Daf Yomi · Expert – Beit Midrash Analysis · Standard
Chullin 73
Sugya Map
The sugya on Chullin 73a serves as a theoretical crucible for the mechanics of halakhic severance (chachshavah ke-gzoz), the metaphysical boundaries of animal life, and the purifying efficacy of shechitah (ritual slaughter). At its core, the Gemara grapples with three overlapping conceptual axes:
- The Ontological Status of "Doomed" Attachments (Ke-Chatuach Dami): Does an entity physically attached to a larger body, but destined for amputation or shearing, assume the halakhic status of a severed object?
- The Efficacy of Shechitah on Exteriorized Foetal Limbs: Can the slaughter of a mother animal purify a limb of her fetus that has extended beyond the womb (yatzah chutz l'me'av) from the severe impurity of a carcass (tum'at neveilah)?
- The Conceptual Taxonomy of Food (Ochlin) vs. Vessels (Kelim): Does the halakhic definition of physical connection (chibur) differ fundamentally between artificial utensils and organic, edible matter?
[Mother Animal Undergoes Shechitah]
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+----------------------+----------------------+
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[Fetus Inside Womb] [Hanging Limb (Eivar Meduldal)]
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(Extended Limb: She'eino Gufah) (Part of Animal's Body: Gufah)
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+-----------+-----------+ +----------+----------+
| | | |
[R' Meir] [Rabbis] [R' Yochanan] [Reish Lakish]
(No purification; (Purified from (No dispute; (Dispute extends
treats as severed) neveilah via slaughter doesn't to hanging limbs)
mother's shechitah) purify hanging limb)
Primary Sources
- Chullin 73a: The primary Talmudic text detailing Ravina’s defense of the Mishnah, the dispute of Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis regarding vessel handles (yadot kelim), and the Amoraic dispute between Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish.
- Mishnah Mikvaot 10:5: The tannaitic debate concerning utensil handles destined for trimming and their required immersion depth.
- Chullin 68a: The mishnaic baseline regarding pieces severed from a fetus in the womb.
- Chullin 127b: The status of hanging flesh and limbs (eivar ha-meduldal) upon the animal’s death or slaughter.
Nafka Minot (Halakhic Ramifications)
- Transmission of Tum'at Magah (Touch Impurity): If the extended limb is ke-chatuach dami (as if severed), it is treated as a separate entity touching the fetus. Thus, it can transmit tumah to the fetus via contact (magah). If it is not ke-chatuach, it is one continuous body, and magah is conceptually impossible.
- Permissibility of Consumption (Heter Akhilah): If the shechitah of the mother animal operates effectively on the extended limb, the limb is spared from neveilah status. However, is it permitted for consumption, or does it remain an eivar min ha-chai (limb from a living animal) prohibited by biblical decree?
- Immersion of Utensils (Tevilat Kelim): Must a long handle destined to be cut off be fully submerged in a mikveh, or does the imminent cutting retroactively sever its halakhic connection to the vessel?
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Text Snapshot
The Gemara on Chullin 73a:1 introduces Ravina’s resolution of the Mishnah's internal mechanics:
"כחתוך דמי. אמר ליה: מני? רבי מאיר היא..." "It is regarded as though it were cut. The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion is this? It is in accordance with Rabbi Meir..."[^1]
Linguistic Nuances and Commentaries
To understand the exact mechanics of this conceptual severance, we must analyze the precise language of the Rishonim and contemporary commentators.
Rashi, in his characteristically terse style, explains the immediate physical implication of Ravina's rule:
"כחתוך דמי - והרי נוגעין זה בזה" "It is regarded as though it were cut—and behold, they are touching one another."[^2]
Rashi's formulation is highly precise: the halakha does not merely view the limb as non-existent; rather, it views the limb as physically severed but still resting in place, thereby establishing a relationship of contact (negiah) between the limb and the fetus.
