Leviticus 20

Sugya Map

• Issue: The precise dikduk and derasha of the opening phrase "ואל בני ישראל תאמר" (Leviticus 20:1) compared to the more common "דבר אל בני ישראל" or "אמור אל בני ישראל."
• Nafka Mina(s):
  • The scope of mitzvot detailed in Parshat Kedoshim, specifically whether they apply only to Bnei Yisrael or also to Bnei Noach (non-Jews).
  • The methodology for deriving halachic obligations for Bnei Noach in arayot (forbidden sexual relations), avodah zarah (specifically Molech worship), and birkat Hashem (blasphemy).
  • R' Yossi's unique approach to lashon haTorah – when to treat "איש איש" as lashon benei adam (colloquial) and when to derive halacha from it.
• Primary Sources:
  • Leviticus 20:1 ("ואל בני ישראל תאמר")
  • Leviticus 18:6 ("איש איש אל כל שאר בשרו לא תקרבו לגלות ערוה")
  • Leviticus 24:15 ("ואל בני ישראל תדבר איש איש כי יקלל אלקיו")
  • Sanhedrin 56a, 57b (regarding Bnei Noach obligations)
  • Chaggiga 11b (regarding na'ara me'urasa for Bnei Noach)
  • Zevachim 108a (regarding R' Yossi's view on "איש איש" in shochtei chutz)
  • Sifra Acharei Mot 13:18
  • Sifra Emor 19:7
  • Malbim on Leviticus 20:1 (Kedoshim 88:1)
  • Malbim Ayelet HaShachar 111:1-4, 260:1

Text Snapshot

The parsha opens with a seemingly innocuous command:

וַיְדַבֵּר ה' אֶל־מֹשֶׁה לֵּאמֹר: וְאֶל בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל תֹּאמַר אִישׁ אִישׁ כִּי־יִתֵּן מִזַּרְעוֹ לַמֹּלֶךְ מוֹת יוּמָת אֶבֶן יִרְגְּמוּ אֹתוֹ עַם הָאָרֶץ׃ And G-d spoke to Moses, saying: And to the Israelite people you shall say: Anyone among the Israelites, or among the strangers residing in Israel, who gives any offspring to Molech, shall be put to death; the people of the land shall pelt them with stones. (Leviticus 20:1-2)

Dikduk/Leshon Nuance

The immediate linguistic peculiarity lies in the sequence "וְאֶל בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל תֹּאמַר" (preposition + noun + verb). This deviates from the more standard biblical construct, which typically places the verb before the noun (e.g., "דַּבֵּר אֶל בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל" or "אֱמֹר אֶל בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל"). This subtle grammatical inversion is the fulcrum upon which the Malbim's profound derasha turns. The parsha then proceeds with the specific prohibition of Molech worship, followed by a litany of capital crimes, primarily focusing on arayot. As Rav Hirsch notes, this chapter serves as the penal code for the arayot prohibitions of Chapter 18, with Chapter 19 interjecting the overarching theme of national sanctity.

Readings

Malbim: The Anomalous Form as an Indicator of Derasha

The Malbim, in his commentary to Leviticus 20:1 (Kedoshim 88:1), dives deep into the dikduk of "ואל בני ישראל תאמר." He begins by noting that the standard linguistic practice in the Torah is to place the verb before the noun (e.g., "וידבר ה'", "וילך אברהם"). Any deviation from this norm, particularly the inversion of noun before verb, signals a specific gader (definition), mi'ut (exclusion), or diyuk (precision). The Malbim, referencing his Ayelet HaShachar (111:1-4, 260:1), often states that "כל מקום שכתוב 'דבר אל בני ישראל' בא למעט עכו"ם" (Wherever it says "speak to the Children of Israel," it comes to exclude non-Jews), unless there's an explicit inclusion. This general rule would suggest that "ואל בני ישראל תאמר" should exclude non-Jews.

However, the Malbim presents R' Yossi's chiddush which turns this on its head: R' Yossi asserts that this atypical phrasing – "ואל בני ישראל תאמר" – is precisely what necessitates a derasha. Unlike the more common "דבר אל בני ישראל," which R' Yossi considers lashon benei adam (colloquial language) and thus not subject to derasha from the phrase "איש איש" (as he holds regarding shochtei chutz in Zevachim 108a), the altered structure here demands interpretation.

The Malbim explains that this derasha from "ואל בני ישראל תאמר," when combined with the subsequent "איש איש," serves to include akum (non-Jews) in the issur (prohibition) of arayot, Molech, and birkat Hashem. He clarifies that this inclusion is for the issur itself, not necessarily for the exact dinim (laws/punishments) applied to Israelites. For instance, in arayot, an akum engaging in certain forbidden relations (like with a na'ara me'urasa) is judged by Bnei Noach laws, which differ from those applied to Israelites (Chaggiga 11b, Sanhedrin 57b). The Malbim emphasizes: "כי דיניהם מובדל בזה מעכו"ם הגם שגם בו נוהג דיני עריות ודיני ברכת השם" (for their laws are distinct in this from non-Jews, even though the laws of arayot and birkat Hashem apply to them as well).

