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Nedarim 58

StandardIntermediate – From Familiar to FluentDecember 6, 2025

Alright, let's dive into Nedarim 58. We're going to peel back some layers here and see how seemingly simple halakhic distinctions can lead to some pretty intricate legal reasoning.

Hook

What's really fascinating about this passage is how it frames the very nature of prohibition and permissibility. It's not just about whether something is forbidden, but whether it can become permitted. This distinction, seemingly abstract, has massive implications for how we understand mixtures and the power of rabbinic legislation.

Context

This discussion in Nedarim is deeply rooted in the complex world of agricultural laws and the rabbinic endeavor to manage them. Think about the Temple period, when many of these prohibitions were directly tied to ritual purity and the sacrificial system. Even after the destruction of the Temple, these laws remained, becoming a bedrock of Jewish practice. The Rabbis, in their wisdom, developed intricate systems to navigate these laws in a post-Temple era. The concept of "things that can become permitted" versus "things that cannot" is a way of categorizing these laws based on their inherent potential for change and redemption, reflecting a broader theological idea of eventual restoration. It’s a testament to how Jewish law constantly adapts, seeking practical solutions even when the original context shifts dramatically.

Text Snapshot

For any item that can become permitted, i.e., a forbidden object whose prohibition can or will lapse, for example, untithed produce that can be permitted through tithing, and second tithe that is permitted through redemption or bringing it to Jerusalem (Deuteronomy 14:24–26), and consecrated items that are also permitted through redemption, and produce of the new crop that is permitted after the sacrifice of the omer offering (Leviticus 23:14), the Sages did not determine a measure for their neutralization, and no mixture with any quantity of permitted items neutralizes their prohibition. And for any item that cannot become permitted, for example, teruma, and teruma of the tithe, and ḥalla (Numbers 15:20–21); fruit of a tree during the first three years after its planting [orla]; and forbidden food crops in a vineyard (Deuteronomy 22:9), the Sages determined a measure for their neutralization.

The Rabbis said to Rabbi Shimon: But isn’t Sabbatical-Year produce an item that cannot become permitted, and nevertheless, the Sages did not determine a measure for its neutralization, as we learned in a mishna (Shevi’it 7:7): The Sabbatical-Year produce prohibits permitted produce of its own species with which it is mixed in any amount. Rabbi Shimon said to them: I too said that Sabbatical-Year produce prohibits permitted produce in a mixture and permitted growths that develop from it only with regard to the removal of the produce. Sabbatical-Year produce may be eaten only as long as produce of that species remains in the field, after which it must be removed from one’s possession. Since it is permitted to eat the produce before that time, its legal status during this period is that of an item that can become permitted.

However, with regard to the permissibility of eating Sabbatical-Year produce after the time of removal has passed, when eating that produce is prohibited, the Sages determined a measure for their neutralization. The mixture is forbidden only if the measure of that produce is enough to impart flavor to the mixture. Apparently, permitted growths can neutralize the prohibition of the original item. The Gemara rejects the proof: And perhaps here too, it is different when the ruling is a stringency. In this case, the stringency is that the original item is sacred with the sanctity of the Sabbatical Year. However, here too, there is no proof that the same would be true in cases where the result is a leniency.

Rather, Yishmael of Kefar Yamma resolved his dilemma from this source, as we learned in a mishna (Shevi’it 6:3): With regard to sixth-year onions upon which rain fell during the Sabbatical Year, and they sprouted, if their leaves were black [sheḥorin], i.e., dark green, an indication of fresh, recent growth, the onions are forbidden as Sabbatical-Year growth. If their leaves turned green [horiku], i.e., lighter and yellower, and appeared withered, the onions are permitted, as they are considered a product of the sixth year.

