Leviticus 21

Sugya Map

This sugya delves into the opening verses of Parashat Emor, specifically the unique phrasing of the command to kohanim regarding tum'at met.

Issue

The sugya explores two primary textual nuances in Leviticus 21:1:

1. The Double Verb: The apparent redundancy of "אֱמֹר אֶל־הַכֹּהֲנִים... וְאָמַרְתָּ אֲלֵהֶם" (Say to the priests... and you shall say to them). What does this literary device signify?
2. The Addressees: The precise definition of "הַכֹּהֲנִים בְּנֵי אַהֲרֹן" (the priests, the sons of Aaron). Who is included and excluded from this prohibition?

Nafka Mina(s)

• Chinuch (Education) of Minors: Does the double verb imply an active obligation for adults to prevent kohanim children from contracting tum'at met? This has broader implications for chinuch regarding all mitzvos.
• Scope of Kehunah: Which individuals, by virtue of their lineage or status, are bound by this tum'at met prohibition? Specifically, the status of chalalim, ba'alei mum, and kohanim's daughters.
• Nature of the Prohibition: Is the prohibition against tum'at met for kohanim an intrinsic distinction or conditional on their Temple service? This informs the understanding of kedushat kehunah.
• Met Mitzvah: The application of the tum'at met prohibition to a met mitzvah (an unattended corpse).
• Marital Status: The meaning of "בְּעַמָּיו" in verse 4, and whether it refers to a kohen's wife.

Primary Sources

• Leviticus 21:1-4
• Talmud Bavli, Yevamot 114a
• Sifra, Emor, Section 1:1-3
• Rashi, Ramban, Sforno ad loc.

Text Snapshot

The focal point for our analysis is Leviticus 21:1:

וַיֹּאמֶר ה' אֶל־מֹשֶׁה אֱמֹר אֶל־הַכֹּהֲנִים בְּנֵי אַהֲרֹן וְאָמַרְתָּ אֲלֵהֶם לְנֶפֶשׁ לֹא־יִטַּמָּא בְּעַמָּיו׃ God said to Moses: Speak to the priests, the sons of Aaron, and say to them: None shall defile himself for any [dead] person among his kin.

Dikduk/Leshon Nuance

• "אֱמֹר... וְאָמַרְתָּ": The first verb, "אֱמֹר," is an imperative, while "וְאָמַרְתָּ" is a vav hahipuch (vav consecutive) creating a future-imperative sense. The repetition and grammatical shift are significant. Is it truly a repetition, or does each word carry a distinct nuance?
• "הַכֹּהֲנִים בְּנֵי אַהֲרֹן": The definite article "הַ" before "כֹּהֲנִים" specifies the priests. The phrase "בְּנֵי אַהֲרֹן" could be understood as a descriptive clarification or as a limiting factor.
• "לֹא־יִטַּמָּא בְּעַמָּיו": The verb "יִטַּמָּא" (he shall defile) is singular, even though the command is addressed to multiple priests. This singular form potentially points to an individual obligation or, as some suggest, a specific type of priest. The phrase "בְּעַמָּיו" (among his kin/people) is also ambiguous; "עַמָּיו" is plural ("his peoples") but can mean "his people" collectively.

Readings

Rashi: Warning Adults about Children & Specific Exclusions

Rashi, drawing from the Torat Kohanim and Gemara, provides a foundational reading of the verse.

The Double Verb: Warning Adults about Children

Rashi explains the double verb "אֱמֹר... וְאָמַרְתָּ" as "להזהיר גדולים על הקטנים" (to warn adults concerning children). This interpretation, sourced from Yevamot 114a, suggests that adults (specifically, the fathers of kohanim) are obligated to ensure that their minor children do not contract tum'at met¹. This is a crucial nafka mina for the broader concept of chinuch in Halakha, establishing that the Torah sometimes places an indirect obligation on adults for the mitzva observance of minors.

"בְּנֵי אַהֲרֹן": Inclusions and Exclusions

Rashi systematically defines "בְּנֵי אַהֲרֹן" based on additional derashot from the Sifra:

• Exclusion of Chalalim: "One might think that chalalim (priests who have lost their priestly status for reasons connected with their birth or marriage) also may not defile themselves by the dead, Scripture therefore states, 'Say unto the priests,' — thus only those sons of Aaron are included who have not lost their priestly character; consequently chalalim are excluded."² This teaches that the kedusha of a kohen is not merely lineal but conditional on maintaining certain halachic standards. A chalal lacks the kedushat kehunah that would prohibit tum'at met.
• Inclusion of Ba'alei Mum: "בני אהרן — This implies also those of Aaron's sons who have a bodily blemish."³ Despite their disqualification from Temple service, kohanim with mumim (blemishes) retain their kedushat kehunah regarding tum'at met. This highlights that the prohibition of tum'at met is a personal distinction of kehuna, not solely linked to sacrificial duties.
• Exclusion of Daughters: "בני אהרן — but not the daughters of Aaron."⁴ The male-gendered language of "בְּנֵי אַהֲרֹן" is understood to exclude kohanim's daughters from this specific prohibition.
• Met Mitzvah Exception: Rashi interprets "לֹא־יִטַּמָּא בְּעַמָּיו" (there shall none be defiled by the dead among his peoples) to mean "as long as the dead is among his peoples (i.e. so long as there are some of his people — Jews — who can occupy themselves with his burial) thus excluding the case of a met mitzvah (a corpse of a person whose relatives are unknown or which lies in a place where there are no Jews, nor are there any in the near vicinity; cf. Nazir 43b) in which case the priest is allowed to make himself unclean by handling the corpse."⁵ This establishes the met mitzvah as a halachic exception where the universal human obligation to bury the dead overrides the kohen's personal prohibition against tum'ah.

Ramban: Emphasizing Stringency and Personal Distinction

Ramban offers a different perspective on the double verb and the significance of "הַכֹּהֲנִים."

The Double Verb: Emphasis on Stringency

Ramban challenges Rashi's interpretation of "אֱמֹר... וְאָמַרְתָּ," suggesting that the repetition does not inherently imply chinuch for minors, but rather a general emphasis on the stringency of the command. He states, "In my opinion the plain sense of the verse is as follows: The meaning of emor (say) is like that of dabeir (speak)... And so also you find in many places that both [amor and dabeir are used in one verse, such as:] 'Dabeir (Speak) unto the children of Israel, v’amarta (and say) unto them' (Numbers 15:38), such usage [of the two verbs] being found in those sections where He wishes to warn them strongly [about a certain law] either because of the stringency of the matter, or on account of their habit to commit that sin."⁶ For Ramban, the repetition is a rhetorical device signifying the gravity of the mitzvah. While acknowledging the Gemara's derasha in Yevamot 114a, he interprets it as "we are not to assist with our hands in the defilement of children," not necessarily a broader obligation to prevent them.

"הַכֹּהֲנִים": Personal Distinction

Ramban distinguishes the use of "הַכֹּהֲנִים" here from other contexts where the Torah says "צו את אהרן ואת בניו" (Command Aaron and his sons). He argues that "הַכֹּהֲנִים" emphasizes that the prohibition of tum'at met is a personal mark of distinction (kedusha) for the kohen himself, regardless of his active service in the Sanctuary. "But here He warns the priests that they should never defile themselves for the dead, even at a time when they do not come into the Sanctuary, this being a mark of distinction to them personally; therefore Scripture mentioned here the priests, meaning to say that it is because they are the priests of the Eternal and the ministers of our G-d that He told them to conduct themselves in a manner reflecting honor and greatness, and that they should never become defiled."⁷ This understanding directly leads to the nafka mina that chalalim are excluded from this prohibition because they lack this personal distinction, reinforcing Rashi's derasha on this point, albeit from a different conceptual basis.

"בַּעַל בְּעַמָּיו": A Dignitary

Ramban also addresses "בְּעַמָּיו" in verse 4, where the text states "לֹא יִטַּמָּא בַּעַל בְּעַמָּיו לְהֵחַלֹּו." He offers an alternative to Rashi's interpretation of "בעל בעמיו" as "a husband among his people." Ramban suggests "בעל" here means "dignitary" or "lord," akin to phrases like "בעלי גויים" or "בעל הבית." Thus, "the honored one among his people [i.e., the priest] is not to defile himself for the dead, [in which case] he would be treating his honor with irreverence."⁸ This further reinforces his theme that the tum'at met prohibition is about the kohen's inherent kedusha and honor.

Sforno: Distinguishing General from Specific Priestly Duties

Sforno offers a concise and structured interpretation of the double verb, seeing it as a division of priestly instruction.

"אֱמֹר" vs. "וְאָמַרְתָּ": General vs. Specific Warnings

Sforno interprets "אֱמֹר אֶל־הַכֹּהֲנִים" as referring to general priestly duties and instructions that Moses has already given them (e.g., distinguishing between pure and impure animals, as per Leviticus 10:10-11). "What has been written earlier so that they will understand and instruct each other in the various categories of ritual impurities and contaminations, including the difference between ritually pure domestic beasts and birds, for these are the aspects of foremost concern to the priests on a regular basis as we read in 10,10-11 ולהבדיל בין הקדש ובין החול, ובין הטמא ובין הטהור ולהורות."⁹ The subsequent "וְאָמַרְתָּ אֲלֵהֶם" then refers to the specific, new prohibitions that follow in this chapter, such as tum'at met and the laws concerning their marriages. "That the need to exercise caution in addition to these categories of the ritually pure and that which is not, also in regard to impurity conferred through contact with the dead as well as through desecrating their seed."¹⁰ This view sees the repetition not as emphasis, but as an organizational structure for the divine command.

