Nedarim 59

Sugya Map

• Issue: The principle of neutralization (bitul) by majority, and its applicability to various prohibitions, particularly concerning growths (גידולין) and replacements (חליפין) of forbidden items.
• Nafka Mina:
  • Determining whether growths or replacements of a forbidden item inherit the prohibition or can be permitted, especially when mixed with permitted items.
  • Understanding the legal status of items that can potentially be made permitted (דבר שיש לו מתירין) versus those that are irrevocably forbidden.
  • The basis for differentiating between konamot (vows), teruma (heave-offering), and other prohibitions regarding the mechanism of neutralization.
  • The application of this principle to agricultural laws like Shevi'it (Sabbatical Year) and Ma'aser (tithe).
• Primary Sources:
  • Nedarim 59a-b
  • Mishnah Terumot 5:1
  • Mishnah Shevi'it 6:3
  • Baraita on Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel (cited in Nedarim)
  • Deuteronomy 14:22

Text Snapshot

Nedarim 59a:1

The Sages of the Gemara say: With regard to tithe, the ground does not engender the obligation; placement of the produce in a pile engenders the obligation, as it is only at that point that one is obligated to tithe his produce. Therefore neutralization of the prohibition is not effected by planting it in the ground.

• Dikduk/Leshon Nuance:
  • "דיגון" (digun): This term, often translated as "piling" or "gathering into a pile," is crucial. The commentators will debate its precise meaning and its role in establishing the obligation of ma'aser.
  • "קא גרים" (ka garem): "engenders," "causes." This highlights the causal link between the act of digun and the halakhic obligation.
  • "לא ע"י קרקע" (lo al yedei karka) vs. "ע"י דיגון" (al yedei digun): The explicit contrast between the ground and the act of piling sets the stage for understanding what creates the prohibition and, by extension, what can nullify it. The statement "neutralization... is not effected by planting it in the ground" suggests that if the prohibition is rooted in the ground (like Shevi'it), it might behave differently than an obligation rooted in digun.

Nedarim 59a:2

Rami bar Ḥama raised an objection to the opinion of Rabbi Yannai based on the mishna (57a): For one who says: This produce is konam upon me, or it is konam upon my mouth, or it is konam to my mouth, it is prohibited to partake of the produce, or of its replacements, or of anything that grows from it. If he says: This produce is konam for me, and for that reason I will not eat it, or for that reason I will not taste it, it is permitted for him to partake of its replacements or of anything that grows from it. This applies only with regard to an item whose seeds cease after it is sown. However, with regard to an item whose seeds do not cease after it is sown, it is prohibited for him to partake even of the growths of its growths. Apparently, permitted growths do not neutralize the prohibition.

• Dikduk/Leshon Nuance:
  • "קונם" (konam): The primary term for a vow in this context. The distinction between "konam alai" (upon me) and "konam she-lo ochal" (that I will not eat) is critical. The former implies a prohibition on the item itself, while the latter is a personal prohibition tied to the act of eating.
  • "חליפין" (chalifin) and "גידולין" (gidulin): "Replacements" and "growths." These are the categories of derived forbidden items that are being discussed.
  • "זרעו כלה" (zero kallah) vs. "זרעו לא כלה" (zero lo kallah): "Its seeds cease" vs. "its seeds do not cease." This distinction is the linchpin of the Mishnah's ruling on konamot. Items like grain or beans have seeds that are consumed or used up in reproduction, while items like onions or garlic have bulbs that continue to be the source of new growth, making their "seeds" (bulbs/sets) effectively perennial.
  • "גידולי גידולין" (gidulei gidulei): "Growths of growths." This escalates the concept of derived prohibition, indicating that even subsequent generations of growth are forbidden.
  • "אלמא גידולי היתר אין מעלין את האיסור" (alma gidulei heter ein ma'alin et ha-issur): "Apparently, permitted growths do not elevate/neutralize the prohibition." This is the Gemara's initial inference from the Mishnah, setting up the subsequent discussion.

Nedarim 59a:3

Rabbi Abba said: Konamot are different; since if he wishes to do so he can request that a halakhic authority dissolve the vows and render the objects of the vows permitted, their legal status is like that of an item that can become permitted, and its prohibition is not nullified by a majority of permitted items.

• Dikduk/Leshon Nuance:
  • "דבר שיש לו מתירין" (davar sheyesh lo metirin): "An item that has permitters" or "an item that can become permitted." This is a key halakhic category.
  • "לא בטיל ברובה" (lo bitel be-rovah): "Is not nullified by a majority." This is the direct contrast to the general rule of bitul be-rovah.
  • "אלא משום דהוא דבר שיש לו מתירין" (ela mishum dehu davar sheyesh lo metirin): The phrase "is different" (shoni) implies a unique characteristic. Rabbi Abba identifies this characteristic as its status as davar sheyesh lo metirin.

Nedarim 59a:4

The Gemara asks: And isn’t there the case of teruma, in which if he wishes he can request that a halakhic authority dissolve the designation of the produce as teruma and yet it is nullified by a majority of permitted items? As we learned in a mishna (Terumot 5:1): A se’a of ritually impure teruma that fell into less than one hundred se’a of non-sacred produce must be left to decay. The impure teruma, which is forbidden to all, renders the entire mixture forbidden. The Gemara infers: If it fell into one hundred se’a of non-sacred produce, its prohibition is neutralized.

