Nedarim 56

Sugya Map

• Issue 1: Whether an upper story (עלייה) is subsumed within the category of "house" (בית) for the purpose of vows.
  • Nafka Mina: The scope of a vow prohibiting entry into a house versus an upper story.
  • Primary Sources: Mishna Nedarim 56a; Gemara Nedarim 56a.
• Issue 2: The definition and status of a "dargash" (דרגש) in relation to a standard "bed" (מיטה).
  • Nafka Mina: Whether a vow prohibiting a bed includes a dargash, and vice-versa; customs of mourning.
  • Primary Sources: Mishna Nedarim 56a; Gemara Nedarim 56a-b.
• Issue 3: The legal status of a city's outskirts (תחום העיר) versus its Shabbat boundary (תחום שבת).
  • Nafka Mina: The scope of a vow prohibiting entry into a city.
  • Primary Sources: Mishna Nedarim 56b; Gemara Nedarim 56b.
• Issue 4: The status of the threshold/doorstep (אגף/מפתן) in relation to the interior of a house, particularly concerning vows and the laws of tzara'at.
  • Nafka Mina: Whether one who vows a house forbidden can stand at the entrance, and the application of tzara'at laws.
  • Primary Sources: Mishna Nedarim 56b; Gemara Nedarim 56b.

Text Snapshot

MISHNA (Nedarim 56a):

For one who vows that a house is forbidden to him, entry is permitted for him in the upper story of the house; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: An upper story is included in the house, and therefore, entry is prohibited there as well. However, for one who vows that an upper story is forbidden to him, entry is permitted in the house, as the ground floor is not included in the upper story.

• Nuance: The core of the first dispute hinges on the conceptual inclusion of an aliyya (upper story) within the definition of bayit (house). Rabbi Meir separates them, while the Rabbis see them as integral. The second clause inverts the scenario, establishing a clear distinction: a house is never included in an aliyya.

GEMARA (Nedarim 56a):

The Gemara asks: Who is the tanna who taught with regard to the halakhot of leprosy that in the verse “it appears to me as it were a plague in the house” (Leviticus 14:35), the term “in the house” comes to include the gallery, a half story above the ground floor, and “in the house” comes to include the upper story? Rav Ḥisda said: The tanna is Rabbi Meir, as, if the tanna were the Rabbis, didn’t the Rabbis say that a second story is included in the house? Why then do I need the verse containing the phrase “in the house” to include the second story?

• Nuance: The Gemara uses the verse regarding tzara'at (leprosy) to explore the definition of "house." Rav Ḥisda posits that Rabbi Meir's view (that an upper story is not inherently part of a house) necessitates a verse to include it in the tzara'at context, whereas the Rabbis' view (that it is part of the house) would render such a verse redundant. This highlights a principle of kal va'chomer (a fortiori) or avoidance of redundancy in Torah interpretation.

Readings

Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis on "House" (עלייה and בית)

The fundamental disagreement revolves around the conceptual scope of a "house." Rabbi Meir, as presented in the mishna, views the aliyya as a distinct entity, not inherently part of the bayit. The Rabbis, conversely, consider the aliyya to be subsumed within the broader definition of bayit.

Ran on Nedarim 56a s.v. מן הבית מותר בעלייה: The Ran explains the mishna's initial statement: "For one who vows that a house is forbidden to him, entry is permitted in the upper story of the house; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir." He clarifies that this is because, according to Rabbi Meir, "an aliyya is not included within the bayit." Conversely, "the Rabbis dispute him, as they hold that an aliyya is included within the bayit." However, the Ran notes the mishna concludes that "one who vows from an aliyya is permitted in the bayit," which is universally accepted, as "the bayit is not included within an aliyya." This establishes a one-way inclusion: the larger entity can encompass the smaller, but not vice-versa.

Rashi on Nedarim 56a s.v. מותר בעלייה: Rashi concisely states the reason for Rabbi Meir's ruling: "because an aliyya is not included within the bayit." For the converse case, he writes: "one who vows from an aliyya etc. – by all opinions, the bayit is not included within an aliyya." Rashi's commentary reinforces the Ran's point about the asymmetrical inclusion.

The Definition of a Dargash

The Gemara grapples with the precise nature of a dargash, a term that appears in the mishna concerning vows about beds.

