Daf A Week · Expert – Beit Midrash Analysis · On-Ramp

Nedarim 55

On-RampExpert – Beit Midrash AnalysisNovember 13, 2025

Sugya Map

Issue

The core issue revolves around the precise scope of terms used in nedarim (vows), specifically dagan (grain) and tevua (produce). Does the vower's intent follow a broad, common linguistic usage (lashon bnei adam) or a narrower, halachically/biblically defined category (lashon Torah)? This question impacts which foodstuffs become prohibited.

Nafka Mina(s)

  1. Scope of Prohibition: Whether a vow concerning dagan prohibits only the five biblical species (wheat, barley, oats, spelt, rye) or extends to anything that is "piled" (midgan), like dry cowpeas.
  2. Monetary Obligations: The gemara's discussion of alalta (crop/produce) illustrates how these definitional nuances extend to financial agreements, determining what constitutes "profit" or "crop" for distribution.
  3. Blessings: The later gemara concerning truffles and mushrooms, and the bracha of Shehakol, demonstrates how the definition of "growth from the ground" can be nuanced, even requiring an emendation to differentiate between growth and sustenance.

Primary Sources

  • Nedarim 55a-55b
  • II Chronicles 31:5
  • Numbers 21:18-20
  • Isaiah 40:4
  • Berakhot 40b

Text Snapshot

The mishna opens with a classic machloket Tanna'im: MISHNA: For one who vows that grain [dagan] is forbidden to him, it is prohibited to eat the dry cowpea, because, like grain, its final stage of production involves being placed in a pile; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: It is prohibited for him to partake of only the five species of grain: Wheat, barley, oats, spelt, and rye, as that is the connotation of the term dagan in the Torah. [Nedarim 55a:1]

Note the immediate friction: Rabbi Meir's definition of dagan is functional (midgan – anything piled), while the Rabbis restrict it to the ḥameshet minim (five species) based on Torah usage.

The mishna continues to nuance Rabbi Meir's position: MISHNA: Rabbi Meir says: For one who vows that grain is forbidden to him, and therefore he will refrain from eating grain [tevua], it is prohibited for him to eat from only the five species of grain. However, for one who vows that grain is forbidden to him, and therefore he will refrain from eating grain [dagan], it is prohibited to eat all produce whose final stage of production involves being placed in a pile... [Nedarim 55a:2] Here, Rabbi Meir differentiates between dagan and tevua. While dagan is broad (midgan), tevua is narrow (five species). This concession for tevua is pivotal.

The gemara then probes these definitions, particularly Rav Yosef's objection from Divrei Hayamim II: GEMARA: Rav Yosef raised an objection: ...“And as soon as the matter was publicized, the children of Israel gave in abundance the first fruits of dagan, wine, and oil, and honey, and of all the tevua of the field; and the tithe of all that they brought in abundance” (II Chronicles 31:5). And if you say that dagan means any produce that is placed in a pile, what is the meaning of the words “As soon as the matter was publicized, the children of Israel gave in abundance the first fruits of dagan…and of all the tevua of the field”? There is no need to list both dagan and all tevua of the field. [Nedarim 55a:7] Rav Yosef's kushya relies on the redundancy if dagan already encompasses all midgan.

Later, the gemara delves into the term alalta in a practical scenario: GEMARA: The son of Master Shmuel commanded his workers that they give thirteen thousand dinars to Rava from the crop [alalta] produced in his fields... Rava sent this question before Rav Yosef: What is called alalta; what crops are included in the category of alalta? Rav Yosef said: It is as it is taught in the baraita cited above: And they agree with regard to one who vows that tevua is forbidden to him that it is prohibited for him to eat from only the five species of grain; just as tevua includes only the five species, so too alalta includes only the five species. Abaye said to him: Are the two cases comparable? Although tevua means grain and includes only the five species, alalta means crop and includes all items that grow. [Nedarim 55a:11-13] This machloket between Rav Yosef and Abaye highlights the malleability of linguistic definitions, even within the same conceptual domain (crops). Rav Yosef conflates alalta with tevua (five species), while Abaye gives alalta a broader, lashon bnei adam meaning ("all items that grow").

Readings

Rashi: Defining the Terms and Distinguishing Dagan from Tevua

Rashi, ever the master of clarity, elucidates the core machloket and Rabbi Meir's nuanced position. Regarding the Rabbis' stance on dagan, Rashi states, "אלא מחמשת מינין - חטה ושעורה וכוסמין ושיפון ושבולת שועל" (Nedarim 55a:1, s.v. "אלא מחמשת מינין"). This establishes the narrow, technical definition of dagan as the five biblical species.