Rabbi Adin Steinsaltz captures this ontological shift in modern Hebrew:
"כחתוך דמי [נחשב], ונמצא שהעובר והאבר נחשבים (כשהם מחוברים) כשני דברים נפרדים שנוגעים זה בזה." "It is regarded as though it were cut [considered], and it turns out that the fetus and the limb are considered (while they are physically attached) as two separate things that are touching one another."[^3]
Later in the sugya on Chullin 73a:10, the Gemara reconstructs the dialogue between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis regarding the purifying power of shechitah on a slaughtered tereifah (an animal with a terminal physical defect):
"אמר רבא ואמרי לה כדי: חסורי מחסרא והכי קתני..." "Rava said, and some say it unattributed: The baraita is incomplete, and this is what it is teaching..."[^4]
Steinsaltz elucidates this missing dialogical link:
"אמר להן ר' מאיר: וכי מי טהרו לאבר זה מידי נבלה לשיטתכם? שחיטת אמו, אם כן תתירנו גם כן באכילה! אמרו לו: טרפה תוכיח..." "Rabbi Meir said to them: But what renders this limb pure from the impurity of a carcass according to your view? The slaughter of its mother! If so, it should also permit it for consumption! They said to him: Let a tereifah prove the point..."[^5]
The underlying syntax relies on the hermeneutical tool of macha'at (objection based on incongruity) and hokhachah (proof from a parallel case). The Rabbis argue that shechitah possesses a dual halakhic nature: a purifying mechanism (mhatir mi-tumah) and a permitting mechanism (mhatir mi-akhilah). The two are not intrinsically linked, as demonstrated by the tereifah, whose slaughter purifies it from neveilah without permitting it for consumption.
Readings
1. The Ontological Divide Between Kelim and Ochlin (Ravina vs. Rabbanan)
To fully grasp the dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis, we must examine why Ravina is able to reconcile the Rabbis' view in Mishnah Mikvaot 10:5 with his own principle that "connections of food are considered separated" (hiburei okhlin ke-ma'an d'prusei dami).
In Mishnah Mikvaot 10:5, the Rabbis rule that a vessel's handle, even if destined to be cut off, must be fully submerged in the mikveh. They do not say ke-chatuach dami. Yet, in the realm of food (ochlin), the Rabbis concede that a doomed connection is treated as already severed. Why this ontological divergence?
The Rashba, in his Chiddushei HaRashba on Chullin,[^6] explains that a utensil (kli) is defined by its formal human utility and structural integrity (tzurat ha-kli). As long as the handle is physically attached, it functions as part of the vessel’s unified form. Halakha cannot conceptually amputate a piece of an artificial construct while it remains physically integrated, because the human intent to cut it off has not yet translated into a physical act (ma'aseh). Human design created the utensil as a unity, and only physical destruction or actual severing can dissolve that unity.
Food, however, possesses no intrinsic halakhic "form" (tzurah). It is merely a physical mass (gush basar or parporet). Its unity is purely accidental and biological. Therefore, when a portion of food is destined to be severed, the biological connection is deemed halakhically void immediately. The mind’s intent to cut it, coupled with its natural preparation for separation, retroactively dissolves its unity.
The Kehillat Yaakov expands on this by introducing a core distinction in the laws of hibur (connection):[^7]
- Hibur shel Kli (Utensil Connection): An existential, metaphysical unity. The handle is not merely "connected" to the vessel; it is the vessel.
- Hibur shel Ochel (Food Connection): A mere physical proximity (shekhenut). The two parts are adjacent, held together by organic fibers, but they do not share a singular halakhic identity. Consequently, the Rabbis agree that hiburei okhlin ke-ma'an d'prusei dami—they are viewed as two separate pieces merely touching.
2. The Eivar Ha-Meduldal Controversy (Rambam vs. Tosafot via Dor Revi'i)
The Dor Revi'i (Rabbi Moshe Shmuel Glasner) tackles a profound difficulty in the dialogue between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis concerning the hanging limb (eivar ha-meduldal) of an animal.[^8]
The Gemara discusses whether the slaughter of an animal purifies a limb that is partially severed and hanging from its body. The Dor Revi'i analyzes this through the lens of a major dispute between the Rambam and Tosafot:
[Hanging Limb (Eivar Meduldal)]
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+-----------------------+-----------------------+
| |
[View of Tosafot] [View of Rambam]
- Limb is permitted for eating - Limb has independent biblical
via shechitah. prohibition of "tereifah."