The Malbim further clarifies that the derasha from "איש איש" here is not to include gerim, women, or slaves, as they are often explicitly mentioned elsewhere (e.g., Leviticus 18:26 regarding "האזרח והגר הגר בתוככם" which Sifra Acharei Mot 13:18 derives to include women and slaves; and Leviticus 24:16 "כגר כאזרח" for birkat Hashem, as per Sifra Emor 19:7). Therefore, the unique derasha of "ואל בני ישראל תאמר" coupled with "איש איש" must be to include akum.

Rav Hirsch: Thematic Context of Sanctity and Punishment

Rav Hirsch (Leviticus 20:1) offers a thematic, rather than purely halachic or linguistic, reading of Chapter 20. He sees it as a direct continuation of the arayot laws from Chapter 18, providing the judicial death penalties (mitat Beit Din) and karet (divine excision) for their transgression. He notes the placement of Chapter 19 (the Kedoshim chapter, emphasizing holiness) between Chapter 18 (prohibitions) and Chapter 20 (punishments). This arrangement is crucial: it underscores that the arayot laws are not merely legalistic prohibitions but are foundational to the sanctity (kedusha) of the individual and the nation.

Before detailing the severe punishments, the Torah first articulates the profound significance of these mitzvot for the entire national purpose. Observing these laws ensures a holy family life, without which the nation cannot fulfill the directive "קדושים תהיו" (You shall be holy). Any transgression against arayot laws strikes at the very moral core and future of the nation, justifying the severe penalties of mitat Beit Din or karet and obligating the community to enforce them. While not delving into the Malbim's dikduk, Rav Hirsch provides the overarching machshava (philosophical framework) that imbues the punishments with meaning, emphasizing the grave spiritual and societal implications of these transgressions.

Friction

The Apparent Contradiction in Malbim's Dikduk

Kushya: The Malbim's analysis of "ואל בני ישראל תאמר" presents an intriguing tension. On the one hand, his Ayelet HaShachar (111:1-4, 260:1) establishes a general rule for dikduk: placing the noun before the verb ("הכהן ימלק," "ואת אשמו יביא") typically indicates a gader, mi'ut, or diyuk. In the specific context of "דבר אל בני ישראל," he states that this phrasing normally serves "למעט עכו"ם" (to exclude non-Jews). Yet, in Kedoshim 88:1, R' Yossi's derasha from "ואל בני ישראל תאמר" (which features the noun "בני ישראל" before the verb "תאמר") is precisely to include akum in the issur of Molech, arayot, and birkat Hashem. How can a grammatical structure that normally excludes akum be the very basis for their inclusion? This seems to contradict the Malbim's own established rules of dikduk.

Terutz: The Malbim himself provides the resolution within his Kedoshim 88:1 commentary. The key lies in understanding R' Yossi's unique approach to lashon haTorah and the nuance of derasha.

1. "Lashon Benei Adam" vs. "Lashon HaTorah HaMeduyak": R' Yossi's foundational premise, as noted by the Malbim (referencing Zevachim 108a), is that where the Torah uses standard colloquial language ("דברה תורה כלשון בני אדם"), particularly with phrases like "איש איש," it does not necessarily invite derasha beyond the plain meaning. If "דבר אל בני ישראל" were used here, R' Yossi would dismiss "איש איש" as mere common parlance, without any expansive derasha.
2. The Signal for Derasha: The unusual phrasing "ואל בני ישראל תאמר" (preposition + noun + verb) is precisely what signals to R' Yossi that this is not merely lashon benei adam. This deviation from the norm, even if its intrinsic grammatical function might elsewhere be mi'ut, here serves as an indicator that a derasha is intended. The Malbim states this explicitly: "רק על ידי שכתוב 'ואל בני ישראל תאמר' מוכרח שבא 'איש איש' בדרך הדיוק." The grammatical anomaly forces a precise reading of "איש איש."
3. Inclusion in Issur, Distinction in Dinim: The mi'ut (exclusion/limitation) implied by "אל בני ישראל" (as per Ayelet HaShachar) is reconciled with the ribui (inclusion) derived by R' Yossi. The Malbim explains that the derasha includes akum in the issur (the prohibition itself) but not necessarily in the dinim (the specific judicial consequences or punishments) applied to Bnei Yisrael. "כי דיניהם מובדל בזה מעכו"ם הגם שגם בו נוהג דיני עריות ודיני ברכת השם." Thus, the phrase serves both to include akum in the general prohibition (via "איש איש" derasha triggered by the anomalous phrasing) and simultaneously to hint at the distinction in their legal framework and penalties. The specific target of the phrase "אל בני ישראל" is to highlight that the dinim (e.g., mitat Beit Din for arayot) are specifically for Bnei Yisrael, even while the underlying issur extends to akum.