Rabbi Ḥanina ben Antigonus says: There is a different indicator; if the plants can be uprooted by their leaves, clearly the leaves are fresh and recent, and they are forbidden. And in the parallel situation, if that indicator was discovered in a Sabbatical-Year onion that sprouted at the conclusion of the Sabbatical Year, i.e., during the eighth year, the onions are permitted. The Gemara asks: Is this to say that one may conclude from here that permitted growth neutralizes the prohibition of the original plant? The Gemara rejects this conclusion: And perhaps the halakha is with regard to crushed [medukhanin], pounded onions, and the reason that the prohibition of the original plant is neutralized is not that the permitted growth neutralizes the prohibition, but that it is no longer fit for consumption.

Rather, the dilemma can be resolved from this source; as it is taught in a baraita: One who weeds ḥasayot with a Samaritan may eat a casual meal from them without tithing, as any untithed produce may be eaten in the framework of a casual meal. And when he completes the labor on the ḥasayot, places them into a pile, and they require tithing, he tithes them as produce that is definitely obligated in tithing, not as doubtfully tithed produce, as the assumption is that the Samaritan did not tithe the ḥasayot.

Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: If the ḥasayot belong to a Jew who is suspect about observance of the Sabbatical Year, at the conclusion of the Sabbatical Year it is permitted to weed with him, as there is no concern that there might be Sabbatical-Year sanctity. The Gemara asks: Is this to say that the permitted growths of the eighth year neutralize the prohibition, and that is why there is no concern about Sabbatical-Year sanctity? The Gemara rejects that inference: And perhaps the tanna is speaking with regard to an item whose seeds cease after it is sown, whose growths neutralize the original prohibition? The Gemara rejects that possibility: Isn’t it taught in a baraita: These are ḥasayot, for example, arum, garlic, and onions, whose seeds do not cease?

The Gemara asks: And perhaps the tanna is speaking with regard to plants that were crushed before they sprouted growths? The Gemara answers: It is the case of one who is suspect about observance of the Sabbatical Year, that is taught in the baraita, and one who is suspect would not bother to eliminate the prohibition by crushing it. The Gemara asks: And perhaps the tanna is speaking with regard to a mixture of forbidden ḥasayot and permitted ones, and the reason that it is permitted is that the prohibition was neutralized by the majority of permitted ḥasayot? The Gemara answers: One who weeds, is taught in the baraita, indicating that he is eating the leaves as he weeds them, leaving no opportunity for the ḥasayot to be mixed with others.

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that this is a conclusive refutation of the opinions of Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Yonatan, who stated regarding orla and food crops in a vineyard that their permitted growth does not neutralize the prohibition of the original fruit or food crops respectively. Rabbi Yitzḥak said: The Sabbatical-Year produce is different. Since its prohibition is engendered by means of the ground, its nullification is effected by means of the ground as well. The prohibition can be neutralized by means of the growth that results from replanting the forbidden plant in a permitted manner.

The Gemara asks: Isn’t there the case of tithe, whose prohibition is engendered by means of the ground, but its nullification is not effected by means of the ground? As it is taught in a baraita: With regard to a litra of untithed first tithe from which the teruma of the tithe was not taken, which one sowed in the ground, and it grew and it is now approximately ten litra, that additional growth is obligated to have tithe taken and is subject to the halakhot of Sabbatical-Year produce. And with regard to that original ** litra** of untithed first tithe that he sowed, one tithes for it from produce in a different place, and not from the litra itself, based on a calculation of how much teruma of the tithe needed to be taken from that litra. Apparently, the growth that results from sowing the first tithe in the ground does not neutralize its prohibition.

Close Reading

Let's unpack this complex passage, focusing on the underlying logic and the subtle distinctions the Gemara is grappling with.

Insight 1: The Dichotomy of Permissibility and Its Impact on Mixtures

The foundational principle established at the outset is the critical distinction between items that "have a means of becoming permitted" (יש לו מתירין - yesh lo metirin) and those that "do not have a means of becoming permitted" (אין לו מתירין - ein lo metirin). This isn't just a semantic difference; it's a legal chasm that dictates how prohibitions behave in mixtures.

