Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 6:8:10-11:1

Sugya Map: The Nuances of Vows and Nomenclature

• Issue: The precise scope of a vow of abstinence, particularly when the prohibited item has a common name and a more specific or derivative name. This also extends to distinctions between raw ingredients and their processed forms, and the interplay of linguistic conventions with halakhic interpretation.
• Nafka Mina(s):
  • Food Consumption: Differentiating between abstaining from "wine" and abstaining from "apple wine," or "oil" versus "sesame oil."
  • Sabbatical Year (Shemittah) Regulations: The distinction between "vegetables" and "field vegetables" impacts their permissibility during Shemittah, tied to issues of importation and purity.
  • Calendar Intercalation: The text delves into the complexities of intercalating a year (adding a leap month), the authority to do so, and the criteria (famine, impurity, diaspora needs) and geographical locus (Judea vs. Galilee vs. outside the Land). This has direct implications for the timing of festivals.
  • Legal and Familial Ramifications: The dating of events and the determination of age, particularly concerning minors, can be affected by the calendrical decisions of the Sanhedrin.
  • Definition of "Wheat" and "Groat": Distinguishing between the raw kernel, processed flour, and the final product (bread, soup) for vows.
• Primary Sources:
  • Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 6:8 (Mishnah and Halakha)
  • Mishnah Nedarim 6:6-8
  • Tosefta Sanhedrin 2:5-13
  • Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 1:2
  • Jerusalem Talmud Shevi'it 6:4
  • Jerusalem Talmud Berakhot 6:5
  • Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 5:2
  • Jerusalem Talmud Pesaḥim 4:9
  • Jerusalem Talmud Peah 1:1
  • Jerusalem Talmud Roš Haššanah 3:1
  • Tanakh: II Kings 4:42, II Chronicles 28:27, 29:17-18, 30:18-19, 32:30, 20:20, Numbers 9:9-14, 23:44, Isaiah 2:3, Jeremiah 29:1, II Kings 24:16, Leviticus 23:2, 14, 23:4
  • Babylonian Talmud Nedarim 53a-b, Sanhedrin 11b-12a, Berakhot 10b, 63a/b, Pesachim 56a, Gittin 88a, Rosh Hashanah 25a

Text Snapshot

J. Nedarim 6:8:10-11:1 (Mishnah)

“If somebody vows not to use wine, he is permitted apple wine. Not oil, he is permitted sesame oil. Not honey, he is permitted date honey. Not vinegar, he is permitted winter grape vinegar. Not leeks, he is permitted field leeks. Of vegetables, he is permitted field vegetables, because that is an accompanying name.”

• Leshon Nuance: The phrase "שם לווי" (shem luvai) translates to "accompanying name" or "secondary name." This is the crux of the Mishnah's reasoning: if the prohibited item is commonly known by a simple, generic name (e.g., "wine," "oil," "vegetables"), a vow against that generic term does not extend to a specific variety or derivative that is known by a more descriptive or qualified name (e.g., "apple wine," "sesame oil," "field vegetables"). The latter is seen as distinct enough linguistically to fall outside the vow. The footnote notes the connection between the Hebrew "כרשין" and the Greek "κεφαλωτόν" for leeks, highlighting the potential for linguistic ambiguity.

J. Nedarim 6:8:11:1 (Halakha)

“If somebody vows not to use wine, etc. The Mishnah speaks of a place where one does not call field leeks leeks. But not at a place where one calls field leeks leeks. Just in that case it is needed, even a place where one calls field leeks leeks: ‘Not leeks, he is permitted field leeks.’”

• Leshon Nuance: This perplexing statement seems to contradict the Mishnah's initial logic. The Gemara introduces a qualification: the Mishnah's rule about "field leeks" only applies if in that locale, "field leeks" are not commonly called simply "leeks." If "field leeks" are commonly called "leeks," then the Mishnah's statement ("Not leeks, he is permitted field leeks") becomes trivial and, paradoxically, still applies. This suggests a deeper principle at play than mere linguistic distinction, perhaps related to the intention of the vow or the inherent nature of the item. The footnote clarifies this by contrasting the leek example (Greek vs. Hebrew name) with commercial contracts, implying that while language might allow for a distinction in vows, commercial intent operates differently.

