Nedarim 60

Sugya Map: Vows of Time and the Nature of Growth

• Issue: The precise duration of vows related to specific temporal units (day, week, month, year, Sabbatical cycle) and the halakhic status of "growths" (גידולים) of terumah and untithed produce, particularly concerning the interplay of quantity (majority) and the nature of the source.
• Nafka Mina(s):
  • Determining the exact expiration of a vow based on temporal phrasing (e.g., "today" vs. "one day").
  • The permissibility of consuming produce that has grown from terumah or untithed sources, especially when the "growths" themselves have grown.
  • The significance of whether the original produce's seeds "cease" (כלה) or not, impacting the halakha of growths of growths.
  • The legal implications of leap years (שנה מעוברת) on vows related to a year.
  • The rabbinic decree (תקנה) regarding the need for a halakhic authority to dissolve vows that have naturally expired.
  • The fundamental question of how a vow's scope is determined: by explicit wording or by common understanding of temporal units.
• Primary Sources:
  • Mishnah Nedarim 60a-60b
  • Gemara Nedarim 60a-60b
  • Baraita regarding Rabbi Natan (cited in Gemara Nedarim 60b)
  • Mishnah Nedarim 63a (cited by Rav Ashi)

Text Snapshot: Vows and the Shadow of Time

Mishnah Nedarim 60a:

"If one vowed: Wine is forbidden to me as if it were an offering (קונם), and for that reason I will not taste it today, he is prohibited from drinking wine only until nightfall."

• Dikduk/Leshon Nuance: The phrase "as if it were an offering" (קונם) signifies the severity and all-encompassing nature of the vow, equating the forbidden item to something consecrated and therefore strictly prohibited. The phrase "for that reason" (ולא טעמתי ממנו) links the prohibition directly to the vow. The crucial temporal element is "today" (היום).

Mishnah Nedarim 60a:

"If one vowed not to drink wine this week, he is prohibited from drinking wine for the entire remainder of the week. And as Shabbat is considered part of the week that passed, i.e., it is the end of the week, he is prohibited from drinking wine on the upcoming Shabbat."

• Dikduk/Leshon Nuance: "This week" (השבוע) denotes a specific, ongoing temporal unit. The Gemara's explanation hinges on the understanding of how temporal units are demarcated and include their boundary points. The phrase "as Shabbat is considered part of the week that passed" (ושבת דשבוע העבר) is key to understanding the inclusion of Shabbat itself within the vow's scope.

Mishnah Nedarim 60b:

"If one says: Until Passover, it is forbidden to him until Passover arrives. If he said: Until it will be Passover, it is forbidden to him until Passover ends, as he may have intended for the vow to apply as long as it was still Passover (Rosh)."

• Dikduk/Leshon Nuance: The distinction between "until Passover" (עד פסח) and "until it will be Passover" (עד שיהא פסח) is subtle but critical. The former marks the arrival of the holiday as the endpoint, while the latter suggests the duration until the holiday concludes, encompassing its entirety. The parenthetical "(Rosh)" indicates that Rashi's interpretation is based on the view of Rabbenu Gershom (Rosh).

Gemara Nedarim 60a:

"Rabbi Yirmeya said: Even when darkness falls he is not permitted to drink wine immediately; rather, he is required to request that a halakhic authority dissolve his vow."

• Dikduk/Leshon Nuance: This introduces a rabbinic decree (תקנה). The requirement is not to continue the vow, but to formally dissolve it through a chacham (חכם), implying a procedural necessity even after the temporal limit has passed.

Readings: Navigating Temporal Vows and Produce Status

Rabbi Yirmeya and the "Request for Dissolution" (Rabbinic Decree)

The Gemara's initial discussion on Nedarim 60a wrestles with the precise expiration of a vow made for "today." The Mishnah states it expires at nightfall. However, Rabbi Yirmeya adds a crucial layer: even after nightfall, one must seek a hakham to dissolve the vow. This is not because the vow is still in effect, but due to a rabbinic decree (תקנה) instituted to prevent confusion.