  • Items with a Means of Permitting: For things like untithed produce (tevel), second tithe, consecrated items, and new crop produce (chadash), the Sages determined that no amount of permitted food, regardless of quantity, can neutralize their prohibition. The text states, "the Sages did not determine a measure for their neutralization, and no mixture with any quantity of permitted items neutralizes their prohibition."

    • Why this strictness? The commentary of Ran (on Nedarim 58a:1:1) offers a crucial insight: "And [for] any item that can become permitted... there is a remedy for them through redemption." This implies that because these items can be rectified—through tithing, redemption, or specific offerings—their inherent state of prohibition is seen as more fluid, more amenable to correction. The Sages, in their legislative wisdom, seemingly decided that allowing a small amount of such a rectified item to permit a large quantity of forbidden food would undermine the very concept of rectification. It’s akin to saying, "We've established a clear path to make this kosher; we're not going to let a loophole in mixture law undermine that path."
    • The Role of "Mixture with its Own Kind" (במינן): The Ran further clarifies (58a:1:3) that while these items are forbidden "in any amount" (בכל שהוא - bechol shehu) when mixed with their own kind, this rule might be different when mixed with something else. However, the core idea remains: the potential for future permissibility doesn't automatically grant leniency in mixture. It's the possibility of redemption that keeps the prohibition potent, preventing simple dilution.
  • Items Without a Means of Permitting: Conversely, for items like terumah, terumat ma'aser, hallah, orlah, and forbidden crops in a vineyard (kilay hakerem), the Sages did establish measures for neutralization. The text states, "the Sages determined a measure for their neutralization."

    • The Rationale: Rashi (on Nedarim 58a:1:2) explains: "they have determined a measure for their neutralization—that terumah is nullified in a hundred, and orlah in two hundred." This indicates that for these inherently forbidden items, the rabbinic approach was to allow for dilution, provided a significant majority of permitted food was present. The prohibition is seen as more fixed, more absolute, and thus more susceptible to being overwhelmed by a large quantity of permissible food.

This initial dichotomy sets the stage for the subsequent debate, particularly around Sabbatical Year produce, which seems to defy this neat categorization.

Insight 2: The Ambiguity of Sabbatical Year Produce (Shevi'it)

The Gemara immediately challenges the initial categorization by bringing up Sabbatical Year produce. The Rabbis present a seemingly unassailable point: "But isn’t Sabbatical-Year produce an item that cannot become permitted...?" According to the mishnah in Shevi'it (7:7), it prohibits permitted produce of its own species "in any amount." This sounds precisely like an item that cannot become permitted.

  • Rabbi Shimon's Nuance: Rabbi Shimon's response is pivotal. He doesn't deny the Shevi'it mishnah's ruling but reframes the reason for its prohibition. He argues that the strict prohibition "in any amount" applies only "with regard to the removal of the produce." Sabbatical Year produce has a limited window of permissibility; it can be eaten as long as produce of that species remains in the field. Once that time passes, it must be removed.
    • "An Item That Can Become Permitted": Because there's a period where it is permitted to eat, Rabbi Shimon asserts, "its legal status during this period is that of an item that can become permitted." This is a brilliant move. He's not arguing that Sabbatical Year produce is inherently permitted, but that its halakhic status shifts. During its permitted period, it behaves like something that can become permitted, thus aligning with the first category (no neutralization).
    • "However, with regard to the permissibility of eating... after the time of removal has passed... the Sages determined a measure for their neutralization." This is the crucial distinction. Once the removal deadline passes and it becomes strictly forbidden, then the rule shifts. The prohibition now behaves like an item that cannot become permitted, and neutralization (by imparting flavor) applies. This demonstrates that the potential for permissibility, even if temporary, fundamentally alters the halakhic framework for mixtures.

This distinction highlights how the timing and context of a prohibition are as important as the prohibition itself. Rabbi Shimon is showing that the Sages' legislative intent is sensitive to these nuances, not just to the raw fact of prohibition.