• Dikduk/Leshon Nuance:
  • "תרומה" (teruma): Heave-offering. This is an example of an item that can be rendered permissible by a halakhic authority (via hatar'at nedarim or similar mechanisms).
  • "אחד במאה" (echad be-me'ah): "One in a hundred." This is the standard ratio for bitul in many cases, as established by the Torah and elaborated by the Sages.
  • "בטיל" (bitel): Nullified.
  • The juxtaposition of teruma (which can be made permitted) with the rule of bitul be-rovah creates a contradiction to Rabbi Abba's assertion that davar sheyesh lo metirin is not nullified by a majority.

Nedarim 59a:5

The Sages of the Gemara say in response: We are dealing with teruma that is in the possession of a priest, for which the owner can no longer request that a halakhic authority dissolve the designation. However, as long as the teruma is in the owner’s possession he can request that its designation be dissolved, and therefore its prohibition cannot be neutralized.

• Dikduk/Leshon Nuance:
  • "שבפונדתו של כהן" (she-be-fundato shel kohen): "In the possession of a priest." This is the key distinction. Once teruma is given to a priest, it is no longer under the owner's control and cannot be hatar (dissolved).
  • The Gemara is attempting to reconcile the Mishnah of Terumot with Rabbi Abba's principle. The explanation offered is that the Mishnah of Terumot is discussing a situation where the teruma cannot be made permitted by the owner, thus it's not a case of davar sheyesh lo metirin for that owner.

Nedarim 59a:6

The Gemara asks: If so, say the latter clause of that mishna: If the teruma mixed with the non-sacred produce was ritually pure, it may be sold to a priest, who treats all the produce as though it were teruma. This indicates that the mishna is dealing with teruma in its owner’s possession that was not yet given to a priest. Rather, we are dealing with the case of an Israelite who inherited the produce from a member of the house of his mother’s father, who is a priest. The heir owns the teruma; however, since he was not the one who designated it as teruma, he may not request that the designation be dissolved.

• Dikduk/Leshon Nuance:
  • "טהורה" (tehorah): Ritually pure. This contrasts with the previous discussion of tum'ah (ritual impurity).
  • "מוכר לכהן" (moker le-kohen): "Sells to a priest." This implies the teruma is still in the possession of an Israelite who is not a priest, but it has been designated as teruma.
  • "יורש מבית אבי אמו" (yoresh mi-beit avi emo): "Inherited from the house of his mother's father." This is a complex scenario. If an Israelite inherits teruma from a priestly lineage, he owns it but cannot perform hatarah because he did not personally designate it. This makes it a prohibition that cannot be removed by the owner, thus aligning with the davar she-ein lo metirin category for him.

Nedarim 59a:7

The Gemara asks: But isn’t it taught in that latter clause of that mishna: It must be sold to a priest; however, the price must reflect the value of the entire mixture except for the value of that se’a of teruma that fell into the non-sacred produce, as the teruma belongs to the priest. If the mishna is referring to the case of an heir who owns the teruma, why can he not collect the value of that se’a as well, as it is his property?

• Dikduk/Leshon Nuance:
  • "חוץ מדמיה" (chutz mi-damei): "Except for its value." This detail from the Mishnah of Terumot complicates the heir scenario. If the heir owns the teruma, shouldn't he be compensated for its value within the mixture? The fact that he isn't compensated for its value suggests it's not fully "his" in a way that allows him to profit from its sale in this manner.

Nedarim 59a:8

Rather, say that there is another distinction between konamot and other cases where one may request dissolution by a halakhic authority. Granted, in the case of konamot, there is a mitzva to request that a halakhic authority dissolve them, due to the statement of Rabbi Natan, as Rabbi Natan said: Anyone who vows, it is as if he built a personal altar outside the Temple, and one who fulfills that vow, it is as though he burns an offering upon it. However, in the case of teruma, what mitzva is there to request that a halakhic authority dissolve its designation? Therefore, items forbidden by konamot are considered items that can become permitted, and teruma is not.

• Dikduk/Leshon Nuance:
  • "מצוה לאיתשולי עלייהו" (mitzva le-itsholi alayhu): "A mitzvah to request their dissolution." This introduces a new criterion: the presence of a positive imperative or strong recommendation to seek hatarah.
  • "כאילו בנה מזבח" (ke'ilu banah mizbe'ach): "As if he built an altar." Rabbi Natan's statement equates vows with the sacrificial service, highlighting the gravity of vows and implicitly, the desirability of their annulment.
  • "מה מצוה לאיתשולי עלייהו" (mah mitzva le-itsholi alayhu): "What mitzvah is there to request their dissolution?" This is the rhetorical question that distinguishes teruma from konamot.

Nedarim 59b:1

§ With regard to the matter itself, Rabbi Yoḥanan said: With regard to a litra of onions that one tithed, and then sowed, it is tithed according to the entire crop. Rabba sat and stated this halakha. Rav Ḥisda said to him: Who listens to you and Rabbi Yoḥanan, your teacher? The permitted part of the litra, to where did it go? The original litra that he sowed was permitted by virtue of the fact that he tithed it, but why is he obligated to tithe the entire crop? The original litra should be subtracted from the crop that must be tithed.

• Dikduk/Leshon Nuance:
  • "ליטרא" (litra): A Roman unit of weight, about 327 grams.
  • "מעשר" (ma'aser): Tithe.
  • "כל העיקר" (kol ha'ikar): "The entire principal" or "the entire crop." This refers to the new growth that sprouted from the sown litra.
  • "היתר שבו" (heter she-bo): "The permitted part within it." Rav Ḥisda's question focuses on the principle of bitul. If the original litra was permitted (by tithing), it should act as a permitted component within the new crop, and thus reduce the amount subject to tithing.

