Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 6:4:2-8:1

Judaism 101: The Foundations

The Big Question

Welcome, everyone, to our ongoing exploration of introductory Judaism. Today, we're diving into a fascinating and, frankly, sometimes puzzling area of Jewish law: the laws of vows, specifically as they are discussed in the Jerusalem Talmud in tractate Nedarim. Vows, or nedarim, are promises made to God, often to abstain from something for a period of time or permanently. The Mishnah and the accompanying Gemara (the Talmud's commentary and analysis) in Nedarim 6:4 grapple with a seemingly simple question: when someone vows to abstain from a certain food or drink, how strictly should that vow be interpreted?

Imagine you've made a vow not to drink milk. Does that mean you can't have cheese? What about yogurt? What if the milk is cooked into a sauce? This might seem like a minor detail, but it touches upon a fundamental aspect of Jewish thought: the careful balance between human agency and divine commitment, and the precise language we use to express our intentions. The Sages, in their meticulous way, are trying to understand the nuances of language, intent, and the very nature of things. They are asking: what constitutes "milk"? Is it just the liquid, or does it extend to products derived from milk?

This discussion isn't just about dairy products; it's a case study in how Jewish tradition interprets the human word, particularly when directed towards the divine. It explores the idea that words have weight and that our intentions, when expressed through vows, are taken seriously. The Sages are not trying to trap people; rather, they are providing clarity and guidance so that individuals can understand the boundaries and implications of their commitments. They are helping us navigate the delicate relationship between our free will and our sacred promises.

So, as we delve into this passage, try to keep in mind the bigger picture. We're not just learning about historical legal debates; we're exploring principles of interpretation, the importance of precision in language, and the profound respect the Sages had for both the human capacity to make promises and the divine imperative to uphold them. This seemingly small detail about milk and cheese can illuminate much about how Jewish law functions and how it guides us in living a life of intention and integrity.

One Core Concept

The core concept we'll explore today is the principle of lav davar al shemo (it is not called by its name). This principle, central to the discussion in the Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim, addresses how vows are interpreted. Essentially, it asks whether a forbidden item is still considered by its original name once it has undergone a transformation or is part of a mixture. If something is no longer called by its original name, a vow made against that original item might not apply to its transformed state. This concept highlights the importance of language and perception in defining the scope of religious obligations.

Breaking It Down

Our journey today takes us into the heart of the Jerusalem Talmud's Nedarim (Vows) tractate, specifically chapter 6, mishnah 4, and its accompanying Halakha (rabbinic law). This passage is a masterclass in rabbinic reasoning, dissecting the precise meaning and application of vows. We'll see how the Sages use logic, linguistic analysis, and precedent to understand the complexities of human commitment to the divine.

The Vow and Its Transformation: Milk, Curd, and Cheese

We begin with a seemingly straightforward scenario: "If somebody vows not to drink milk, he is permitted curd but Rebbi Yose forbids." (Mishnah 6:4:2).

### Milk and Its Offspring

• The Basic Rule: The general understanding presented here is that if you vow not to drink "milk," you are forbidden from drinking the liquid milk itself. However, "curd" is considered a distinct enough entity that a vow against milk doesn't automatically prohibit it.
• What is Curd? The Halakha clarifies: "What is curd? Curdled milk." (Halakha 6:4:2). So, it's milk that has started to solidify.
• Rebbi Yose's Strict Interpretation: Rebbi Yose disagrees. He "forbids" curd. The reason given is that "the name of its father is called over it." (Halakha 6:4:2). This is a brilliant insight into how language and identity work in Jewish thought. Even though the milk has curdled, the word "milk" is still intrinsically linked to its identity. It's like saying a child is forbidden if you vowed not to see "parents," because the child still carries the name of the parent. Rebbi Yose believes that the fundamental essence of milk remains, even in its curdled form.
• The Counterpoint: The Mishnah then states, "But from curd, he is permitted milk." This seems counterintuitive at first. If curd is derived from milk, why would a vow against curd not prohibit milk? The logic here is that the vow was specifically against curd. Once curd transforms into milk (which, in this context, likely refers to a more liquid or processed form), it's no longer considered "curd" by its specific name. This reinforces the idea of lav davar al shemo – it's no longer called by its name.
• Abba Shaul's Extension: Abba Shaul expands the scope for cheese: "if he vows not to have cheese, it is forbidden to him whether salted or unsalted." (Mishnah 6:4:2). This indicates that "cheese" is a broader category, and the method of preservation (salting) doesn't create a new category that would be exempt. This is further explained in the commentaries: "Even though most cheese is salted." (footnote 59). The Sages are considering common practice and the general understanding of what "cheese" entails.

