Nedarim 68

Sugya Map

• Issue 1: Source for hafara (nullification) of a na'ara me'urasa (betrothed young woman) by both her father and her husband.
  • Nafka Mina: The drashot themselves, and the implications for the scope of hafara (e.g., dvarim shebeino u'veinah).
  • Primary Sources: Numbers 30:7 ("ואם לאיש היתה"), Numbers 30:17 ("בין איש לאשתו בין אב לבתו בנעוריה בית אביה").
• Issue 2: The "מקיש קודמי הויה שניה לקודמי הויה ראשונא" drasha regarding a na'ara me'urasa whose betrothed died before nullifying.
  • Nafka Mina: Whether the father alone can nullify vows made before the betrothal (kodmin) if the husband died without acting.
  • Primary Source: Numbers 30:7 ("ואם לאיש היתה").
• Issue 3: The dilemma of whether a husband's partial hafara is mitak (weakens the entire vow's force) or machriach (severs his share, leaving the rest intact).
  • Nafka Mina: A case where a betrothed nullified a vow on two olives, and the girl ate them before the father nullified. If machriach, she's chayav malkot for one olive; if mitak, she's not.
  • Primary Sources: Nedarim 68a (the safek), Nedarim 70a Mishna (as cited in the baraita).
• Issue 4: Understanding the baraita that resolves the machriach/mitak dilemma, specifically the scenario where the husband nullified and died on the same day.
  • Nafka Mina: The underlying nature of hafara – whether it's a complete removal or a weakening of issur.
  • Primary Source: Nedarim 68a (the baraita).

Text Snapshot

The sugya opens with a machloket on the pasuk for hafara of a na'ara me'urasa:

דְּבֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל תָּנָא: "אֵלֶּה הַחֻקּוֹת אֲשֶׁר צִוָּה ה' אֶת מֹשֶׁה בֵּין אִישׁ לְאִשְׁתּוֹ בֵּין אָב לְבִתּוֹ בִּנְעוּרֶיהָ בֵּית אָבִיהָ" (במדבר ל, יז). מִכָּאן לְנַעֲרָה הַמְאוֹרָסָה שֶׁאֵבִיהָ וּבַעֲלָהּ מְפִירִין נְדָרֶיהָ. The school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: "These are the statutes, which the Lord commanded Moses, between a man and his wife, between a father and his daughter, being in her youth, in her father’s house" (Numbers 30:17). From here it is derived with regard to a betrothed young woman that her father and her husband nullify her vows.

וּלְתַנָּא דְּבֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל: "וְאִם לְאִישׁ תִּהְיֶה" (במדבר ל, ז) מַאי עָבֵיד לֵיהּ? מָקֵים לֵיהּ כְּאִידָךְ דְּרָבָא. And according to the tanna of the school of Rabbi Yishmael, what does he do with the words “and if she be to a husband” (Numbers 30:7)? He establishes it to teach the other statement of Rava.

וְרָבָא, הַאי דְּבֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל מַאי דָּרֵישׁ בֵּיהּ? מִיבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ לְמֵימַר: בַּעַל אֵינוֹ מֵפֵר אֶלָּא דְּבָרִים שֶׁבֵּינוֹ לְבֵינָהּ. And Rava, what does he do with this verse that the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught? He requires that phrase to say that the husband can nullify only vows that are between him and her. (Nedarim 68a)

Later, the Gemara presents the dilemma:

בָּעוּ מִינֵּיהּ: בַּעַל מִיתַּר אוֹ מַכְרִיעַ? A dilemma was raised before the Sages: If a husband nullifies his betrothed’s vow, does he sever his share of the vow or does he weaken the force of the entire vow? (Nedarim 68a)

The dikduk of "בין איש לאשתו בין אב לבתו" is key. The repetition of "בין" (between) implies two distinct authorities over one entity, or two distinct aspects of hafara for one woman. The Gemara grapples with this structure to derive either the joint hafara for an arussa (Tanna d'bei R' Yishmael) or the scope of hafara (Rava). The phrasing "מִיתַּר אוֹ מַכְרִיעַ" precisely captures the core of the safek regarding the nature of hafara – whether it's a quantitative reduction or a qualitative alteration.

Readings

Ran on Nedarim 68a s.v. דבי רבי ישמעאל תנא

The Ran elucidates Tanna d'bei R' Yishmael's drasha from Numbers 30:17 ("בין איש לאשתו בין אב לבתו בנעוריה בית אביה"). The Ran (following Rashi) notes that the pasuk is redundant if it merely refers to a husband nullifying his wife's vows and a father nullifying his daughter's vows, as these are established elsewhere. The phrase "בנעוריה בית אביה" explicitly refers to a young woman still in her father's house, which, when combined with "בין איש לאשתו," suggests a scenario where she is simultaneously under the authority of a ba'al (husband/betrothed) and an av (father). This unique confluence, where both "איש" and "אב" are mentioned alongside "בתו בנעוריה בית אביה," leads to the conclusion that for a na'ara me'urasa, both her father and her betrothed nullify her vows. The innovative aspect here is the drasha that interprets the juxtaposition of "איש" and "אב" within the context of "בנעוריה בית אביה" as signifying a joint authority, not just separate authorities over different women.

