Nedarim 67

Sugya Map

• Issue: The Mishna establishes the conditions for nullifying a woman's vows (hafara).
  • Clause 1: A married woman's vows require her husband's nullification.
  • Clause 2: A na'arah me'urasa (betrothed young woman) requires both her father and her ba'al me'urasa (betrothed husband) to nullify her vows.
  • Sub-Issue: What is the nature of joint nullification? Is it an independent act by each, or a synergistic partnership?
• Nafka Mina(s):
  • What happens if only one party nullifies?
  • What if one nullifies and the other ratifies?
  • What if the ratifier retracts their ratification?
  • Who has authority over a na'arah me'urasa's vows—her father alone, her ba'al me'urasa alone, or both?
• Primary Sources:
  • Mishna Nedarim 67a.
  • Gemara Nedarim 67a.
  • Torah: Bamidbar 30:7 ("ואם איש תהיה ונדריה עליה...") and 30:11 ("ואם נדרה בבית אישה..."). These are the foundational verses for nullification.

Text Snapshot

The sugya opens with the Mishna, followed by the Gemara's dialectic:

מִשְׁנָה: הֵפֵר הָאָב וְלֹא הֵפֵר הַבַּעַל, אוֹ הֵפֵר הַבַּעַל וְלֹא הֵפֵר הָאָב – אֵינוֹ מוּפָר. וְאֵין צָרִיךְ לוֹמַר אִם קִיֵּם אֶחָד מֵהֶן.

גְּמָרָא: פָּרִיךְ הַיְינוּ רֵישָׁא? מִשְׁנָה מִתְחִלָּה: אָבִיהָ וּבַעְלָהּ מְפִירִין נְדָרֶיהָ. אֶלָּא לְהַשְׁמִיעֵנוּ: שֶׁלֹּא תֹּאמַר, אֶחָד מֵהֶן מַפְקִיעַ, וְלֹא צָרִיךְ שְׁנֵיהֶם. תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: שְׁנֵיהֶם צְרִיכִין.

וְאֵין צָרִיךְ לוֹמַר אִם קִיֵּם אֶחָד מֵהֶן – לָמָה לִי לְמִיתְנָא? וְהָא אִיתְּמַר אֶחָד מֵהֶן הֵפֵר בְּלֹא חֲבֵירוֹ — לָאו כְּלוּם הוּא!

אֶלָּא, צְרִיכָא: בְּשֶׁהֵפֵר אֶחָד מֵהֶן וְקִיֵּם אֶחָד מֵהֶן, וְחָזַר וּבִיקֵּשׁ הַמְקַיֵּם הֲפָרָה לְקִיּוּמוֹ, דְּמֵיגוֹ דַּעֲקַר קִיּוּמוֹ, עֲקַר נַמִי נִדְרָא. קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן: דִּשְׁנֵיהֶם צְרִיכִין לְהַפְרִין בְּיַחַד.

• Mishna: If the father nullified and the husband did not nullify, or if the husband nullified and the father did not nullify—it is not nullified. And needless to say, if one of them ratified it.
• Gemara: It asks: Is this not the same as the first clause? (The Mishna begins: Her father and her husband nullify her vows.) Rather, it teaches us: Lest you say that one of them alone can annul, and both are not needed. It therefore teaches us that both are needed.
• As for "And needless to say, if one of them ratified it"—why do I need the Mishna to teach this? It has already been stated that if one of them nullified without the other, it is nothing!
• Rather, it is necessary: In a case where one of them nullified and the other ratified, and the one who ratified then retracted and sought hafara for his ratification (i.e., hattarat nedarim). Lest you say that since he uprooted his ratification, he also uprooted the vow itself. It teaches us that both must nullify together.

Dikduk/Leshon Nuance

• "הפר האב ולא הפר הבעל": The use of "הפר" (he nullified) in the perfect tense, followed by "ולא הפר" (and he did not nullify), emphasizes a completed action by one party and a lack thereof by the other. Rashi (Nedarim 67a s.v. ולא הפר הבעל) clarifies "ולא הפר הבעל - אלא שתק מעת לעת," meaning the husband remained silent until the time for nullification passed, thereby effectively allowing it to stand. This silence is functionally equivalent to ratification in terms of negating the other's nullification.
• "וביקש המקיים הפרה לקימונו": This phrase is crucial. It doesn't mean the ratifier nullified the vow, but rather sought hattarat nedarim (dissolution by a beit din) on his act of ratification. The Gemara considers whether undoing the ratification retrospectively empowers the other's earlier nullification. The Mishna, in its chiddush, teaches it does not, underscoring the joint, concurrent nature of hafara.