### The Principle of "Name" in Other Contexts

The Gemara then broadens the discussion to explore this principle in other areas. "In the opinion of Rebbi Yose, is one who vows not to taste wine permitted cooked wine?" (Halakha 6:4:2).

• Cooked Wine: Cooked wine, which has had its alcohol significantly reduced or eliminated through cooking, is still called "wine." Rebbi Yose's logic from the milk example would suggest that if the name remains, the prohibition remains. The commentary states: "Since in the Aramaic vernacular it still is called wine it is forbidden." This shows how vernacular usage is crucial in determining the application of these laws.
• The Broader Rule: A significant Halakha is introduced, quoting Rebbi Simeon in the name of Rebbi Joshua, which categorizes things into two groups:
  1. Things that can become permitted through some action: Examples include ṭevel (untithed produce), Second Tithe, Temple donations, and "new grain." For these, the Sages did not fix strict limits. If a forbidden item mixes with a permitted one, it might become permitted if the forbidden element is no longer discernible or its taste is gone.
  2. Things that cannot become permitted through any action: Examples include heave-offering (terumah), ḥallah (dough offering), orlah (fruit from a tree's first three years), and kilaim (mixed species). For these, even a minuscule amount of the forbidden element renders the mixture forbidden.

### Applying the Principle to Vows

The Talmud then grapples with how to categorize vows themselves: "How do you treat vows? As referring to something that can become permitted or to something that cannot become permitted?"

• Vows as "Permittable": The text suggests it's "reasonable that we treat them as referring to things that can become permitted." (Halakha 6:4:2). This is because vows can be annulled by a qualified rabbi, implying a process by which the vow's effect can be reversed or altered, making the formerly forbidden item permissible again. The reference to "the Elder uproots the vow from the start" points to this annulment process.
• The Nuance of Annulment: However, the clarification follows: "They said, he only uproots for the future." This is a critical distinction. While a rabbi can annul a vow, they cannot retroactively erase the guilt incurred from past violations.
• Mishnah vs. Halakha: The text then presents a seeming contradiction: "Certainly a Mishnah treats it as referring to something that cannot become permitted..." This refers to a Mishnah discussing growth from heave-offering and other sacred produce. The key here is the concept of "growth from growth." If the original item is forbidden, its growth, and the growth of its growth, can also be forbidden. This is where the concept of "seeds disappearing" versus "seeds not disappearing" becomes relevant. If the seeds of the forbidden item are no longer present, its offspring might be considered permitted.
• The Case of Kilaim: The example of an "onion of kilaim in a vineyard" is used. Even if replanted and grown enormously, it remains forbidden because the prohibition of mixed species is absolute. This is contrasted with situations where the original forbidden element is no longer identifiable.
• Vows and Mixtures: The passage returns to vows, referencing another Mishnah: "For if somebody vowed not to have a certain thing and it became mixed with something else, if it can be tasted it is forbidden." (Halakha 6:4:2). This Mishnah, seemingly, aligns with the principle of things that can become permitted, where taste or recognizability is the deciding factor.

Meat and Its Derivatives

The discussion shifts to meat: "If somebody vows not to eat meat, he is permitted clear bouillon and coagulated fibers, but Rebbi Jehudah forbids." (Mishnah 6:4:4).

• Bouillon and Fibers: Clear bouillon (a broth) and coagulated fibers (the solids that form on the pot's edge) are derived from meat but are not considered "meat" in the same way as a cut of flesh.
• Rebbi Jehudah's Stricter View: Rebbi Jehudah, however, forbids them. He recounts an instance where Rebbi Tarphon forbade him eggs cooked in meat broth. The Sages clarify that this stricter ruling applies "If he would say, that piece of meat [is forbidden] to me." This emphasizes the importance of the specific wording of a vow. If the vow is general ("meat"), then derivatives might be permitted. If the vow is specific to a particular piece of meat, its essence (even its taste in other forms) is prohibited.
• Usufruct: The Halakha explains: "The moment he said 'this one', he forbade for himself it and its usufruct." (Halakha 6:4:4). "Usufruct" refers to the use or enjoyment derived from something, including its taste. This highlights the difference between vowing against a category (meat) and vowing against a specific instance.