The Ran then addresses the kushya of "ולתנא דבי רבי ישמעאל אם היו תהיה מאי עביד ליה" (And according to the Tanna d'bei Rabbi Yishmael, what does he do with "אם היו תהיה"?). This pasuk (Numbers 30:7) is generally understood to teach that a ba'al can nullify kodmin (vows made before betrothal/marriage). Tanna d'bei R' Yishmael uses it for Rava's other statement (Nedarim 70a), which teaches "מקיש קודמי הויה שניה לקודמי הויה ראשונא" – if the husband died before nullifying, the father can nullify even kodmin. The Ran explains that the Rabbanan (who argue with Tanna d'bei R' Yishmael's initial drasha) derive two things from "אם היו תהיה": the primary halacha of na'ara me'urasa's joint hafara, and the hekkesh regarding kodmin. The Ran then raises a kushya on Tanna d'bei R' Yishmael: if he uses the entire pasuk for Rava's other statement, where does he derive that an arussah's betrothed can nullify kodmin at all, even in partnership with the father? The Ran, citing HaChacham HaVatik HaRav Shmuel z"l, answers that the limitation on hafara of kodmin applies to a ba'al acting alone, especially for a nesu'a (married woman) where the father's authority is gone. However, for an arussah, because the father's authority still exists and he can nullify kodmin, the betrothed, acting in shutfut (partnership) with the father, can also nullify kodmin. This is a significant chiddush: the arussah's betrothed's ability to nullify kodmin is not derived from "אם היו תהיה" directly for him, but rather is a consequence of his shutfut with the father, who can nullify kodmin. This implies that the ba'al's hafara for kodmin in an arussah is contingent on the father's existing authority over kodmin. Ran on Nedarim 68a s.v. דבי רבי ישמעאל תנא. Ran on Nedarim 68a s.v. ולתנא דבי רבי ישמעאל אם היו תהיה.

Rashba on Nedarim 68a s.v. דבי רבי ישמעאל תנא

The Rashba delves into the drasha of "בין איש לאשתו בין אב לבתו" and Rava's counter-drasha. He first raises a similar kushya to Tosafot: "איכא למידק אכתי אימא דאפילו בנשואה אביה ובעלה מפירין נדריה" (One can still argue that even for a married woman, her father and husband nullify her vows). This is crucial because the pasuk could be interpreted as applying to any isha (woman) under both a father and a husband, not necessarily just an arussa. The Rashba offers a terutz analogous to the Gemara's earlier distinction for Rava: the pasuk referring to a nesu'a (Numbers 30:13, "ואם בית אישה נדרה") explicitly limits the husband's hafara to after the marriage (kodmei hoveya rishona), implying he cannot nullify kodmin. The absence of such a limitation in Numbers 30:17, combined with "בנעוריה בית אביה," suggests that the father's presence enables hafara of kodmin. This indirect proof points to the context being an arussah where the father's authority still extends to kodmin.

The Rashba then focuses on Rava's drasha from "בין איש לאשתו בין אב לבתו," which states that "בעל אינו מפר אלא דברים שבינו לבינה" (a husband only nullifies vows that are between him and her). The Rashba expands this, stating that the father's hafara is similarly limited to "דברים שבינו לבינה" (vows impacting their relationship) and "נדרי עינוי נפש" (vows of self-affliction). He substantiates this with a powerful reference to the Sifrei:

"ותניא בספרי אין לי אלא בעל שמפר נדרים שבינו לבינה, ונדרים שיש בהן עינוי נפש, האב מנין תלמוד לומר אלה המוקים וכו' בין איש לאשתו בין אב לבתו, על כרחך אתה מקיש את האב לבעל, מה בעל אין מיפר אלא נדרים שבינו לבינה ונדרים שיש בהם עינוי נפש, אף האב אינו מיפר אלא נדרים שבינו לבינה ונדרים שיש בהן עינוי נפש." (And it is taught in the Sifrei: I only know that a husband nullifies vows that are between him and her, and vows of self-affliction. From where do we know this for the father? The verse states: 'These are the statutes...' 'between a man and his wife, between a father and his daughter.' You are forced to equate the father to the husband: just as a husband only nullifies vows that are between him and her and vows of self-affliction, so too a father only nullifies vows that are between him and her and vows of self-affliction.) The Rashba further brings a Yerushalmi (Nedarim 11:1) that supports this hekkesh. This is a crucial chiddush by Rava (as understood by Rashba), establishing a fundamental limitation on the scope of both father's and husband's hafara based on this pasuk. The Rashba explicitly notes that the Rambam (Hil. Nedarim 12:1) does not explicitly state this limitation for the father, implying a potential machloket or nuance in understanding the Rambam's position. Rashba on Nedarim 68a s.v. דבי רבי ישמעאל תנא. Rashba on Nedarim 68a s.v. בין איש לאשתו בין אב לבתו.