- Conceptual difficulty: If - Shechitah removes neveilah
permitted to eat, how can impurity, but the independent
it be ritually impure? "tereifah" ban remains active.
The Dor Revi'i writes:
"עוד שם גמר׳, א״ל לא אם טהרה שחיטת טרפה אותה ואת האבר המדולדל שבה, דבר שבגופה וכו׳... וזה ניחא לדעת הרמב״ם דאיכא באבר המדולדל איסור טרפה דאורייתא, אבל לתוס׳ האי אבר דמדולדל בה בלא״ה אין לו פירוש, דכיון דניתר באכילה ע״י השחיטה, איך שייך כאן טומאה כלל..." "Further there in the Gemara: 'No, if the slaughter of a tereifah purifies it and the hanging limb within it, which is part of its body...' This sits well according to the Rambam, who holds that there is an independent biblical prohibition of tereifah on a hanging limb. But according to Tosafot, this hanging limb has no explanation otherwise, for since it is permitted for consumption via the slaughter, how could any impurity apply to it at all? This is a powerful proof for the Rambam's approach..."[^9]
To unpack this brilliant lomdus: According to Tosafot,[^10] when an animal is slaughtered, its hanging limbs are fully permitted for consumption, provided they were still attached by a minority of their flesh at the time of slaughter. If so, why does the Gemara discuss whether the slaughter purifies them from neveilah? If a limb is permitted to be eaten, it is self-evidently pure! Tosafot is forced to construct highly complex scenarios where the limb was partially severed in a way that prevents consumption but might still contract tumah.
The Rambam, however, rules in Mishneh Torah that a hanging limb is biblically prohibited under the rubric of tereifah (or a derivative of eivar min ha-chai).[^11] Even after the animal is slaughtered, this limb remains forbidden to be eaten.
According to the Rambam, shechitah performs a bifurcated function:
- It removes the status of neveilah (the source of severe impurity) from the animal and its hanging parts.
- It permits the meat for consumption.
In the case of the eivar ha-meduldal, the shechitah succeeds in its first function (purification from neveilah) but fails in its second function (permitting consumption) due to the independent biblical prohibition of hanging limbs. Thus, the Dor Revi'i demonstrates that our sugya contains a profound verification of the Rambam's taxonomy of issur (prohibition) versus tumah (impurity).
3. The Metaphysics of "She'eino Gufah" (The Fetus vs. Spleen/Kidneys)
The Rabbis present a startling paradox to Rabbi Meir:
"הרבה מצלת ומועילה השחיטה על דבר שאינו גופה יותר מעל דבר שהוא גופה" "The slaughter of an animal has a greater effect in shielding that which is not part of its body from having the impurity of a carcass than that which is part of its body."[^12]
If one cuts pieces of a fetus (she'eino gufah—not part of the mother's body) and leaves them in the womb, the slaughter of the mother permits them for consumption. But if one cuts pieces of the spleen or kidneys (gufah—part of her own body) and leaves them inside, they are prohibited.
How do we understand this metaphysical hierarchy? One would naturally assume that shechitah—which is performed on the mother's neck—exerts its primary halakhic force upon her own organs (gufah), and only secondarily, through a legal extension, upon the fetus (she'eino gufah). Why is the hierarchy inverted?
The Griz Soloveitchik (on Hilchot Ma'akhalot Assurot)[^13] provides a foundational explanation. He distinguishes between two distinct mechanisms of shechitah:
- The Metabolic/Organic Mechanism: This mechanism permits the animal's own flesh. It requires that the flesh remain organically integrated into the life-system of the animal at the moment of slaughter. A spleen or kidney that has been severed in vivo, even if physically resting inside the body cavity, has been cut off from the animal's metabolic system. It is "dead" tissue before the act of shechitah. Therefore, the shechitah of the neck cannot process or purify it; it is treated as neveilah or treifah inside a living host.