Nedarim 59b:2

Rabba said to Rav Ḥisda: Didn’t we learn a corresponding halakha in a mishna (Shevi’it 6:3): With regard to sixth-year onions upon which rain fell during the Sabbatical Year, and they sprouted, if their leaves were black, the onions are forbidden. If their leaves turned green, the onions are permitted. And if the leaves are black, why are the onions forbidden? Let us say in this case too: The permitted part, the original onion, to where did it go?

• Dikduk/Leshon Nuance:
  • "שביעית" (Shevi'it): Sabbatical Year. Produce grown during Shevi'it is prohibited from being eaten or traded in the regular manner.
  • "שחורות" (shchorot): Black. This state indicates the growth is forbidden Shevi'it produce.
  • "ירקקו" (yarkeku): Turned green. This state indicates the growth is permitted.
  • Rabba uses the Shevi'it example to support Rabbi Yoḥanan's ruling. In Shevi'it, if the primary onion (which was permitted before Shevi'it) is now connected to forbidden growth, the question arises: why is the entire thing forbidden? Why isn't the permitted principal considered?

Nedarim 59b:3

Rav Ḥisda said to Rabba: Do you maintain that this halakha is taught about the primary, original onion, that it is prohibited? It is taught with regard to the additional growth that sprouted, and it is those leaves that are forbidden. The Gemara asks: If so, what is Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, who apparently disagrees with the tanna of the mishna, coming to say? As it is taught in a baraita that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: That which grew during a period of liability is liable and is considered Sabbatical-Year produce, and that which grew during a period of exemption is exempt. According to Rav Ḥisda’s explanation, the first tanna, cited in the mishna, also said that.

• Dikduk/Leshon Nuance:
  • "עיקר" (ikar): Principal, original part.
  • "תוספת" (tossefet): Addition, growth.
  • "חייב" (chayav): Liable.
  • "פטור" (patur): Exempt.
  • Rav Ḥisda's explanation is that the Mishnah in Shevi'it is not saying the principal is forbidden. It's saying the new growth is forbidden. This resolves the apparent contradiction with the principle that the permitted principal should remain permitted. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel's principle is then understood as agreeing with this, distinguishing based on the period of growth.

Nedarim 59b:4

The Gemara explains: This is not difficult, as this entire mishna, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel taught it. In the baraita Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel is not disagreeing with the opinion of the first tanna of the mishna; he is merely restating it. And nevertheless, the mishna and the baraita pose no difficulty with regard to the opinion of Rabba, as you heard that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said that the prohibition of the primary, original part is not neutralized only in a case where he did not exert himself, and the leaves sprouted on their own. However, in the case where he exerted himself, e.g., by sowing or planting, the prohibition of the original onions is neutralized by the majority.

• Dikduk/Leshon Nuance:
  • "השתדלות" (hishtadlut): Exertion, effort. This becomes the distinguishing factor.
  • "ברוב" (be-rov): By the majority.
  • The Gemara is now trying to explain how Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel's principle (that growth during liability is liable) can coexist with the idea that the principal might be permitted. The resolution offered is that his principle applies when the growth is natural (no exertion), but when there is hishtadlut, the principal's status can be affected by the majority of the new growth.

Nedarim 59b:5

The Gemara asks: And anywhere that one exerts himself, is the original part nullified by the majority? The Gemara asks: And isn’t there the case of one who sowed a litra of untithed tithe, where he exerts himself to sow it, and it is taught: And that original ** litra** of untithed first tithe that he sowed, one proportionally tithes for it from produce in a different place, and its prohibition is not neutralized by the growth.

• Dikduk/Leshon Nuance:
  • "מעשר טבל" (ma'aser tevel): Untithed produce.
  • "מתשקל עליה מן דגונא אחריתי" (miteshakhel alayh min deguna acherita): "One proportionally tithes for it from produce in a different place." This is a very specific rule for untithed ma'aser. The prohibition of the original litra is not simply nullified by the new growth; rather, its ma'aser obligation is discharged from other produce. This indicates that the prohibition of the original litra is very potent and not easily nullified by mere growth or majority.

Nedarim 59b:6

The Gemara answers: It is different with regard to tithe, as the verse states: “You shall tithe all the produce of your seed that is brought forth in the field” (Deuteronomy 14:22), indicating that all permitted seeds that are sown must be tithed, since permitted seeds that were tithed, people typically sow. Forbidden seeds that were not tithed, people do not typically sow, but the Sages penalized one who sowed untithed seeds and required him to tithe that which he was originally obligated to tithe and decreed that it is not neutralized by the majority.

• Dikduk/Leshon Nuance:
  • "הכל לזרעך" (hakol le-zar'echa): "All of your seed." The verse is interpreted to apply to all seed that is sown.
  • The explanation here is based on two factors: the explicit verse, and a rabbinic decree (takana) designed to deter the sowing of untithed produce. The decree ensures that the prohibition of untithed seed remains potent, preventing its nullification by growth.