Friction

The Kushya: Rashi's "Warning" and the Limits of Chinuch

Rashi's interpretation of "אֱמֹר... וְאָמַרְתָּ" as "להזהיר גדולים על הקטנים" (to warn adults concerning children) presents a significant kushya when juxtaposed with the broader halachic principles of chinuch and responsibility for minors. If the Torah is "warning adults about children," does this imply an obligation for adults to actively prevent a child kohen from becoming tamei?

The Gemara in Yevamot 114a, which Rashi cites, discusses this very point. The Gemara explicitly states that ein onshim min ha'Torah ad sheyavo l'kol ha'Torah kulah (we do not punish based on Torah law until one is fully obligated in all of Torah)¹¹. A minor is not bar mitzvah and therefore not obligated in mitzvot from the Torah. Consequently, one is generally not obligated to prevent a child from transgressing an issur (prohibition) if the child acts on their own accord. The typical understanding of chinuch is to train children to perform mitzvot, not necessarily to stop them from aveirot if they are not yet at the age of chinuch or if they are acting independently.

How then can Rashi interpret the double lashon as a "warning" that seems to create an obligation to prevent? If a child kohen picks up a dead lizard, are adults obligated to intervene? If the child kohen is too young to understand tum'ah, what is the nature of this "warning"? This seems to contradict the nuanced approach to chinuch which typically distinguishes between actively assisting a child in an aveirah (which is forbidden due to lifnei iver – putting a stumbling block before the blind) and merely allowing a child to perform an aveirah independently (which is generally permissible if the child is not yet at the age of chinuch)¹².

The Terutz: Ramban's Clarification of Rashi

The Ramban, in his commentary on this very verse, provides the most compelling terutz by clarifying Rashi's intention. He directly addresses the potential misunderstanding of Rashi's lashon:

"Now the meaning of this 'warning' is to state that we are not to assist with our hands in the defilement of children [but it does not intend to warn us that we are obliged to prevent them from becoming defiled]. There are many admonitions in the Torah of this nature according to the interpretation of our Rabbis, such being the prohibitions against eating blood and swarming things, and against the defilement [of priests], and from them we learn that [it is applicable to] all prohibitions of the Torah, that we must not assist children in any case to transgress the law. But if they are doing it of their own accord, we [I.e., the court. But his father is obliged to rebuke him and prevent him from doing that which is forbidden (ibid., and such is the final decision of the law, Shulchan Aruch, Hilchoth Shabbath, 343).] are not commanded to prevent them [from so doing since they have not yet reached the training period of minors for religious practices, but if they have reached that stage, everyone is commanded to prevent them from doing a prohibited act]."¹³

Ramban carefully distinguishes between assisting a child in an aveirah and preventing a child from committing an aveirah on their own. Rashi's "להזהיר גדולים על הקטנים," according to Ramban, refers to the prohibition of lifnei iver, meaning adults should not actively facilitate the tum'ah of a child kohen. For example, a father should not hand a dead body to his child kohen. This is consistent with the general halachic principle.

The second part of Ramban's terutz introduces the concept of chinuch stage. If a child kohen has reached the age of chinuch (where they are capable of understanding the mitzvah), then their father is obligated to rebuke them and prevent them, even if they act independently. If they have not reached that stage, the obligation to prevent is not binding on others (though it may be proper). This nuance reconciles Rashi with the broader halachic framework, showing that the "warning" is not a blanket obligation to prevent, but rather a prohibition against facilitation and a conditional obligation of prevention based on the child's chinuch stage. This prevents Rashi from being read as generating an entirely new and problematic obligation for all minors.

Intertext

Chinuch of Minors: A Foundational Principle

The discussion regarding "להזהיר גדולים על הקטנים" immediately brings to mind the broader sugya of chinuch (education or training) of minors in mitzvot. The Gemara in Yevamot 114a itself is a locus classicus for this principle, contrasting prohibitions (lo ta'aseh) with positive commandments (mitzvot aseh). For mitzvot aseh, the obligation to train a child begins when they are capable of performing the mitzvah (e.g., Sukkah 42a regarding lulav and tzitzit)¹⁴. For issurim, the principle articulated by Ramban (and others) based on Yevamot 114a is that while one cannot assist a child in an aveirah (due to lifnei iver), if the child acts independently, one is not obligated to prevent them unless they are at the chinuch stage for that specific issur. The derasha on "אֱמֹר... וְאָמַרְתָּ" thus serves as a textual source for this nuanced approach to chinuch concerning issurim, emphasizing the unique kedusha of the kohen and the need for early training.