Friction

The "Mitak or Machriach" Dilemma

The most pronounced friction in this sugya is the direct safek posed by the Gemara: "בַּעַל מִיתַּר אוֹ מַכְרִיעַ?" (Does the husband weaken the vow's force or sever his share?). This isn't a mere academic drasha dispute; it carries immediate halachic ramifications. The Gemara outlines the nafka mina: a na'ara me'urasa vows not to eat two olives. Her betrothed nullifies for her, then she eats both olives before her father acts.

• The Kushya (The Dilemma): If the husband's hafara is machriach, he severs his "share" of the vow. This implies that one "olive-worth" of the vow is completely nullified, while the other "olive-worth" remains fully forbidden, backed by the father's (as yet unexercised) authority. Thus, eating the second olive would incur malkot. If, however, his hafara is mitak, it weakens the entire vow's prohibition. In this scenario, the full issur of the vow is diminished, leaving only a partial prohibition (e.g., issur d'Rabbanan or a less severe issur d'Oraita). Eating both olives would then not incur malkot, as the full issur for a k'zayit has been weakened. The kushya is the fundamental uncertainty about the nature of hafara when shared between two authorities. Does hafara act atomistically on portions of the vow, or holistically on its entire force?

The Terutz from the Baraita

The Gemara resolves this safek by citing a baraita (Nedarim 68a, and later on Nedarim 70a Mishna):

תָּא שְׁמַע: אֵימָתַי אָמְרוּ בַּעַל שֶׁמֵּת — רְשׁוּת חוֹזֶרֶת לָאָב? בְּשֶׁלֹּא שָׁמַע בָּעַל עַד שֶׁמֵּת. אוֹ שָׁמַע וְשָׁתַק. אוֹ שָׁמַע וְהֵפֵר וּמֵת בּוֹ בַּיּוֹם. Come and hear: When did they say that if the husband of a betrothed young woman dies, the authority to nullify her vows reverts to the father? This occurs in a case when the husband had not heard her vow before he died; or in a case where he heard and was silent; or where he heard and nullified it and died on the same day.

The critical phrase for our safek is "אוֹ שָׁמַע וְהֵפֵר וּמֵת בּוֹ בַּיּוֹם" (or where he heard and nullified it and died on the same day). In this scenario, the baraita states that "רְשׁוּת חוֹזֶרֶת לָאָב" (the authority reverts to the father). The implication is that even though the husband already nullified his share of the vow, the father still has the power to nullify the remaining part. If the husband's hafara were machriach (severing his share), then that portion would be entirely gone, and the father would only be able to nullify his own remaining share. The fact that the baraita says "רְשׁוּת חוֹזֶרֶת לָאָב" – implying the father now has full authority over the entire vow, or at least the part that was not fully nullified – suggests that the husband's prior hafara did not sever the vow into two distinct, independently existing prohibitions. Rather, his hafara merely weakened the overall force of the vow, leaving it in a state where the father could still complete its nullification. This points to the conclusion that the husband's hafara is mitak (weakens), not machriach (severs). If it were machriach, there would be no "reverting" of authority over what the husband had already "severed." The father's ability to act upon a vow that the husband had already partially nullified implies that the vow, in its entirety, was merely weakened, awaiting complete nullification or ratification. Nedarim 68a. Nedarim 70a, Mishna.

Intertext

Sifrei and Yerushalmi on the Scope of Hafara

The Rashba, in his commentary on Nedarim 68a, provides crucial intertextual support for Rava's drasha that a husband's hafara is limited to "דברים שבינו לבינה" (vows that affect their marital relationship) and "עינוי נפש" (vows of self-affliction). He cites the Sifrei Bamidbar (Parshat Matot, Piska 153) explicitly:

"אין לי אלא בעל שמפר נדרים שבינו לבינה, ונדרים שיש בהן עינוי נפש, האב מנין תלמוד לומר אלה המוקים וכו' בין איש לאשתו בין אב לבתו, על כרחך אתה מקיש את האב לבעל, מה בעל אין מיפר אלא נדרים שבינו לבינה ונדרים שיש בהם עינוי נפש, אף האב אינו מיפר אלא נדרים שבינו לבינה ונדרים שיש בהן עינוי נפש." Sifrei Bamidbar 30:17, Piska 153. This Sifrei directly equates the father's hafara authority to that of the husband, limiting both to specific types of vows. This is a powerful midrash halacha that informs the Gemara's understanding of the pasuk "בין איש לאשתו בין אב לבתו." The Sifrei uses the hekkesh (analogy) derived from the shared pasuk to extend the known limitations of a husband's hafara to the father.