Grapes, Olives, and Their Products

The theme of derivatives continues with fruits:

• Grapes and Wine: "If somebody vows not to eat grapes, he is permitted wine." (Mishnah 6:4:5). Wine is made from grapes but is a distinct product.
• Olives and Oil: "not to eat olives, he is permitted oil." Similarly, oil pressed from olives is permitted if the vow was only against "olives."
• Specific Vow, Specific Prohibition: However, if the vow is more specific: "If he said, a qônām that I shall not taste these olives or grapes, he is forbidden them and anything coming from them." (Mishnah 6:4:5). The use of "qônām" (a strong formula for making something forbidden) and the direct reference to "these olives or grapes" expands the prohibition to derivatives.
• Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar's Rule: The Halakha introduces a principle from Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar:
  • Usual Edibles with Edible Derivatives: If something is usually eaten, and a derivative is also usually eaten (like grapes and wine), vowing against the original permits the derivative.
  • Usual Edibles with Non-Edible Derivatives: If something is usually eaten, but its derivative is not usually eaten (like mulberries, where the fruit is eaten but perhaps not a specific processed product), vowing against the original permits the derivative.
  • Non-Edibles with Edible Derivatives: If something is usually not eaten, but its derivative is eaten (like garden seeds not eaten raw but used in cooking), vowing against the original implies an intention to forbid the derivative as well.
• The "Name of its Father" vs. "Name of its Descendant": This leads to a fascinating linguistic and conceptual debate. The Halakha explains the reasoning for Rebbi Yose (from the milk example) and Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra.
  • Rebbi Yose's reason for forbidding curd from milk is "The name of its father is called over it" (Halakha 6:4:6).
  • Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra's reason for forbidding a derivative when the original is vowed against is "The name of its descendant is called over it" (Halakha 6:4:6).
  • The Talmud then analyzes the relationship between these two: Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra should agree with Rebbi Yose because if the "father's name" is on the descendant, then the "descendant's name" certainly applies. However, Rebbi Yose might not agree with Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra because Yose only mentioned the "father's name," implying he doesn't extend it to the "descendant's name" as a general rule.

Distinguishing Categories: Wine, Oil, and More

The Mishnah continues to provide examples of how different categories are treated:

• Wine and Apple Wine: "If somebody vows not to use wine, he is permitted apple wine." (Mishnah 6:4:7). Apple wine is a different type of beverage, even though it shares the name "wine" in a broader sense.
• Oil and Sesame Oil: "Not oil, he is permitted sesame oil." This suggests that "oil" often refers to a specific type of oil, and other oils are permitted.
• Honey and Date Honey: "Not honey, he is permitted date honey." Similar logic applies.
• Vinegar and Winter Grape Vinegar: "Not vinegar, he is permitted winter grape vinegar."
• Leeks and Field Leeks: "Not leeks, he is permitted field leeks." This is explained as an "accompanying name" (Halakha 6:4:7). The term "leeks" might refer to a cultivated variety, while "field leeks" are a wilder, related type. The distinction is based on common usage and how things are referred to in everyday language.
• Vegetables and Field Vegetables: "Of vegetables, he is permitted field vegetables, because that is an accompanying name." (Mishnah 6:4:7).

### The Importance of Vernacular and Place

The Halakha delves into the significance of local custom and language: "The Mishnah speaks of a place where one does not call field leeks leeks. But not at a place where one calls field leeks leeks." (Halakha 6:4:7). This is a crucial point: the interpretation of vows is deeply tied to how people in a specific time and place use language. What might be a distinct category in one region could be considered the same thing in another. The example of leeks is used to illustrate that if, in a particular locale, "field leeks" are never referred to as simply "leeks," then a vow against "leeks" would not prohibit "field leeks." Conversely, if they are commonly called "leeks," then the vow would apply. This principle of kefiyyah al lashon benei adam (following the language of people) is fundamental. The discussion then expands to the Sabbatical year (Shemitah) and agricultural laws, demonstrating that these principles of categorization and definition extend beyond food items to broader agricultural and calendrical regulations. The debates about importing vegetables and the timing of agricultural prohibitions show how the Sages meticulously applied these interpretive tools to ensure adherence to the Torah's commandments.

Vows and Specificity: The Case of "This Piece"

The text then returns to the distinction between general and specific vows, exemplified by meat:

• General Vow vs. Specific Instance: "If somebody vows not to eat meat, he is permitted clear bouillon and coagulated fibers... But Rebbi Jehudah forbids." (Mishnah 6:4:4). This is the general prohibition.
• The Crucial Distinction: "Rebbi Jehudah said, it happened that Rebbi Ṭarphon forbade to me eggs that were cooked in it. They said to him, that is correct; when? If he would say, that piece of meat [is forbidden] to me." (Mishnah 6:4:4). This highlights a critical difference:
  • Vowing against "meat" (a category) might permit derivatives.
  • Vowing against "that piece of meat" (a specific item) extends the prohibition to its essence and usufruct, meaning anything derived from it or tasting like it.
• The Nature of "Qônām": The use of the term "qônām" is significant. It's a very strong form of vow, often used for more severe prohibitions. When applied to a specific item, like "a qônām that I shall not taste this wine," it implies a broader prohibition encompassing derivatives.