Rav Yosef explains the rationale: A vow for "today" (היום) is distinct from a vow for "one day" (יום אחד). If one who vowed for "today" is immediately permitted to drink wine at nightfall, a person might mistakenly think that a vow for "one day" (which by its nature extends for a full 24 hours) also expires at nightfall, leading to an underestimation of the vow's duration. The decree mandates seeking a chacham for "today" vows to create a clear demarcation, preventing the conflation of "today" with the more expansive "one day."

Abaye challenges this, suggesting that if this is the concern, then a decree should be made for "one day" vows to prevent confusion with "today" vows. If a "one day" vow expires in the middle of the day (24 hours after its inception), people might think a "today" vow also expires mid-day. Rav Yosef counters that "this day" can be confused with "one day," leading to the mistaken assumption that "one day" vows expire at nightfall. However, "one day" is not confused with "today" in a way that would cause a "today" vow to expire mid-day. The core of Rav Yosef's argument is about preventing the lesser duration ("today") from being mistakenly applied to the greater duration ("one day").

Rabbi Natan and the "Personal Altar" Analogy

Ravina introduces a significant underpinning for Rabbi Yirmeya's stringent approach, linking it to Rabbi Natan's opinion as conveyed by Rav Yosef. Rabbi Natan posits that anyone who vows is as if they have built a personal altar. Fulfilling such a vow is akin to burning offerings on this forbidden personal altar, thus compounding the transgression. Consequently, even after the vow's stipulated time has passed, it is preferable to have it annulled by a hakham so that it's as if the vow was never made. This perspective imbues the act of vowing with inherent problematicness, even when the vow's temporal limit is reached. The chacham's annulment acts as a retroactive erasure, preventing the ongoing spiritual consequence of having made the vow in the first place. This is not merely about temporal duration but about the very act of nedarim itself.

The Inclusion of Shabbat and Rosh Chodesh

The Mishnah then details how vows for broader temporal units like "this week" or "this month" are interpreted. A vow for "this week" includes Shabbat, even if Shabbat is the end of the week. Similarly, a vow for "this month" includes the New Moon (Rosh Chodesh) of the following month.

The Gemara clarifies the necessity of these statements. For "this week," it's to preclude the argument that the vow only applies to the weekdays and not Shabbat. The phrase "this week" encompasses the entirety of the weekly cycle, including its culminating day.

For "this month," the Gemara explains that this teaching is particularly relevant when the New Moon precedes a chaser (deficient) month (29 days). In such a scenario, Rosh Chodesh is often observed for two days. The first day might be considered the thirtieth of the previous month, and the second day the first of the new month. The Mishnah clarifies that even if the vow was taken on the first day of Rosh Chodesh, it extends into the new month because "people call it the New Moon" of the upcoming month. This highlights the communal and calendrical perception of time units, where names and designations override strict calendrical calculations for the purpose of vows.

The Distinction Between "Until X" and "Until It Will Be X"

A subtle but significant distinction is drawn regarding vows made "until" a specific event, like Passover.

• "Until Passover" (עד פסח) means the prohibition ends when Passover begins.
• "Until it will be Passover" (עד שיהא פסח) implies the prohibition lasts until Passover ends. Rashi explains this is because the latter phrasing suggests the duration extends through the entire period designated as Passover.

Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosei debate the meaning of "Until before Passover" (עד שלפני פסח). Rabbi Meir holds it means the prohibition lasts until Passover arrives (i.e., the day before Passover is forbidden). Rabbi Yosei argues it lasts until Passover ends, implying the day before Passover is forbidden, and then Passover itself is also forbidden. This showcases the intricate parsing of temporal prepositions and their impact on vow duration.

Friction: The Paradox of Permitted Growths and Temporal Ambiguity

Friction 1: The Paradox of "Growths of Growths" and Their Permissibility

The initial section of the Gemara presents a seemingly contradictory chain of reasoning regarding terumah and its growths.