Insight 3: The Elusive Nature of "Neutralization by Growth"

The bulk of the passage then becomes a deep dive into whether "permitted growths" can neutralize the prohibition of an original forbidden item. This is where the Gemara really tests the boundaries of these categories and rabbinic reasoning.

  • The Shevi'it 6:3 Case (Onions): The Gemara uses a mishnah about Sabbatical Year onions that sprouted. The distinction between "black" leaves (fresh growth, forbidden) and "green" leaves (withered, considered sixth-year produce, permitted) is presented as a potential source for Yishmael of Kefar Yamma's dilemma.
    • The Question: "Is this to say that permitted growth neutralizes the prohibition of the original plant?" If the sprouted leaves are permitted, does that permit the onion itself?
    • The Rejection: The Gemara immediately offers counter-explanations:
      • "And perhaps here too, it is different when the ruling is a stringency." This suggests that the leniency observed might not be due to neutralization but some other factor that avoids a more stringent outcome.
      • "And perhaps... with regard to crushed [medukhanin], pounded onions." If the onions were crushed, their prohibition might be nullified because they are no longer fit for consumption in their original form. This is a common principle in mixture laws: if the forbidden item is rendered inedible, it doesn't transmit its prohibition.
      • The Ḥasayot Baraita: The Gemara then pivots to a baraita about weeding ḥasayot (weeds) with a Samaritan. The key point is that the weeded ḥasayot require tithing as "definitely obligated" (vadai), not "doubtfully obligated" (safek). This implies the Samaritan didn't tithe, so the produce is untithed and needs tithing.
      • Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar's Ruling: His statement about weeding with a Jew "suspect about the Sabbatical Year" at the "conclusion of the Sabbatical Year" being permitted leads to the question: "Is this to say that the permitted growths of the eighth year neutralize the prohibition?" If the eighth-year growth is permitted, does that permit the original seventh-year produce?
      • Multiple Rejections: The Gemara again throws up multiple reasons why this doesn't prove neutralization:
        • "And perhaps... with regard to an item whose seeds cease after it is sown." This refers to plants where the original plant dies off after its seeds have spread, and the new growth is considered entirely separate.
        • "Isn’t it taught... These are ḥasayot, for example, arum, garlic, and onions, whose seeds do not cease?" This directly counters the previous point, showing that ḥasayot are indeed plants where the original and new growth are connected.
        • "And perhaps... with regard to plants that were crushed." Similar to the onion case, crushing could be the reason for permissibility.
        • "And perhaps... with regard to a mixture of forbidden ḥasayot and permitted ones, and the reason... is that the prohibition was neutralized by the majority of permitted ḥasayot." This suggests a simple numerical majority, not a growth-based neutralization.
        • "One who weeds, is taught... indicating that he is eating the leaves as he weeds them, leaving no opportunity for the ḥasayot to be mixed with others." This implies the leniency comes from the specific act of eating leaves while weeding, not from the growth itself permitting the original item.

These repeated rejections highlight the Gemara's rigorous approach. It demands clear, unequivocal proof. The problem is that many scenarios can explain a leniency other than the specific principle of "permitted growth neutralizing prohibition."

  • Rabbi Yitzḥak's Attempted Resolution: Finally, Rabbi Yitzḥak attempts to resolve the dilemma regarding the orlah and kilay hakerem prohibition. He proposes that Sabbatical Year produce is different: "Since its prohibition is engendered by means of the ground, its nullification is effected by means of the ground as well." This suggests a principle of equivalence: the source of the prohibition dictates the method of nullification.
    • The Counter-Example (Tithe): But then, the Gemara provides a powerful counter-example: tithe. Tithe's prohibition is "engendered by means of the ground" (when it grows from the earth), yet its nullification is not effected by the ground. The baraita about sowing untithed tithe and having the new growth obligated to tithe, while the original portion requires tithe from elsewhere, shows that the growth doesn't magically rectify the original. This severely weakens Rabbi Yitzḥak's elegant "ground-to-ground" theory.

