Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 7:3:2-11:2

Sugya Map

• Issue: The precise scope of vows of abstinence (נדרים) concerning material objects and their derivatives, specifically focusing on garments, dwellings, furniture, and produce. The Yerushalmi grapples with the interplay between the literal meaning of the vow, common vernacular usage (לשון בני אדם), and the underlying intent (כוונה).
• Nafka Mina(s):
  • Determining the permissibility of using items that are similar to, derived from, or functionally equivalent to the object of the vow.
  • Understanding how context (e.g., carrying vs. wearing, city vs. country dwelling) influences the interpretation of a vow.
  • Clarifying the nature of a vow made regarding a wife's earnings or produce, and its temporal implications.
  • Establishing the principle of following the vernacular in vow interpretation, unless a specific intent overrides it.
• Primary Sources:
  • Mishnah Nedarim 7:3-7:9 (Yerushalmi Nedarim 7:3:2-11:2)
  • Tosefta Nedarim 4:3-4:4
  • Babli Nedarim 55b-57b
  • Mishnah Kelim 16:1, 27:6
  • Tanakh: Yehoshua 5:13, 6:1; Bamidbar 30:3
  • Commentaries: Penei Moshe, Korban HaEdah, Mishneh Torah (Rambam)

Text Snapshot

Mishnah: "One who vowed to abstain from garments is permitted sack-cloth, carpets, and goat’s hair cloth. If he said, a qônām that wool shall not come onto me, he is permitted to cover himself with shorn wool; that linen should not come upon me, he is permitted to cover himself with linen fibers."

• Dikduk/Leshon Nuance: The phrase "wool shall not come onto me" (צמר אל יבוא עלי) and "linen should not come upon me" (פשתים אל יבואו עלי) uses the singular form of the material (צמר, פשתים), but the permission extends to "shorn wool" (צמר גזוז) and "linen fibers" (בעצי פשתן). This suggests a distinction between the raw material and its processed form as a garment, or perhaps a subtle difference in the scope of the vow. The Gemara will need to clarify this.

Mishnah: "If he was carrying and sweating and smelling badly, when he said, a qônām that no wool or flax should be on me, he is permitted to wear but forbidden to carry on his back."

• Dikduk/Leshon Nuance: The contrast between "to wear" (ללבוש) and "to carry on his back" (לשאת על גביו) is crucial. The vow is interpreted to apply to the state of being clothed, not necessarily to the physical presence of the material in proximity. This highlights the semantic flexibility of "on me" (עלי).

Halakha: "Rebbi Jeremiah said, Rebbi Ze‘ira asked: If one said, a qônām, that I shall not wear a garment, that I shall not cover myself with clothing? Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar said, if he said, a qônām for anything that is generally used to cover oneself and a derivative of it is generally used to cover oneself; generally he is permitted the derivative; if he made a vow to abstain from the derivative he is permitted the material itself. What is an example? For example, sheepskin. For anything that is generally used to cover oneself but no derivative of it is generally used to cover oneself; if he vowed about it, he is permitted the derivative; if he made a vow to abstain from the derivative he is forbidden the material itself. What is an example? For example, goatskin."

• Dikduk/Leshon Nuance: The distinction between "generally used to cover oneself" (הראוי להתכסות בו) and its "derivative" (נגזרת ממנו) is central to Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar's analysis. This introduces a tiered approach to vow interpretation based on the common usage and relationship between materials and their derived products. The examples of sheepskin and goatskin illustrate this principle.

Halakha: "Rebbi Mana asked, does this not disagree with Rebbi Joḥanan, since Rebbi Joḥanan said, in matters of vows they follow the vernacular?"

• Dikduk/Leshon Nuance: This question directly confronts the established principle of following the vernacular (אנו הולכין אחר לשון בני אדם) in vow cases. The subsequent discussion about Joshua and Jericho, and the example of seeing someone "in Tiberias" when they are outside the gate, attempts to bridge the gap between biblical language and common parlance.

Readings

Penei Moshe on Nedarim 7:3:1:1-4

Penei Moshe, in his commentary on the Yerushalmi, offers detailed explanations for the initial distinctions made in the Mishnah regarding vows about garments.