• The Mishnah states: "The growths of terumah are terumah." This implies they inherit the status of the original produce.
• Rabbi Yannai is introduced, permitting terumah due to the "majority of growths of growths."
• The Gemara immediately counters: "We have already learned that too: The status of growths of growths of terumah is that of non-sacred produce (חולין)."

This creates a paradox: How can Rabbi Yannai permit terumah based on the majority of growths of growths, when we have a clear ruling that growths of growths are chullin (non-sacred)?

Kushya: If growths of growths are inherently chullin, how can Rabbi Yannai's ruling, which relies on the permissibility of these growths of growths (via the majority principle), be valid? Does Rabbi Yannai's permission hinge on a quantitative majority that somehow overrides the qualitative status of growths of growths?

Terutz 1 (Based on Rashi and Gemara's explanation): The Gemara clarifies that Rabbi Yannai is not referring to growths directly from the terumah, but growths of growths. The initial statement "growths of terumah are terumah" applies to the first generation of growth. However, the second generation of growth (growths of growths) has a different halakhic status. The statement that "growths of growths of terumah are chullin" is the general rule. Rabbi Yannai's ruling is not based on the inherent permissibility of growths of growths in all cases, but on a specific scenario where the increase of these growths of growths surpasses the primary (original) part. The Gemara explains this by saying, "This teaches us that the growths of growths are permitted even in items whose seeds do not cease, e.g., onions." This implies that when the secondary growth becomes dominant, it can render the primary source permitted. The initial terumah status is neutralized by the overwhelming quantity of the chullin secondary growth.

Terutz 2 (Deeper Analysis): A deeper look reveals a potential tension between the Gemara's own explanations. Rashi on "בגידולי גידולין קאמר" (Nedarim 60a s.v. בגידולי גידולין) states: "כדאמר גידולי בצל של תרומה שנטעה ורבו גידוליו על עיקרו דהוו להו גידולי גידולין" - "as it says, growths of an onion of terumah which was planted and its growths multiplied over its root, thus they became growths of growths." This suggests that the growths of growths become chullin only when they are quantitatively superior to the original. The Gemara's second explanation, "This teaches us that the growths of growths are permitted even in items whose seeds do not cease," further supports this quantitative interpretation. The issue isn't that growths of growths are always chullin, but rather that their status is dependent on their relationship with the original source. When they exceed the primary source, they can render it permitted. The initial statement "growths of growths of terumah are chullin" might refer to a situation where they don't exceed the primary, or where the distinction is less clear. Rabbi Yannai's ruling, therefore, highlights a scenario where quantitative superiority of growths of growths overrides the terumah status of the original.

Friction 2: The Ambiguity of "A Day" vs. "Today" and the Rationale for the Rabbinic Decree

The Gemara grapples with the precise duration of a vow of prohibition for "a day" (יום אחד) versus "today" (היום). The Mishnah indicates that "today" expires at nightfall, while the Gemara implies "one day" lasts for 24 hours. A dilemma is raised: what is the halakha for someone who says "wine is konam for me for a day"? Is it treated like "today" (expiring at nightfall) or "one day" (24 hours)?

Kushya: The Mishnah itself seems to offer conflicting clues. The first clause states "today" means until nightfall. The latter clause states "one day" means from that time to the same time the next day. How can we definitively distinguish between "a day" and "today" if the Mishnah presents them in contrasting clauses that appear to resolve the ambiguity in opposite directions? Specifically, if "one day" lasts 24 hours, why would "a day" (which sounds synonymous) be treated differently?

Terutz 1 (Rav Yosef's Distinction): Rav Yosef's explanation for the decree regarding "today" vows provides the key. He differentiates between the potential for confusion. A vow for "this day" might be confused with "one day," leading someone to believe "one day" vows expire at nightfall. However, a vow for "one day" is not confused with "today" in a way that would make a "today" vow expire mid-day. This implies that "today" is a more immediate, bounded period (until the end of that specific calendar day), while "one day" signifies a full 24-hour cycle. The rabbinic decree is designed to preserve this distinction by requiring a formal dissolution for "today" vows, thereby preventing their conflation with the more extended "one day" vows. Thus, "a day" (יום אחד) is understood as the more general, 24-hour period, distinct from the calendrically-bound "today" (היום).

