Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 8:1:1-2:2

Sugya Map

The Yerushalmi Nedarim 8:1 presents a foundational discussion on the interpretation of temporal vows, exploring the intricate balance between literal linguistic meaning, common parlance (lashon benei adam), and biblical usage (lashon Torah) in defining the duration of a neder. The central issue revolves around how a neder specifying a temporal limit — such as "today," "this week," "this month," "this year," or "this Sabbatical period" — is to be understood, particularly in contrast to a vow specifying "one day," "one week," etc.

Core Issue: Temporal Scope of Vows

The primary question is the precise termination point of a vow that uses temporal markers. Does "today" mean until sunset, or a full 24-hour cycle from the moment of the vow? Does "this week" include the coming Sabbath, or refer to the completion of the current seven-day cycle? Similarly, how do "this month" and "this year" interact with calendar markers like Rosh Chodesh and Rosh Hashanah, and the phenomenon of intercalary months? The Mishnah delineates distinct rules for phrases like "this day/week/month/year" versus "one day/week/month/year," necessitating an exploration of the underlying hermeneutic principles.

Nafka Mina(s): Practical Ramifications

The practical implications (nafka mina) are immediate and far-reaching:

• Duration of Prohibition: When is the noder (vower) released from their neder? This impacts whether they may partake in the forbidden item (e.g., wine) at nightfall, after the coming Sabbath, or on Rosh Chodesh/Rosh Hashanah.
• Linguistic Interpretation: The sugya forces a confrontation between lashon benei adam (common usage) and lashon Torah (biblical definition). If "today" means only daylight hours in common speech, but "day" in Bereishit includes night, which takes precedence? The Yerushalmi grapples with this tension directly, even presenting a machloket (dispute) with R. Yochanan on this very point.
• Calendar and Vows: The discussion extends to the Jewish calendar, examining whether a vow of "this month" includes the forthcoming Rosh Chodesh, or "this year" includes Rosh Hashanah. The inclusion or exclusion of an intercalary month (Adar Aleph/Bet) further complicates the issue for "this year" vows, reflecting the practicalities of a lunisolar calendar.
• Fast Days: The sugya segues into a discussion of fasts, specifically "fasting by hours" and the validity of personal fasts on certain days (Sabbath, holidays, Megillat Ta'anit days), illustrating how temporal definitions influence other halachot.

Primary Sources

• Mishnah Nedarim 8:1: Lays out the initial distinctions between "this [period]" and "one [period]" for various temporal units (day, week, month, year, Sabbatical period).
• Yerushalmi Nedarim 8:1:1-2:2 (our text): Explores the Mishnah's statements, challenges them with R. Yochanan's principle of lashon benei adam, offers various terutzim (solutions), and delves into related topics like the interpretation of "Adar" and the status of Megillat Ta'anit.
• Bavli Nedarim 60a-61b: Parallel sugya offering a different, albeit related, analysis of the same Mishnah. Crucial for comparative lomdus.
• Tosefta Nedarim 4:7: Provides a Tannaic parallel, especially concerning the interpretation of "Adar" in intercalary years.
• Mishnah Kiddushin 3:9-10: Referenced in our sugya to highlight a potential inconsistency in R. Yose's interpretative approach.
• Bereishit 1:5: The biblical source for the definition of "day" ("ויהי ערב ויהי בוקר יום אחד").
• Isaiah 58:13: Quoted in the Yerushalmi regarding the delight of Shabbat and its implications for fasting.
• Leviticus 23:32: Referenced regarding the duration of Yom Kippur fast (evening to evening).

Text Snapshot

We examine the specific lines from Yerushalmi Nedarim 8:1:1-2:2, noting dikduk and leshon nuances.

MISHNAH: "‘A qônām that I shall not taste wine today,’ he is forbidden only until nightfall. ‘This week’, he is forbidden the entire week; the Sabbath belongs to the past. ‘This month’, he is forbidden the entire month; the day of the New Moon belongs to the future. ‘This year’, he is forbidden the entire year; New Year’s Day belongs to the future. ‘This Sabbatical period’, he is forbidden the entire Sabbatical period; the Sabbatical year belongs to the past. But if he said, one day, one week, one month, one year, he is forbidden from day." (Nedarim 8:1:1)

• ‘A qônām that I shall not taste wine today,’ he is forbidden only until nightfall: The key phrase is "היום" (today). The Mishnah's ruling, "אינו אסור אלא עד שתחשך" (he is forbidden only until it darkens), explicitly limits the prohibition to the daylight hours. This implicitly aligns with a lashon Torah understanding of "day" as distinct from "night" in its functional capacity for human activity, or a common usage where "today" refers to the current daylight period.
• ‘This week’, he is forbidden the entire week; the Sabbath belongs to the past: "שבת זו" (this Sabbath). The nuance here is that the vow made "this week" (presumably during the weekdays) extends only until the commencement of the coming Shabbat, which is considered the end of the week in common parlance. The phrase "השבת של עבר" (the Sabbath belongs to the past) implies that the upcoming Sabbath is not included in "this week" from the perspective of the vow's duration.
• ‘This month’, he is forbidden the entire month; the day of the New Moon belongs to the future: "חדש זה" (this month). Similar to "this week," the vow ends before the coming Rosh Chodesh. "ראש חדש שלבא" (the coming New Moon) is considered to belong to the next month, not the current one.
• ‘This year’, he is forbidden the entire year; New Year’s Day belongs to the future: "שנה זו" (this year). Analogous to "this month," the vow terminates before the coming Rosh Hashanah, which initiates the next year.
• ‘This Sabbatical period’, he is forbidden the entire Sabbatical period; the Sabbatical year belongs to the past: "שבוע זה" (this Sabbatical period). This refers to the cycle of seven years. The vow ends before the upcoming Sabbatical year itself, which marks the end of the previous cycle and the start of a new one. The phrase "שביעית של עבר" (the Sabbatical year belongs to the past) parallels "השבת של עבר."
• But if he said, one day, one week, one month, one year, he is forbidden from day: "יום אחד" (one day). The shift from "this day" to "one day" is critical. The Mishnah states "אסור מיום" (forbidden from day), which the subsequent Halakha clarifies as "מיום ליום, משעה לשעה" (from day to day, from hour to hour). This implies a full 24-hour cycle from the moment of the vow, a significant departure from "today" ending at nightfall. This distinction is the core of the sugya's interpretative challenge.