The Nuances of Vow Interpretation

The Halakha continues to flesh out these concepts, often by contrasting different opinions and offering interpretations:

• Grapes and Wine Again: "If somebody vows not to eat grapes, he is permitted wine; not to eat olives, he is permitted oil." (Mishnah 6:4:5). This reiterates the principle that if the derivative is not commonly called by the original name, it's permitted.
• Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar's Rule (Revisited): The Halakha elaborates on Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar's categorization of edibles and their derivatives. The key is whether the derivative is usually eaten. This implies a consideration of what is culturally and practically considered "food."
• Examples of Derivatives: The examples of "mulberries" and "garden seeds" further illustrate the principle. If the primary purpose of the item is not consumption (like raw garden seeds), but its derivative is used for food, then a vow against the original implies the derivative.

The "Accompanying Name" and Local Customs

The examples of wine, oil, honey, vinegar, leeks, and vegetables are crucial for understanding how general categories are defined:

• Wine: Vowing against "wine" permits "apple wine." This is because "apple wine" is a distinct type, not simply "wine."
• Oil: Vowing against "oil" permits "sesame oil." This implies that "oil" often refers to olive oil (in regions where it's prevalent) or a standard oil, and other types are permissible.
• Honey: Vowing against "honey" permits "date honey."
• Vinegar: Vowing against "vinegar" permits "winter grape vinegar."
• Leeks: Vowing against "leeks" permits "field leeks." The explanation is that "field leeks" is an "accompanying name." This means it's a related but distinct entity, often found in nature, while cultivated leeks are the standard.
• Vegetables: Vowing against "vegetables" permits "field vegetables." Again, the distinction is between cultivated garden vegetables and wilder field vegetables.

### The Role of Common Language

The Halakha emphasizes that the interpretation of vows depends heavily on "the language of men" (lashon benei adam). This means that what is considered a distinct category or derivative is determined by how people actually speak and understand these items. The commentary mentions that in Babylonia, where olive trees didn't grow, a contract for "oil" would default to sesame oil, and thus a vow against "oil" would permit olive oil. This underscores the context-dependent nature of these rulings.

The Wider Implications: Calendar and Purity

The latter part of the provided text shifts dramatically to discussions about intercalating the Jewish calendar (adding a month to align the lunar year with the solar year), the laws of ritual purity, and historical events related to these matters. While seemingly disconnected from the initial discussion on vows, these sections reveal the same underlying rabbinic methodology:

• Precise Definitions: Just as the Sages meticulously define "milk" and its derivatives, they also meticulously define when and how the calendar can be intercalated, and what constitutes ritual purity.
• Interpreting Scripture and Tradition: The debates about intercalating the year, the reasons for Hezekiah's actions, and the testimonies of witnesses for the New Moon all demonstrate the Sages' commitment to interpreting biblical texts and established traditions with great care.
• Context and Circumstance: The discussions about intercalating in Judea versus Galilee, or outside the Land of Israel, show how practical considerations and the prevailing circumstances (like war or persecution) influence the application of Jewish law.
• Debates and Nuances: The disagreements between various Tannaim and Amoraim (different generations of Sages) on these complex issues highlight that Jewish law is not monolithic but involves ongoing discussion and refinement. For example, the debate about whether one intercalates for impurity or whether Hezekiah truly "forced" the Second Passover shows the depth of analysis.
• The Importance of the Sages' Role: The passages about the "outstanding Elders of the diaspora" versus a "small group in the Land of Israel," and the story of Hananiah the nephew of Rabbi Joshua, underscore the authority of the Sages in determining the calendar and leading the Jewish people, even when facing political or geographical challenges.

In essence, the entire passage, from vows about milk to the intricacies of calendar intercalation, showcases the rabbinic commitment to understanding and applying divine will through careful interpretation, a deep understanding of language, and a consideration of practical realities.

How We Live This

Understanding the intricate discussions in the Jerusalem Talmud about vows might seem like a purely academic exercise, detached from our daily lives. However, the principles at play have profound implications for how we approach our commitments, our language, and our relationship with God.