Readings

Penei Moshe: The Nature of "Shem Luvai"

The Penei Moshe grapples with the core principle of "שם לווי" (shem luvai) in his commentary on the Mishnah. He explains the permissibility of apple wine when one vows against wine:

מתני' מותר ביין תפוחים. דכיון שיש לו שם לויי לא מיקרי יין סתם: "Mishnah: He is permitted apple wine. For since it has an accompanying name, it is not called plain wine."[^1]

The key here is the concept of "סתם" (stam) – plain or unspecified. When one vows against "wine" (יין סתם), they are abstaining from the generic category. Apple wine, while a type of wine, possesses its own distinct designation ("apple wine"), a "שם לווי." This distinct name elevates it beyond the simple, unspecified "wine" that was the object of the vow. The Penei Moshe reiterates this for other examples:

מן השמן. משמע שמן זית והילכך מותר בשמן שומשמין: "From oil. It implies olive oil, and therefore he is permitted sesame oil."[^2]

מותר בקפלוטות. מין ממיני הכרישין הגדילי' בא"י ולא הוו בכלל סתם כרישין: "He is permitted cabbage shoots. A type of leek that grows in the Land of Israel and is not included in plain leeks."[^3]

מותר בירקות שדה מפני שהוא שם לויי. שנקרא ירק השדה ולא ירק סתם: "He is permitted field vegetables because it is an accompanying name, as it is called 'field vegetable' and not plain vegetable."[^4]

For Penei Moshe, the principle is clear: a vow against a general term does not encompass specific instances or derivatives that have their own qualifying nomenclature. This linguistic distinction creates a halakhic separation, allowing the prohibited item to be consumed.

Korban Ha'edah: The Context-Dependent Nature of "Stam"

The Korban Ha'edah offers a crucial contextualization to the Penei Moshe's linguistic analysis, emphasizing that the definition of "סתם" (stam) is not absolute but rather dependent on local custom and common usage. He challenges the seemingly straightforward application of the principle in certain cases:

ה"ג מן השמן מותר בשמן שומשמין. שסתם שמן של זית הוא ובמקום שמסתפקין משמן שומשמין אף של שומשמין אסור וה"ה בכל השנויים במשנתינו: "The Halakha is: From oil, he is permitted sesame oil. For plain oil is olive oil. But in a place where they suffice with sesame oil, even sesame oil is forbidden. This is also the case for all the items mentioned in our Mishnah."[^5]

This is a profound insight. While generically "oil" might refer to olive oil, if a community's standard practice is to use sesame oil, then "oil" in that locale means sesame oil. Therefore, a vow against "oil" in such a place would include sesame oil. The Korban Ha'edah argues that the Mishnah's examples are only valid where the plain term refers to a specific, dominant type (e.g., olive oil). If that dominant type is different, the vow's scope shifts. He extends this to the other examples:

קפלוטו'. מין ממיני הפרישין הגדלות בא"י: "Kaplotot. A type of leek growing in the Land of Israel."[^6]

מפני שהוא שם לוויי. הבא לומר ירקות (שדה) צריך לחבר שם לירק ולומר ירקות שדה וכן כולם: "Because it is an accompanying name. One who wants to say 'vegetables (field)' needs to connect the name to the vegetable and say 'field vegetables,' and so with all of them."[^7]

Korban Ha'edah’s contribution lies in highlighting the inherent subjectivity and contextuality of what constitutes "סתם" or "שם לווי." The halakhic determination hinges not just on linguistic possibility but on the actual, prevailing nomenclature within a given community. This introduces a layer of empirical observation into the halakhic analysis of vows.

Mishneh Torah, Vows 9:14: The Codification of the Principle

Maimonides, in his Mishneh Torah, codifies the principle elucidated by the Mishnah and elaborated by the commentators, emphasizing the distinction between a substance and its derivative or a specific variety. He explicitly states the overarching rule:

"When a person takes a vow [not to partake of grapes], he is permitted to partake of wine, even fresh wine. Even though the wine tastes the same as grapes, since it is called by a different name, it is not considered in the same category."[^8]

Maimonides then proceeds to list the examples from the Mishnah, reinforcing the concept that the derivative or specific form, possessing a distinct name, falls outside the scope of a vow against the general or original item. He cites the rationale:

"The substances produced by the fruit are considered as being different from the fruit itself."[^9]

And regarding the distinction between general and specific terms:

"[The rationale for all of these rulings is] that [the names of] all these substances have a modifier and [when] the person took the vow, he referred to the substance without a modifier."[^10]

Maimonides' formulation underscores the importance of the modifier in creating a linguistic and therefore halakhic distinction. A vow against "wine" (unmodified) does not encompass "apple wine" (modified). This codified principle provides a clear framework for understanding the application of vows in these situations.