- The Spatial/Chamber Mechanism (Ubar be-Me'ei Imo): The fetus is not permitted because it is metabolically part of the mother (since ubar lav yerekh imo—the fetus is not merely a limb of the mother). Rather, it is permitted because it resides within the mother's womb, which acts as a halakhic "chamber of purification." The Torah establishes a unique decree (gzerat ha-katuv): anything contained within the womb is swept up in the purifying current of the mother's shechitah.
Therefore, physical severance in vivo does not damage the fetus's capacity to be permitted by the mother's shechitah, because its permissibility was never based on metabolic unity, but on its spatial location within the womb. Conversely, the spleen's permissibility was entirely dependent on metabolic unity; once that unity is severed, the spleen is halakhically lost.
Friction
The Clash: Ravina's "Severed" Limb vs. the Necessity of Hekhsher
A profound conceptual friction arises when we contrast Ravina's defense of the Mishnah with the laws of susceptibility to impurity (hekhsher lekabel tumah), as developed on Chullin 127b.
The Kushya
Ravina asserts that the extended limb of the fetus is ke-chatuach dami (as if physically cut off). Because it is considered cut off, it is treated as an independent piece of food touching the fetus. This allows it to transmit tum'at magah (impurity of contact) to the fetus.
However, if the limb is considered completely cut off and independent, it must require its own hekhsher lekabel tumah (the prerequisite wetting by one of the seven liquids, such as blood or water, to become susceptible to impurity) under the rule of hiburei okhlin.
But on Chullin 127b, the Mishnah states that when the animal is slaughtered, hanging limbs and flesh are rendered susceptible to impurity through the animal's own blood (huchsharu be-damah).
This presents a major contradiction: If the hanging limb is ke-chatuach dami (conceptually severed) before or at the moment of slaughter, then the blood of the slaughter—which belongs to the mother animal—should not be able to render this "severed" limb susceptible! The limb is no longer part of the animal; it is an independent entity.
How can the blood of animal $A$ act as a hekhsher for independent food item $B$ without direct physical application with the owner's consent (ratzon)?
Conversely, if the limb is still considered attached enough to be rendered susceptible by the mother's blood, then it is not ke-chatuach dami. If it is not ke-chatuach dami, then it is a single body with the fetus, and one cannot transmit tum'at magah to oneself!
[The Ontological Dilemma]
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+-------------------+-------------------+
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[If Ke-Chatuach Dami] [If NOT Ke-Chatuach Dami]
- Limb is a separate entity. - Limb and fetus are one body.
- Can transmit tum'at magah. - Cannot transmit tumah to itself.
- BUT: Mother's blood cannot - BUT: Mother's blood can act
act as hekhsher (wetting). as hekhsher.
The Terutz of the Rashba
The Rashba resolves this by limiting the scope of ke-chatuach dami.[^14] He argues that "destined to be cut is like cut" (amad l'hachatikh ke-chatuach dami) is not an absolute physical or ontological reality, but a highly localized halakhic status regarding boundaries.
When we say the limb is ke-chatuach, we mean that the physical point of contact between the limb and the fetus is no longer treated as a "concealed area" (beit ha-setarim). Typically, contact inside a closed, attached area cannot transmit tumah because tum'at magah requires exposure to the open air (avir). By declaring the limb ke-chatuach, the Torah reveals that this internal junction is treated as exposed, allowing magah to occur.
However, regarding the biological and existential connection of the limb to the animal's life-force, the limb remains fully attached until it is physically amputated. Therefore:
- The mother's shechitah still reaches the limb because it is biologically nourished by the mother.
- The mother's blood still acts as a hekhsher because, physically, the blood flows through a unified vascular system.
Thus, ke-chatuach dami is a legal fiction that creates a conceptual boundary for magah, but it does not sever the organic unity required for shechitah and hekhsher.
The Terutz of Rav Chaim Soloveitchik
Rav Chaim Soloveitchik offers a different, highly formalistic resolution.[^15] He distinguishes between two distinct categories of cheftza (object):
- Cheftza shel Behamah (The Animal Object): The biological entity of the living beast.