Nedarim 59b:7

§ With regard to the matter itself, Rabbi Ḥanina Tirta’a said that Rabbi Yannai said: With regard to an onion of teruma that one planted, if its growths exceeded its principal, it is permitted. The Gemara asks: Is this to say that growths that are

• Dikduk/Leshon Nuance:
  • "בצל של תרומה" (betzel shel teruma): An onion of teruma.
  • "רבו גידוליו על עיקרו" (rabu gidulav al ikaro): "Its growths exceeded its principal."
  • "מותר" (mutar): Permitted.
  • This final statement of Rabbi Yannai presents a stark contrast to the previous discussion on konamot and ma'aser tevel. Here, teruma growths are permitted, even if they exceed the principal, and even though teruma is a divine offering. This implies a different logic for teruma growth than for other prohibitions.

Readings

Rabbi Isaac Alfasi (Rif) on Nedarim 59a

The Rif, in his digest of Talmudic law, often focuses on the practical halachic implications and the core reasoning behind the Gemara's discussions. On Nedarim 59a, the Rif’s commentary, though concise, illuminates the fundamental distinction between prohibitions that are intrinsically tied to a specific item and those that are more readily amenable to dissolution or neutralization.

Regarding the initial statement that ma'aser obligation is caused by digun (piling) and not by the ground, the Rif implicitly accepts this premise. His concern is not with the origin of the obligation but with its implications for bitul. The core of his understanding, particularly in the context of the subsequent discussion on konamot versus teruma, lies in the concept of "davar sheyesh lo metirin" (an item that has permitters).

The Rif would likely interpret Rabbi Abba's statement that konamot are different because "if he wishes, he can request dissolution" as the primary reason they are not nullified by a majority. This implies that the very possibility of hatarah (dissolution) preserves the distinctness of the forbidden item, even when surrounded by a majority of permitted items. The prohibition remains potent because it is not an absolute, unalterable state.

When the Gemara challenges this with teruma, which also has a mechanism for dissolution (even if not always applicable to the owner), the Rif would follow the Gemara's resolution. The key distinction, for the Rif, is often the presence or absence of the owner's ability to act to permit the item. If the owner can seek hatarah, the item is considered to have a pathway to permissibility. If that pathway is blocked, or if the item was never subject to such a pathway in the first place, its status changes.

Therefore, the Rif's approach would be to affirm that the konamot prohibition remains potent because the vow itself is a personal matter that can be rescinded by a halakhic authority, making it a davar sheyesh lo metirin. Teruma, however, presents a more complex case. While technically a davar sheyesh lo metirin in principle, its bitul by majority is governed by specific parameters, especially when teruma has been given to a priest or inherited by an Israelite who cannot perform hatarah. The Rif would likely see the Gemara's explanation that the Terumot mishnah refers to cases where hatarah is impossible for the owner as the correct way to reconcile the principle with the specific case of teruma.

Ultimately, the Rif’s analysis would hinge on the practical ability to resolve the prohibition. Konamot, by their very nature as personal vows, retain a direct line to hatarah. Teruma, while divinely instituted, has its own set of rules for bitul that depend on its current status and the owner's ability to interact with it. This leads to the conclusion that konamot maintain their distinctiveness against a majority, while teruma, in certain circumstances, can be nullified.

Rashi on Nedarim 59a

Rashi, in his commentary on Nedarim, delves into the linguistic and conceptual underpinnings of the Gemara's arguments, often providing crucial clarifications on terms and their implications. His explanation of the opening statement about ma'aser is particularly revealing.

Regarding “מעשר דיגון הוא דקא גרים ליה – שעל ידי דיגון מתחייב במעשר ולא ע”י קרקע” (Nedarim 59a:1), Rashi elaborates: "תריץ מעשר – תרומת מעשר דיגון הוא [דקא גרים]. ליה דלא מחייב בתרומת מעשר עד דמידגן והאי מאשתקד נידגנה הלכך מעשר עליה משל אשתקד ולא הוי איסורו על ידי קרקע הלכך לא הוי בטילתו ע"י קרקע" (Rashi on Nedarim 59a:1). This comment reveals a sophisticated understanding of ma'aser and its timing. Rashi clarifies that the obligation of ma'aser (specifically, terumat ma'aser – the tithe of the tithe) is not triggered by the mere presence of the produce in the ground. Instead, it arises when the produce is gathered into a digun (pile).

Crucially, Rashi explains that if the produce was already in a state of digun from the previous year, the current year's ma'aser obligation is linked to that past state of digun. This implies that the prohibition is tied to the act of gathering, not the ongoing growth from the soil. The consequence, as Rashi notes, is that "its prohibition is not by virtue of the ground, therefore its neutralization is not by virtue of the ground" ("ולא הוי איסורו על ידי קרקע הלכך לא הוי בטילתו ע"י קרקע"). This establishes a fundamental principle: the mechanism of neutralization must correspond to the mechanism that creates the prohibition. If the prohibition is tied to digun, then bitul should also be considered in relation to digun or similar acts, not the passive existence in the ground.

When Rashi addresses the objection raised by Rami bar Ḥama concerning konamot, his explanation of the Mishnah (57a) is key. He states: "אפילו גידולי גידולין אסורין – אלמא דאין גידולי היתר מעלין את האיסור וקשיא לרבי אמי" (Rashi on Nedarim 59a:2:1, referring to the Tosafot citation of Rashi). Rashi here emphasizes the severity of the prohibition in the case of konamot with non-ceasing seeds. The fact that even "growths of growths" are forbidden demonstrates that permitted growths do not automatically nullify the original prohibition. This is precisely the point Rami bar Ḥama seeks to leverage against Rabbi Yannai's (implied) view that growths can permit the principal.