Ulla's Initial Definition and its Challenge: Ulla initially suggests that a dargash is a "bed of fortune" (מיטת מזל), implying it's not for regular sleeping and thus distinct from a standard bed. This definition faces immediate challenges. The Rabbis question how such a bed, not used for sleeping, would be relevant in the context of a meal of comfort (סעודת הבראה), where one might recline. Ravina offers a defense, likening it to meat and wine which are only consumed on such occasions if desired, suggesting the dargash might be used ceremonially. However, a baraita about a mourner not overturning a dargash presents a deeper difficulty. If it's not for sleeping, why would the custom of overturning beds (הפיכת המיטות) not apply? The Gemara resolves this by likening it to a bed designated for vessels, which also doesn't require overturning, as it's not for human rest.

Ravin's Clarification: The true difficulty, the Gemara asserts, lies with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel's statement that one loosens the loops (karvitin) of a dargash to collapse it. This implies a structural element not found in a "bed of fortune." Ravin, arriving from Eretz Yisrael, clarifies that a dargash is simply a "leather bed."

Rabbi Yirmeya's Distinction: Rabbi Yirmeya provides a more technical distinction: in a standard bayit, straps are fastened over the frame; in a dargash, they are fastened through the frame itself. This is then refined, based on the Kelim mishna, to suggest both have straps fastened through the frame, but the distinction is the method of attachment: beds use holes for insertion and extraction, while dargash uses loops.

The Status of City Outskirts and Boundaries

The mishna differentiates between vows concerning a city and vows concerning a house.

Ran on Nedarim 56b s.v. מותר ליכנס לתחומה: The Ran explains the mishna: "permitted to enter its boundary" means "within the two thousand cubits adjacent to the city." He further clarifies "its outskirts" (le'iburah) as "within the seventy cubits and the additional measurements adjacent to the city." This establishes a hierarchy of proximity and legal status to the city itself.

Rabbi Yoḥanan and the "Jericho" Verse: The Gemara seeks a source for the notion that the outskirts of a city are legally equivalent to the city itself. Rabbi Yoḥanan derives this from Joshua 5:13, where Joshua is described as being "in Jericho," even though Jericho was "completely shut." The Gemara infers that "in Jericho" must refer to the outskirts, implying they carry the city's designation.

Friction

The Redundancy of "In the House" for the Rabbis

The Kushya: The Gemara raises a significant challenge to the Rabbis' position regarding the inclusion of an aliyya within the definition of a bayit. Rav Ḥisda argues that if the Rabbis hold that an upper story is inherently part of the house, then the verse in Leviticus 14:35 ("in the house") serving to include the upper story would be redundant. Why would the Torah need to specify that an upper story is included in the "house" if, according to the Rabbis, it is intrinsically part of it? This suggests that Rabbi Meir's view, which requires a verse to include the aliyya, fits more elegantly with the structure of the verse.

The Terutz (Abaye's Defense): Abaye offers a compelling defense for the Rabbis. He argues that even if the Rabbis hold that an aliyya is conceptually included in a bayit, a specific verse is still necessary in the context of tzara'at to prevent a different kind of misunderstanding. The verse "In a house of the land of your possession" (Leviticus 14:34) might lead one to believe that only that which is directly attached to the ground (mutẓav al ha'aretz) possesses the legal status of a "house." An upper story, by its nature, is not directly attached to the ground. Therefore, the verse "in the house" is required to explicitly state that even a structure not directly on the ground, like an aliyya, is included within the halakhic definition of a house for the purposes of tzara'at. This terutz effectively shifts the focus from the Rabbis' definition of "house" to the specific context and potential misinterpretations within the laws of tzara'at. It demonstrates that even a generally accepted inclusion might require explicit textual reinforcement due to specific halakhic parameters.

The Status of the Doorway in Vows vs. Tzara'at

The Kushya: A notable tension arises between the mishna's ruling on vows concerning a house and the Gemara's discussion regarding tzara'at and the priest's entry. The mishna states that for one who vows a house forbidden, it is prohibited "only from the doorstop and inward." This implies that one may stand outside the doorstop and it is not considered "entering the house." However, the Gemara's discussion of Leviticus 14:38 ("And the priest shall go out from the house to the entrance of the house, and he shall quarantine the house") suggests a more stringent view. The verse is interpreted to mean the priest cannot quarantine the house until he is entirely "out from the house." This implies that even the entrance area, or beneath the lintel, might be considered intrinsically linked to the house in a way that prohibits effective action from there. If the priest must be entirely outside the house to quarantine it, how can one who vows a house forbidden be permitted to stand at the entrance (outside the doorstop)?