Crucially, Rashi then explains Rabbi Meir's differentiation between dagan and tevua: "רבי מאיר אומר בו' - בהא ודאי מודינא לך שהנודר מן התבואה אינו אסור אלא מחמשת מינין אבל הנודר מן הדגן אסור בכל מין דמידגן משמע דבר שעושין ממנו כר ופול המצרי יבש עושין ממנו כרי ולהכי אסור" (Nedarim 55a:2, s.v. "רבי מאיר אומר בו'"). Chiddush: Rashi clarifies that Rabbi Meir concedes that tevua refers only to the five species. His unique chiddush lies in distinguishing dagan as a broader category defined by its processing — anything that is "piled" (midgan), like dry cowpeas. This highlights the mishna's careful choice of vocabulary and Rabbi Meir's consistent internal logic: tevua has a specific, limited meaning, while dagan has a broader, functional meaning, yet both are distinct from general "field crops."

Shita Mekubetzet: The Underlying Hermeneutic Principle – Lashon Torah vs. Lashon Bnei Adam

The Shita Mekubetzet brings a fundamental interpretive principle to the fore, quoting the Ran (הרנב"י ז"ל): "פירוש דקא סלקא דעתיה דרבי מאיר דכל שעושין ממנו גורן איקרי דגן ופול המצרי יבש נמי עושין ממנו גורן. וחכמים אומרים אינו אסור אלא מחמשת המינין והאי נודר ללשון תורה נתכוון ורבי מאיר סבר ללשון בני אדם נתכוון" (Shita Mekubbetzet on Nedarim 55a:1, s.v. "הנודר מן הדגן אסור בפול המצרי יבש דברי רבי מאיר"). Chiddush: The Shita Mekubetzet (via Ran) identifies the root of the machloket between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis: whether the vower's words are interpreted according to lashon Torah (the technical, biblical definition) or lashon bnei adam (common, everyday parlance). Rabbi Meir views dagan through the lens of lashon bnei adam, where "grain" commonly refers to anything piled and processed like grain. The Rabbis, conversely, assume the vower intended the precise, limited Torah definition of dagan as the five species. This provides a crucial hermeneutical framework, transforming a specific dispute about dagan into a broader principle for interpreting nedarim. This distinction between lashon Torah and lashon bnei adam is a recurring motif in halakha, particularly in areas like nedarim and kiddushin, where the validity and scope of an act hinges on the precise meaning of spoken words.

Ran: Reinforcing the "Midgan" Principle

The Ran concisely reiterates Rabbi Meir's reasoning: "הנודר מן הדגן אסור בפול המצרי יבש - דכיון דמידגן שעושין ממנו דגן סבירא ליה לר' מאיר דדגן מיקרי" (Ran on Nedarim 55a:1:1, s.v. "הנודר מן הדגן אסור בפול המצרי יבש"). Chiddush: This emphasizes that for Rabbi Meir, the operative definition of dagan is not the inherent nature of the plant, but its processing — anything that is "piled" like grain (midgan). This focus on a functional definition is a significant chiddush in understanding how terms are interpreted in vows.

Friction

The most potent kushya arises from Rav Yosef's objection to Rabbi Meir's expansive definition of dagan. Kushya: Rav Yosef challenges Rabbi Meir's view that dagan means "any produce that is placed in a pile" (midgan). He cites II Chronicles 31:5: "And as soon as the matter was publicized, the children of Israel gave in abundance the first fruits of dagan, wine, and oil... and of all the tevua of the field." (II Chronicles 31:5). Rav Yosef argues: If dagan is already so broad as to include all piled produce, then the subsequent phrase "and of all the tevua of the field" would be redundant. Why would the verse list dagan and then add "all tevua of the field" if dagan already covers such a wide array of field crops? This seems to imply a narrower scope for dagan than Rabbi Meir posits. [Nedarim 55a:7]

Terutz 1 (Abaye): Abaye offers a terutz by suggesting that the phrase "and of all the tevua of the field" comes "to include fruits of the tree and vegetables" (Nedarim 55a:8). According to Abaye, dagan (even in Rabbi Meir's broad sense) would not include tree fruits or vegetables, as these are not typically "piled" in the manner of grains or dry legumes. Therefore, the verse specifies "all tevua of the field" to ensure that these items, which are field produce but not dagan by Rabbi Meir's definition, are also included in the tithed items. This terutz preserves Rabbi Meir's broad definition of dagan by carving out a distinct category for "fruits of the tree and vegetables" under "all tevua of the field."

Terutz 2 (Rava): Rava offers an alternative terutz which significantly redefines the terms: "Tevua is discrete and refers to only the five species of grain, and tevua of the field is discrete and refers to all crops that grow in the field" (Nedarim 55a:10). Chiddush: Rava's terutz is a powerful reinterpretation. He argues that the term tevua on its own is restricted to the five species (as the mishna states Rabbi Meir concedes). However, when the verse adds "of the field" (hasadeh), it broadens the scope to all field crops, including those not considered dagan or even the five species of tevua. This terutz avoids the redundancy by positing a hierarchical structure of terms: dagan (broad, per R' Meir), tevua (narrow, 5 species), and tevua hasadeh (broadest, all field crops). This highlights how the addition of a qualifier (hasadeh) can fundamentally alter the meaning and scope of a term, even if the base term (tevua) might otherwise be narrow. The machloket between Abaye and Rava here is not just about the pasuk, but about the very hermeneutics of linguistic expansion.