The Distinctive Kedusha of Kohanim

Ramban's emphasis on "הַכֹּהֲנִים" signifying the kohen's personal distinction, even outside the Temple, resonates deeply with other texts that underscore the unique kedusha of the priesthood. For instance, the laws of terumah (holy gifts) which kohanim alone may eat, or the special bigdei kehunah (priestly vestments) worn during service, all highlight their elevated status¹⁵. The prohibition against marrying certain women (divorcees, chalalot) also demonstrates that their kedusha impacts their personal lives and lineage, not just their cultic roles¹⁶. This consistent theme across Tanakh and Chazal reinforces the idea that a kohen's status is not merely functional but ontological, a sacred identity that imposes unique responsibilities and privileges both inside and outside the Sanctuary. The tum'at met prohibition, therefore, is not just about ritual purity for service, but about maintaining the inherent sanctity of the individual kohen as "holy to their God" (Leviticus 21:6).

Psak/Practice

The halachic ramifications of this sugya are thoroughly codified and form fundamental principles in Jewish law.

Chinuch regarding Aveirot

The nuanced approach to chinuch for issurim, as clarified by Ramban on Rashi, is the prevailing halakha. The Shulchan Aruch rules that one may not assist a child in an aveirah, citing the prohibition of lifnei iver¹⁷. If a child performs an aveirah independently, one is not obligated to prevent them if they are too young to understand the prohibition. However, if the child has reached the age of chinuch (which varies by mitzvah and the child's capacity), then one is obligated to prevent them¹⁸. Specifically, for tum'at met, a kohen's father would be obligated to prevent his child from becoming tamei once the child is old enough to understand the concept of tum'ah and the prohibition.

Scope of Kohen's Tum'at Met Prohibition

• Chalalim: It is explicitly ruled that chalalim are not bound by the prohibition of tum'at met¹⁹. This aligns with Rashi's derasha and Ramban's conceptualization of their lack of kedushat kehunah.
• Ba'alei Mum: Kohanim with mumim (blemishes) are included in the prohibition of tum'at met. Despite their inability to perform Temple service, their kedusha regarding tum'ah remains²⁰.
• Daughters of Kohanim: Kohanim's daughters are not prohibited from tum'at met from a Torah perspective, as the verse specifies "בְּנֵי אַהֲרֹן" (sons of Aaron)²¹.
• Met Mitzvah: The exception of met mitzvah is a universally accepted halakha. A kohen is not only permitted but obligated to defile himself for a met mitzvah, as the communal obligation to bury the dead overrides the individual priestly prohibition²².

These rulings underscore that the Torah's precise lashon is not merely academic; it directly shapes the practical application of Halakha for kohanim across generations.

Takeaway

The opening verses of Emor, through their precise lashon and the subsequent derashot, reveal the multifaceted nature of kedushat kehunah – an intrinsic, personal sanctity that extends beyond cultic service and necessitates a unique approach to chinuch even for minors.

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¹ Rashi on Leviticus 21:1 s.v. אמר אל הכהנים, citing Yevamot 114a. ² Rashi on Leviticus 21:1 s.v. בני אהרן, citing Sifra, Emor, Section 1:1. ³ Rashi on Leviticus 21:1 s.v. בני אהרן, citing Sifra, Emor, Section 1:1. ⁴ Rashi on Leviticus 21:1 s.v. בני אהרן, citing Sifra, Emor, Section 1:1. ⁵ Rashi on Leviticus 21:1 s.v. לא יטמא בעמיו, citing Sifra, Emor, Section 1:3 and Nazir 43b. ⁶ Ramban on Leviticus 21:1:1 s.v. אמור אל הכהנים. ⁷ Ramban on Leviticus 21:1:1 s.v. הכהנים. ⁸ Ramban on Leviticus 21:1:1 s.v. בעל בעמיו. ⁹ Sforno on Leviticus 21:1:1 s.v. ויאמר ה' אל משה אמור אל הכהנים. ¹⁰ Sforno on Leviticus 21:1:2 s.v. ואמרת אליהם. ¹¹ Yevamot 114a. ¹² See Avoda Zara 6b, Kiddushin 42a for discussions on lifnei iver. ¹³ Ramban on Leviticus 21:1:1 s.v. אמור אל הכהנים. ¹⁴ Sukkah 42a. ¹⁵ E.g., Numbers 18:8-19 regarding terumah; Exodus 28 regarding bigdei kehunah. ¹⁶ Leviticus 21:7, 13-15. ¹⁷ Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 343:3; Yoreh De'ah 151:4. ¹⁸ Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 343:3; Mishnah Berurah 343:7. ¹⁹ Yevamot 69b; Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Tum'at Met 3:10. ²⁰ Sifra, Emor 1:1; Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Tum'at Met 3:10. ²¹ Sifra, Emor 1:1; Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Tum'at Met 3:10. ²² Nazir 43b; Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Tum'at Met 3:8; Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De'ah 374:1.