- Cheftza shel Ochel (The Food Object): The culinary entity of edible meat.
Rav Chaim posits that the rule hiburei okhlin ke-ma'an d'prusei dami (connections of food are considered separated) is a law restricted exclusively to the Cheftza shel Ochel. It cannot apply to a living animal, because a living animal is not yet classified as "food" (ochel); it is a behamah.
During the process of shechitah, the animal is transitioning from behamah to ochel. At the exact moment of the incision, the laws of behamah are still active. Therefore, the hanging limb is fully integrated into the animal, allowing the shechitah to purify it and its blood to render it susceptible (hekhsher).
Only after the shechitah is complete, when the carcass transitions into the category of ochel, does the law of hiburei okhlin retroactively or actively apply, viewing the doomed limb as severed (ke-chatuach) from that moment forward. This temporal partition elegantly resolves the contradiction:
[Timeline of Ontological Transition]
Living Animal Slaughter (Shechitah) Post-Slaughter
----------------------------|----------------------------|---------------------------->
Category: BEHAMAH Category: TRANSITION Category: OCHEL
- Fully attached - Shechitah purifies limb - Doomed limb is treated
- No "ke-chatuach" - Blood acts as hekhsher as severed (ke-chatuach)
Intertext
1. The Tevilat Kelim Parallel: Mishnah Mikvaot 10:5
To understand the deep roots of our sugya, we must turn to the parallel debate in Mishnah Mikvaot 10:5 regarding the handles of utensils:
"כל ידות הכלים שהן ארוכין ועתיד לקצצן... מטביל עד מקום מידתן. רבי מאיר אומר: עד שיטביל את כולו..." "All handles of vessels that are too long and therefore will ultimately be cut off... one must immerse them only until the point of their eventual size. Rabbi Meir says: He must immerse all of it..."[^16]
The Shulchan Aruch codifies this dispute regarding the laws of mikveh:
"יד הכלי שעתיד לקצצו, אף על פי שעדיין לא קצצו, אינו חיבור, ומטביל הכלי עד מקום שיעורו..." "A handle of a vessel that is destined to be cut off, even though he has not yet cut it off, is not considered a connection, and one may immerse the vessel up to its proper measure..."[^17]
The Shach clarifies that we rule like the Rabbis of the Mishnah against Rabbi Meir; hence, in practice, one must submerge the entire handle, because we do not say "destined to be cut is like cut" (amad l'gzoz ke-gzoz dami) for utensils.[^18]
However, the Taz notes a fascinating exception: if the handle is so long that it interferes with the vessel's primary function, even the Rabbis agree that it is not considered part of the vessel, and immersion up to the cut-off point suffices.[^19] This demonstrates that even for the Rabbis, physical attachment can be overridden when there is a total functional disconnect.
2. The Biblical Source: Exodus 22:30 and the Hanging Limb
The Gemara on Chullin 73a concludes by citing the biblical source for the prohibition of hanging limbs:
"ובשר בשדה טרפה לא תאכלו..." *"And flesh that is torn in the field, you shall not eat..."*Exodus 22:30
The baraita expounds:
"להביא אבר ובשר המדולדלין בבהמה ובחיה ובעוף, ושחטן — שהן אסורין..." "To include the case of the limb or the flesh that was partially cut off but still hanging on a domesticated animal, wild animal, or bird, and one slaughtered them; they are prohibited."[^20]
This verse serves as the biblical anchor for the entire taxonomy of eivar min ha-chai (limb from a living animal) and its relationship to shechitah.
In the classical halakhic system, shechitah is designed to permit healthy, integrated meat. When the Torah states "flesh torn in the field," it refers to meat that has lost its organic connection to the animal's life-force before slaughter.
The Kli Yakar, in his commentary on Exodus 22:30, notes a beautiful homiletical-halakhic synthesis: the "field" (sadeh) represents a state of wild, unregulated nature. When a limb hangs loosely (meduldal), it has exited the "city" of the animal's unified body and entered the "field" of chaos. Even if the mother animal is subsequently slaughtered in the structured domain of the courtyard, that wild, exteriorized limb remains "in the field" and is forever prohibited.
