "does not intercalate in a year of famine" is a practical consideration that overrides a standard procedure. Similarly, the debate about intercalating in Judea versus Galilee, and the eventual acceptance of intercalation outside the Land under certain circumstances, shows an adaptation to geopolitical realities.
• Connection to Vows: The principle of "הולכין אחר לשון בני אדם" (we go according to the language of men) in vow interpretation is akin to the Sages adapting calendar rules based on practical needs and prevailing customs. Just as the calendar is not rigidly fixed but adapts to the needs of the community and the land, so too are vows interpreted based on how people actually use language. The decision of the Sages to allow intercalation in Galilee, even if Judea was the primary location, mirrors the allowance of "apple wine" if it's not commonly called "wine." Both demonstrate a pragmatism rooted in understanding the human element and the context of observance.

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Psak / Practice: The Dominance of Linguistic Convention

The interpretation of vows in Jewish law is deeply rooted in the principle of "הולכין אחר לשון בני אדם" (we go according to the language of men). This means that the scope of a vow is determined by how the terms used are generally understood in a particular place and time.

• Default Position: Unless explicitly stated otherwise or when a specific rabbinic opinion (like Rebbi Yose's stringent view) is adopted by a later authority, the default is to permit derivatives that have acquired a distinct name and identity in common parlance. Thus, a vow against "milk" generally permits "curd" (whey), "grapes" permits "wine," and "olives" permits "oil." This is because these derivatives are understood as separate categories of food and drink.
• Specificity is Key: The Yerushalmi highlights that if the vow is made very specific, such as "this piece of meat," the prohibition extends to its "usufruct." This indicates that precision in language can broaden the scope of a vow, even for derivatives.
• Local Custom: The Yerushalmi's examples of "apple wine" and "sesame oil" underscore the importance of local custom. If in a particular region, "apple wine" is commonly referred to as "wine," then a vow against wine would include it. Conversely, if "sesame oil" is the default for "oil," a vow against oil would not necessarily include olive oil (unless "oil" is used in a very broad sense).
• The Influence of Rishonim and Acharonim: Later halakhic authorities (Rishonim and Acharonim) generally follow this principle. For instance, the Mishneh Torah (Hilchot Neder 9:8) and the Shulchan Arukh (Yoreh De'ah 217:11) reflect this approach, distinguishing between substances and their common derivatives based on linguistic convention. The Shulchan Arukh notes that if the local custom uses a name for a derivative that includes the original word (e.g., "curd of milk"), then the prohibition might be more stringent.

In practice, when encountering a vow, one must first determine the precise language used and then ascertain the common understanding of those terms in the relevant community. Only in cases of extreme ambiguity or where a specific stringency is explicitly adopted would one move beyond this foundational principle of linguistic convention.

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Takeaway:

The interpretation of vows hinges on the nuanced interplay between linguistic convention and conceptual continuity; the spoken word, shaped by custom, defines the boundaries of prohibition. Ultimately, rabbinic discourse prioritizes practical understanding, allowing for differentiation where nomenclature diverges, but demands precision when the prohibition is narrowly defined.