Readings

Ran (Nedarim 67a s.v. ואין צריך לומר קיים אחד מהן)

The Ran, following the Gemara, delves into the chiddush of the Mishna's seemingly superfluous clause: "וְאֵין צָרִיךְ לוֹמַר אִם קִיֵּם אֶחָד מֵהֶן" (And needless to say, if one of them ratified it).

• The Gemara's Question: The Gemara initially finds this clause redundant. If the Mishna already taught that "הפר האב ולא הפר הבעל – אינו מופר" (if one nullified and the other didn't, it's not nullified), then surely if one ratified (which is a stronger act than mere silence), the vow would stand!
• Ran's Elucidation of the Gemara's Answer: The Gemara responds that this clause is not redundant, but addresses a very specific scenario: "בְּשֶׁהֵפֵר אֶחָד מֵהֶן וְקִיֵּם אֶחָד מֵהֶן, וְחָזַר וּבִיקֵּשׁ הַמְקַיֵּם הֲפָרָה לְקִיּוּמוֹ" (where one nullified and the other ratified, and the ratifier later sought hattarah for his ratification). The Ran emphasizes that the chiddush here is that even if the ratification itself is subsequently dissolved (through hattarah by a beit din), the original act of nullification by the other party does not retroactively take effect.
• Ran's Chiddush: This teaches us a fundamental principle about hafara: "דִּשְׁנֵיהֶם צְרִיכִין לְהַפְרִין בְּיַחַד" (that both must nullify together). It's not merely that two independent conditions must be met, but that the nullification must be a unified, synchronized act. If one's action (ratification) actively counteracts the other's (nullification), even if that counteraction is later undone, the initial nullification remains ineffective because it was never a joint nullification in the first place. The Ran highlights that the Gemara is rejecting the idea of meigo de'akar kiyumo, akar nami nidra (since he uprooted his ratification, he also uprooted the vow). The hafara mechanism requires concurrent, positive action from both authorized parties, rather than merely the absence of opposition from one.

Rashi (Nedarim 67a s.v. הפר האב)

Rashi's brief comments provide crucial contextualization for the Mishna's statement.

• "הפר האב - ביום שמעו": Rashi immediately clarifies that the father's nullification, like all hafara, must occur "on the day he hears it" (within 24 hours). This connects the Mishna directly to the broader halachic framework of hafara timing derived from Bamidbar 30.
• "ולא הפר הבעל - אלא שתק מעת לעת": This is a critical interpretive move. "Did not nullify" is not merely passive inaction. Rashi explains it as active silence that allows the vow to stand by default, after the 24-hour window has passed. This silence is equivalent to "קיום" (ratification) in its effect of making the vow binding.
• "דשתיקתו של זה מבטלת הפרתו של זה": This statement, building on the previous one, articulates Rashi's chiddush: The inaction (silence) of one party effectively cancels the action (nullification) of the other. This isn't just about failing to meet a dual requirement; it implies a dynamic tension where one party's passive acceptance actively undermines the other's attempted nullification. It reinforces the idea that hafara is a delicate, joint process, easily thwarted by either opposition or even mere neglect. The chiddush lies in understanding silence as an active force in this context.

Rif (Nedarim 23a:1)

The Rif, as is his wont, presents the halakha derived from the sugya in a concise, authoritative manner, reflecting the Gemara's conclusion as the accepted psak.

• "נערה המאורסה אביה ובעלה מפירין נדריה (דף סז ע"א) הפר האב ולא הפר הבעל הפר הבעל ולא הפר האב אינו מופר ואצ"ל שקיים אחד מהם": The Rif directly quotes the Mishna (and its initial clause on na'arah me'urasa) as the established law. His chiddush, if one can call it that in this context, is to present this as straightforward halakha, without delving into the Gemara's dialectics. This affirms the Mishna's conclusion as the final word in halakha, confirming that for a na'arah me'urasa, both father and ba'al me'urasa are indispensable for hafara, and the absence of one's nullification (or the presence of one's ratification) renders the vow intact. It emphasizes the practical, unambiguous outcome of the sugya.

Friction

The most compelling friction point in this sugya arises from the Gemara's extensive discussion regarding the na'arah me'urasa (betrothed young woman) and the source for the halakha that both her father and ba'al me'urasa nullify her vows. The Gemara presents a series of hava aminas (initial assumptions) and refutations, meticulously dissecting the scriptural verses in Bamidbar 30 to arrive at its conclusion.

The Strongest Kushya: Why is a special verse needed for Na'arah Me'urasa?