HALAKHAH: "“ ‘A qônām that I shall not taste wine today,’ ” etc. This implies that he is permitted at nightfall. Does this not disagree with Rebbi Joḥanan, since Rebbi Joḥanan said, in matters of vows one follows common usage? It is not usual that a man should say to another in the evening, I did not eat until evening. Would he say, yesterday? Refer to the following and it does disagree: It is not usual that a man should say to another in the morning, I did not eat in the evening. Would he say, the same day? Does the following not disagree? This day from this week, or this week from this day? What is the difference between “this day” and “today”? That is, following the opinion that in matters of vows one follows common usage. But here, one follows the opinion that in matters of vows one follows biblical usage. Rebbi Jonah from Bostra said, it is the way of people to say to another, bear with me this day." (Nedarim 8:1:1-2)

• This implies that he is permitted at nightfall. Does this not disagree with Rebbi Joḥanan...?: The Gemara immediately zeroes in on the Mishnah's interpretation of "today" as daylight hours, challenging it against R. Yochanan's principle of lashon benei adam. The kushya (difficulty) is that in common usage, "today" might extend into the night, or a person might refer to the previous evening as part of "yesterday."
• "What is the difference between “this day” and “today”? That is, following the opinion that in matters of vows one follows common usage. But here, one follows the opinion that in matters of vows one follows biblical usage.": This line explicitly presents the machloket regarding the hermeneutic principle: common usage vs. biblical usage. It suggests the Mishnah (for "today") might follow lashon Torah.
• Rebbi Jonah from Bostra said, it is the way of people to say to another, bear with me this day: R. Yonah provides a terutz (resolution) by finding a common usage scenario where "this day" does mean daylight hours, thereby potentially reconciling the Mishnah with R. Yochanan's principle. This is a crucial leshon-based terutz.
• "If he said, one day, one week, one month, one year, one Sabbatical period, he is forbidden from day to day.” From hour to hour. It was stated, from hour to hour. This clarifies the Mishnah's terse "מיום" for "one day" vows, confirming it means a precise 24-hour period from the moment of the vow, משעה לשעה (from hour to hour).

The Mishnah's distinction between "this [period]" and "one [period]" establishes a fundamental dichotomy in temporal vow interpretation: the former often aligning with fixed calendar units or common linguistic cut-offs, the latter with a precise, continuous duration from the moment of the vow. The Yerushalmi's subsequent analysis grapples with the underlying principles governing these distinctions, particularly the tension between lashon benei adam and lashon Torah.

Readings

The sugya in Yerushalmi Nedarim 8:1 is rich with interpretative possibilities, focusing on the precise scope of temporal vows. We will delve into the approaches of several key commentators, analyzing their chiddushim and logical underpinnings.

1. Penei Moshe

The Penei Moshe, R. Moshe Margolies, is a foundational commentator on the Yerushalmi, offering concise yet profound insights into its often cryptic language. His primary chiddush in this sugya is to consistently interpret the Mishnah's rulings through the lens of lashon benei adam (common usage) for the specific temporal units, while highlighting the distinct nature of "one [period]" vows as strictly quantitative.

• "קונם יין שאיני טועם היום אינו אסור אלא עד שתחשך." (Penei Moshe, Nedarim 8:1:1:1): The Penei Moshe explains the Mishnah's ruling for "today" (היום) as ending at nightfall: "דכיון דאמר היום לא משמע אלא עד שיגמר אותו יום דהיינו עד שתחשך" (since he said 'today,' it implies only until that day ends, which is until it darkens). This explanation is crucial because it immediately frames the Mishnah's ruling as based on common linguistic understanding. For the average person, "today" refers to the daylight hours. This understanding is key to the Gemara's subsequent challenge regarding R. Yochanan's principle, as it assumes the Mishnah is following common usage, and then questions if this specific common usage is truly universal. Penei Moshe, therefore, sees the Mishnah as operating within the lashon benei adam framework from the outset, rather than lashon Torah (which defines a day from evening to evening).

• "שבת זו." (Penei Moshe, Nedarim 8:1:1:2): Regarding "this week" (שבת זו), Penei Moshe clarifies: "היה עומד באמצע השבוע ואמר שבת זו אסור בכל ימי השבוע ושבת עצמו בכלל איסור של שבוע שעברה דכי אמר שבת זו דעתייהו על ימי החול הבאים ועל יום השבת" (If he stood in the middle of the week and said 'this week,' he is forbidden for all the days of the week, and Shabbat itself is included in the prohibition of the past week, because when he says 'this week,' his intention is for the coming weekdays and for the day of Shabbat). This is a unique reading, as the Mishnah itself states "השבת של עבר" (the Sabbath belongs to the past), which usually means the coming Shabbat is excluded. Penei Moshe's reading here seems to contradict the straightforward meaning of the Mishnah's phrase, possibly interpreting "שבת זו" as a broader temporal unit that includes the end-point. However, the more common understanding of "השבת של עבר" is that the prohibition ends before the upcoming Shabbat, because that Shabbat is considered the end of the previous week in calculation for the vow, not part of this current, incomplete week. It's plausible that Penei Moshe is struggling with the precise leshon of "שבת זו" and trying to make it fit a more encompassing interpretation, or perhaps his text read differently. The prevailing understanding, as noted in the Sefaria footnotes and other commentaries, is that "השבת של עבר" means the coming Sabbath is excluded from the vow.

• "חדש זה... וראש חדש שלבא." (Penei Moshe, Nedarim 8:1:1:3-4): For "this month" (חדש זה) and "this year" (שנה זו), Penei Moshe explains: "היה עומד באמצע החודש ואמר חדש זה אסור עד תשלום החדש" (If he stood in the middle of the month and said 'this month,' he is forbidden until the completion of the month) and "אין ראש חדש מכלל ימי האיסור אלא להבא הוא נמנה ומותר" (Rosh Chodesh is not included in the days of prohibition; rather, it is counted as belonging to the future and is permitted). This firmly establishes that the vow terminates before the commencement of the subsequent calendrical unit (Rosh Chodesh or Rosh Hashanah), again rooted in lashon benei adam where these days are seen as beginnings of new periods. Even for a two-day Rosh Chodesh, the first day (30th of the previous month) is permitted because "אינשי קרו ליה ריש ירחא" (people call it Rosh Yeracha – the head of the month). This explicitly reinforces the lashon benei adam principle: what people call it dictates the halacha.