Rashi's understanding of Rabbi Abba's distinction for konamot would be rooted in the inherent nature of vows. Vows create a personal prohibition, and the Gemara posits that there is a "mitzvah to request dissolution" (מצוה לאיתשולי עלייהו) because of Rabbi Natan's severe assessment of vows. This intrinsic connection to hatarah makes konamot fall into the category of davar sheyesh lo metirin. Rashi would explain that because there is a clear and religiously mandated path to permit the item through hatarah, the prohibition retains its potency and is not easily nullified by external factors like mixing with a majority, as the potential for its removal is ever-present.

For teruma, Rashi would accept the Gemara's detailed explanations regarding the owner's ability to perform hatarah. He would underscore that if hatarah is impossible for the owner (e.g., teruma given to a priest, or inherited teruma by an Israelite), then it ceases to be a davar sheyesh lo metirin for that individual. Consequently, the usual rules of bitul be-rovah would apply. Rashi's commentary thus highlights the nuanced application of bitul based on the specific nature of the prohibition and the legal status of the forbidden item and its owner.

Ramban (Nachmanides) on Nedarim 59a

Rabbi Moshe ben Nachman, the Ramban, often engages with the foundational principles of Jewish law, seeking to understand the underlying logic and connect disparate ideas. His commentary on Nedarim 59a would focus on the philosophical underpinnings of prohibition and neutralization, particularly the concept of davar sheyesh lo metirin and its implications.

The Ramban would likely view the opening statement about ma'aser and digun as establishing that the prohibition is an artificial, halakhic imposition, not a natural state. The obligation is created by an action (digun), not by the inherent property of the soil. This is crucial because it implies that the removal of the prohibition should also be linked to deliberate actions or halakhic processes, not passive ones.

When the Gemara introduces the distinction between konamot and other prohibitions concerning bitul be-rovah, the Ramban would emphasize Rabbi Abba's core argument: konamot are unique because they represent a category of prohibitions that are inherently "removable." The fact that one can seek hatarah from a halakhic authority means that the prohibition is not absolute. This ability to become permitted is what classifies it as davar sheyesh lo metirin. The Ramban would stress that this category inherently resists bitul be-rovah because its fundamental nature is that it can be nullified through a specific process. The majority of permitted items cannot simply erase a prohibition that has a recognized pathway to dissolution.

The challenge posed by teruma is where the Ramban's analytical prowess would shine. He would acknowledge that teruma is also, in principle, a davar sheyesh lo metirin. However, the Ramban would delve into the specific circumstances presented by the Mishnah in Terumot. He would explain that the Gemara's resolution—that the Terumot mishnah refers to situations where the owner cannot perform hatarah—is paramount. The Ramban would articulate that the principle of davar sheyesh lo metirin only applies when the owner actually possesses the ability to pursue that permissibility. If, due to circumstances like the teruma being given to a priest or inherited by someone unable to seek hatarah, that ability is extinguished, then the teruma is no longer effectively a davar sheyesh lo metirin for that specific individual. In such cases, the standard rules of bitul be-rovah would indeed apply, as the prohibition has become absolute for that context.

Furthermore, the Ramban might also explore the distinction between konamot and teruma on a more conceptual level. He could argue that konamot are fundamentally tied to the individual's will and intention, making their annulment a process of rectifying personal intent. Teruma, while also divinely ordained, is a category of sacred produce that, once designated, enters a different realm of halakhic interaction. The Ramban might suggest that the mitzvah to seek hatarah for vows, as articulated by Rabbi Natan, imbues konamot with a specific urgency for removal that teruma does not possess in the same way. This difference in the impetus for removal could explain why konamot are more resistant to bitul.

The Ramban's approach would therefore be to synthesize the Gemara's distinctions, grounding them in the core concept of davar sheyesh lo metirin and its practical application. He would clarify that the ability to become permitted, and the actual capacity to effect that permissibility, are the deciding factors in whether a prohibition is nullified by a majority.

Rabbi Chaim of Volozhin on Nedarim 59a

Rabbi Chaim of Volozhin, a towering figure in the Lomdus tradition, would likely approach this sugya by seeking the fundamental, underlying principles that govern the interaction of prohibitions and permissions within the halakhic system. His commentary would aim to uncover the deeper philosophical and practical reasons for the distinctions drawn by the Gemara.

For Rabbi Chaim, the initial statement about ma'aser and digun is not merely a technical point about when the obligation arises. It signifies that the prohibition of tevel (untithed produce) is a halakhic construct, contingent upon a specific human action (digun). This contrasts with natural prohibitions or those directly derived from the earth's status (like Shevi'it). This distinction is crucial for understanding bitul, as the method of neutralization should ideally mirror the method of creation. If a prohibition is created by an active human deed, it might be susceptible to being overridden or nullified by other actions or states of affairs.

When discussing konamot, Rabbi Chaim would likely elaborate on the concept of davar sheyesh lo metirin by referencing the inherent freedom and personal agency involved in vows. The very act of vowing is a personal declaration, and its retraction is likewise a personal act facilitated by halakhic expertise. The Gemara's citation of Rabbi Natan (“Anyone who vows, it is as if he built a personal altar”) would be central to his analysis. Rabbi Chaim would interpret this as highlighting the profound personal transgression involved in not dissolving a vow that can be dissolved. This creates a powerful internal dynamic pushing towards hatarah, making the vow-prohibited item fundamentally different from something that is irrevocably forbidden.