Friction

The Paradox of "Field Leeks" and the Fluidity of "Stam"

The most significant point of friction arises from the seemingly contradictory elaboration on the leek example in the Yerushalmi's Halakha. The Mishnah states: "Not leeks, he is permitted field leeks." The Penei Moshe explains this by the "שם לווי" – "field leeks" is a distinct name from "leeks." However, the Halakha then declares:

"The Mishnah speaks of a place where one does not call field leeks leeks. But not at a place where one calls field leeks leeks. Just in that case it is needed, even a place where one calls field leeks leeks: 'Not leeks, he is permitted field leeks.'"[^11]

This presents a paradox: if "field leeks" are commonly called "leeks," why is the Mishnah's ruling still applicable and even "needed"? The initial explanation of "שם לווי" appears to be insufficient, or at least requires significant nuance.

The Strongest Kushya: If "field leeks" are indistinguishable in common parlance from "leeks," then the linguistic distinction that forms the basis of the "שם לווי" principle is absent. How can a vow against "leeks" permit "field leeks" if they are essentially the same thing in the speaker's mind and in common usage? The Mishnah's statement becomes tautological if "field leeks" are simply "leeks." The subsequent assertion that it is needed even in such a case is perplexing.

A Potential Terutz (or two):

1. The Intent of the Vow vs. Linguistic Precision: One possible resolution lies in distinguishing between the intent of the vow and the precise linguistic definition of the terms. Even if, in a specific locale, "field leeks" are commonly referred to as "leeks," the underlying reality is that there is a distinction between the wilder, more expansive "field leek" and a cultivated variety. The vow against "leeks" might be understood by its inherent linguistic separation. The Yerushalmi might be emphasizing that even if the common name is the same, the underlying distinction (perhaps based on its growth or specific botanical characteristics, akin to the footnote's reference to allium capitatum) is sufficient to create a separate category for the vow. The "necessity" of the Mishnah's statement in this context could be to clarify that the halakhic distinction persists despite the linguistic convergence. It prevents a situation where a community's casual linguistic usage overrides the inherent separateness of the item. The footnote's reference to commercial contracts versus vows is relevant here; commercial contracts rely on specific intent and clear identification, while vows might operate on a more nuanced understanding of linguistic categories.

2. The "Stam" Principle as a Default, Not Absolute: A second approach, building on the Korban Ha'edah's insight, is to view the "שם לווי" principle as a default mechanism, but one that can be overridden or nuanced by other factors, including the clarity of the "stam" term. The Korban Ha'edah suggests that the definition of "stam" is context-dependent. If "field leeks" are not the default "leek" in a place, then "leeks" refers to the common variety, and "field leeks" is a distinct "שם לווי." However, if "field leeks" are the common variety, then "leeks" might refer to any leek, including field leeks. Yet, the Mishnah insists the permission still stands. This might imply that the vow is interpreted with a degree of leniency, favoring the specific over the general when a specific name exists, even if that specific name overlaps with the general one in common usage. The "needed" aspect could be to prevent an overly stringent interpretation where any overlap in common parlance immediately invalidates the distinction. The Halakha might be saying: "Even if you call them the same thing, the Mishnah's principle of distinction still holds, and you are permitted the 'field' variety." This interpretation posits that the underlying reality of a distinct name for "field leeks" is what matters, even if everyday speech blurs the lines.

Intertext

Shemittah and "Field Vegetables"

The discussion around "vegetables" and "field vegetables" in the Yerushalmi's Halakha directly links to the laws of Shemittah (the Sabbatical Year). The text states:

"He who makes a vow to abstain from vegetables in the Sabbatical is also forbidden field vegetables." Rebbi Crispus stated the reason in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina ben Gamliel: That means, as long as Rebbi did not permit to import vegetables into the Land. But since Rebbi permitted to import into the Land there is no difference between the Sabbatical and the remaining years of the Sabbatical cycle. Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina says, endives are important enough to become impure as food in the Seventh year. That means, as long as Rebbi did not permit to import vegetables into the Land. But since Rebbi permitted to import into the Land there is no difference between the Sabbatical and the remaining years of the Sabbatical cycle."[^12]