The Terutz: The Gemara resolves this apparent contradiction by drawing a distinction between the two scenarios. The resolution states: "It is different with regard to a leprous house, as it is written: 'And the priest shall go out from the house,' indicating that he cannot quarantine the house until he goes out from the entire house." This implies that the laws of tzara'at have a unique requirement for physical separation from the afflicted structure. The verse explicitly demands the priest exit the house before acting. In contrast, the vow scenario is governed by the definition of "entering" the house. Standing "from the doorstop outward" is not considered "entering" in the context of a vow, even if it is the physical threshold. The tzara'at law necessitates a complete divestment from the house's immediate vicinity for the quarantine process, a requirement not imposed by a simple vow of prohibition. The pshat of "entering" for a vow is less encompassing than the requirement of "going out from" for tzara'at.

Intertext

Vows and Intent: Nedarim 55a and Rosh

The concept of intent being paramount in vows, as discussed in Nedarim 56a regarding the aliyya, echoes a broader theme in the tractate.

Mishna Nedarim 55a: This mishna discusses vows where one says, "Konam [it is forbidden for me], wine that I taste until Pesach," or "Konam, meat that I taste until the fast." The Gemara there explains that this vow is only in effect until the night of Pesach or the fast, respectively, because the person only intended to abstain during the typical times of consumption. This establishes the principle that the scope of a vow is often limited by the user's intent and the usual times of use.

Rosh on Nedarim 8:3:1 (commenting on Nedarim 55a): The Rosh, in his commentary on a similar discussion in the next chapter (which he connects to 55a), states that the halakha is not like Rabbi Yehuda or his son, who would interpret such vows strictly. Instead, he asserts that the intent of the vow is crucial. If the vow was made without intending to abstain from the commandment (mitzvah), then the vow is nullified. He explicitly contrasts this with situations where one intends to abstain from eating and drinking (as in the 55a mishna). He writes: "It seems to me that there is no distinction... in the case of 'I will not enter your house' and 'I will drink cold water'... we negate his words due to his intention. And the vow is entirely nullified, all the more so that we follow his intention for the time of his vow. And this intention is healthy and good, that he does not wish to be prevented from the commandment." This directly supports the idea that intent can override the literal wording of a vow, a principle implicitly at play in the aliyya discussion where the halakhic definition of "house" is debated.

Tzara'at and "House": Leviticus 14

The discussion in Nedarim 56b regarding the priest's actions concerning tzara'at in a house directly engages with the biblical text.

Leviticus 14:34-38: "When you come into the land of Canaan, which I give you for a possession, and I put a plague of tzara'at in a house in the land of your possession, then he that owns the house shall come and tell the priest, saying, It seems to me there is as it were a plague in my house. And the priest shall command that they empty the house, before the priest goes in to see the plague, that all that is in the house be not made unclean; and afterward the priest shall go in to see the house. And he shall look on the plague, and, behold, if the plague be in the walls of the house with hollows of greenish or reddish discoloration, and it seems deeper than the wall; Then the priest shall go out of the house to the entrance of the house, and shut up the house seven days. And the priest shall come again the seventh day, and look on the house; and, behold, if the plague be spread in the walls of the house; Then the priest shall command that they take out those stones in which the plague is, and cast them into an unclean place outside the city. And he shall cause the house to be scraped within, and shall pour plaster of the same kind without the house."

The verse "Then the priest shall go out of the house to the entrance of the house, and shut up the house seven days" is the crux of the Gemara's debate. The interpretation that the priest must be entirely outside the house before acting, and that the entrance itself requires shutting up, highlights a specific, ritualistic definition of proximity and contamination that informs the Gemara's understanding of "inside" versus "outside." This biblical framework directly informs the Gemara's discussion on the status of the threshold.

Psak/Practice

Vows and Intent: The Primary Heuristic

The overarching principle emerging from this sugya, particularly concerning vows, is the supremacy of intent (kavanah) over literal wording when ambiguity or competing definitions arise. While the mishna presents differing views on the inclusion of an aliyya in a bayit, the Gemara's discussions, especially when cross-referenced with commentaries like the Rosh, emphasize that a vow is ultimately annulled or limited by the vower's underlying intention. If the intention was not to abstain from a commandment, or if the perceived scope of the vow is demonstrably contrary to common understanding or expected usage, the vow weakens.

Tzara'at and Spatial Definitions

The discussion on tzara'at reveals that biblical laws can impose specific, sometimes counterintuitive, spatial definitions. The requirement for the priest to "go out from the house" implies a stringent separation that goes beyond the everyday understanding of entering or exiting. This serves as a reminder that halakhic definitions are not always uniform; context and specific biblical language are paramount in determining the precise application of laws.

Takeaway

The definition of a "thing" in halakha is fluid, often dictated by context and intent, not just its physical constituents. Where biblical law imposes specific spatial requirements, these take precedence over ordinary definitions to ensure ritual purity and adherence to divine command.