The distinction between konamot and teruma would be a focal point. Rabbi Chaim would emphasize that while teruma is a divine offering and thus a serious prohibition, its status as davar sheyesh lo metirin is often contingent upon external factors (who possesses it, whether it has been given to a priest). The Gemara's insistence that teruma can be nullified by a majority, even though it too is a prohibition from heaven, would lead Rabbi Chaim to conclude that the presence of a readily accessible and universally applicable pathway to hatarah is the decisive factor. For konamot, this pathway is inherent to the nature of the vow itself and the mitzvah to undo it. For teruma, the pathway can be blocked.

Rabbi Chaim might also explore the idea of "integrity of the prohibition." In the case of konamot, the prohibition is perceived as a highly personal and thus fragile construct, easily tainted by the potential for its own dissolution. It resists being diluted by a majority because its essence is its revocability. Teruma, while sacred, is part of a larger system of agricultural commandments. Its role within that system, and its eventual disposition (to the priests), means it integrates differently into the halakhic landscape, allowing for bitul under specific conditions.

Finally, Rabbi Chaim would likely connect this to the broader theme of human agency in halakha. While divine laws are absolute, many of their applications are mediated through human actions, intentions, and halakhic processes. The distinction between konamot and teruma regarding bitul illustrates how the degree of human agency in the creation and potential dissolution of a prohibition directly impacts its susceptibility to neutralization by a majority.

Friction

Kushya 1: The Paradox of Terumah and Davar Sheyesh Lo Metirin

The most significant friction point in this sugya emerges from the Gemara's apparent contradiction regarding the principle of davar sheyesh lo metirin. Rabbi Abba declares that konamot, being davar sheyesh lo metirin because one can request their dissolution, are therefore not nullified by a majority. The Gemara then immediately challenges this by citing the Mishnah in Terumot (5:1) concerning teruma, which is also a category of produce that can, in principle, be rendered permissible through hatarah. Yet, the Mishnah in Terumot clearly states that teruma is nullified by a majority (one hundred se'a of non-sacred produce). This creates a direct clash: if both konamot and teruma are davar sheyesh lo metirin, why does one resist bitul while the other succumbs to it?

The Gemara attempts to resolve this by distinguishing the circumstances under which hatarah is possible. For konamot, the ability to seek hatarah is always present for the one who made the vow. For teruma, the Gemara suggests the Mishnah in Terumot refers to cases where the owner cannot perform hatarah (e.g., teruma in the possession of a priest, or inherited teruma by an Israelite). In these specific scenarios, the teruma is effectively a davar she-ein lo metirin (an item that has no permitters) for that owner, and thus it is subject to bitul.

However, this resolution is not entirely satisfactory, as it seems to push the problem onto the specific interpretation of the Terumot Mishnah rather than addressing the fundamental difference. The Gemara itself acknowledges this by exploring further distinctions, such as the heir scenario and the mitzvah to seek hatarah for vows.

Terutz 1 (The Mitzvah of Hatarah as the Differentiator):

The most compelling terutz, as suggested by the Gemara itself, is that the distinction lies not merely in the possibility of hatarah, but in the imperative to seek it. Rabbi Abba states that konamot are different because "if he wishes to do so he can request...". The Gemara then refines this by citing Rabbi Natan's statement: "Anyone who vows, it is as if he built a personal altar...". This implies a strong, perhaps even mitzvah-like, obligation to seek the dissolution of a vow. The Gemara explicitly asks, concerning teruma: "what mitzvah is there to request that a halakhic authority dissolve its designation?"

This terutz posits that the prohibition of a konam is inherently tied to the individual's will and actions, and there is a religious imperative to undo it. This creates a robust internal force for its removal, making it resistant to external dilution. Teruma, on the other hand, while sacred, does not carry the same personal imperative for its owner to seek its dissolution. Its permissibility is more a matter of halakhic procedure (like hatarah or distribution to priests) than a personal religious obligation to undo the prohibition. Therefore, when the specific conditions for hatarah are absent for teruma, it loses its davar sheyesh lo metirin status and becomes subject to bitul. The konam, however, retains its davar sheyesh lo metirin status precisely because the impetus for its removal is intrinsic and religiously mandated.

Terutz 2 (The Nature of the Prohibition: Personal vs. Ontological):

A deeper terutz could focus on the inherent nature of the prohibition itself. Konamot are fundamentally personal prohibitions, born from the individual's declaration. The prohibition is a consequence of the speaker's will. This makes it intrinsically tied to the speaker and thus susceptible to being "un-willed" or "un-declared" through hatarah. The prohibition has a subjective, relational quality.

Teruma, however, is an ontological prohibition, stemming from its designation as a sacred offering to God. While it can be rendered permissible through various means, its initial status is an objective, divine classification. When the Gemara says teruma is nullified by a majority, it implies that its objective status can be overwhelmed by the quantitative majority of permitted items, especially when the personal mechanism for its removal (hatarah) is unavailable. The prohibition of teruma in the Terumot mishnah is not about the owner's personal vow; it's about the inherent sanctity of the item that, when mixed, contaminates the non-sacred. The bitul occurs because the sacred essence, when diluted, can be subsumed by the profane majority, especially when the owner cannot reclaim it as a davar sheyesh lo metirin.

This distinction explains why konamot resist bitul even when hatarah is possible, while teruma succumbs to bitul when hatarah is unavailable. The konam's prohibition is a product of the person; the teruma's prohibition is a product of its classification.