The passage meticulously explores the concept of neutralization, distinguishing between dilution by mixture, neutralization by physical alteration (crushing), the passage of time, and the intriguing, yet elusive, idea of neutralization by permitted growth.

Two Angles

Let's explore two classic approaches to understanding the core distinction presented in this sugya (halakhic topic): the perspective of Rashi and the perspective hinted at by the reasoning of Tosafot.

Rashi: The Focus on Potential and Rabbinic Legislation

Rashi, as seen in his commentary on the opening lines (Rashi on Nedarim 58a:1:1), grounds his understanding in the Sages' legislative intent and the inherent potential of an item to be rectified.

  • "Potential for Redemption": For Rashi, the primary factor is whether an item can be permitted. He explicitly states for tevel (unconsecrated produce), "that can be rectified and become permitted." Similarly, for second tithe and consecrated items, there's "a remedy through redemption" (yesh lahem hetter al yedei pediyah). This potential for active rectification is the defining characteristic.
  • No Measure for Neutralization: Consequently, for these items with "a means of permitting," Rashi explains (58a:1:1), "they did not determine a measure for their neutralization, meaning that they prohibit even a thousand parts of permitted food, because it is possible for them to be rectified" (afilu alef lo b'tlei deha efshar lehu b'tikun). The Sages legislated stringently here to avoid undermining the very mechanisms of rectification they established. Allowing dilution would effectively circumvent the need for tithing or redemption.
  • Fixed Prohibitions: In contrast, items like terumah, hallah, orlah, and kilay hakerem are inherently forbidden in a way that doesn't allow for a positive act of permitting them. Rashi notes (58a:1:2) that for these, "the Sages determined a measure," specifically mentioning that terumah is nullified in one hundred parts, and orlah in two hundred. This indicates that their prohibition is seen as more static, and thus susceptible to being overwhelmed by a significant majority of permitted food. The focus is on the fixed nature of the prohibition rather than its potential for change.

Rashi's approach emphasizes the active role of rabbinic legislation in defining the status of these items and their behavior in mixtures, driven by the potential for correction.

Tosafot: The Emphasis on Practical Status and Circumstance

Tosafot, while agreeing with the core distinction, often delves into the practical circumstances and even potential loopholes or alternative interpretations that might permit leniencies. Their commentary on Nedarim 58a:1:1, "כל דבר שיש לו מתירין כגון טבל - שנתערב בחולין דמצי מעשר עליו מדמאי או מעציץ שאינו נקוב," suggests a more practical, less theoretical, view on how tevel might become permitted.

  • Practical Paths to Permissibility: Tosafot points to specific, practical ways an item like tevel might be "rectified" or its status changed, even before the explicit act of tithing. For example, if untithed produce (tevel) gets mixed with produce that is doubtfully tithed (damai), or if it's from a potted plant that isn't pierced (me'atiziz she'eino nakuv), there might be ways to navigate its status. This suggests that the "potential for redemption" isn't always a grand, abstract concept but can involve navigating existing halakhic pathways.
  • Focus on the "As Is" Status: Where Rashi emphasizes the inherent potential for redemption, Tosafot might focus more on the current halakhic status and how it can be legally altered through existing mechanisms, even if those mechanisms aren't the primary "redemption" of the item. The mishnah they cite for tevel (damai or me'atiziz she'eino nakuv) points to a situation where the prohibition is already somewhat in question or can be managed through other rules, making the question of mixture neutralization more complex.
  • Implicit Acceptance of Leniencies: The very act of Tosafot raising these alternative scenarios implicitly suggests that the strict rule of "no neutralization" might not always apply if there are other, valid ways to deal with the prohibition. They are exploring how the law actually functions in practice, rather than just its theoretical underpinnings. While they don't explicitly disagree with Rashi's fundamental dichotomy, their commentary often opens doors to considering how specific factual scenarios might lead to different outcomes or interpretations of the rule.