This passage reveals a critical distinction: during Shemittah, the permissibility of consuming "field vegetables" (ירקות שדה) is tied to the prevailing halakhic ruling on the import of produce. The Mishnah itself permits "field vegetables" when one vows against "vegetables," based on the "שם לווי" principle. However, the Halakha brings in the Shemittah context. If Rebbi permitted importing vegetables into the Land during Shemittah, then "field vegetables" are treated like any other produce and are subject to Shemittah restrictions. The implication is that during Shemittah, when importation is permitted, the distinction between generic "vegetables" and "field vegetables" becomes less significant in terms of their halakhic status regarding Shemittah, and a vow against "vegetables" would indeed encompass "field vegetables" in this context. This demonstrates how the interpretation of vows can intersect with other areas of Halakha, creating nuanced applications.

The "Two Witnesses" and the Calendar: A Matter of Life and Death

Later in the Yerushalmi text, the discussion shifts dramatically to the implications of calendar intercalation and the testimony of witnesses. Rebbi Hoshaia's words to the witnesses proclaiming the new moon are stark:

"Rebbi Hoshaia, when he received witnesses at Kallirhoë, used to say to them: You should know the importance of the testimony that comes from your mouth, how much rent money depends on your mouths. Rebbi Abuna said, if it is so, it is even a matter of criminal law. If somebody sleeps with a girl three years and one day old, he is stoned. The Court decided to lengthen, if he sleeps with her he is not stoned. Rebbi Abun said: 'I am calling to Almighty God, to the God who decides with me.' If a girl is three years and one day old, if the Court decided to lengthen, her hymen repairs itself, otherwise it does not repair itself."[^13]

This passage is astonishing. The validity of the calendar, determined by the sighting of the new moon and the potential intercalation of a month, has direct consequences for capital offenses. The timing of a girl's third birthday, which is contingent on whether a month has 29 or 30 days (or if a leap month was added), determines her legal status regarding the age of consent and the penalty for statutory rape. If the court lengthens a month (i.e., makes a 29-day month into 30 days, or adds a leap month), it can retroactively alter a girl's age, potentially saving a man from capital punishment. This illustrates the immense power and responsibility vested in the Sanhedrin or its representatives regarding calendar determination. The meticulous care in establishing the calendar is not merely about observing festivals on the correct dates but about upholding the very fabric of Jewish law, including its most severe judgments. The verse quoted, "to the God who decides with me," underscores the divine involvement in these judicial decisions that have such profound implications.

Psak/Practice

The primary application of the Nedarim section discussed here revolves around the principle of Hekdesh (sanctified items) and issur (prohibited items) in vows. The core psak derived from the Mishnah and its commentators is that a vow against a general term does not encompass a specific, qualified, or derivative item that possesses its own distinct name.

• Practical Application in Vows: If someone vows "not to eat fruit," they are permitted to eat "dried fruit" because "dried fruit" is a distinct category with a qualifying modifier. Similarly, a vow against "meat" would not prohibit "fish." This principle is still relevant today, though its application requires careful consideration of contemporary nomenclature.
• Meta-Heuristic in Interpretation: The Yerushalmi's discussion, particularly through the lens of Korban Ha'edah, introduces a meta-heuristic for interpreting vows: always consider the local custom and common usage when defining the terms of a vow. What is "plain oil" (שמן סתם) or "plain wine" (יין סתם) is not a fixed definition but rather determined by what is prevalent in the community. If a community primarily uses olive oil, then "oil" refers to olive oil. If sesame oil is the norm, then "oil" refers to sesame oil. This heuristic prevents overly broad or overly narrow interpretations of vows based on abstract linguistic possibilities rather than practical realities.
• The Example of "Field Leeks": The confusion surrounding "field leeks" highlights a potential ambiguity. If the intent was to prohibit all forms of leeks, the vow should have been phrased more inclusively. The leniency shown here, even when common speech might blur the lines, suggests a bias towards a narrower interpretation of vows when a distinct name exists, even if colloquially merged.

Takeaway

The interpretation of vows hinges on the precise linguistic distinctions between general and specific terms, with a strong emphasis on local custom and the presence of qualifying modifiers. The meticulous determination of the calendar, while seemingly abstract, underpins the very framework of Jewish law, impacting everything from festival observance to capital jurisprudence.