The Gemara asks: "וְאִם תֹּאמַר: הָאִי אִיכָּא קַל וָחוֹמֶר מִנְּשׂוּאָה? דְּאִי בְּנְשׂוּאָה, בַּעַל מֵפֵר לְחוּדֵיהּ, כָּל שֶׁכֵּן בְּאֵרוּסִין, שֶׁיֵּשׁ אָב? וְהַבַּעַל מֵפֵר לְחוּדֵיהּ!" (Nedarim 67a)

• The Kushya: If a married woman's husband can nullify her vows alone (as indicated by "ואם נדרה בבית אישה" - Bamidbar 30:11), then surely by a kal v'chomer (a fortiori) argument, a ba'al me'urasa should be able to nullify his betrothed's vows alone, especially since her father is still involved and could also nullify. Why does the Torah need a specific verse (Bamidbar 30:7, "ואם איש תהיה ונדריה עליה") to teach that both father and ba'al me'urasa must nullify, or even that the ba'al me'urasa has any power at all? One might think that the ba'al me'urasa has more power than a married husband, as he is still in the "presence of the father."
• Another related Kushya: The Gemara also explores the possibility that the father alone could nullify for his na'arah me'urasa. If the father nullifies for his unmarried daughter ("ואם נדר נדרה בבית אביה" - Bamidbar 30:4), why would he lose that power when she is merely betrothed, and still in his house? The Gemara rejects this by noting that the verse for an unmarried daughter specifies "בבית אביה," implying that once "to a husband" (even betrothed), the situation changes. The very fact that the Torah doesn't simply say "father nullifies" for a me'urasa indicates a different reality.

The Best Terutz (Gemara's Conclusion)

The Gemara systematically dismantles these hava aminas, showing the necessity of the verse and its interpretation that both nullify. The core of the terutz lies in rejecting the kal v'chomer and establishing that the ba'al me'urasa's authority is distinct and conditional.

The Gemara first refutes the kal v'chomer that the ba'al me'urasa nullifies alone. It suggests that if the ba'al me'urasa could nullify alone, and the verse "ואם נדרה בבית אישה" (Bamidbar 30:11) implies that a married husband nullifies vows made "in her husband's house," then that verse itself would be redundant. Why? Because if the ba'al me'urasa can nullify alone, then "מקל וחומר: ומה במקום אב, ארוס מפר לחודיה, כשאין אב - לא כל שכן?" (Nedarim 67a) — if in the presence of the father, the ba'al me'urasa nullifies alone, then when there is no father (i.e., when she's married), surely her husband nullifies alone! Thus, the verse for a married woman would be unnecessary. Since the Torah does not write superfluous verses, this kal v'chomer must be flawed.

The Gemara then reaches its final conclusion regarding the na'arah me'urasa:

אֶלָּא לָאו מִשּׁוּם שׁוּתָּפוּת הוּא? (Nedarim 67a)

"Is it not, rather, because of his partnership with the father?"

• Terutz Elaboration: The Gemara concludes that the ba'al me'urasa does not possess an independent power of nullification akin to a married husband. His power to nullify vows made by his betrothed is only "מִשּׁוּם שׁוּתָּפוּת עִם הָאָב" (because of his partnership with the father). This partnership is a unique status, established by the verse "ואם איש תהיה ונדריה עליה" (Bamidbar 30:7), which the Gemara identifies as referring to a na'arah me'urasa. This verse, therefore, is not redundant, as it defines a specific shared authority that cannot be derived by kal v'chomer from a married woman. The chiddush is that the ba'al me'urasa's power is not a full, independent ba'al authority, but rather a contingent, shared one. The term "שותפות" implies a joint venture, where neither party acts fully independently to effect the hafara.

This detailed analysis of the verses and the rejection of various hava aminas highlights the precision required in deriving halakha from pesukim and the unique nature of the me'urasa status, which is neither fully under her father's authority nor fully under her husband's.

Intertext

1. Bamidbar 30: The Torah's Graduated System of Hafara

The entire sugya is an extended drasha on Bamidbar, Chapter 30. The chapter itself lays out a graduated system of authority over a woman's vows, based on her marital status:

• Unmarried Daughter (Bamidbar 30:4-6): Only the father nullifies. "וְאִם הָפֵר אָבִיהָ אֹתָהּ בְּיוֹם שָׁמְעוֹ כָּל נְדָרֶיהָ וֶאֱסָרֶיהָ אֲשֶׁר אָסְרָה עַל נַפְשָׁהּ לֹא יָקוּם..."
• Betrothed Woman (Na'arah Me'urasa) (Bamidbar 30:7-9): The focus of our sugya. The Gemara derives that both the father and the ba'al me'urasa nullify. The verse states: "וְאִם אִישׁ תִּהְיֶה וּנְדָרֶיהָ עָלֶיהָ... וְאִם הָפֵר אִישָׁהּ אֹתָהּ בְּיוֹם שָׁמְעוֹ..." The Gemara's rigorous analysis is needed to show that despite the language, the father's authority is not entirely supplanted.
• Married Woman (Nesua) (Bamidbar 30:11-13): Only the husband nullifies. "וְאִם נָדְרָה בְּבֵית אִישָׁהּ אוֹ אָסְרָה אִסָּר עַל נַפְשָׁהּ בִּשְׁבֻעָה וְשָׁמַע אִישָׁהּ וְהֶחֱרִישׁ לָהּ וְלֹא הֵפֵר אֹתָהּ וְקָמוּ נְדָרֶיהָ... וְאִם הָפֵר אֹתָהּ אִישָׁהּ בְּיוֹם שָׁמְעוֹ..."

This progression underscores a shift in kinyan and authority. The sugya focuses on the transition point, the na'arah me'urasa, as a state of dual, shared authority, which is precisely what the Gemara's "שותפות עם האב" conclusion captures. This intertextual connection is foundational, as the entire discussion is a deep dive into the nuances of these pesukim.

2. Kiddushin 2a: Shared Agency in Kinyanim

The concept of "שותפות" (partnership) in effecting a kinyan or status change resonates with other areas of halakha.

• Kiddushin 2a: The Gemara there discusses the various ways a woman can be acquired in kiddushin. While the man performs the act of kiddushin ("האיש מקדש"), the woman must also consent ("והאשה מתקדשת"). Although not a direct parallel of two external parties acting, it highlights that even in a seemingly unilateral act of kinyan, the agency of both parties is essential for the legal effect.
• Connection to Nedarim 67a: In Nedarim 67a, the "שותפות" between father and ba'al me'urasa is even more pronounced. Here, two distinct individuals, both with a vested interest and a degree of kinyan over the woman (the father's residual authority, the ba'al me'urasa's incipient authority), must actively collaborate to nullify the vow. Neither's action alone suffices. This contrasts with the kiddushin scenario where the woman's agency is often passive consent. In hafara, it's active nullification from both. The common thread is the idea that certain legal statuses or changes require a composite of actions or agencies, rather than a single, dominant authority.

Psak/Practice

The sugya on Nedarim 67a directly informs practical halakha concerning the nullification of vows.

1. Na'arah Me'urasa: The core psak is that for a na'arah me'urasa, both her father and her ba'al me'urasa must nullify her vows. If either nullifies and the other does not (or, worse, ratifies), the vow stands. This is codified by the Rambam (Hilchot Nedarim 12:7) and Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 236:6), who state, "נערה המאורסה אביה ובעלה מפירין נדריה, וצריכין שניהם להפר."
2. Nature of Joint Nullification: The Gemara's chiddush that the "וְאֵין צָרִיךְ לוֹמַר אִם קִיֵּם אֶחָד מֵהֶן" clause addresses a scenario where one nullified, the other ratified, and then the ratifier's ratification was dissolved by hattarah. The psak is that even in such a case, the vow is not nullified, because "דִּשְׁנֵיהֶם צְרִיכִין לְהַפְרִין בְּיַחַד" (both must nullify together). This means hafara is not a mere accumulation of individual actions, but a singular, joint legal act. The Rambam (Hilchot Nedarim 12:5) states similarly, "הפר האב ולא הפר הבעל... אינו מופר... ואפילו קיים אחד מהן. ואין צריך לומר אם קיים אחד מהן ונשאל על קיומו והתירוהו, אינו מופר." This confirms the Gemara's rigorous analysis of the Mishna's seemingly redundant clause.
3. Meta-Psak Heuristic: The sugya's protracted dialectic regarding the na'arah me'urasa and the careful parsing of scriptural verses, rejecting multiple hava aminas and kal v'chomer arguments, serves as a powerful heuristic for psak. It teaches that one cannot simply extrapolate from seemingly similar cases (kal v'chomer) or assume a singular authority where the Torah implies a more complex structure. The phrase "אלא לאו משום שותפות הוא?" emphasizes that unique legal relationships (like kinyanei ishut at different stages) often entail unique divisions of authority, which must be precisely derived from the text, not assumed.

Takeaway

This sugya meticulously dissects the concept of hafara for a na'arah me'urasa, revealing that authority over her vows is neither fully paternal nor fully marital, but a unique "שותפות" derived from precise textual analysis. It underscores that halakha often demands concurrent, unified action from multiple stakeholders to effect a legal change, and that silence or even a later retraction of a counter-action does not retroactively validate a partial hafara.