Terutz 2 (Rival Interpretation - The "Day" as a Unit of Time): An alternative perspective might argue that the fundamental unit of time referred to is a "day." The distinction then becomes whether that day is the current calendar day or a period of 24 hours. The phrase "today" anchors it to the present calendar day, hence its termination at nightfall (the end of that day). The phrase "one day" implies a duration of one full cycle of day and night, hence 24 hours. The dilemma concerning "a day" (יום) without the qualifier "one" could lean towards the "today" interpretation because it's less specific than "one day" and thus defaults to the more immediate temporal marker. However, the Mishnah's later statement, "if he said that wine is forbidden to him for one day... he is prohibited from drinking wine from the day he took the vow to the same time on the following day," strongly suggests that "one day" is indeed the 24-hour period. This leaves the term "a day" (יום) itself ambiguous, and Rav Ashi's subsequent citation of the Mishnah regarding "this year" suggests the Gemara is still seeking a definitive resolution. The friction lies in whether "a day" defaults to the calendar day or the 24-hour cycle, and the reason for the decree is to prevent the shorter duration from being applied to the longer one.

Intertext: Vows, Time, and the Nature of Purity

1. Vows and the Sanctity of Time (Tanakh - Bamidbar 30:3-16)

The very concept of vows (נדרים) is deeply rooted in Tanakh. Bamidbar chapter 30 deals extensively with the laws of vows, emphasizing their binding nature and the process of their annulment by a father or husband. The verses highlight how vows create a personal sphere of sanctity, akin to consecrated items. This parallels the Mishnah's opening statement where wine is made konam (as an offering), immediately invoking the concept of kedushah (sanctity). The temporal aspect of vows, as discussed in Nedarim, directly engages with the sanctity of specific periods. A vow not to eat on a particular day or week transforms that ordinary time into a period of personal asceticism, mirroring the sanctity of Shabbat or Yom Tov. The intricacy of determining the precise end of such vows reflects the broader Torah principle of carefully demarcating sacred time from profane time.

2. The Status of Growths and Purity Laws (Torah - Vayikra 22:15)

The discussion on terumah growths echoes the Torah's concern for the purity of consecrated produce. Vayikra 22:15 states: "And they shall not profane the holy things of the children of Israel, which they offer unto the LORD; neither shall they bear iniquity of trespass, when they eat their holy things: for I am the LORD who sanctify them." This verse underscores that the sanctity of terumah must be maintained. The principle that "growths of terumah are terumah" (גידולי תרומה תרומה) is a direct application of this, ensuring that even produce that sprouts from consecrated items retains its sacred status. The complexity introduced by "growths of growths" and the quantitative factor (ribui) reflects the rabbinic endeavor to meticulously apply purity laws to all possible scenarios, preventing even unintentional defilement of consecrated items. This mirrors the meticulousness in Nedarim concerning the precise expiration of vows.

3. The Authority of the Sage in Annulment (Mishnah Eduyot 1:5)

The requirement for a chacham to dissolve a vow, even after its natural expiration, finds resonance in other areas of rabbinic jurisprudence where the authority of the sage is paramount in clarifying and rectifying halakhic ambiguities. Mishnah Eduyot 1:5 describes how Rabban Gamliel was deposed and later reinstated, demonstrating the rabbinate's role in maintaining order and authority. While not directly about vows, it illustrates the principle that established halakhic authorities possess the power to interpret, clarify, and even retroactively adjust matters of Jewish law. The hakham's role in annulling a vow, as discussed in Nedarim, is a specific manifestation of this broader principle of rabbinic oversight and the need for expert guidance in matters that could otherwise lead to confusion or transgression.