• "ואם אמר יום אחד כו'. מיום ליום משעה לשעה." (Penei Moshe, Nedarim 8:1:1:7): Here, Penei Moshe clarifies the distinction for "one day" (יום אחד) vows: "אם עומד באמצע היום ואמר יום אחד עלי אסור עד למחר כעת הזאת וכן אם עומד באמצע החדש ואמר חדש עלי אסור עד יום זה מחדש הבא וכן בשנה וכן בשמיטה" (If he stood in the middle of the day and said 'one day is upon me,' he is forbidden until tomorrow at this time, and similarly if he stood in the middle of the month and said 'one month is upon me,' he is forbidden until this day of the coming month, and so too for a year and a Sabbatical period). This highlights the quantitative nature of these vows, lasting a full, unbroken duration from the moment of utterance, entirely independent of calendrical or conventional cut-off points. This distinction is a major chiddush of the Mishnah itself, and Penei Moshe simply elucidates it.

2. Korban HaEdah

The Korban HaEdah, by R. David Frankel, is another essential commentary on the Yerushalmi, often building upon or providing alternative explanations to the Penei Moshe. For our sugya, Korban HaEdah largely aligns with Penei Moshe on the Mishnah's basic interpretations, reiterating the primacy of lashon benei adam for "this [period]" vows and the quantitative nature of "one [period]" vows. Its chiddush often lies in its precision and subtle emphasis.

• "קונם יין שאיני טועם היום אינו אסור אלא עד שתחשך." (Korban HaEdah, Nedarim 8:1:1:1): Korban HaEdah's explanation for "today" is almost identical to Penei Moshe's: "דכיון דאמר היום לא משמע אלא עד שיגמור אותו היום דהיינו עד שתחשך" (since he said 'today,' it implies only until that day ends, which is until it darkens). This reinforces the understanding that the Mishnah's initial ruling is based on the common perception of "day" as daylight. The agreement between these two primary Yerushalmi commentators on this point underscores its foundational nature for the subsequent Gemara discussion.

• Regarding the problematic "שבת זו": Korban HaEdah (not explicitly in the provided text snippet for this line, but generally consistent with its approach) would likely interpret "השבת של עבר" more directly, meaning the coming Sabbath is excluded from the vow. This aligns with the common understanding that a period defined as "this week" concludes when the subsequent unit (Shabbat) begins, as it is considered a distinct entity in common temporal reckoning. This would contrast with the Penei Moshe's more complex reading.

• "חדש זה... וראש חדש שלבא." (Korban HaEdah, Nedarim 8:1:1:4): For "this month," Korban HaEdah emphasizes the exclusion of Rosh Chodesh, stating it is "להבא הוא נמנה ומותר" (counted for the future and permitted). He similarly echoes Penei Moshe's point about the first day of a two-day Rosh Chodesh being permitted because "אינשי קרו ליה ריש ירחא" (people call it Rosh Yeracha). This reiterates the decisive role of common linguistic practice in defining the boundaries of these vows.

• Overall Approach: Korban HaEdah consistently seeks to explain the Mishnah's rulings as reflecting the most straightforward and common interpretation of the language used by the noder. Where the Yerushalmi raises a kushya from R. Yochanan, Korban HaEdah understands it as challenging the assumption that the Mishnah did follow common usage, or seeking to define which common usage is applicable. His explanations often provide the standard, accepted understanding when Penei Moshe offers a more intricate or less common interpretation.

3. Rashba (Rabbi Shlomo ben Aderet)

While the Rashba primarily comments on the Bavli, his analysis of Nedarim 60a-61b is directly relevant to our Yerushalmi sugya because both Talmuds grapple with the same Mishnah and the fundamental tension between lashon benei adam and lashon Torah. Rashba's chiddush lies in his detailed exposition of this tension and the nuanced application of each principle.

• The R. Yochanan Contradiction: The Bavli (Nedarim 60a) presents the same kushya as our Yerushalmi: How can the Mishnah rule that "today" (היום) ends at nightfall (i.e., refers only to daylight hours) when R. Yochanan states that vows follow lashon benei adam, and common usage might interpret "today" as extending to the next morning, or even a full 24-hour period? Rashba delves into this, explaining the various facets of lashon benei adam. He acknowledges that while for many purposes (like the biblical "ויהי ערב ויהי בוקר יום אחד" - Bereishit 1:5), a day includes both night and day, common speech for "today" often refers to the period from sunrise to sunset. The Rashba thus validates the Mishnah's stance as a legitimate lashon benei adam interpretation.

• Reconciling the "Day": Rashba suggests that the term "יום" (day) itself has multiple meanings in common parlance. It can mean the entire 24-hour period, or it can specifically refer to the daylight portion. When someone says "היום" (today), the natural understanding is often the current daylight period. This aligns with the Yerushalmi's terutz from R. Yonah of Bostra: "it is the way of people to say to another, bear with me this day," implying a request for work during daylight hours. Rashba thus finds a lashon benei adam basis for the Mishnah's ruling, rather than resorting to lashon Torah as the Yerushalmi briefly considers. This represents a significant chiddush in reconciling the Mishnah with R. Yochanan.

• Distinction between "היום" and "יום אחד": Rashba rigorously upholds the distinction established by the Mishnah. "היום" refers to the current calendrical daylight day, ending at nightfall. "יום אחד" (one day) refers to a full 24-hour period from the moment of the vow. This distinction is not arbitrary but rooted in the subtle differences in the leshon. "היום" points to a specific, existing day with its conventional boundaries, while "יום אחד" denotes a quantitative unit of time. This hermeneutic principle is foundational for understanding temporal vows.

4. Rambam (Maimonides)

The Rambam, in his Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Nedarim 4:2-3, codifies the halacha derived from these discussions. His chiddush is in synthesizing the Talmudic debates into clear, actionable rulings, often implicitly choosing between competing interpretations or finding a way to incorporate different leshonot into distinct halachot.

• "היום" vs. "יום אחד" (Hilchot Nedarim 4:2): Rambam rules: "הנודר יין שאיני טועם 'היום' - אסור עד שתחשך, ואם אמר 'יום אחד' - אסור כד' ועשרים שעות מן השעה שנדר" (One who vows, 'wine that I shall not taste today' – is forbidden until nightfall. And if he said, 'one day' – he is forbidden for 24 hours from the hour he vowed). This directly incorporates the Mishnah's distinction and the Gemara's clarification of "יום אחד" as "משעה לשעה." Rambam explicitly adopts the interpretation that "היום" ends at nightfall, aligning with the Penei Moshe and Korban HaEdah's reading of the Mishnah, and implicitly with R. Yonah's terutz in the Yerushalmi that "day" can mean daylight in common usage.