### The Power of Our Words

The most immediate takeaway is the immense power and responsibility we have with our words. When we make a vow, even a casual one, we are engaging in a form of spiritual commitment. The Sages' meticulous analysis of language teaches us to be precise and mindful of what we say.

• Intentionality: If you say, "I'll never eat chocolate again," the Sages would prompt you to consider what you truly mean. Are you forbidding all forms of chocolate, including chocolate chips in cookies? Or just a chocolate bar? The principle of lav davar al shemo suggests that if a chocolate chip is no longer called "chocolate" but rather part of a cookie, the vow might not apply. However, the converse is also true: if your intent was clearly to abstain from all things chocolate, the Sages would want you to be bound by that intention.
• Clarity in Promises: This extends beyond formal vows. When we make promises to others – to a friend, a family member, a colleague – the same principle of clarity and precision applies. Vague promises can lead to misunderstandings and broken trust. The Sages' approach encourages us to be clear about the scope and limitations of our commitments.

### Understanding Categories and Nuances

The distinction between categories (like "meat") and specific instances (like "that piece of meat") or between a primary item and its derivatives (like "grapes" and "wine") teaches us about recognizing nuance and context.

• Beyond the Literal: Jewish law often goes beyond the literal meaning of words to understand the underlying intent and the nature of things. Just as curd is "curdled milk" but can be seen as distinct, so too can we learn to see the different facets of situations in our lives.
• Appreciating Derivatives: When we vow to abstain from something, we are encouraged to consider what is truly meant. If you vowed not to eat "bread," would that include breadcrumbs used as a binder in a dish? The Sages would likely ask about the specific context and language used. This encourages a more thoughtful approach to self-imposed restrictions.

### The Role of Community and Custom

The emphasis on "the language of men" and local customs highlights the importance of community and shared understanding.

• Living Tradition: Jewish law is not static; it evolves and adapts based on the communities that practice it. What is considered a "derivative" or a "distinct category" can change over time and across different regions. This reminds us that our religious practice is often shaped by the collective wisdom and practices of our communities.
• Context Matters: When interpreting religious texts or making personal commitments, understanding the cultural and linguistic context is vital. This encourages us to engage with tradition in a way that is both respectful of its origins and relevant to our present reality.

### Navigating Permitted and Forbidden

The discussion about things that "can become permitted through some action" versus those that "cannot" offers a framework for understanding how we deal with restrictions and limitations in life.

• Flexibility and Grace: The Sages acknowledge that sometimes, through a process of transformation or annulment, something that was forbidden can become permitted. This reflects a belief in the possibility of redemption and the potential for grace. It suggests that even in areas of strict observance, there can be room for understanding and flexibility when approached with the right intention and through the proper channels.
• Unwavering Principles: Conversely, there are core principles that are absolute. The discussion about kilaim (mixed species) or the fundamental prohibitions of the Torah remind us that some boundaries are non-negotiable. This teaches us to discern between areas where there is room for interpretation and adaptation, and those where adherence is paramount.

### Practical Application in Vows and Commitments

While most of us may not make formal vows in the rabbinic sense today, the principles are highly relevant to how we make commitments:

• Vows to Ourselves: Think about personal goals you set. If you say, "I will exercise every day," and then one day you only stretch, does that violate the vow? The Sages' approach would encourage you to define "exercise" more clearly beforehand or to consider if stretching is a form of exercise in that context.
• Dietary Choices: Even outside of formal vows, many people make conscious dietary choices for health, ethical, or religious reasons. Understanding how the Sages differentiated between milk and cheese, or meat and broth, can inform how we think about the nuances of our own dietary commitments. Is a vegetarian broth made with vegetable "broth" the same as meat "broth"? The principles of lav davar al shemo can be helpful here.
• Spiritual Growth: Ultimately, the Sages' meticulous approach to vows is about spiritual growth. It’s about taking our relationship with God seriously, understanding the weight of our words, and striving for integrity in all our commitments. It encourages a life of mindfulness, where our actions align with our intentions and our words have substance.

By engaging with these ancient texts, we gain not just historical knowledge but practical wisdom for navigating the complexities of commitment, language, and ethical living in our own lives.

One Thing to Remember

The core principle to carry with you from this discussion is the importance of clarity and intention in language, especially when making commitments. The Sages meticulously analyzed how words are used and understood, recognizing that the "name" of something dictates whether a vow applies. This teaches us that when we make promises or commit to something, whether to God or to others, we must be precise in our language and clear about our intentions, considering the literal meaning, the derivative meanings, and the common usage of words.