• On "sack-cloth, carpets, and goat’s hair cloth": He explains these items as "very coarse and thick garments, which people are not accustomed to cover themselves with" (בגדים גסים ועבים ביותר ואין בני אדם רגילין להתכסות בהם). This implies that the vow to abstain from "garments" (בגדים) is understood in its common usage, referring to the typical, comfortable apparel worn by people. Coarse materials, not usually considered garments for everyday wear, fall outside this scope.
• On "shorn wool": Regarding the vow "wool shall not come onto me" (צמר אל יבוא עלי), Penei Moshe clarifies that one is permitted to cover himself with "shorn wool" (צמר גזוז). His reasoning is that "one only intended [a vow] for a wool garment" (שלא נתכויין אלא לבגד צמר). This suggests that the vow is tied to the finished product (garment) rather than the raw material itself. If the intent was to forbid the material in any form, the phrasing might have been more encompassing.
• On "linen fibers": Similarly, concerning "linen should not come upon me" (פשתים אל יבואו עלי), the permission extends to "linen fibers" (בעצי פשתן). Penei Moshe explains this as "that which is twisted and not carded" (דדייק ולא נפיץ). This technical distinction implies that the vow might have been directed at the processed linen ready for weaving into garments, and not at the more rudimentary fibrous state.
• On R. Yehudah's view and the carrying scenario: Penei Moshe interprets Rabbi Yehudah's position ("everything refers to the vow" - הכל לפי הנדר) as meaning "according to the time of the vow" (לפי שעת הנדר). He elaborates that "if it is apparent that due to the burden of his load he made the vow, he is permitted to cover himself, and the Halakha follows R. Yehudah" (אם ניכר שמחמת כובד משאו נדר מות' להתכסות והל' כר"י). This is a crucial insight: when the vow is made under specific duress or circumstance (like carrying a heavy load), the scope of the vow is narrowed to that specific context. In this instance, the vow was made because of the discomfort of carrying, not the inherent nature of wool or linen. Therefore, wearing them might be permissible, but carrying them, which caused the distress, remains forbidden.

Korban HaEdah on Nedarim 7:3:1:1-3

Korban HaEdah, another significant commentator on the Yerushalmi, echoes and expands upon some of Penei Moshe's explanations.

• On "sack-cloth, carpets, and goat’s hair cloth": Korban HaEdah also defines these as "coarse and thick garments, which people are not accustomed to cover themselves with" (בגדים גסים ועבים הם ואין בני אדם רגילים להתכסות בהם). This reinforces the idea that the vow pertains to conventional clothing.
• On "shorn wool": He concurs with Penei Moshe's interpretation that "one only intended [a vow] for a wool garment" (שלא נתכוין אלא לבגד צמר), permitting the use of shorn wool. This emphasizes the intent behind the vow, focusing on the function and form of the forbidden item.
• On R. Yehudah's view and the carrying scenario: Korban HaEdah also states that "everything is according to the vow, according to the time of the vow" (הכל לפי הנדר. לפי שעת הנדר). He adds that "if it is apparent that due to the burden of his load he made the vow, he is permitted to cover himself" (אם ניכר שמחמת כובד משאו נדר מותר להתכסות). This reiterates the contextual interpretation of the vow, where the practical circumstances surrounding its utterance significantly shape its scope.

Mishneh Torah, Vows 9:15

Maimonides, in his codified Halakha, summarizes the rulings derived from these discussions, providing a clear normative conclusion.

• On vows of abstinence from clothing: He states, "When a person takes a vow not to wear clothing, he is permitted [to cover himself] with sackcloth, [a weave from goat's hair], a coarsely woven thick fabric, a thick sheet used as a rainshield. The rationale is that none of these fabrics are considered as garments." This aligns with the Yerushalmi's emphasis on common usage and the definition of "garment."
• On vows of abstinence from a house: Maimonides rules, "he is forbidden to enter its loft. For the loft is part of the house. [If he] takes a vow [not to enter] a loft, he is permitted [to enter] the home." This reflects the Sages' view that a loft is intrinsically part of the house, while R. Meir distinguishes them.
• On vows of abstinence from furniture: He explains, "[When a person takes a vow not to] use a dargeish, he is permitted [to use] a bed. [If he takes a vow not to use] a bed, he is forbidden to use a dargeish, because it is like a small bed." This encapsulates the principle of inclusion and exclusion based on functional similarity and the common understanding of these items.