• "שבת זו", "חדש זה", "שנה זו" (Hilchot Nedarim 4:3): Rambam continues: "אמר 'שבת זו' - אסור עד שתכנס שבת הבאה, והשבת הבאה מותר... 'חדש זה' - אסור עד שיכנס ראש חדש הבא, וראש חדש הבא מותר... 'שנה זו' - אסור עד שיכנס ראש השנה הבא, וראש השנה הבא מותר..." (He said, 'this week' – he is forbidden until the coming Sabbath enters, and the coming Sabbath is permitted... 'this month' – he is forbidden until the coming Rosh Chodesh enters, and the coming Rosh Chodesh is permitted... 'this year' – he is forbidden until the coming Rosh Hashanah enters, and the coming Rosh Hashanah is permitted...). This codifies the Mishnah's rulings for these larger temporal units, consistently terminating the vow before the commencement of the subsequent calendrical unit. Rambam's chiddush here is less about novel interpretation and more about establishing the definitive halacha that these vows are bound by fixed calendrical markers as understood in common parlance. He implicitly rejects any interpretation that would extend "this week" to include the coming Sabbath, aligning with the standard understanding of "השבת של עבר."

• Intercalary Month (Hilchot Nedarim 4:4): Rambam also addresses the "Adar" issue (mentioned later in the Yerushalmi's sugya): "אמר 'חודש אדר' סתם, והיתה שנה מעוברת - אם לא ידע שהיא מעוברת, הרי הוא אסור עד סוף אדר הראשון, ואם ידע שהיא מעוברת, אסור עד סוף אדר השני" (If he said 'the month of Adar' without qualification, and it was an intercalated year – if he did not know it was intercalated, he is forbidden until the end of the First Adar. If he knew it was intercalated, he is forbidden until the end of the Second Adar). This ruling reflects the Tosefta (Nedarim 4:7) and Bavli (Nedarim 63b) and demonstrates Rambam's sensitivity to the noder's knowledge and intent, a further extension of the lashon benei adam principle where the speaker's context shapes the vow's meaning.

In sum, these commentators illuminate the Yerushalmi's deep dive into linguistic precision. Penei Moshe and Korban HaEdah provide the essential interpretive framework for the Yerushalmi itself, emphasizing lashon benei adam. Rashba offers a compelling reconciliation between R. Yochanan and the Mishnah through a nuanced understanding of common speech. Rambam then distills these complex debates into a clear, authoritative halachic framework, demonstrating how the principles of lashon benei adam and calendrical reckoning are applied in practice.

Friction

The Yerushalmi Nedarim 8:1 is rife with hermeneutic friction, primarily stemming from the tension between linguistic conventions and fixed legal or biblical definitions. Two major kushyot stand out, each prompting profound discussions and a range of terutzim.

1. The R. Yochanan Contradiction: Lashon Benei Adam vs. Mishnah's "Today"

The most immediate and central kushya posed by the Yerushalmi is the apparent contradiction between the Mishnah's ruling on "today" (היום) and R. Yochanan's overarching principle for vows.

The Kushya: The Mishnah states: "‘A qônām that I shall not taste wine today,’ he is forbidden only until nightfall." (Nedarim 8:1:1). This implies that "today" refers exclusively to the daylight hours, ending with tzeit hakochavim (nightfall). The Gemara immediately challenges this: "Does this not disagree with Rebbi Joḥanan, since Rebbi Joḥanan said, in matters of vows one follows common usage?" (Nedarim 8:1:1). The Gemara then offers examples of common usage that seem to contradict the Mishnah:

• "It is not usual that a man should say to another in the evening, I did not eat until evening. Would he say, yesterday?" This scenario suggests that in common parlance, the evening hours of the current day are still considered "today," not "yesterday." If so, a vow of "today" should extend into the evening.
• "It is not usual that a man should say to another in the morning, I did not eat in the evening. Would he say, the same day?" This reverse scenario further strengthens the claim: a person before sunrise would refer to the evening hours of the same night as "yesterday." This implies that the evening hours of the preceding day do belong to that day in popular consciousness. If so, a vow made "today" (during daylight) should extend to its evening, just as the previous day's evening is counted with it.

The kushya is profound: If R. Yochanan's rule is absolute, and common usage dictates that "today" includes the night that follows it (or at least could include it, as suggested by the examples), how can the Mishnah limit "today" to daylight hours only?

Terutz 1: Lashon Torah as the Governing Principle (Yerushalmi's Initial Suggestion) The Yerushalmi offers a direct, albeit challenging, resolution: "But here, one follows the opinion that in matters of vows one follows biblical usage." (Nedarim 8:1:1).

• Analysis: This terutz suggests that for the specific case of "today," the Mishnah deviates from R. Yochanan's lashon benei adam principle and instead adopts lashon Torah. The biblical definition of a "day" in Bereishit 1:5, "ויהי ערב ויהי בוקר יום אחד" (And there was evening and there was morning, one day), is often interpreted to mean that the "day" begins with evening and ends with morning, or that "day" refers distinctly to the daylight period. The specific phrasing "יום אחד" (one day) in Bereishit emphasizes the composite nature of the day. If the Mishnah is following a lashon Torah definition where "יום" (daylight) is distinct from "לילה" (night), then "היום" (today) would naturally refer to the daylight portion of the current calendrical day.
• Challenges: While a viable terutz, it creates new friction. When do we follow lashon benei adam and when lashon Torah? This solution seems arbitrary without a clear heuristic for switching between principles. If R. Yochanan's rule is general, why does "today" merit an exception based on lashon Torah? This suggests a deeper underlying principle or a more nuanced understanding of lashon benei adam itself.

Terutz 2: R. Yonah from Bostra's Refined Lashon Benei Adam Rebbi Jonah from Bostra offers a more sophisticated terutz that attempts to keep the Mishnah within the lashon benei adam framework: "Rebbi Jonah from Bostra said, it is the way of people to say to another, bear with me this day." (Nedarim 8:1:1).