In essence, the Malbim posits that the non-standard syntax acts as a meta-linguistic cue, overriding R' Yossi's general lashon benei adam rule and compelling a deeper derasha for "איש איש" to include akum in the issur, while the very specificity of "אל בני ישראל" also maintains a distinction regarding the dinim. It's a masterful demonstration of how subtle shifts in leshon haKodesh carry multi-layered halachic implications.

Intertext

The Seven Noachide Laws (Sheva Mitzvot Bnei Noach)

The Malbim's derasha for the inclusion of akum in the issurim of Molech, arayot, and birkat Hashem directly connects to the foundational halachic concept of Sheva Mitzvot Bnei Noach. These seven universal laws are enumerated in the Talmud (Sanhedrin 56a): prohibitions against avodah zarah (idolatry), birkat Hashem (blasphemy), shefichut damim (murder), gilui arayot (sexual immorality), gezel (theft), ever min ha'chai (eating a limb from a living animal), and the establishment of dinim (courts of justice).

The specific prohibitions of Molech (a form of avodah zarah), arayot, and birkat Hashem discussed by the Malbim fall squarely within these Noachide laws. The Talmud in Sanhedrin 57b explicitly discusses the Bnei Noach obligation in arayot and birkat Hashem. The Malbim's intricate linguistic analysis provides R' Yossi's specific textual basis for these obligations, showing how even a phrase seemingly directed at Israel can, through precise derasha, reveal universal moral imperatives. This highlights the Torah's layered nature, where explicit instructions for one group can contain implicit obligations for all humanity.

The Derasha of "איש איש"

The phrase "איש איש" ("anyone," literally "a man, a man") appears frequently in the Torah and is a common trigger for derashot to expand the scope of a mitzvah. However, its application is not uniform. The Malbim notes R' Yossi's specific view (Zevachim 108a) that in certain contexts (like shochtei chutz), "איש איש" is merely lashon benei adam and does not demand a derasha.

Yet, in our sugya, R' Yossi does derive a derasha from "איש איש" to include akum for arayot, Molech, and birkat Hashem. The Malbim attributes this to the unique preceding phrase "ואל בני ישראל תאמר." This demonstrates a sophisticated derasha methodology: the derasha of "איש איש" is not automatic, but rather activated by specific, unusual linguistic cues in its vicinity. The interplay between "איש איש" and the surrounding dikduk reveals a nuanced approach to halachic expansion. The Sifra (Acharei Mot 13:18) utilizes "איש איש" from Leviticus 18:6 ("איש איש אל כל שאר בשרו") to include women, slaves, and gerim in arayot, and Sifra Emor 19:7 does similarly for birkat Hashem. The Malbim's point is that R' Yossi must find an alternative source for akum inclusion, and he finds it in the unique structure of Leviticus 20:1, distinguishing his view from other tannaim.

Psak/Practice

The halacha largely accepts that Bnei Noach are obligated in the prohibitions of arayot, avodah zarah, and birkat Hashem, as part of the Sheva Mitzvot Bnei Noach (Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Melachim 9:1). While the psak generally aligns with the chachamim who do derive these obligations from "איש איש" even without R' Yossi's specific dikduk of "ואל בני ישראל תאמר" as the triggering mechanism, R' Yossi's opinion is a significant voice in the halachic discourse.

The practical implications of this sugya are twofold:

1. Universal Moral Code: It reinforces the concept of a universal moral code binding all humanity, derived from the Torah, not solely from natural law or human reason.
2. Distinct Legal Frameworks: It highlights that while the issur (prohibition) may be universal, the dinim (specific judicial punishments and details) can differ significantly between Bnei Yisrael and Bnei Noach. For instance, the exact definitions of prohibited arayot and their penalties for Bnei Noach are distinct (Sanhedrin 57b). This distinction is crucial in practical halachic application, particularly in interactions between Jewish and non-Jewish legal systems or in matters of gerut. The Malbim's derasha of "ואל בני ישראל תאמר" beautifully encapsulates this duality: inclusion in issur but distinction in din.

Takeaway

The seemingly minor grammatical inversion in "ואל בני ישראל תאמר" serves as a profound halachic signal, demonstrating how the Torah's precise language (לשון הקודש) reveals universal ethical obligations for Bnei Noach alongside specific legal frameworks for Bnei Yisrael. This dikduk underscores the intricate layers of meaning embedded within the Divine text, where every word choice bears halachic weight.