The Rashba further strengthens this point by citing the Yerushalmi (Nedarim 11:1), which echoes a similar drasha:

"וגרסינן בירושלמי [כאן פרק י"א הלכה א'] נמי כתיב כל נדר וכל שבועות איסור לענות נפש אשה יקימנו ואשה יפרנו, אין לי אלא נדרים שיש בהם עינוי נפש נדרים שבינו לבינה מנין, תלמוד לומר בין איש לאשתו, עד כדון בבעל, באב מנין, מה הבעל אינו מיפר אלא נדרים שיש בהם עינוי נפש ונדרים שבינו לבינה כו'." Yerushalmi Nedarim 11:1. This Yerushalmi begins by noting that the verse "כל נדר וכל שבועת איסר לענות נפש" (Numbers 30:14) specifies vows of self-affliction. It then asks how we know that "דברים שבינו לבינה" are included, and answers from "בין איש לאשתו." Finally, it applies this same hekkesh to the father, demonstrating a consistent halachic tradition across Talmudim regarding the limited scope of hafara. These parallel sources confirm that the limitation of hafara to "דברים שבינו לבינה" and "עינוי נפש" is not merely Rava's chiddush, but a foundational principle rooted in midrashei halacha.

Shutfut in Hafara and its Implications

The concept of shared authority, where both the father and husband must nullify for an arussah, finds parallels in other areas of Halakha where joint actions are required for legal efficacy. For instance, in Gitin (M. 4:1), the Gemara discusses the requirement for both the husband and wife to be rotzim (willing) for a get to be valid, even if the husband is the meza'eh (delivering party). While not a perfect analogy, the idea that a legal act (like hafara) requires the concurrence of multiple parties or authorities, and that one party's action might be incomplete without the other, resonates with the sugya's discussion of mitak vs. machriach. If hafara is a holistic act affecting the entire vow's status, then one party's nullification merely weakens it, requiring the other's action for full effect. This notion of shutfut (partnership) in legal processes, where individual contributions are not independent "severances" but rather components of a larger, cumulative effect, is a recurring theme in Torah Sheb'al Peh. Gitin 34b, Mishna.

Psak/Practice

The safek of "בַּעַל מִיתַּר אוֹ מַכְרִיעַ?" and its resolution in the Gemara has direct halachic implications for malkot (flogging) and the general status of the vow. The Gemara's conclusion from the baraita points strongly to the position of mitak – that the husband's partial hafara weakens the entire vow, rather than severing his portion.

Rambam codifies this understanding. In Hilchot Nedarim 12:10, he states concerning a na'ara me'urasa:

"וכן אם הפיר הבעל ונשאר שתיקת האב או הפרתו, הרי זה יפר אותו האב שנדר זה נחלש בהפרת הבעל ונשאר האב להפירו כולו." Rambam, Hilchot Nedarim 12:10. (And similarly, if the husband nullified, and there remained the father's silence or his nullification, the father may nullify it, for this vow was weakened by the husband's nullification, and the father remains to nullify it completely.) The Rambam's language "נֶחְלַשׁ בְּהַפְרַת הַבַּעַל" (weakened by the husband's nullification) explicitly adopts the mitak position. This means that if the husband nullified his part of the vow, and the woman then transgressed it before the father nullified his part, she would not be liable for malkot (if the vow was d'Oraita), because the vow's full issur was weakened by the first hafara. The prohibition that remains is not sufficient to warrant malkot for the full measure, though it may still be forbidden to some degree (e.g., issur d'Rabbanan or a partial issur d'Oraita that does not carry malkot).

The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 234:25) follows the Rambam:

"הפיר הבעל ונשאר שתיקת האב או הפרתו, הרי האב יפר אותו, שנדר זה נחלש בהפרת הבעל ונשאר האב להפירו כולו." Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De'ah 234:25. This ruling reiterates the mitak principle. The practical consequence is lenient regarding malkot: since the issur is weakened, a transgression, while still a transgression, would not incur the severest penalty associated with a full, un-nullified vow. This reflects a meta-psak heuristic that tends towards leniency in cases of doubt regarding malkot or severe penalties, especially when a partial halachic act has already been performed.

Takeaway

The intricate drashot in Nedarim 68a not only establish the dual authority for hafara of a na'ara me'urasa but also, through the machriach/mitak dilemma, define the very nature of hafara as a weakening of the entire vow's force rather than a severance of its parts, a principle enshrined in halacha.