Intertext

Berakhot 40b: Defining "Growth from the Ground" and Sustenance

The gemara in Nedarim 55b presents a baraita stating that truffles and mushrooms are permitted to one who vows against "produce of the land," but prohibited to one who vows against "growths of the ground." It then raises a contradiction from Mishna Berakhot 40b: "And over a food item whose growth is not from the ground, one recites: By Whose word all things came to be." A baraita there explicitly lists "salt and over brine, and over truffles and mushrooms" as items over which one recites Shehakol (Berakhot 40b:15). Abaye's initial resolution is that truffles and mushrooms "grow from the earth, but with regard to sustenance, they draw sustenance from the air and not from the earth" (Nedarim 55b:11). The gemara then refines this, stating: "Emend the mishna to read: Over a food item that does not draw sustenance from the ground, one recites: By Whose word all things came to be" (Nedarim 55b:13). This discussion is a striking parallel to our sugya on dagan and tevua. Just as dagan required a precise definition (by its piling vs. five species) and tevua required distinguishing tevua from tevua hasadeh, here "growths of the ground" is nuanced by how they grow and how they draw sustenance. The gemara is forced to emend a Mishna in Berakhot to accommodate this distinction. This demonstrates that defining what constitutes "from the ground" is not straightforward and can hinge on subtle biological or functional criteria, rather than just superficial appearance. The context (vows vs. blessings) drives the interpretive lens, echoing the lashon Torah vs. lashon bnei adam debate.

Rosh on Nedarim 8:2: The Principle of Lashon Bnei Adam in Vows

The Rosh, commenting on a different mishna in Nedarim (8:2), discusses the interpretation of vows related to time, such as "until the rains" or "this year." He explains: "המודר הנאה מחבירו לשנה מונה שנים עשר חדש מיום ליום ואם אמר שנה זו אפילו לא עמד אלא עשרים ותשעה באלול עלתה לו שנה ואפילו למאן דאמר יום אחד בשנה אינו חשוב שנה הכא לצעורי נפשיה קביל עליה והא אצטער. ואימא ניסן בנדרים הלך אחר לשון בני אדם והא דתנן הכא אסור בה ובעיבורה אם אמר שנה אחת אסור שלשה עשר חדש ולא אמרינן לא היתה דעתו על שנה מעוברת אלא כסתם השנים שהם שנים עשר חדש אלא בנדרים הלך אחר לשון בני אדם ובין פשוטה ובין מעוברת קרויה שנה" (Rosh on Nedarim 8:2:1, s.v. "מתני' קונם יין"). The Rosh explicitly states that "בנדרים הלך אחר לשון בני אדם" (in vows, one follows common parlance). He cites the mishna that if one vows "this year," and the year becomes a leap year (me'uberet), the vow applies for all thirteen months, because "between a simple year and a leap year, both are called 'year' in common parlance." This directly parallels the machloket in our sugya concerning dagan. The Shita Mekubetzet (Ran) identified the machloket between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis as one of lashon bnei adam vs. lashon Torah. The Rosh's comments here provide strong intertextual support for the principle that lashon bnei adam is a primary interpretive lens in nedarim, often overriding a stricter, technical definition, especially when the vower's intent (implied by common usage) is to "afflict himself" (l'tza'urei nafshiya). This shows the broader applicability and significance of this hermeneutic principle across different types of vows.

Psak/Practice

The sugya regarding dagan and tevua in nedarim lands in halakha primarily through the principle of interpreting vows according to lashon bnei adam (common parlance) versus lashon Torah (technical/biblical usage). While the gemara doesn't explicitly state the halakha between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis regarding dagan, the general meta-psak heuristic in nedarim leans towards lashon bnei adam to determine the vower's intent.

However, the Gemara's discussion and Rashi's commentary reveal that tevua is generally understood as the five species, even by Rabbi Meir. The machloket specifically concerns dagan, where Rabbi Meir broadens it to all midgan based on common usage. The Rishonim (e.g., Rosh, Ran, Shita Mekubetzet) consistently highlight the lashon bnei adam principle as central to nedarim. Therefore, in practice, if someone vows "from dagan," the widespread custom might lean towards the more inclusive definition if that's how people commonly refer to "grain" in a given locale. Nevertheless, in cases of doubt, a she'eilas chakham would be necessary, and often a more lenient interpretation is sought for the sake of lifting the neder.

The discussion of alalta also has practical implications for financial agreements. The halakha often follows Abaye's broader definition, including "all items that grow," reflecting a general intent for comprehensive profit-sharing unless explicitly limited. The final halakha for adar rishon/sheini explicitly follows Rabbi Yehuda (Nedarim 55b:14), who aligns with the lashon bnei adam approach that an unspecified "Adar" refers to the second Adar in a leap year, showing a preference for common understanding in determining the scope of the vow.

Takeaway

The sugya underscores that the binding force and scope of a neder are exquisitely sensitive to linguistic nuance, often oscillating between technical definitions (lashon Torah) and common parlance (lashon bnei adam). This linguistic ambiguity compels a rigorous contextual analysis to decipher the vower's true intent, a recurring challenge in much of halakha.

Citations