Friction

The central tension within this sugya, particularly in the Nedarim 7:3 discussion, revolves around the interpretive principles governing vows. Specifically, the friction arises from the apparent clash between the principle of Keviat Halacha al Pi Ivrit (establishing Halakha according to the Hebrew language) versus Keviat Halacha al Pi Lashon Benei Adam (establishing Halakha according to the vernacular). This is most acutely felt in the discussion concerning the vow not to use a town and its suburbs, and the subsequent attempt to find a biblical basis for the Sages' opinion.

The Kushya: The Vernacular vs. Biblical Language in Vows

The core of the friction lies in Rebbi Mana's question to Rebbi Joḥanan: "Does this not disagree with Rebbi Joḥanan, since Rebbi Joḥanan said, in matters of vows they follow the vernacular?" (רבי מנא בעי, האי כוותיה דר' יוחנן דאמר, במקום נדרים אנו הולכין אחר לשון בני אדם? האין זה מחלוקת). This question arises after the Yerushalmi cites Joshua 5:13 ("it happened when Joshua was in Jericho") as a source for the idea that being "in Jericho" could include its suburbs. The underlying assumption is that if the suburbs are considered part of the town, then one who vows not to use the town is forbidden its suburbs.

The friction is this: Rebbi Joḥanan, a towering figure in the Yerushalmi, explicitly states that in matters of vows, we follow the lashon benei adam – the common, everyday language people use. However, the Yerushalmi's justification for the Sages' view (that suburbs are akin to the town) seems to rely on a nuanced interpretation of biblical narrative (Joshua's presence in Jericho despite its closure in Joshua 6:1). This suggests a potential reliance on the biblical meaning of words, or at least a deeper linguistic analysis, rather than purely the vernacular.

The example that follows, "Is it not the way of a person who sees another one outside the gate to say, 'I saw him in Tiberias'?" (האין דרכו של אדם הרואה את חבירו חוץ לשער ואומר ראיתיו בטבריא?), is meant to bridge this gap. It suggests that common usage does equate being "in the city" with being in its immediate environs, even outside the walls, thus aligning with the vernacular. However, the initial reliance on the biblical text for the Sages' opinion, and the subsequent need to demonstrate that this biblical usage aligns with the vernacular, creates the tension. Why even bring the biblical text if the vernacular is the sole determinant? Does the biblical text merely serve as asmachta (a support, not a primary source) for a ruling already established by vernacular usage? Or does it imply that sometimes the biblical language informs the vernacular understanding in specific contexts?

The Terutz: Vernacular as the Primary Rule, Biblical Language as a Supporting Instance

The best terutz (or rather, the way the Yerushalmi navigates this friction) is to see the principle of following the vernacular as the primary guiding rule, with the biblical citation serving as an illustration or a confirmation that the vernacular usage is indeed rooted in a deeper linguistic reality, or at least that the biblical usage itself reflects a common understanding.

The Yerushalmi's approach is to first establish the ruling based on the Sages' understanding, and then seek a justification. The citation from Joshua 5:13 is presented as a source for this ruling. The subsequent discussion, including Rebbi Mana's question, highlights the potential conflict with Rebbi Joḥanan's principle. The Yerushalmi then attempts to resolve this by showing that the vernacular usage aligns with the broader understanding exemplified by the biblical text.

The statement, "Is it not the way of a person who sees another one outside the gate to say, 'I saw him in Tiberias'?" is the key to the resolution. This demonstrates that the vernacular itself, in everyday speech, considers proximity to the city (even outside the walls) as being "in the city." Therefore, the biblical usage, which implies Joshua was "in Jericho" even when its gates were closed (suggesting a broader understanding of the city's domain), is not necessarily in conflict with the vernacular. Instead, it reflects and perhaps even grounds the vernacular understanding.