4. The Nature of Time in Vows and Contracts (Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 204:6)

The Shulchan Aruch, in Choshen Mishpat 204:6, discusses the interpretation of terms in contracts and vows. It states: "Any term that is used in its common parlance (לשון בני אדם) is interpreted according to its common parlance." This principle is directly applicable to the Nedarim discussion. The interpretation of "this week," "this month," and "this year" relies heavily on how these temporal units are commonly understood. The Gemara's elaboration on how "Shabbat is considered part of the week that passed" and "New Moon is considered part of the next month" exemplifies this. These are not strict calendrical dissections but rather reflect how people perceive and delineate these periods. The ambiguity surrounding "a day" versus "one day" highlights the challenge of applying this principle when the common parlance itself might be imprecise or subject to multiple interpretations, necessitating rabbinic clarification.

5. The Metaphysics of Vows (Responsa of the Radbaz, Siman 731)

The Radbaz, in a responsum (Siman 731), discusses the spiritual ramifications of vows, echoing Rabbi Natan's view. He explains that a vow creates a spiritual bond or "chain" that ties the individual to the object of the vow. Even after the physical prohibition ends, the spiritual tie may persist. The annulment by a chacham severs this spiritual chain. This metaphysical understanding of vows provides a deeper rationale for Rabbi Yirmeya's insistence on formal annulment, going beyond mere practical confusion to address a deeper spiritual entanglement that requires the intervention of a higher authority to unravel.

Psak/Practice: The Practical Implications of Temporal Vows andrabbinic Decrees

The Gemara's discussion in Nedarim 60a-b has significant practical implications for the interpretation and observance of vows.

Firstly, the distinction between "today" (היום) and "one day" (יום אחד) is crucial. A vow made for "today" is generally understood to expire at nightfall of that calendar day. However, the rabbinic decree (תקנה) mandates that one should seek a chacham to formally dissolve it. This decree, as explained by Rav Yosef, aims to prevent confusion with vows of "one day," which typically extend for a full 24-hour period. Therefore, while the prohibition technically ends at nightfall, the halakha requires a formal annulment to avoid potential misinterpretations and ensure proper observance.

Secondly, the interpretation of broader temporal units like "this week," "this month," and "this year" is based on common understanding and calendrical divisions, often including boundary days. A vow for "this week" includes Shabbat. A vow for "this month" extends to the New Moon of the following month. A vow for "this year" includes Rosh HaShanah of the subsequent year. This highlights a principle of inclusiveness in temporal vows, where the designated period encompasses its natural temporal boundaries and associated holidays or observances.

Thirdly, the distinction between "until X" and "until it will be X" (e.g., until Passover vs. until it will be Passover) demonstrates the importance of precise language in vows. The former typically signifies the commencement of the event as the termination point, while the latter can imply the entire duration of the event. The differing opinions of Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosei on "until before Passover" further underscore the need for careful linguistic analysis.

In practice, when dealing with vows, one must consider:

• Precise Wording: The exact phrasing used is paramount.
• Common Understanding: The generally accepted meaning of temporal units is applied.
• Rabbinic Decrees: The need for formal annulment, particularly for vows of "today," must be observed.
• Context: The specific circumstances, such as leap years (as alluded to by Rav Ashi's question regarding "this year" and leap years), can impact the duration of vows tied to years.

The meta-heuristic here is one of caution and stringency when interpreting vows. Since vows involve personal prohibition, the Sages erred on the side of caution to ensure clarity and prevent transgression. The requirement for a chacham's annulment, even after the vow's time has passed, serves as a mechanism to reinforce the seriousness of vows and ensure their proper understanding and resolution.

Takeaway: The Precision of Time and the Sanctity of Words

The meticulous analysis of temporal vows reveals that halakha treats time not as a monolithic continuum but as a series of defined units, each with its own boundaries and implications for prohibition. The careful parsing of language, coupled with rabbinic decrees designed to prevent confusion, underscores the profound respect for the binding nature of one's words.