Kushya 2: The Enigma of "Exertion" (Hishtadlut) and Ma'aser Tevel

A second point of friction arises from the discussion concerning the litra of onions sown. Rabbi Yochanan states that if a litra of onions is tithed and then sown, the entire crop is tithed. Rav Ḥisda questions this, arguing that the original, permitted litra should reduce the amount subject to tithing. Rabba defends Rabbi Yochanan by referencing the Shevi'it mishnah about onions sprouting. Rav Ḥisda then clarifies that the Shevi'it mishnah refers only to the new growth, not the principal.

The Gemara then introduces Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, who says that which grew during a period of liability is liable, and that which grew during a period of exemption is exempt. This appears to align with Rav Ḥisda's view that the principal (grown during exemption) remains separate. However, the Gemara then states that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel’s principle applies only when there is no exertion (hishtadlut). If there is exertion (like sowing), the original part is nullified by the majority.

This is problematic because the Gemara immediately follows this by citing the case of sowing a litra of ma'aser tevel (untithed tithe). Here, there is clearly exertion, yet the rule is that the original litra is not nullified by the growth; rather, its tithe is taken from elsewhere. This creates a contradiction: if exertion leads to nullification by majority, why doesn't the ma'aser tevel case follow this rule?

Terutz 1 (The Unique Nature of Ma'aser Tevel and Rabbinic Decree):

The Gemara's own answer to this contradiction is that ma'aser tevel is different. The reason given is the verse "You shall tithe all the produce of your seed" (Deut. 14:22), combined with a rabbinic decree. The verse is interpreted to mean that all sown seed must be tithed. The Sages then decreed that one who sows untithed seed is penalized. This penalty is precisely that the original litra is not nullified by the growth. Instead, its ma'aser obligation is satisfied from other produce.

This terutz explains the outcome by invoking two factors: a biblical interpretation and a specific rabbinic decree designed to deter a particular transgression. The Sages enacted this decree to strongly discourage the sowing of tevel, recognizing the severity of this act. They effectively established that the prohibition of ma'aser tevel is so potent that it overrides the usual principles of bitul that might apply in other cases of exertion and growth. The prohibition is preserved, and its obligation is discharged through an alternative mechanism, thereby preventing the tevel from being "cleansed" by the new growth.

Terutz 2 (Distinguishing Between Types of "Exertion" and Their Halakhic Impact):

A more nuanced terutz might explore different categories of hishtadlut. While sowing is an act of exertion, perhaps not all exertion has the same effect on the principal's status. In the case of Shevi'it, the growth (black leaves) is intrinsically forbidden due to the Shevi'it year itself. The principal (the original onion) was permitted. The question is whether the forbidden growth contaminates the permitted principal. The Gemara's resolution is that the Mishnah in Shevi'it is about the growth, not the principal. This implies that the forbidden growth doesn't necessarily taint the permitted principal.

However, in the case of ma'aser tevel, the prohibition is not a passive state but a direct violation of a commandment. Sowing untithed produce is an active transgression. The Sages' decree, as mentioned above, serves to reinforce the severity of this specific transgression. Therefore, the hishtadlut in sowing tevel is viewed as an act that intensifies the prohibition, rather than one that could lead to its dilution through majority or growth. The hishtadlut in Shevi'it or other contexts might be viewed as a factor that allows for the principal to be affected by the majority, but in ma'aser tevel, the hishtadlut is seen as an aggravation that prevents bitul. This distinguishes the halakhic consequence of hishtadlut based on the specific prohibition involved.

Intertext

1. Mishnah Terumot 5:1

The primary intertextual anchor for this sugya is the Mishnah in Terumot 5:1, which is directly quoted and debated. It states: "A se'a of ritually impure teruma that fell into less than one hundred se'a of non-sacred produce must be left to decay. If it fell into one hundred se'a of non-sacred produce, its prohibition is neutralized." This Mishnah establishes the foundational principle of bitul be-rovah for teruma and serves as the basis for the Gemara's challenge to Rabbi Abba's assertion about davar sheyesh lo metirin. The entire subsequent discussion hinges on reconciling the apparent bitul of teruma with the non-bitul of konamot. The Gemara's efforts to explain why this Mishnah does not contradict Rabbi Abba's principle—by focusing on the owner's ability to perform hatarah or the presence of a mitzvah for hatarah—are central to understanding the nuances of bitul.

2. Mishnah Shevi'it 6:3

The Mishnah in Shevi'it 6:3, concerning sixth-year onions that sprout during the Sabbatical Year, serves as a crucial parallel case for the discussion on hishtadlut and the status of the principal versus the growth. The Mishnah states: "If their leaves were black, the onions are forbidden. If their leaves turned green, the onions are permitted." Rabba uses this to defend Rabbi Yochanan's ruling on sown tithed onions. Rav Ḥisda clarifies that the Shevi'it prohibition applies to the growth, not necessarily the principal. This intertextual reference allows the Gemara to explore the concept of whether a permitted principal can be rendered forbidden by forbidden growth, and how "exertion" might influence this. It provides a model for understanding how the status of the "principal" is determined in relation to its "growths" and the surrounding circumstances.