The Yerushalmi is not saying that the biblical meaning overrides the vernacular. Rather, it is demonstrating that the Sages' ruling, which might initially seem to rely on a specific interpretation of biblical text, is in fact supported by the very vernacular that Rebbi Joḥanan champions. The biblical text serves as a re'ayah (evidence) that the vernacular understanding is consistent with a broader linguistic and geographical conception of a place.

Essentially, the Yerushalmi is saying:

1. The Sages rule that suburbs are part of the town for vow purposes.
2. We find this principle in Joshua 5:13 – Joshua was "in Jericho" even when the city was besieged.
3. Rebbi Mana questions this, as Rebbi Joḥanan says to follow the vernacular.
4. The Yerushalmi answers: Common vernacular usage itself dictates that if you see someone outside the gate, you say "I saw him in Tiberias." This means the vernacular already includes the environs within the notion of "being in the city."
5. Therefore, the biblical text and the vernacular usage are in harmony, not in conflict. The vernacular is the primary rule, and the biblical text serves to illustrate or confirm that this vernacular usage is consistent with a broader conception of place.

This approach allows the Yerushalmi to maintain the primacy of the vernacular principle while still drawing upon biblical sources for support and deeper understanding. The nuances of language, both biblical and vernacular, are woven together to arrive at the Halakha.

Intertext

1. Tosefta Nedarim 4:3 & Babli Nedarim 55b

The Mishnah and Halakha in the Yerushalmi are closely paralleled in the Tosefta and the Babylonian Talmud, highlighting a shared tradition in interpreting vows related to garments.

• Tosefta Nedarim (Lieberman) 4:3: "One who vows to abstain from garments is permitted sack-cloth, carpets, goat's hair, leather aprons, and bandages. He is forbidden fascia and belts. Rebbi Yehudah says, all these are forbidden to him except sackcloth and goat's hair. Rebbi Meir says, all are permitted to him except for wool and linen." (המתכסה בנדר מותר בשק וביריעה ובחמורת צמר ובמפשעות ופפליאות. אסור בפסקין ובחגורות. רבי יהודה אומר הכל אסור לו חוץ משק וחמורת צמר. רבי מאיר אומר הכל מותר לו חוץ מצמר ופשתן.) This Tosefta presents a similar list of permitted and forbidden items, with differing opinions among the Rabbis, aligning with the Yerushalmi's discussion of what constitutes "garments." The Tosefta's mention of "חמורת צמר" (a load of wool) and the Yerushalmi's later discussion on carrying vs. wearing, further links these texts.

• Babli Nedarim 55b: The Gemara in Babli directly discusses the Mishnah's initial statement. It asks about sackcloth, carpets, and goat's hair, and whether they are considered garments. It also grapples with the interpretation of vows like "wool shall not come upon me," distinguishing between raw wool and woven garments. The Babli's discussion on R. Yehudah's opinion regarding the carrying scenario mirrors the Yerushalmi's, albeit with a reversed outcome in the Tosefta's version mentioned in the Yerushalmi's footnote. The Babli states: "If he was wearing wool and felt uncomfortable and said, 'Konam that wool shall be on me,' he is forbidden to wear it but permitted to carry it. If he was carrying wool and sweating, and said, 'Konam that no wool shall be on me,' he is permitted to wear it but forbidden to carry it." (היה לבוש בצמר והיה לו צער לומר קונם צמר עלי אסור ללבשו ומותר לשאת וכו') This confirms the fundamental debate about the scope of the vow based on the action (wearing vs. carrying) and the material versus the garment.

2. Mishnah Kelim 27:6 & Bamidbar 30:3

The Yerushalmi's discussion of specific items and the concept of vows' validity also finds echoes in other areas of rabbinic literature.