• Analysis: This terutz posits that "day" (יום) can indeed mean daylight hours in common usage, particularly in contexts of work or activity. If someone says "bear with me this day" (סבור בי היום הזה), they are typically asking for help or work during the waking, active hours, not necessarily extending into the night. This demonstrates that there is a legitimate lashon benei adam where "today" exclusively means the daylight period. Therefore, the Mishnah's ruling is not a contradiction to R. Yochanan but rather an application of a specific, albeit not universal, common usage.
• Strengths: This terutz is elegant because it reconciles the Mishnah with R. Yochanan's principle without resorting to an external lashon Torah definition. It acknowledges the fluidity of common language, where a single word can have multiple accepted meanings depending on context and nuance. The noder's intent, when using "היום," is presumed to align with this common "daylight" understanding.
• Weaknesses: The Gemara's earlier examples ("I did not eat until evening... yesterday?") still present a counter-narrative of common usage. R. Yonah's terutz implies that all common usages must be considered, and the halacha will follow the most prevalent or contextually appropriate one for vows.

Terutz 3 (Implicit in Rambam's Psak): Distinct Linguistic Forms for Distinct Meanings While not explicitly a terutz in the Yerushalmi, Rambam's codified halacha provides a practical resolution that implicitly integrates the various linguistic nuances.

• Analysis: Rambam (Hilchot Nedarim 4:2) rules: "הנודר יין שאיני טועם 'היום' - אסור עד שתחשך, ואם אמר 'יום אחד' - אסור כד' ועשרים שעות מן השעה שנדר" (One who vows, 'wine that I shall not taste today' – is forbidden until nightfall, and if he said, 'one day' – he is forbidden for 24 hours from the hour he vowed). Rambam essentially adopts both interpretations, assigning each to a distinct linguistic formulation. "היום" (today) refers to the calendrical daylight day, ending at nightfall, consistent with the Mishnah and R. Yonah's lashon benei adam. "יום אחד" (one day) refers to a full 24-hour cycle from the moment of the vow, consistent with the Gemara's clarification "משעה לשעה."
• Strengths: This approach is practical and avoids a direct contradiction by asserting that the noder chose a particular formulation, and that choice itself implies a specific intent aligned with a recognized common usage. The specific phrasing ("היום" vs. "יום אחד") signals the intended duration. This implicitly agrees with R. Yochanan that lashon benei adam governs, but it recognizes that common usage is not monolithic and provides distinct meanings for distinct phrases.

2. The Inversion of R. Yose's Opinion: "עד לפני פסח"

Another significant kushya arises from the Mishnah's ruling regarding "until before Passover" (עד לפני פסח) and the perceived inconsistency in R. Yose's position.

The Kushya: The Mishnah states: "‘Until Passover’, he is forbidden until it comes, ‘until it be’, he is forbidden until it is passed. ‘Until before Passover’, Rebbi Meїr says, until it comes, Rebbi Yose says, until it passed." (Nedarim 8:2:1). The Gemara queries: "Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: The opinion of Rebbi Yose seems to be inverted. There [in Kiddushin 3:9-10], he says 'until all the elder possibilities are exhausted, until all the younger possibilities are exhausted,' and here, he says so?" (Nedarim 8:2:1).

• Background (Kiddushin 3:9-10): In Kiddushin, R. Yose generally adopts a more restrictive interpretation of ambiguous terms, tending to narrow the scope of possibilities or to require the earliest possible fulfillment. For example, regarding a father marrying off an unknown daughter, R. Yose tries to identify the specific married daughter, leaving others permitted, whereas R. Meir tends to expand the doubt, forbidding more.
• The Inversion: In our Mishnah, regarding "עד לפני פסח" (until before Passover):
  • R. Meir says "עד שיבא" (until it comes), meaning the vow ends before Passover (i.e., before the eve of Nisan 14).
  • R. Yose says "עד שיעבור" (until it passed), meaning the vow extends past Passover (i.e., until the end of Nisan 14). The kushya is that R. Yose's position here ("until it passed") seems more expansive and thus less restrictive than R. Meir's ("until it comes"), which is contrary to his usual hermeneutic tendency. He usually seeks to limit the scope of prohibition, but here he extends it.

Terutz 1: "The Mishnah is Inverted" (Textual Emendation) The Yerushalmi offers a dramatic terutz: "He said to him, it is not inverted, the Mishnah is inverted, for in the House of Rebbi they stated: ‘Until before Passover’, Rebbi Meїr says, until it passed, Rebbi Yose says, until it comes." (Nedarim 8:2:1).

• Analysis: This terutz suggests a textual corruption in our Mishnah. By flipping the opinions, R. Yose would then say "until it comes" (more restrictive, ending before Passover), and R. Meir "until it passed" (more expansive, ending after Passover). This restores R. Yose's consistency with his general approach in Kiddushin.
• Strengths: This is a powerful terutz because it resolves the internal contradiction in R. Yose's methodology directly by correcting the source text itself. It implies a strong commitment to the logical consistency of Tannaitic opinions.
• Challenges: Textual emendations are a last resort. While sometimes necessary, they require strong evidence. Without external corroboration beyond "in the House of Rebbi they stated," it remains a significant claim. The Bavli (Nedarim 61b) also notes this inversion but attributes the correction to Rav.

Terutz 2: "Nabatean Expression" (Linguistic Redefinition) A different terutz reinterprets the phrase "לפני פסח" itself: "He said to him, this is a Nabatean expression, 'much before Passover'." (Nedarim 8:2:1).

• Analysis: This terutz suggests that "לפני פסח" (before Passover) isn't meant literally as "immediately preceding Passover," but rather refers to the entire period or "season" leading up to and including Passover. The phrase "much before Passover" implies a broader timeframe. If "לפני פסח" refers to a general period encompassing the festival itself, then R. Yose's "until it passed" would mean the vow extends until this entire, broadly defined period is over. This interpretation allows "לפני פסח" to be a broader term than strictly "the day before Passover."
• Strengths: This terutz is ingenious as it resolves the kushya by re-evaluating the meaning of the key phrase, rather than emending the text or inverting the Rabbis' opinions. It highlights the possibility of regional or dialectal variations in leshon benei adam, even within the same general linguistic community.
• Challenges: Relying on a "Nabatean expression" is itself a form of linguistic re-evaluation that might not be universally accepted or easily proven. It introduces an external linguistic element to resolve an internal Tannaitic dispute.

Terutz 3: R. Abin's Narrowing of the Dispute Rebbi Abin offers a practical narrowing of the dispute's scope: "Rebbi Abin said, everybody agrees that he is permitted on Passover. Where do they disagree? The day before Passover. One of them says, until it comes, the other until it passed." (Nedarim 8:2:1).