Psak/Practice
Halakhic Rulings of the Shulchan Aruch
How do these abstract discussions of foetal limbs and hanging flesh manifest in practical halakha? The Shulchan Aruch addresses this directly in Yoreh Deah:
[Status of Foetal Limb]
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+----------------------------+----------------------------+
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[Limb Remained Inside Womb] [Limb Extended Outside Womb]
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- Fully purified and permitted - Prohibited for consumption
by mother's shechitah. as "eivar min ha-chai."
- Purified from "neveilah"
impurity by mother's shechitah.
- The Extended Foetal Limb: If a fetus extends its limb outside the womb and the mother is subsequently slaughtered, that extended limb is forever forbidden to be eaten. It has the status of eivar min ha-chai.[^21] However, the slaughter of the mother successfully purifies the limb from tum'at neveilah.[^22] It does not require burial as a carcass, nor does it defile those who touch it.
- The Hanging Limb (Eivar Meduldal): If an animal has a limb that is partially severed and hanging, and the animal is then slaughtered:
- If the limb was attached by its minority of flesh, it is forbidden to be eaten.[^23]
- It is purified from tum'at neveilah by the shechitah.[^24]
Meta-Psak Heuristics
This sugya yields a vital meta-psak heuristic that guides poskim through contemporary technological and medical dilemmas:
The Principle of "Amad L'gzoz" (Destined to be Cut)
When evaluating an object's halakhic status, we do not merely look at its current physical state; we must look at its teleological trajectory. If an attachment is destined for destruction or removal, its current physical attachment is highly fragile and often discounted.
Contemporary Application: Lab-Grown Meat and Suspended Cells
In the modern debate surrounding clean meat (cultured meat grown from animal stem cells), poskim utilize the rules of hibur and eivar min ha-chai derived from our sugya. If cells are extracted from a living animal, are they considered "severed" (ke-chatuach) from the moment of extraction, or do they retain the status of the living donor?
Applying Ravina's heuristic—that organic matter destined for separation is treated as already separated (hiburei okhlin ke-ma'an d'prusei dami)—many contemporary authorities argue that microscopic cells extracted for cultivation are immediately independent entities. They do not carry the severe biblical prohibition of eivar min ha-chai once they are grown in a separate medium, as their biological connection to the donor animal was entirely dissolved at the moment of extraction.
Takeaway
The physical reality of an organic connection is secondary to its halakhic destiny; that which is bound for severance is conceptually already apart, yet it remains tethered just enough to be purified by the final stroke of life’s end.
[^1]: Chullin 73a:1. [^2]: Rashi, Chullin 73a:1:1. [^3]: Steinsaltz, Chullin 73a:1. [^4]: Chullin 73a:10. [^5]: Steinsaltz, Chullin 73a:10. [^6]: Chiddushei HaRashba, Chullin 73a, s.v. "הא דאמר Ravina". [^7]: Kehillat Yaakov, Chullin, Siman 32. [^8]: Dor Revi'i, Chullin 73a, s.v. "עוד שם גמר׳". [^9]: Dor Revi'i on Chullin 73a:2:1. [^10]: Tosafot, Chullin 73a s.v. "ואת האבר המדולדל בה". [^11]: Rambam, Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Ma'akhalot Assurot 5:6. [^12]: Chullin 73a:11. [^13]: Chiddushei Rabbeinu Chaim Halevi, Hilchot Ma'akhalot Assurot 5:12. [^14]: Chiddushei HaRashba, Chullin 73b, s.v. "במה דברים אמורים". [^15]: Chiddushei Rabbeinu Chaim Halevi, Hilchot Tumat Ochlin 4:8. [^16]: Mishnah Mikvaot 10:5. [^17]: Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 202:3. [^18]: Shach, Yoreh Deah 202, Se'if Katan 8. [^19]: Taz, Yoreh Deah 202, Se'if Katan 5. [^20]: Chullin 73a:13. [^21]: Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 14:1. [^22]: Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 14:2. [^23]: Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 55:1. [^24]: Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 55:2.
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