• Mishnah Kelim 27:6: This Mishnah discusses ritual impurity (tumah) concerning various items, including "feminalia" (פפליא), which is identified in the Yerushalmi Nedarim commentary as a possible translation for bandages. "Bandages, fascia, girdles, and straps [are impure if they are] four handbreadths [in length]." (פפליא ופסקין וחגורות ורצועות – ארבעה טפחים.) The presence of items like "fascia" and "bandages" in both Kelim and Nedarim suggests a shared vocabulary and concern for the categorization of different types of clothing or bodily coverings, which is directly relevant to defining the scope of a vow. The Yerushalmi's gloss on "bandages" (פמליא) as a "muslin headscarf" in Maimonides' commentary indicates the difficulty in precisely identifying these terms across different contexts and eras, a challenge that also plagues vow interpretation.

• Bamidbar 30:3: The concept of a wife's vows and her husband's ability to annul them is introduced in the Torah: "When a man vows a vow to the LORD, or swears an oath to bind himself with a binding, he shall not profane his word; he shall do according to all that proceeds out of his mouth." (בִּיִדַּר אִישׁ נֶדֶר לַיהוָה אוֹ־נִשְׁבַּע שְׁבֻעָה לֶאֱסֹר אִסָּר עַל־נַפְשׁוֹ לֹא יַחֵל דְּבָרוֹ כְּכָל־הַיֹּצֵא מִפִּיו יַעֲשֶׂה.) The later verses in Bamidbar 30:4-16 discuss the nullification of vows by a father or husband. The Yerushalmi Nedarim 7:8-9 deals extensively with vows made between husband and wife, concerning their economic and personal interactions. The phrase "he shall not profane his word" (לֹא יַחֵל דְּבָרוֹ) is directly quoted in the Yerushalmi's Halakha concerning a wife's vow. This intertextual link highlights the fundamental halakhic principle that vows are binding and must be upheld, and the complex halakhic frameworks developed to navigate them, especially within marital relationships.

Psak/Practice

The discussions in Nedarim 7:3-11:2, while delving into the nuances of vow interpretation, offer several practical implications for Halakha.

1. The Primacy of Vernacular and Intent: The overarching principle established, particularly through Rebbi Joḥanan's dictum and its subsequent application, is that in matters of vows, the lashon benei adam (vernacular) and the kavanah (intent) of the vower are paramount. This means that standard dictionary definitions or even biblical meanings are secondary to how ordinary people understand and use language, and what the person setting the vow intended to forbid. This guides the interpretation of forbidden items – are they commonly understood as such?

2. Contextual Interpretation: The ruling concerning the man carrying a heavy load and sweating, who then vows to abstain from wool, demonstrates that the circumstances under which a vow is made can significantly narrow its scope. If the vow is a reaction to a specific discomfort or situation, the prohibition might only apply to that situation. This is a crucial heuristic for unraveling vows made in moments of stress or anger.

3. Material vs. Derivative/Garment: The distinction between a raw material (like wool) and its processed form (a garment) is critical. A vow against "wool" might not inherently include "shorn wool" or "linen fibers" if the intent was specifically against woven garments. This requires careful consideration of the specific wording and the common understanding of the items involved.

4. Spatial Vows and Proximal Inclusion: The discussion on vows against using a town or house establishes that the prohibition often extends to areas commonly associated with or functionally part of the forbidden entity. For a town, this includes its suburbs. For a house, it can include its loft. This principle of inclusion based on common association informs how we delineate boundaries in halakhic practice.

5. Wife's Vows and Husband's Rights: The latter part of the sugya delves into vows made between husband and wife, particularly concerning her earnings or produce. The principle here is that the husband's vow against usufruct from his wife (e.g., "what you prepare I would eat") is immediately binding, even if the wife's action that triggers the vow is in the future. This is to avoid the possibility of the husband retroactively transgressing his own vow. This reflects a stringent approach to preventing vow profanation within marital dynamics, emphasizing the husband's responsibility to ensure his vows are not violated.

In essence, the practice derived from this sugya is one of careful linguistic and contextual analysis. Vows are not taken lightly, but their interpretation requires a deep understanding of everyday language, the specific intent of the vower, and the practical circumstances surrounding the vow.

Takeaway

The interpretation of vows hinges not on rigid definitions, but on the dynamic interplay of common speech, intent, and contextual circumstance. Halakha navigates these complexities by prioritizing how people actually communicate and what they truly mean, ensuring that vows uphold integrity without becoming traps.