In essence, Rashi provides the foundational principle based on the Sages' intent and the item's potential. Tosafot, by highlighting practical scenarios and alternative pathways, demonstrates how this principle plays out in the messy reality of Jewish law, sometimes leading to nuanced exceptions or different ways of achieving the same goal of permissibility.

Practice Implication

This intricate discussion on "items that can become permitted" versus "items that cannot" has a direct bearing on how we approach uncertainty and decision-making in our daily lives, particularly concerning kashrut.

The Principle of Safek De'orayta Leḥumra, Safek De'rabanan Lekula (Doubt of Biblical Law is Stringent, Doubt of Rabbinic Law is Lenient)

The fundamental distinction between things that can become permitted and those that cannot mirrors, in a way, the rabbinic principle of how to treat doubts. When we encounter a situation where a Biblical prohibition might be involved, and we are unsure if it applies, the rule is to be stringent (leḥumra). We assume the prohibition applies. However, if the prohibition is only Rabbinic, and we are unsure if it applies, the rule is to be lenient (lekula). We can often rely on a principle of dilution or assume the rabbinic decree does not apply in such a doubtful situation.

  • Applying the Nedarim Logic: Think about this in terms of food. If you have a food item where the uncertainty stems from a Biblical prohibition (like terumah, orlah, or kilay hakerem), and there's a question of whether it's mixed into something else, the mishnah in Nedarim tells us that the Sages established measures for neutralization precisely because these are prohibitions that cannot be easily rectified. The stringent application of safek de'orayta leḥumra aligns with this: if it's a Biblical prohibition that can't be "fixed," we err on the side of caution and look for significant dilution or assume it remains prohibited.
  • Rabbinic Prohibitions and Leniency: Conversely, for items that can become permitted, the Sages' approach in Nedarim seems to lean towards leniency in certain mixture scenarios. This echoes the safek de'rabanan lekula principle. If the prohibition itself has a pathway to permissibility (like untithed produce that can be tithed), and there's a doubt about its status in a mixture, one might be able to rely on a smaller ratio of permitted food, or perhaps even assume it's permitted if the doubt is significant enough.
  • Navigating Halakhic Uncertainty: In practice, this means that when faced with a kashrut question involving a potential mixture, a knowledgeable individual or a halakhic decisor will first try to categorize the prohibition. Is it a fundamental, unrectifiable Biblical prohibition (like orlah)? If so, the standards for what constitutes neutralization or permissibility in a doubtful situation will be very high. Or is it a prohibition that has clear pathways to correction (like untithed produce)? In such cases, there might be more room for leniency based on established halakhic principles of mixture and doubt. This encourages a nuanced approach, moving beyond a simple "forbidden" or "permitted" to understanding the underlying legal framework and the potential for rectification.

Ultimately, this passage teaches us that our response to uncertainty should be informed by the nature of the prohibition itself – its inherent fixity or its potential for change.

Chevruta Mini

Let's ponder the tradeoffs inherent in these distinctions.

Tradeoff 1: Stringency vs. Practicality in Mixtures

The Sages' decision not to allow neutralization for items that "can become permitted" (like tevel or chadash) creates a significant stringency.

  • Question 1: What is the primary benefit of this strict approach for upholding the integrity of the laws of tithing and new crop offerings, and conversely, what is the practical challenge or inconvenience it presents to the average person?

Tradeoff 2: The Nature of Growth and Permissibility

The debate around whether "permitted growth" can neutralize the prohibition of an original item, and the various rejections of simple proofs, highlights a tension.

  • Question 2: If the Gemara's hesitations (e.g., regarding crushed items, mixtures, or specific plant types) suggest that proving neutralization by growth is difficult, does this imply the Sages were more concerned with preventing the appearance of leniency, or were they truly grappling with the fundamental nature of how new growth relates to the original prohibition?

Takeaway

The distinction between items that can and cannot become permitted fundamentally shapes how prohibitions behave in mixtures, reflecting a layered approach to rabbinic legislation that balances stringency with practical considerations.