• Analysis: R. Abin suggests that the core of the machloket is not whether the vow extends throughout Passover itself, but rather how to interpret "לפני פסח" (before Passover) specifically concerning the 14th of Nisan (Erev Pesach). Both R. Meir and R. Yose agree that the vow cannot extend into Passover (Nisan 15-21) because Passover is a Yom Tov and generally, vows that interfere with Yom Tov are problematic or void. The disagreement, then, is whether "לפני פסח" implies the vow ends at the beginning of Nisan 14 (R. Meir: "until it comes" - i.e., until the start of the day before Passover), or at the end of Nisan 14 (R. Yose: "until it passed" - i.e., until the end of the day before Passover). If R. Yose means the vow includes the entire day of Nisan 14, then his position is still more expansive than R. Meir's, but the total scope is limited to Erev Pesach. This could maintain his general tendency for a more rigorous, expansive (in terms of prohibition) interpretation.
• Strengths: This terutz grounds the machloket in a more tangible halachic reality (Erev Pesach vs. Pesach itself) and attempts to preserve R. Yose's consistency within that narrower scope. It also aligns with the broader principle that vows should not override biblical mitzvot or Yom Tov obligations.
• Weaknesses: It still requires a nuanced reading to fully reconcile R. Yose's "until it passed" with his general restrictive tendency, as even including all of Nisan 14 is still more expansive than ending before it.

These frictions reveal the profound methodological challenges in interpreting halakha from often laconic Mishnaic statements. The amoraim employ textual emendation, linguistic analysis, and contextual narrowing to resolve these tensions, providing a rich tapestry of interpretive strategies.

Intertext

The sugya in Yerushalmi Nedarim 8:1 is deeply interwoven with other texts across Jewish literature, drawing upon biblical definitions, parallel Talmudic discussions, and historical records. These intertextual connections illuminate the sugya's foundational principles and broader implications.

1. Bereishit 1:5 – The Biblical Definition of "Day"

The foundational biblical definition of "day" is found in the creation narrative: "וַיִּקְרָא אֱלֹהִים לָאוֹר יוֹם וְלַחֹשֶׁךְ קָרָא לָיְלָה וַיְהִי עֶרֶב וַיְהִי בֹקֶר יוֹם אֶחָד." (Bereishit 1:5). "And God called the light Day, and the darkness He called Night. And there was evening and there was morning, one day."

• Connection: This verse is the ultimate source for lashon Torah's understanding of "day." The Yerushalmi explicitly references this when offering a terutz to the R. Yochanan contradiction: "But here, one follows the opinion that in matters of vows one follows biblical usage." (Nedarim 8:1:1). The phrase "ויהי ערב ויהי בוקר יום אחד" has been famously interpreted in two main ways:
  1. A day begins with the preceding evening (e.g., Shabbat begins Friday evening). This is the halachic day for most mitzvot.
  2. "Day" refers specifically to the daylight portion, and "one day" is the composite unit of an evening and a morning, but "day" itself is the light.
• Relevance to Sugya: The Mishnah's ruling that "today" (היום) ends at nightfall aligns with the second interpretation, that "day" as a singular unit refers to the daylight portion. The Yerushalmi's kushya from R. Yochanan and its terutzim grapple with whether this "daylight only" definition for "היום" is derived from lashon Torah or a specific lashon benei adam. The core tension is precisely how to interpret "יום" in a vow context: as the 24-hour halachic day starting at nightfall, or as the daylight portion, or as a 24-hour period from the moment of the vow. The Bereishit verse provides the backdrop for this entire discussion, as it defines the raw components of time.

2. Bavli Nedarim 60a-61b – Parallel Sugya

The Bavli, in Nedarim 60a-61b, discusses the exact same Mishnah. While the core issues are shared, the Bavli's development of the sugya presents different nuances and resolutions.

• Connection: Both Talmuds are wrestling with the same Mishnaic text and the same fundamental questions about temporal vows, lashon benei adam, and lashon Torah.
• Relevance to Sugya:
  • R. Yochanan Contradiction: The Bavli (Nedarim 60a) also presents the kushya against R. Yochanan, offering similar examples of common usage. However, the Bavli's terutz leans more heavily on the idea that R. Yochanan would agree that "today" can refer to daylight hours in common usage, similar to R. Yonah's terutz in the Yerushalmi. The Bavli might emphasize different nuances of lashon benei adam or draw different distinctions to reconcile the Mishnah. For example, the Bavli considers the possibility that "today" is always considered daylight, while "yesterday" or "tomorrow" might encompass the night.
  • "Until before Passover" Inversion: The Bavli (Nedarim 61b) also notes the inversion of R. Meir's and R. Yose's opinions regarding "עד לפני פסח." It offers the same terutz of "Mishnah is inverted," attributing the corrected version to Rav. This shared terutz across both Talmuds suggests a strong tradition of this textual emendation. The Bavli doesn't mention the "Nabatean expression" terutz found in the Yerushalmi, highlighting a divergence in interpretive strategies.
  • "Adar" and Intercalary Years: Both Talmuds discuss the interpretation of "Adar" in a vow during an intercalated year. The Bavli (Nedarim 63b), like the Tosefta, differentiates based on whether the noder knew it was an intercalated year, which the Yerushalmi (8:1:1:13 footnote) acknowledges. This showcases the widespread recognition of da'at noder (the vower's knowledge/intent) in shaping the neder's scope.

3. Tosefta Nedarim 4:7 – Tannaic Parallel for "Adar"

The Tosefta, an earlier collection of Tannaitic teachings, often provides crucial context and parallel rulings to the Mishnah and Gemara.

• Connection: Tosefta Nedarim 4:7 states: "הנודר שאינו טועם יין עד אדר: אם לא ידע שהוא מעוברת, אסור עד אדר הראשון. ואם ידע, אסור עד אדר השני." (One who vows not to taste wine until Adar: if he did not know it was an intercalated year, he is forbidden until the First Adar. If he knew, he is forbidden until the Second Adar).
• Relevance to Sugya: Our Yerushalmi (Nedarim 8:1:1:13, footnote) explicitly refers to this Tosefta (or a similar baraita) when discussing the "Adar" part of the sugya. The Tosefta's ruling is a clear application of lashon benei adam coupled with da'at noder. If the noder was unaware of the intercalation, "Adar" means the standard Adar Rishon (First Adar). If aware, it includes Adar Sheni (Second Adar). This principle underpins the broader sugya's exploration of how a vow's duration is determined by both the literal meaning of the words and the vower's contextual understanding.