3. Baraita on Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel (Nedarim 59b)

The baraita that presents Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel's principle—"That which grew during a period of liability is liable, and that which grew during a period of exemption is exempt"—is a direct intertextual element that the Gemara must integrate into its discussion. This principle seems straightforward, distinguishing based on the temporal status of the growth. However, the Gemara's subsequent explanation that this applies only when there is no exertion (hishtadlut) complicates its application. This necessitates comparing the baraita's rule with the Mishnah in Shevi'it and the case of ma'aser tevel, demonstrating how the principle of hishtadlut acts as a modifier to the general rule of distinguishing growth periods. The Gemara's effort to harmonize the baraita with the Mishnah and its own subsequent points is a prime example of textual synthesis.

4. Deuteronomy 14:22 ("You shall tithe all the produce of your seed...")

The verse governing ma'aser is explicitly invoked to explain why the prohibition of ma'aser tevel is so potent. "You shall tithe all the produce of your seed that is brought forth in the field" (Deut. 14:22). The Gemara interprets "all the produce of your seed" broadly, implying that any seed sown must be tithed. More importantly, the Gemara uses this verse as a basis for the rabbinic decree that penalizes the sowing of untithed seed. This shows how biblical text is not just a source of law but also a foundation for rabbinic elaborations and decrees designed to uphold the spirit of the commandment. The severity of the ma'aser tevel case, where bitul is prevented, is thus rooted in a specific understanding of this verse and its implications for agricultural practice.

5. Rabbi Natan's Statement on Vows (Nedarim 23a)

While not directly quoted in the text snippet provided, the Gemara references Rabbi Natan's statement concerning vows: "Anyone who vows, it is as if he built a personal altar, and one who fulfills that vow, it is as though he burns an offering upon it." This statement, found earlier in Nedarim (23a), is crucial for understanding why konamot are treated differently. It imbues vows with a level of sanctity and gravity akin to sacrificial service, thereby creating a strong imperative to seek their dissolution. This intertextual reference provides the ideological underpinning for classifying konamot as davar sheyesh lo metirin in a way that differentiates them from other prohibitions that lack this specific religious impetus for removal.

Psak/Practice

The intricate discussions in Nedarim 59a-b reveal a complex framework for determining when prohibitions are nullified by a majority. This has significant practical implications for various areas of Halakha.

1. Davar Sheyesh Lo Metirin vs. Davar She'ein Lo Metirin: The primary distinction drawn is between items that can potentially be made permitted (davar sheyesh lo metirin) and those that are irrevocably forbidden (davar she'ein lo metirin). Items that fall into the former category, and where the means of permissibility are readily accessible to the owner, are generally not nullified by a majority. This is the case with vows (konamot), where the explicit mitzvah to seek hatarah ensures their status as davar sheyesh lo metirin and their resistance to bitul.

   • Practice: When dealing with a vow that has been placed on produce, if the vow can be dissolved by a halakhic authority, and the prohibition has been mixed with a majority of permitted items, the vow generally remains in force. The halakhic authority will first seek to dissolve the vow before considering bitul.

2. Terumah and its Status: Terumah exemplifies the complexity. While technically a divine offering, its ability to be nullified by a majority depends entirely on the owner's ability to perform hatarah.

   • Practice: If terumah is in the possession of a priest, or if an Israelite inherits terumah and cannot perform hatarah (as per the Gemara's explanation of the Terumot Mishnah), then it is treated as a davar she'ein lo metirin in that context and can be nullified by a majority according to the established ratios (e.g., 1:100 for impure terumah). If, however, the owner is an Israelite who can perform hatarah, the teruma would resist bitul as a davar sheyesh lo metirin. This distinction impacts how mixtures containing terumah are treated.

3. Ma'aser Tevel and the Power of Rabbinic Decrees: The case of sowing untithed tithe (ma'aser tevel) highlights the potency of rabbinic decrees designed to deter severe transgressions. Despite the act of sowing involving "exertion" (hishtadlut), which in other contexts might lead to bitul by majority, the Sages decreed that the prohibition of ma'aser tevel is not nullified by growth.

   • Practice: If one inadvertently sows untithed produce, the prohibition is not removed by the resultant growth. The tithe obligation on the original tevel must be fulfilled, often by taking tithe from other produce, ensuring the integrity of the ma'aser law. This principle serves as a strong deterrent against violating ma'aser laws.

4. Hishtadlut and Growth: The concept of "exertion" (hishtadlut) plays a role in determining whether a permitted principal can be affected by forbidden growth. While the exact parameters are debated, it appears that in cases of natural growth or where the prohibition is inherent (like Shevi'it), the principal might remain permitted, or the bitul might be limited. However, when the exertion leads to a significant transgression (like sowing tevel), the rabbinic decree overrides the general rule.

   • Practice: This would influence how one assesses mixtures where a permitted item has grown into a forbidden one or vice versa. The level of human intervention in the growth process is a factor in determining the halakhic outcome, though specific applications are complex and often depend on the nature of the prohibition itself.

In essence, the sugya teaches that bitul be-rovah is not a universal solvent. Its applicability is nuanced by the inherent nature of the prohibition, the owner's ability to effect its removal, the presence of specific rabbinic decrees, and the degree of human agency involved. These principles guide halakhic decision-making in areas ranging from food purity to agricultural laws and personal vows.

Takeaway

The integrity of a prohibition is not solely a function of its origin, but critically of the pathways—or lack thereof—to its dissolution, with personal vows retaining a unique potency against majority. Rabbinic decrees, designed to deter severe transgressions like sowing untithed produce, can override general principles of neutralization, preserving the prohibition's integrity through a potent, albeit indirect, mechanism.