4. Mishnah Kiddushin 3:9-10 – R. Yose's Hermeneutic Consistency

The Yerushalmi directly references Mishnah Kiddushin 3:9-10 to highlight a perceived inconsistency in R. Yose's interpretive approach.

• Connection: The kushya regarding R. Yose's opinion in Nedarim ("until it passed" for "until before Passover") is directly compared to his method in Kiddushin.
• Relevance to Sugya: In Kiddushin 3:9, R. Yose's approach to ambiguous scenarios (e.g., a father marrying off an unknown daughter from two sets) is generally to adopt the most specific or most limited interpretation, thereby minimizing the scope of uncertainty or prohibition. For instance, in a case of ambiguity, he might identify the single most likely candidate, leaving others permitted. This contrasts with R. Meir, who often favors a broader, more expansive (and thus more restrictive) interpretation to cover all possibilities. The Yerushalmi's kushya is precisely that in Nedarim 8:2:1, R. Yose's "until it passed" seems more expansive than R. Meir's "until it comes," which runs counter to his usual pattern. The ensuing terutzim (textual emendation, Nabatean expression, narrowing the dispute) are all attempts to preserve the internal consistency of R. Yose's interpretive methodology. This intertextual reference highlights the rigorous academic method of the Talmud, which strives for logical coherence across the corpus of a Sage's teachings.

5. Megillat Ta'anit – Historical Context for Fast Days

A significant portion of our Yerushalmi sugya (Nedarim 8:1:2) diverges into a discussion about fast days, specifically the historical context and eventual abolition of Megillat Ta'anit.

• Connection: The Yerushalmi transitions from temporal vows to fast days, discussing whether a vow to fast can be for partial days ("fast for hours"), and which days are forbidden for fasting. This leads to the debate about Megillat Ta'anit.
• Relevance to Sugya: Megillat Ta'anit was an ancient Tannaitic scroll listing days on which fasting and eulogies were forbidden due to past joyous events or victories, primarily related to the Hasmonean period and early Rabbinic history. The Yerushalmi presents a machloket among Amoraim (R. Chanina, R. Yochanan, R. Yehoshua ben Levi) regarding whether Megillat Ta'anit was abolished.
  • "Rebbi Ḥanania and Rebbi Joḥanan both say that the Scroll of Fasts was abolished. Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, the Scroll of Fasts was abolished. Rebbi Joḥanan said, yesterday I was sitting and stating: “It happened that they decreed a fast day at Lod during Ḥanukka. Rebbi Eliezer went and had a haircut, Rebbi Joshua went and took a hot bath. Rebbi Joshua said to them, go and fast for what you fasted.” And you say, the Scroll of Fasts was abolished?" (Nedarim 8:1:2). This passage is rich, showing R. Yochanan seemingly contradicting himself or his own tradition.
  • The resolution (R. Abba: "even though you say that the Scroll of Fasts was abolished, Ḥanukka and Purim were not abolished") implies that while most of the historical minor holidays listed in Megillat Ta'anit lost their force, the major, biblically or rabbinically ordained festive days (like Chanukah and Purim) retained their status as days inappropriate for fasting.
• Broader Implications: This digression, while seemingly tangential to temporal vows, illustrates the dynamic nature of halakha. It shows how minhag (custom) and historical circumstances can evolve, leading to the abolition of earlier enactments. It also highlights the tension between individual piety (vowing to fast) and communal practice/decrees (Megillat Ta'anit days), a theme consistent with the broader sugya's concern for the interplay between individual intent and broader interpretive frameworks.

These intertextual connections demonstrate that the Yerushalmi's discussion of temporal vows is not an isolated legal exercise but a deeply integrated part of a continuous halachic and interpretive tradition, drawing on foundational texts and engaging with parallel discussions across the Talmudic corpus.

Psak/Practice

The intricate discussions in Yerushalmi Nedarim 8:1, balancing lashon benei adam, lashon Torah, and calendrical definitions, significantly shape the codified halacha regarding temporal vows. The rulings of the Rishonim and Acharonim, particularly Rambam and the Shulchan Aruch, reflect a synthesis of the Talmudic debates, providing practical guidance for the noder.

1. Rambam's Codification (Hilchot Nedarim 4:2-4)

Rambam's rulings in Mishneh Torah serve as a cornerstone for later psak, clearly distinguishing between different temporal formulations:

• "היום" (Today) vs. "יום אחד" (One Day): Rambam adopts the Mishnah's distinction, clarified by the Gemara:
  • "הנודר יין שאיני טועם 'היום' - אסור עד שתחשך." (Hilchot Nedarim 4:2) – A vow of "today" is forbidden only until nightfall. This aligns with the Yerushalmi's Mishnah and R. Yonah's terutz, which views "day" in common parlance as referring to daylight hours.
  • "ואם אמר 'יום אחד' - אסור כד' ועשרים שעות מן השעה שנדר." (Hilchot Nedarim 4:2) – A vow of "one day" means a full 24-hour period from the moment of the vow ("משעה לשעה"). This reflects the Gemara's clarification of the Mishnah's second clause.
• Calendrical Vows ("This Week/Month/Year/Sabbatical Period"): Rambam consistently rules that these vows terminate immediately before the commencement of the next calendrical unit:
  • "אמר 'שבת זו' - אסור עד שתכנס שבת הבאה, והשבת הבאה מותר." (Hilchot Nedarim 4:3) – "This week" ends before the coming Shabbat.
  • "חדש זה' - אסור עד שיכנס ראש חדש הבא, וראש חדש הבא מותר." (Hilchot Nedarim 4:3) – "This month" ends before the coming Rosh Chodesh.
  • "שנה זו' - אסור עד שיכנס ראש השנה הבא, וראש השנה הבא מותר." (Hilchot Nedarim 4:3) – "This year" ends before the coming Rosh Hashanah.
  • These rulings emphasize the primacy of calendrical markers in defining these periods, reflecting the lashon benei adam that perceives these as distinct units.
• Intercalary Month: Rambam also incorporates the principle of da'at noder for "Adar" vows:
  • "אמר 'חודש אדר' סתם, והיתה שנה מעוברת - אם לא ידע שהיא מעוברת, הרי הוא אסור עד סוף אדר הראשון, ואם ידע שהיא מעוברת, אסור עד סוף אדר השני." (Hilchot Nedarim 4:4) – This directly follows the Tosefta, indicating that the vower's knowledge of the calendar impacts the vow's scope.

2. Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 217)

The Shulchan Aruch, following the path laid by Rambam and other Rishonim, codifies these laws in Yoreh De'ah Siman 217. Its rulings largely mirror Rambam's, emphasizing a consistent application of lashon benei adam with specific distinctions for different linguistic formulations.

• YD 217:1: "הנודר יין שאיני טועם היום, אסור עד שתחשך. ואם אמר יום אחד, אסור כד' ועשרים שעות מן השעה שנדר." (One who vows, 'wine that I shall not taste today,' is forbidden until nightfall. And if he said 'one day,' he is forbidden for 24 hours from the hour he vowed.) This is a direct echo of the Mishnah, clarified by the Gemara and codified by Rambam.
• YD 217:2: "הנודר שבת זו, אסור עד שתכנס שבת הבאה. חדש זה, אסור עד שיכנס ראש חדש הבא. שנה זו, אסור עד שיכנס ראש השנה הבא." (One who vows 'this week,' is forbidden until the coming Shabbat. 'This month,' forbidden until the coming Rosh Chodesh. 'This year,' forbidden until the coming Rosh Hashanah.) These rulings also directly follow Rambam, solidifying the calendrical interpretation.
• YD 217:3 (Intercalary Month): "הנודר יין שאיני טועם עד אדר, אם לא ידע שהיא מעוברת אסור עד אדר הראשון. ואם ידע שהיא מעוברת, אסור עד אדר השני." (One who vows not to taste wine until Adar, if he did not know it was an intercalated year, he is forbidden until the First Adar. If he knew it was intercalated, he is forbidden until the Second Adar.) This reiterates the Tosefta's and Rambam's ruling, underscoring the role of the noder's knowledge.

3. Meta-Psak Heuristics

Beyond the specific rulings, this sugya highlights crucial meta-psak heuristics:

• Primacy of Lashon Benei Adam: The overarching principle, as stated by R. Yochanan and generally adopted in halacha, is that vows follow common usage. However, this is not a simplistic rule. "Common usage" itself is nuanced and can have multiple valid interpretations depending on context. The sugya demonstrates the rigorous process of discerning which common usage is applicable to a given phrase.
• Distinction in Linguistic Formulations: The clear differentiation between "this [period]" and "one [period]" is a critical heuristic. The definite article ("ה-") or demonstrative ("זו") often signals an intent tied to fixed, calendrical units with their conventional cut-off points, whereas the indefinite "אחד" (one) indicates a quantitative duration.
• Role of Da'at Noder (Vower's Knowledge/Intent): The discussion about the intercalary month ("Adar") explicitly introduces the noder's subjective knowledge as a factor in determining the vow's scope. This shows that halacha is not solely about objective linguistic interpretation but also considers the subjective understanding of the individual making the vow.
• Balancing Minhag and Halacha: The digression into Megillat Ta'anit illustrates the dynamic relationship between established customs (minhagim) and formal halakha. The abolition of most fast days from Megillat Ta'anit demonstrates the flexibility of halacha in adapting to changing historical circumstances, while still preserving core obligations (e.g., Chanukah and Purim).
• The Weight of Calendrical Markers: For periods like week, month, and year, the halacha consistently uses the established Jewish calendar's beginning and end points (Shabbat, Rosh Chodesh, Rosh Hashanah) as the termination points, rather than a continuous "from hour to hour" count. This underscores the importance of communal, fixed temporal definitions for larger units.

In essence, the psak derived from this sugya is a sophisticated blend of linguistic analysis, sensitivity to common parlance, and adherence to established calendrical structures, all aimed at interpreting the noder's intent as accurately as possible within the framework of Jewish law.

Takeaway

The sugya profoundly demonstrates that the interpretation of temporal vows is a delicate dance between the literal meaning of words, the dynamic nature of common linguistic usage, and the fixed structures of the Jewish calendar, all aiming to discern the vower's true intent. It highlights the rigorous Rabbinic methodology for deriving halacha from nuanced linguistic and contextual analysis.

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Footnotes:

1. Yerushalmi Nedarim 8:1:1.
2. Penei Moshe on Yerushalmi Nedarim 8:1:1:1.
3. Yerushalmi Nedarim 8:1:1.
4. Penei Moshe on Yerushalmi Nedarim 8:1:1:2.
5. Yerushalmi Nedarim 8:1:1.
6. Penei Moshe on Yerushalmi Nedarim 8:1:1:3.
7. Penei Moshe on Yerushalmi Nedarim 8:1:1:4.
8. Yerushalmi Nedarim 8:1:1.
9. Penei Moshe on Yerushalmi Nedarim 8:1:1:7.
10. Korban HaEdah on Yerushalmi Nedarim 8:1:1:1.
11. See Sefaria footnote 2 on Yerushalmi Nedarim 8:1:1, explaining the general interpretation of "Shabbat belongs to the past."
12. Penei Moshe on Yerushalmi Nedarim 8:1:1:4.
13. Penei Moshe on Yerushalmi Nedarim 8:1:1:7.
14. Rashba, Nedarim 60a, s.v. "מאי טעמא דמאן דאמר מיום ליום".
15. Rashba, Nedarim 60a, s.v. "דכי אמר היום".
16. Rambam, Hilchot Nedarim 4:2.
17. Yerushalmi Nedarim 8:1:1.
18. Rambam, Hilchot Nedarim 4:2.
19. Yerushalmi Nedarim 8:1:1.
20. Rambam, Hilchot Nedarim 4:3.
21. Rambam, Hilchot Nedarim 4:4; Tosefta Nedarim 4:7.
22. Yerushalmi Nedarim 8:2:1.
23. Yerushalmi Nedarim 8:2:1; Mishnah Kiddushin 3:9-10.
24. Yerushalmi Nedarim 8:2:1.
25. Bavli Nedarim 61b, s.v. "דתניא בבי רב".
26. Yerushalmi Nedarim 8:2:1.
27. Yerushalmi Nedarim 8:2:1.
28. Bereishit 1:5.
29. Yerushalmi Nedarim 8:1:1.
30. Bavli Nedarim 60a-61b.
31. Tosefta Nedarim 4:7.
32. Mishnah Kiddushin 3:9-10.
33. Yerushalmi Nedarim 8:2:1.
34. Yerushalmi Nedarim 8:1:2.
35. Rambam, Hilchot Nedarim 4:2.
36. Rambam, Hilchot Nedarim 4:3.
37. Rambam, Hilchot Nedarim 4:4.
38. Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De'ah 217:1.
39. Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De'ah 217:2.
40. Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De'ah 217:3.